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Abstract 
Demosthenes’ Against Euboulides is a vibrant lawcourt speech which has rarely 
been given the attention it deserves in modern scholarship. The case focuses on the crucial 
issue of Athenian citizenship in the mid-fourth century BC and arose from the state’s 
decision to review citizen membership in every Attic deme. In the deme of Halimous, 
Euboulides was in charge of proceedings when the demesmen voted against a man named 
Euxitheos and thereby stripped him of his citizen rights. Euxitheos chose to appeal the 
decision before a jury and, seeking reinstatement as a citizen, he again faced Euboulides 
as his main opponent in court. Since citizenship was restricted to those whose parents 
were both Athenian, Euxitheos must defend the citizen status of both his father and his 
mother; specifically, he must account for his father’s strange accent and his mother’s 
humble employment in the marketplace, both of which have been used as evidence that 
they were of foreign extraction. As such, the speech stands as an important source for 
Athenian attitudes towards citizenship and status. Moreover, the speaker illuminates a 
number of topics vital to our understanding of classical Athenian legislation, politics, and 
society at that time. 
My thesis seeks to provide the historical context to the speech, and to explain the 
social and even cultural significance of all its aspects. Primarily, it examines Euxitheos’ 
life and family background, and the procedural elements of his appeal. Along with the 
commentary, I include both the Greek text and my own translation of the speech. In 
addition, I present an extensive introduction which covers key background issues such as 
the decree, process, and penalty relevant to this case.  
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          Abbreviations 
Where they have been applied, abbreviations for ancient authors and works adhere 
to the conventions of The Oxford Classical Dictionary (3rd ed.). The only exceptions are 
for Androtion (Androt.), Deinarchos (Dein.), and Lycourgos (Lycourg.). 
 
 
Note on the text 
The text for Demosthenes’ Against Euboulides derives from the most recent 
Oxford Classical Text, Demosthenis Orationes IV, edited by M. R. Dilts (2009). Since 
my focus has been on the creation of a social and historical commentary, rather than a 
philological one, I have accepted Dilts’ reading of the manuscripts and the reader should 
refer to his edition for a critical apparatus. 
For Libanios’ Hypothesis to Demosthenes’ Against Euboulides, I have used the 
Teubner edition, Libanii Opera VIII, edited by R. Foerster (1915). 
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1. Introduction 
1.1: Introducing Demosthenes’ Against Euboulides 
Against Euboulides is a lawcourt speech that is concerned with Athenian 
citizenship. It was written by Demosthenes for a certain Euxitheos from the deme of 
Halimous. Euxitheos delivered this speech to appeal the deme’s decision to strike him 
from its register of members and to thereby strip him of his citizenship. Although 
Euxitheos initiated the appeal before the court, it seems that the hearing which followed 
took the form of a trial, with the appellant assuming the position of defendant and 
delivering his speech after the opposition had already presented its case. The deme 
therefore assumed the role of prosecutor, primarily represented by Euboulides who is 
named in the title of the speech. Euboulides had also been in charge of proceedings when 
a majority of his fellow demesmen voted to expel Euxitheos. The appellant claims that 
his opponent has abused his position as councillor (βουλευτής) and official in charge of 
conducting the review, and that he has deliberately manipulated the deme’s vote against 
him due to personal rivalry. Euxitheos maintains that there was no foundation for the 
accusations laid against him and that he does indeed meet the requirements for 
citizenship, namely descent from an Athenian father and an Athenian mother. Euxitheos’ 
ejection can be dated to the mid-fourth century BC, after the Athenian Ecclēsia mandated 
a decree compelling every deme to hold a vote on the citizen status of each one of its 
members. In this speech then, Euxitheos is fighting to be reinstated as a member of the 
deme of Halimous and thus to retrieve his citizen status. 
Since Demosthenes is the author of the speech, I will begin with a brief overview 
of his career as a logographer (1.2: Demosthenes and his speech-writing career). 
Secondly, I will examine the information provided by the ancient rhetorician, Libanios; 
specifically, from his Hypothesis to Against Euboulides (1.3: Libanios’ Hypothesis for 
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Against Euboulides). The issues to which Libanios refers will be the focus of subsequent 
sections of my Introduction: firstly, the citizenship law which was revived nearly sixty 
years before Euxitheos was ejected from the deme of Halimous (1.4: The re-enactment 
of Pericles’ citizenship law in 403/2 BC); next, the procedures which controlled deme 
membership and the decree which initiated the deme-wide review of 346/5 BC (1.5: 
Demophilos’ decree and the extraordinary διαψήφισις of 346/5 BC); finally, Libanios’ 
claim that slavery was the given sentence for an appellant who lost his case for 
readmission (1.6: Slavery as the penalty of a failed appeal against expulsion). The 
Introduction will conclude with a brief comment on the likely outcome of Euxitheos’ 
appeal (1.7: Concluding remarks). 
1.2: Demosthenes and his speech-writing career 
Against Euboulides belongs to a vast body of writings attributed to Demosthenes. 
Because of his prodigious output, there have been many biographies tracing his life and 
career.1 Of these, Worthington has produced the most recent in-depth study, in his work 
entitled Demosthenes of Athens and the Fall of Classical Greece.2 While it is not 
necessary to delve into Demosthenes’ familial and personal history in as much detail here 
as Worthington does, it is essential to provide a brief account of his life in order to better 
appreciate the career and reputation of the author of Against Euboulides. Moreover, 
knowledge of the writer’s own historical background aids the placement of this particular 
speech as one of the last public orations which Demosthenes wrote for a client.3 
                                                          
1 To list but a few examples: A. W. Pickard-Cambridge’s Demosthenes and the Last Days of Greek Freedom 
384-322 B.C. (1914); W. Jaeger’s Demosthenes (1938); P. Carlier’s Démosthène (1990); G. A. Lehmann’s 
Demosthenes von Athen (2004); D. M. MacDowell’s Demosthenes the Orator (2009). 
2 Published in 2013, see his chapter entitled ‘Demosthenes, Son of Demosthenes’, pp. 9-41. His monograph 
also provides details on Demosthenes’ private life, specifically his sexuality and his marriage, see pp. 29-
31. 
3 See Introduction, pp. 13-4. 
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Sixty orations, an essay, and a collection of letters and proems have survived 
under Demosthenes’ name.4 Such a prolific body of writings serves to confirm his status 
as one of the most distinguished orators in antiquity. His speeches are classified under 
three forms of oratory: deliberative orations (speeches 1-17), forensic speeches (speeches 
18-59), and an epideictic funeral oration (speech 60).5 The authenticity of the orations 
belonging to the Demosthenic corpus has caused much debate, from ancient 
commentators to modern, and it usually concerns the quality of the works. Most of the 
deliberative speeches are now considered to be authentic.6 Similarly, the Funeral Oration 
has come to be recognised as a genuine work by Demosthenes.7 But a number of the 
forensic speeches under Demosthenes’ name have now been ascribed with some certainty 
to Apollodoros, son of Pasion (circa 394-after 343 BC), and several more have been 
tentatively associated with other orators.8 Though only broadly defined legal categories, 
the forensic speeches may be roughly subdivided into two groups: public speeches, for 
legal suits which had an impact on society as a whole or involved crimes committed 
against the state, and private speeches, in which the onus fell on the aggrieved party to 
                                                          
4 The Erotic Essay ([Dem.] 61) is a rhetorical exercise, not a speech, and so it is not considered to be 
relevant to the present study. This work, the collection of proems and the letters which are also attributed 
to Demosthenes are discussed in detail by I. Worthington, in Demosthenes, Speeches 60 and 61, Prologues, 
Letters (2006). 
5 For a detailed list of these speeches, see Table 1, pp. 262-7. 
6 The set of deliberative speeches contains one work that was clearly not written by Demosthenes, Philip’s 
Letter ([Dem.] 12), and two speeches which even ancient commentators deemed to be too dissimilar to his 
style of writing to be genuine (Dem. 7 and 17; see Dion. Hal. Dem. 57; Lib. Hyp 7 [Dem. 7], Hyp. 16 [Dem. 
17]). Doubts were initially raised over the authenticity of several other speeches in this group: Dem. 10, 11, 
and 13, see R. Sealey, Demosthenes and His Time, pp. 230-7, 239-40. However, it is now generally accepted 
that Dem. 10, 11 and 13 are genuine speeches by Demosthenes; see the brief discussion in J. Trevett, 
Demosthenes, Speeches 1-17, pp. 18-9.  
7 Worthington sets out a solid defence for the genuine status of Dem. 60, in Demosthenes, Speeches 60 and 
61, Prologues, Letters, pp. 21-37. 
8 It is widely accepted that the following six speeches were written by Apollodoros: [Dem.] 46, 49, 50, 52, 
53 and 59. J. Trevett persuasively argues that [Dem.] 47 might also be attributed to Apollodoros, in 
Apollodoros the Son of Pasion, pp. 50-77, and MacDowell suggests that he might have been the speaker 
besides, in Demosthenes the Orator, p. 141. Moreover, it is clear that neither [Dem.] 26 nor [Dem.] 58 was 
written by Demosthenes: see Sealey, in Demosthenes and His Time, pp. 237-9; V. Bers, Demosthenes, 
Speeches 50-57, pp. 130-1. Questions have been raised regarding the authorship of several other speeches: 
Dem. 32-5, 40, 45, 48, 51, and 56. For a brief analysis of each of these speeches, see D. M. MacDowell, 
Demosthenes, Speeches 27-38, pp. 84-149; A. C. Scafuro, Demosthenes, Speeches 39-49, pp. 59-85, 215-
67, 329-53; and Bers, Demosthenes, Speeches 50-57, pp. 39-45, 92-106, 129-50. However, it cannot be 
conclusively proven that any of these orations were composed by another writer and thus, for the purposes 
of this analysis, I accept them as a genuine part of the Demosthenic corpus. 
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bring a suit.9 Of the public and private speeches, Demosthenes presented several himself 
and the rest were written for delivery by other litigants. Unlike some of the other forensic 
speeches in the corpus, it has rarely been doubted that Demosthenes composed Against 
Euboulides.10 
Demosthenes was born circa 384/3 BC,11 and belonged to the deme of Paeania 
([Plut.] X orat. 844a).12 It is known that his paternal grandfather was named Demomeles.13 
This man had three children between 430 and 420 BC: the eldest was his son Demon, 
followed by an unnamed daughter,14 and finally another son Demosthenes senior.15 This 
was undoubtedly a wealthy family.16 Demosthenes, the father of the orator, was a 
businessman who owned workshops, in which over fifty of his slaves made swords, 
knives and furniture (Dem. 27 9; Plut. Dem. 4.1).17 He is described as a free man by 
Aeschines (3.171) and as belonging to the aristocracy by Theopompos of Chios (FGrH 
                                                          
9 For a discussion of these terms, see Appendix 7, pp. 303-4. 
10 With the exception of L. Rubinstein, Litigation and Cooperation, pp. 58 n. 91, and 61-2 n. 99. 
Unfortunately, Rubinstein does not explain why she doubts the authorship of Against Euboulides in this 
work. Elsewhere, however, she appears to accept Demosthenes as the writer of this speech, see Adoption 
in IV. Century Athens, pp. 44 n. 43, 49 n. 58, and 66 n. 7. 
11 The exact year of Demosthenes’ birth is controversial, as either 385/4 BC or 384/3 BC is possible given 
the details provided by the orator, see J. K. Davies for a thorough examination of these dates in Athenian 
Propertied Families 600-300 B.C., pp. 123-6. However, Demosthenes’ comment at 21.154 that he was 
thirty-two years old at that time (in 347 BC) conflicts with the other information provided by the speaker 
and ought to be disregarded, since there appears to have been a corruption to the text, see D. M. MacDowell, 
Demosthenes: Against Medias (Oration 21), pp. 370-1. A later source states that Demosthenes was born 
during the archonship of Dexitheos, in 385/4 BC ([Plut.] X orat. 845d). Yet Hyperides speaks of 
Demosthenes as being over sixty years old in 323 BC, probably sixty or sixty-one years of age (5.21-22), 
thereby making 384/383 BC a more credible date.  
12 The deme Paeania was located to the east of mount Hymettos, approximately ten miles from Athens. It 
was a ‘divided deme’, comprised of two sections: Upper Paeania was located in the north and Lower 
Paeania was to the east. Paeania belonged to the tribe Pandionis. For further details on this deme, see J. S. 
Traill, The Political Organization of Attica, pp. 7-8, 43, and 127. 
13 His name is provided by a decree in honour of his son, Demon (IG II² 1140, 7). This may have been the 
same Demomeles who was the architect of a bridge at Eleusis in 421 BC (IG I³ 79, 16-7), but this cannot 
be definitively established, see Davies, Athenian Propertied Families 600-300 B.C., pp. 113-4.  
14 The name of Demomeles’ daughter is not reported in any of Demosthenes’ speeches, nor has it been 
recorded elsewhere. It was not socially acceptable to name respectable Athenian women, particularly during 
court proceedings. See D. M. Schaps’ article, ‘The Woman Least Mentioned’, pp. 323-30. 
15 See Davies, Athenian Propertied Families 600-300 B.C., p. 115. 
16 The numerous records of liturgies which were performed by members of the family attest their solid 
financial status. Demon served as triērarch in 373/2 BC and in 366/5 BC (IG II² 1607, 26, IG II² 1609, 13), 
as did one of his sister’s sons (Aphobos, Dem. 27.14). For a discussion of the range of liturgies performed 
in Athens and their annual number, see J. K. Davies, ‘Demosthenes on Liturgies’, pp. 33-40. 
17 Writing several centuries after the events he is describing, Plutarch (AD 46-120) was writing a biography 
of Demosthenes’ life and not a history. As a source, he must be treated with caution; throughout this work, 
I have used Plutarch in conjunction with other sources. 
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115 F325 apud Plut. Dem. 4.1).18 He had two children by his wife, whose name is not 
reported by the orator himself, but later writers call her Cleobule ([Plut.] X orat. 844a; 
Lib. Hyp. 28 [Dem. 27]). She was the daughter of Gylon of Kerameis, who was active in 
Athenian politics at the end of the fifth century BC.19 Aeschines states that Gylon married 
a wealthy woman of Scythian blood, as it seems, a non-Greek. But since he was a political 
enemy of Demosthenes’, he had every reason to distort the truth.20 If there had been any 
serious doubts regarding Demosthenes’ legitimacy for citizenship, surely his rivals would 
have publicly challenged his status in much the same manner as Euboulides had accused 
Euxitheos in the events which led to Against Euboulides. Yet there is nothing in the 
surviving sources to suggest that any such challenge was ever brought. If Aeschines is to 
be believed, however, Demosthenes’ status would have been legally unaffected provided 
that his mother was born before 403/2 BC.21 Irrespective of her true status, it is clear that 
Cleobule brought a substantial dowry with her upon her marriage to Demosthenes senior 
(Dem. 27.4, 28.19, 29.23). Though his father’s wealth derived from manufacturing rather 
                                                          
18 Both sources were hostile towards Demosthenes the orator. Most famously, Aeschines the orator and 
statesman was a bitter political opponent of Demosthenes. Theopompos was a fourth century BC historian, 
who was both pro-Spartan and pro-Macedonian. But here their descriptions of Demosthenes’ father 
demonstrate no obvious bias. 
19 Kerameis was located northwest of the Dipylon Gate, possibly extending outside the city walls, and its 
location is confirmed by its association with the Kerameikos. This deme belonged to the Acamantis tribe. 
See Traill, The Political Organization of Attica, pp. 44, 47 and 67. Gylon was accused of treason and fled 
Athens without awaiting his trial, and it is likely that the penalty given in his absence was death, though 
this may have been reduced to a fine at a later date (Dem. 28.1-3). He lived as an exile in Bosporos, on the 
north side of the Black Sea, where he took a wife and from that union two daughters were born (Aeschin. 
3.171-2), one of which was Demosthenes’ mother. Gylon’s other daughter was named Philia and she 
married the triērarch, Demochares of the deme Leuconoion (Dem. 27.14, 28.3; Leuconoion has been 
tentatively located four kilometres northwest of the city, see Traill, The Political Organization of Attica, 
pp. 43-4). A son called Laches was born from this union, and he eventually married Demosthenes’ sister. 
Laches’ son, Demochares, became a successful orator in the late fourth century ([Plut.] X orat. 847c). When 
Demosthenes committed suicide in 322 BC, Demochares was his heir and he used his own political 
influence to persuade the Athenians to dedicate a statue to his uncle forty years after his death, in 280/79 
BC (Cic. Brut. 83.286; Plut. Dem. 30.4-5; [Plut.] X orat. 847a-d, 850f). For further details on this branch 
of the family tree, see Davies, Athenian Propertied Families 600-300 B.C., pp. 138-9, and 141-2. 
20 Plutarch also questions whether Aeschines was merely slandering his opponent (Dem. 4.1). Indeed, 
Deinarchos also utilises knowledge of Demosthenes’ lineage to taunt the orator (1.15). Allegations 
regarding birth qualifications seem to have been used quite often as a rhetorical device to gain a competitive 
advantage in Athenian politics; Demosthenes too makes similar allegations against Aeschines (Dem. 
18.129-31). 
21 See Introduction, pp. 21-5. Davies estimates that the earliest possible date for Cleobule’s birth was 408 
BC and, if she was younger than her sister Philia, that it was no later than 406 BC, in Athenian Propertied 
Families 600-300 B.C., pp. 121, 141. It is impossible, however, to prove an Athenian woman’s birth year 
since they were not formally registered with a deme like their male counterparts. 
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than landed property, the younger Demosthenes hailed from an affluent family and 
possessed notable familial connections through both his paternal and maternal lines. 
Demosthenes’ father died from an illness in 376/5 BC, when his son was seven 
years old and his daughter five (Dem. 27.4, 28.15; Plut. Dem. 4.3; [Plut.] X orat. 844a). 
He left his family and his estate in the hands of three guardians.22 However, these trustees 
failed to abide by the terms of their guardianship and they defrauded the estate to such an 
extent that Demosthenes as the rightful heir received almost nothing when he came of 
age.23 The young Demosthenes would have to bring a series of suits against the guardians 
in order to recover his inheritance (Dem. 27-31). 
Training in rhetoric was a standard element in the education of a wealthy Athenian 
adolescent male, in preparation for his future career in politics. Demosthenes confirms 
that he attended ‘the right schools’ (Dem. 18.257), referring to a costly upper-class 
education.24 But having to depend on his guardians to finance his schooling was yet 
another point of contention.25 To the young Demosthenes, oratory presented itself as the 
means through which to rectify the guardians’ mismanagement of his father’s affairs. 
                                                          
22 Two of whom were his nephews, Aphobos by his sister and Demophon by his brother, and the third was 
a childhood friend of his, Therippides (Dem. 27.4-5). With Aphobos expected to marry Cleobule and the 
young girl betrothed to Demophon, the property was to be administered by all three for young 
Demosthenes’ benefit. This was an estate which Demosthenes himself claimed was worth between fourteen 
and fifteen talents (Dem. 27.4, 9). 
23 According to Demosthenes, ten years passed between his father’s death and his own coming of age (Dem. 
27.6, 17, 24, 26, 29, 35, 36, 59 and 63, 29.34 and 59, 31.14). For a comprehensive analysis of this figure of 
ten years, see Davies, Athenian Propertied Families 600-300 B.C., pp. 123-5. Demosthenes was registered 
in Paeania during the archonship of Polyzelos, by his fellow demesman Philodemos (Dem. 30.15, 17; 
Aeschin. 2.150). The precise date could be at the end of 367/6 BC or at the beginning of 366/5 BC, see R. 
Sealey, ‘On Coming of Age in Athens’, p. 195. Indeed, it would seem likely that the annual examination 
of new candidates for deme enrolment took place at the beginning of the civil year (for details on this 
procedure, see Introduction, pp. 26-8). Taking Demosthenes’ birth year as 384/3 BC, he would have turned 
eighteen in the year 366/5 BC and was enrolled in his deme in that same year. Demosthenes claims that, 
when he came of age, the value of the estate had been reduced to only seventy minas (Dem. 27.6, cf. 37). 
For an evaluation of this claim and the estate, see Davies, Athenian Propertied Families 600-300 B.C., pp. 
126-33. 
24 Plutarch claims that Demosthenes had missed out on the traditional physical training in the gymnasium 
because he had been a sickly child (Dem. 4.3). However, this detail is not confirmed by any other source. 
It is possible that this portrayal was a rhetorical topos, similar to Isocrates’ claim of a weak voice (5.81, 
12.9-10, Ep. 8.7); see Y. L. Too, Rhetoric of Identity in Isocrates, pp. 74-112. 
25 Demosthenes complains that Aphobos failed to pay his teacher’s fees (Dem. 27.46). Plutarch also 
suggests that Demosthenes was further frustrated by his orphan status and thus was unable to afford the 
fees of Isocrates’ famous school of rhetoric (Plut. Dem. 5.6). 
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According to tradition, he was inspired to pursue studies in declamation after he 
persuaded his tutor to smuggle him into court, where he heard the successful defence of 
Callistratos of Aphidna (Plut. Dem. 5.1-4).26 While Plutarch states that Demosthenes was 
struck by Callistratos’ fame, he emphasises that the boy admired the power of oratory 
even more. This, in conjunction with his desire to seek retribution against the guardians 
for squandering his inheritance, compelled Demosthenes to pursue a career in speech-
writing.  
Plutarch reports that Demosthenes’ skill in oratory was developed under Isaeus’ 
training. Isaeus was an orator who specialised in inheritance suits (circa 415-340 BC). 
One account specifically recounts how Isaeus helped him to prepare his case against the 
guardians (Dion. Hal. Isae. 1).27 According to later biographies, Demosthenes had to 
overcome a weak voice and a lisp during his training and he supposedly practised 
speaking with pebbles in his mouth (Cic. De or. 1.260-1, Div. 2.96; Plut. Dem. 4.4-5). It 
is reported that he employed other techniques to physically improve his condition: he 
used an apparatus to stop his shoulder from shaking uncontrollably, he recited speeches 
in front of a large mirror and while walking or running uphill in order to strengthen his 
breathing, and he practised speaking on the shore at Phaleron in order to make his voice 
heard above the waves (Plut. Dem. 6.3-4; Demetrios of Phaleron, FGrH 228 F17a apud 
Plut. Dem. 11.1; [Plut.] X orat. 844e-f). While the reliability of later biographies is 
questionable, Plutarch might be considered trustworthy here as he uses Demetrios as one 
                                                          
26 Callistratos was an Athenian politician and orator, who was elected stratēgos in 378/7 BC. Plutarch’s 
account is problematic, however, as this trial occurred in 366/5 BC when Demosthenes had already come 
of age. It is possible that Plutarch has mistakenly attached the anecdote to Callistratos’ most famous case, 
see MacDowell, Demosthenes the Orator, p. 20. It is reported by Hegesias of Magnesia that Demosthenes 
attended Callistratos’ address to the people in the Ecclēsia ([Plut.] X orat. 844b). 
27 According to MacDowell, it would indeed be possible for Demosthenes to consult Isaeus since he was a 
specialist in inheritance litigation, with eleven of his twelve surviving speeches relating to inheritance, 
Demosthenes the Orator, p. 21. At the very least, it is clear that Demosthenes’ early forensic speeches were 
influenced by Isaeus’ style of oratory (particularly noting the repetition of material from Isaeus in Dem. 27 
and 29, and also 31, 41, 55). It certainly seems more appropriate for Demosthenes to have consulted Isaeus 
rather than Isocrates, since the latter claims that his instruction in rhetoric had nothing to do with private 
cases before the courts (15.37). 
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of his sources for this information. Demetrios was only a generation younger than 
Demosthenes and he claimed to have obtained the information from the orator himself.28 
A childhood nickname, either ‘Batalos’ or ‘Battalos’,29 was given to him by his nurse and 
probably refers to his stammer (Dem. 18.180; Aeschin. 1.126) or possibly a weak 
physique (Plut. Dem. 4.5; [Plut.] X orat. 847e). Aeschines, though, gives it a more 
obscene and degrading meaning of cowardly or effeminate (Aeschin. 1.131, 2.99). Those 
writing about Demosthenes’ life also propose that he studied extensively the published 
speeches of other orators, including Isocrates, and that he read prose literature, especially 
Thucydides and Plato (Dion. Hal. Thuc. 53-4; Hermippos of Smyrna, FGrH IV a, 1026, 
F49a apud Plut. Dem. 5.7; [Plut.] X orat. 844b).30 When viewed in conjunction with one 
another, these accounts portray Demosthenes’ determination to succeed in developing his 
skills in oratory; he would subsequently employ these skills in both the private and public 
spheres, applying them to his own legal and political disputes and to speeches like 
Euxitheos’ Against Euboulides which he wrote for his clients. 
While the young Demosthenes eventually took possession of his father’s house, 
fourteen of his manufacturing slaves, and thirty minas from the guardians (Dem. 28.8), 
he had to bring numerous suits against them in order to recover what was owed to him 
from the rest of his inheritance. He won the first of these private cases in 364/3 BC (Dem. 
27 and 28), and the jury voted that Aphobos pay him the large sum of ten talents (Dem. 
28.18 and 30.32). Aphobos failed to pay and so Demosthenes was able to take possession 
of Aphobos’ house and slaves (Dem. 30.8). Over a three-year period, further suits 
                                                          
28 Demetrios of Phaleron was an Athenian politician and orator, circa 360-280 BC. While Demetrios was 
the pro-Macedonian governor of Athens for ten years from 317 BC, the information he provides here with 
regard to Demosthenes’ training exercises does not demonstrate any particular bias against him as an enemy 
of Macedon. 
29 The spelling of this nickname differs in the manuscripts. See MacDowell, Demosthenes the Orator, p. 
19. 
30 Plutarch uses the third century BC biographer, Hermippos, as a source for asserting that Demosthenes 
was a student of Plato’s. While there is no contemporary evidence to confirm Demosthenes’ familiarity 
with Plato, MacDowell suggests that it is indeed credible for the orator to have attended some of Plato’s 
lectures during his youth, in Demosthenes the Orator, pp. 21-2. 
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followed in which the guardians disputed the status of the possessions which 
Demosthenes sought.31 Having to fight for his inheritance in a series of prolonged 
lawsuits was probably part of the reason why he turned to writing speeches for other 
people in order to support himself and his legal battles. Apart from what he initially 
received upon coming of age and what he won from Aphobos, it is not known what 
exactly he obtained from Demophon and Therippides.32 Later sources state that 
Demosthenes only recovered a fraction of his father’s wealth (Plut. Dem. 6.1; [Plut.] X 
orat. 844c-d). Aeschines, however, claims that he turned to writing speeches after 
squandering what inheritance he did receive (1.170, 3.173). Whatever Demosthenes’ 
financial position might have been, it is certain that his pursuit of the guardians gave him 
his first opportunity to develop his oratorical ability in a real court setting. It is also highly 
likely that his demonstration of skill during these proceedings and his eventual personal 
success brought him a favourable reputation as a winning speaker. The series of suits 
against the guardians certainly helped Demosthenes to develop his ability. Crucially, this 
laid the foundation for his career as a speech-writer.  
Since Demosthenes’ earliest forensic speech was his successful private suit 
against Aphobos, it is most likely that his skill in rhetoric was initially in demand for 
cases concerning guardianship and familial property disputes. Of his surviving speeches, 
his earliest private speech for another litigant that can be dated with any certainty is 
                                                          
31 The next speech in the series against his guardians is Against Aphobos for Phanos (Dem. 29), probably 
dating to 362/1 BC. Aphobos brought a charge of perjury against Phanos, one of Demosthenes’ witnesses 
and the orator delivered a speech in defence of this man. It is likely that Phanos was acquitted or that 
Aphobos abandoned this case, see MacDowell, Demosthenes the Orator, pp. 45-53. In 362/1 or early in 
361/0 BC, Demosthenes then brought two cases against Onetor, who had received Aphobos’ farm when 
the latter had married the former’s sister (Against Onetor 1, Dem. 30, and Against Onetor 2, Dem. 31). It 
is not known for sure who won this case, but MacDowell suggests that Demosthenes would have been able 
to take possession of Aphobos’ farm if he had prevailed, in Demosthenes the Orator, pp. 53-8. 
Unfortunately, the speeches against Demophon and Therippides do not survive. For a succinct summary of 
his battle with the guardians, see Worthington, Demosthenes of Athens and the Fall of Classical Greece, 
pp. 20-7. 
32 For the amount that he might have eventually recovered, see Davies, Athenian Propertied Families 600-
300 B.C., pp. 127-33.  
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Against Leochares (Dem. 44).33 Dating sometime between 361 and 356 BC, this was a 
speech for the prosecution in a suit for bearing false witness (δίκη ψευδομαρτυριῶν) 
during a dispute over the inheritance of an estate.34 After this, he became sought after by 
others and began to write speeches for the prosecution or for the defence in a wide range 
of forensic cases in both the private and public spheres of Athenian law: maritime loans, 
mining rights, forgery, assault, and trespass.35 Winning cases and personal 
recommendations would have promoted his abilities and generated further demand for 
his speech-writing skills. Revised copies of his successful court speeches were also 
circulated to the public to further increase business and to cement his reputation.36 But 
the profession of logographer was not held in high-esteem. The sources indicate that the 
act of being paid to write a speech bore a similar disapproval to making money from 
rhetorical practice or philosophical teaching (Dem. 19.246; Aeschin. 1.94, 125, 175; Isoc. 
13.19-21, 15.37-44; Dein. 1.3). Nevertheless, this did not prevent some of the wealthiest 
and most influential men of Athens from becoming his clients. Among them was the 
banker, Phormion, one of the richest men in Athens in 350/49 BC and for whom 
Demosthenes wrote the highly successful speech For Phormion (Dem. 36) in a counter-
indictment procedure (παραγραφή).37 Having such men obligated to him or even being 
                                                          
33 MacDowell suggests that Against Callicles (Dem. 55) may also be a contender for the earliest known 
private oration, in Demosthenes the Orator, p. 66. This speech was a defence speech in a suit for damages 
(δίκη βλάβης) in a dispute between neighbours over flood damage. However, its date is impossible to 
determine, see Bers, Demosthenes, Speeches 50-57, pp. 81-91. 
34 Some doubts have been raised regarding this speech’s authenticity, see MacDowell, Demosthenes the 
Orator, pp. 97-8, and Scafuro Demosthenes, Speeches 39-49, pp. 190-1. But I agree with E. M. Harris’ 
classification of it among Demosthenes’ genuine speeches, in The Rule of Law in Action in Democratic 
Athens, pp. 401-2.  
35 For the competitive nature of the Athenians in court and the frequency with which they resorted to 
litigation, see M. R. Christ’s specialised study on the matter in The Litigious Athenian (1998). 
36 For Demosthenes at least, Plutarch implies that revisions took place after a speech was delivered and 
before copies of it were circulated (Dem. 11.4-5). For a full analysis, see I. Worthington ‘Greek Oratory, 
Revision of Speeches and the Problem of Historical Reliability’, pp. 55-74. 
37 This Phormion was a former slave who became an Athenian citizen in 361/0 BC. His opponent in the 
counter-indictment was his stepson, Apollodoros. The speech, For Phormion, was such a success that 
Apollodoros later claims that the jury had been so impressed by this speech that they refused to listen to his 
account after it had been delivered (Dem. 45.4-5). In this subsequent case, Against Stephanos I, 
Demosthenes had changed sides and had written Apollodoros’ prosecution speech against Stephanos for 
bearing false witness (δίκη ψευδομαρτυριῶν) on Phormion’s behalf. This change of sides probably had a 
political motivation, since Apollodoros had begun advocating the use of the Theoric fund against Philip by 
the time of this latter trial, see M. Edwards, The Attic Orators, p. 43. 
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able to class them as friends enabled Demosthenes to build a network of connections 
which was useful for his budding political career.  
Composing speeches for others was more than just a way of making money and 
establishing connections; it was also the means through which Demosthenes grew 
familiar with the Athenian legal system, its economy and, essentially, its political life. 
Several years after concluding his cases against the guardians, he decided to pursue a 
political career himself and he began delivering speeches on public issues in the courts 
and in the Ecclēsia. In 355/4 BC, Demosthenes made his first court appearance in a public 
case as one of the two supporting speakers (συνήγοροι) for Apsephion’s prosecution for 
an inexpedient law (γραφὴ νόμον μὴ ἐπιτήδειον θεῖναι), in Against Leptines (Dem. 20). 
In the same year, Demosthenes wrote a speech for Diodoros, Against Androtion (Dem. 
22), who was a supporting speaker in Euctemon’s public suit for an illegal proposal 
(γραφὴ παρανόμων). This was quickly followed by his earliest extant deliberative speech 
before the Ecclēsia, On the Symmories (Dem. 14) in 354/3 BC, and was followed in quick 
succession by further political speeches on public policy (For the Megalopolitans (Dem. 
16) in 353/2 BC; For the Freedom of the Rhodians (Dem. 15) between 353 and 350 BC; 
First Philippic (Dem. 4) circa 352/1 BC; and On Organisation (Dem. 13) circa 350 
BC).38 While delivering speeches in the Ecclēsia during this period, Demosthenes 
continued to write speeches for others to deliver in public political trials (Against 
Timocrates (Dem. 24) in 353/2 BC; Against Aristocrates (Dem. 23) in 352/1 BC). He 
may have decided to enter into political affairs either before his lawsuits against the 
guardians or as a result of discovering his talent in oratory. In any case, Demosthenes 
would take centre stage in the political arena. 
                                                          
38 Demosthenes’ early political speeches were largely unsuccessful. For a thorough analysis of these 
speeches, see Worthington, Demosthenes of Athens and the Fall of Classical Greece, pp. 71-154, especially 
pp. 86-9 and 98. 
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After 350 BC, Demosthenes’ main focus was on public policy and the relations 
between Athens and Macedon: he delivered the three Olynthiacs (Dem. 1-3) in 349/8 BC, 
and the three remaining Philippics (Dem. 6, 9 and 10) between 344/3 and 341 BC. At the 
height of his political career during the 340s BC, he must have had less time and even 
less financial necessity for forensic oratory but he did continue to write speeches for a 
number of public and private cases. By his own admission, however, he did not appear in 
person in private legal suits after entering public life (Dem. 32.32). He continued his 
career as a logographer into the 320s BC, even as his political career deteriorated and 
until he was eventually exiled as a result of the Harpalos Affair in 324/3 BC.39 The 
forensic speeches which he wrote during this period include Against Phormion (Dem. 34) 
in 327/6 BC,40 Against Aristogeiton (Dem. 25) in 325/324 BC,41 and Against 
Dionysodoros (Dem. 56) in 323/2 BC.42 Though Against Dionysodoros is the last 
surviving speech that we possess, six letters are attributed to Demosthenes, which were 
composed during his exile from Athens, and one might reasonably presume that he 
continued to write after his return to Athens.  
Demosthenes’ political career and deliberative speeches have been discussed in 
great detail elsewhere, and one might argue that neither of them are directly relevant to 
his career as a logographer. Yet it is important to note that he needed his career as a 
                                                          
39 No defence speech of Demosthenes survives from the Harpalos Affair, but Deinarchos’ speech for the 
prosecution has been preserved almost in its entirety (Dein. 1). For the background and details of the 
Harpalos Affair, see I. Worthington, A Historical Commentary on Dinarchus, pp. 41-77. 
40 This is a private speech written for Chrysippos to deliver during a counter-indictment (παραγραφή) 
lodged by a different Phormion from the banker depicted in Dem. 36. MacDowell has convincingly argued 
that there is no reason to doubt the authenticity of this speech, in Demosthenes the Orator, pp. 279-87. 
41 It is a public speech in a procedure taken against an alleged disfranchised citizen (ἔνδειξις). While 
scholars generally agree that [Dem.] 26 was not written by Demosthenes, there has been considerable debate 
regarding the authenticity of Dem. 25. Several scholars believe that Dem. 25 is a forgery along with [Dem.] 
26, most notably Sealey in Demosthenes and His Time, pp. 237-9, and Harris in The Rule of Law in Action 
in Democratic Athens, p. 154. However, other scholars have more persuasively defended the authenticity 
of Dem. 25, including M. H. Hansen in Apagoge, Endeixis and Ephegesis against Kakourgoi, Atimoi and 
Pheugontes, pp. 144-52, and MacDowell, Demosthenes the Orator, pp. 298-313. 
42 This is a private speech delivered by Dareios in a suit for damages which, accepting Demosthenes as its 
author, was written after his return from exile in 323 BC and before he died in the autumn of 322 BC, see 
MacDowell, Demosthenes the Orator, pp. 284-7. It is also likely that Demosthenes wrote his proems for 
political speeches during this late period in his career. See Worthington, Demosthenes, Speeches 60 and 
61, Prologues, Letters, pp. 55-98. 
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speech-writer to fund his political pursuits. Though he was far from destitute,43 it appears 
that Demosthenes’ wealth was not enough to support his political career and the lifestyle 
that he desired. With no regular pay for politicians, personal affluence was fundamental 
to engage in the political arena at state-level since there were potential challenges in court 
and fines for failed prosecutions. The writing of speeches not only offered him a way to 
make money, since it is likely that he charged a considerably high price for each speech,44 
but it also served to enhance his rhetorical skill and enabled him to make political 
contacts. It is clear that Demosthenes’ career as a logographer served both his personal 
and public interests.  
While the exact price of a speech is not known, it was probably more than an 
Athenian of modest means could afford and it is likely that the most successful 
logographers could use their reputation to charge a higher amount. We may wonder about 
the case of Euxitheos, then, and how this ribbon-seller could afford Demosthenes’ 
services in 346/5 BC. At this time, the orator’s political career was at its peak and he 
would certainly have been a well-known figure in Athens. During his appeal, Euxitheos 
states that one of the accusations laid against him is that he is wealthy enough to bribe 
numerous men to testify that they are his relatives and yet he claims that, if he was indeed 
wealthy, he and his mother would not still be employed in the ribbon trade (see §§35 and 
                                                          
43 Demosthenes’ financial status is confirmed by the fact that he performed many liturgies: he was triērarch 
on several occasions (in 364/3 BC, Dem. 21.78-80 and 154, 28.17, Aeschin. 3.173; in 360/59 BC, Aeschin. 
3.51-2; and again circa 358/7 or 357/6 BC, Dem. 18.99, 21.161), he was chairman of a tax-syndicate (Dem. 
21.157), he was chorēgos (Dem. 21.13 and 156; [Plut.] X orat. 844d and 851a), and he acted as guarantor 
of ships ([Plut.] X orat. 851a). For a full synopsis of his public contributions, see Davies, Athenian 
Propertied Families 600-300 B.C., pp. 135-7. It is also known that Demosthenes owned two houses (one 
in Athens and one in the Piraeus, Aeschin. 3.209; Dein. 1.69). 
44 Aeschines makes several references to Demosthenes charging a fee for his speeches (2.165, 3.173). 
However, given the enmity between the two men, it is difficult to decipher the truth from the slander. In a 
similarly hostile manner, since he was writing a speech for one of Demosthenes’ prosecutors in 323 BC, 
Deinarchos reports that Demosthenes expected a fee for his legal services (1.111). The only other specific 
indication that logographers charged a fee for their work is found in a fragment of Antiphon’s defence 
speech from 411 BC, after the rule of the Four Hundred oligarchs. Here Antiphon states that one of his 
accusers’ claims against him is that he profited from composing speeches for others (fragment 1a, in M. 
Gagarin and D. M. MacDowell, Antiphon and Andocides, pp. 90-2). A comment made by Philostratos circa 
AD 237 supports this by asserting that comedy attacked Antiphon for selling high-price speeches (VS. 499). 
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52). From this, two conclusions may be drawn: either Euxitheos was misleading the court 
with regard to his personal wealth and he was indeed rich enough to pay for the services 
of the renowned orator, or the appellant had some personal connection to Demosthenes, 
who may have written a speech for him as a favour or even in return for another type of 
payment. Unfortunately, there is no evidence for either assumption. Euboulides’ speech 
against Euxitheos does not survive and so there is nothing to indicate what proofs he 
might have offered for the appellant’s alleged wealth. Furthermore, it cannot be known 
why Euxitheos specifically sought Demosthenes’ help other than for his public renown at 
the time. The orator did not specialise in disfranchisement cases, as attested by the variety 
of actions involved in the surviving speeches that he wrote for other litigants during this 
period.45 Any further link between Euxitheos and Demosthenes other than client and 
successful logographer eludes us.  
Demosthenes certainly earned his reputation as one of the most distinguished 
orators in antiquity. His mastery of Greek prose style was highly praised by ancient 
commentators, such as Dionysios of Halicarnassos, Cicero and Plutarch. Plutarch’s 
account of Demosthenes’ education in the art of speaking reflects that his priority had 
been on honing his oratorical skills. Moreover, he possessed the ability to adapt these 
skills and vary his presentation, depending on the requirements of each legal case. Every 
speech offered a new challenge for the logographer. In each of his forensic speeches, it is 
clear that Demosthenes paid careful attention to its individual style and delivery. With 
such a great talent for character portrayal and logical argument, his expertise was truly 
demonstrated in his application of these features with a mind to suit the topic and to give 
                                                          
45 Demosthenes may have been personally hostile towards Euboulides, perhaps in connection with his 
public role in the Athenian Boulē (§8) or his kinship ties to a prominent political family (at the very least 
in the deme of Halimous, §§26 and 60; cf. Lysias’ defence of Euphiletos after he murdered Eratosthenes, a 
possible relative of Eratosthenes the tyrant (Lys. 12), see S. C. Todd, A Commentary on Lysias, pp. 59-60. 
15 
 
variety and vigour to his speeches.46 Against Euboulides is one such speech, in which it 
is evident that Demosthenes paid considerable attention to the presentation of the speaker 
and dedicated much of the oration to drawing on the jury’s empathy. Dating to 346/5 BC, 
Against Euboulides was written at a time when Demosthenes’ political activity was at its 
peak and, as such, it stands as one of the last public speeches written for a client which 
can be ascribed to him without any significant doubt. 
1.3: Libanios’ Hypothesis for Against Euboulides 
Together with a biography of Demosthenes, the fourth century AD author and 
teacher of rhetoric, Libanios, wrote a series of Hypotheses (ὑποθέσεις) or introductions 
to his speeches.47 Libanios’ Hypothesis for Demosthenes’ Against Euboulides provides 
valuable information regarding the case: he names the appellant, offers information about 
the speech’s historical background, and alludes to the main charges brought against the 
speaker which must be countered during the speech. As such, the Hypothesis serves as a 
useful starting point for the study of Demosthenes’ speech for Euxitheos.  
The Hypotheses and the biography of Demosthenes were written circa AD 352. 
They were requested by the proconsul of Constantinople, Lucius Caelius Montius, and as 
such were dedicated to him (introd. 1).48 Gibson argues that Libanios’ Hypotheses were 
intended to match the needs of novice readers of Demosthenes, for someone like Montius 
who was a native Latin speaker studying Greek literature.49 The biography follows the 
dedication, and the author states that it will only mention the things which contribute to a 
more exact understanding of the speeches (introd. 1: τοσούτων μνημονεύοντες ὅσα δοκεῖ 
                                                          
46 For effective character portrayal in forensic speeches, narrative was an important tool to persuade those 
listening (Arist. Rh. 1417a8). Dionysios, however, rated Lysias’ skill in narrative above all other orators, 
including Demosthenes (Lys. 18). 
47 For a brief biography on Libanios, see Appendix 2, pp. 280-1. 
48 Little is known with regard to Montius. It is possible that he was the quaestor in Antioch who was 
murdered two years after Libanios wrote his Hypotheses (Amm. Marc. 14.7.12-6). 
49 C. A. Gibson, ‘The Agenda of Libanius’ Hypotheses to Demosthenes’, p. 173. 
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καὶ πρὸς κατάληψιν ἀκριβεστέραν τῶν λόγων συντελεῖν). He discusses Demosthenes’ 
familial line (2-3), his childhood (4-5), his training in rhetoric (6-7), the influence of 
Isaeus on his style (8), his entry into public life (9), and his defects as a speaker (10-3). 
Next, Libanios gives a concise history of the Athenian political scene when Demosthenes 
made his political debut (14-9: ὅπως εἶχε τά τε τῶν ῾Ελλήνων καὶ τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων 
πράγματα, ὅτε ἐπὶ τὸ δημαγωγεῖν ἦλθε Δημοσθένης). This section breaks off in mid-
sentence, and the text resumes with Libanios claiming that the epideictic works in the 
Demosthenic corpus are not genuine (20-1: the Funeral Oration and the Erotic Essay).  
Libanios makes very few specific references to the sources he used in his 
Hypotheses. While he employs some of Demosthenes’ terminology and also paraphrases 
the orator, he only quotes him directly on two occasions.50 Besides Demosthenes, he 
names Aeschines,51 Dionysios of Halicarnassos,52 and a historical work called the 
Philippic Histories.53 When Libanios does not specify who his sources were, he 
occasionally gives an indication of contemporary opinion.54 It seems clear that he had 
access to many sources about Demosthenes and his works, including lexicographers and 
rhetoricians. Amongst his unnamed sources, Gibson’s analysis finds that Libanios used 
Lycourgos’ Against Aristogeiton, Harpocration’s lexicon, Aristotle’s Rhetoric, and a 
stasis-theory by Hermogenes.55 In addition to a close familiarity with the texts of the Attic 
orators, Norman plausibly contends that Libanios had other commentaries besides that of 
Dionysios of Halicarnassos, and that Didymos was most probably one of these.56 Gibson 
                                                          
50 Hyp. 1.11 (Dem. 1) and Hyp. 7.4 ([Dem.] 7). 
51 Hyp. 17.6-8 (Dem. 18), Hyp. 18.5 (Dem. 19), referring to Against Ctesiphon and On the Embassy 
respectively. 
52 Introd. 20 and Hyp. 24.11 (Dem 25 and [Dem.] 26). 
53 Hyp. 6.2 (Dem. 6). Although Libanios does not name the author of this work, it is probably by the fourth 
century BC historian, Theopompos (FGrH 115 F401). 
54 Referring to οἱ πολλοί: Hyp. 32.2 (Dem. 31), Hyp. 26.1, 4 ([Dem.] 58); also, οἱ πρεσβύτεροι or τινες: 
Hyp. 7.5 ([Dem.] 7). 
55 Gibson, ‘The Agenda of Libanius’ Hypotheses to Demosthenes’, pp. 179 and 182-7. 
56 A. F. Norman, ‘The Library of Libanius’, p. 169. 
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makes a similar argument, and states that these commentaries are now unknown to us.57 
He also suggests that Libanios used Anaximenes’ Rhetorica ad Alexandrum and Caecilius 
of Caleacte.58 Since Libanios provides so little information with regard to his sources, the 
analyses of both Gibson and Norman play a helpful role in identifying which material 
Libanios most likely used when writing the Hypotheses. 
In addition to the important information he supplies, Libanios’ particular 
placement of Euxitheos’ speech in the Demosthenic corpus is significant for his 
understanding of the speech. Libanios’ treatment of Against Euboulides is highly 
significant: he moved orations 57-59 to an earlier position in the collection, as opposed 
to their current placement in the Demosthenic corpus, locating them between 26 and 27. 
Libanios explicitly notes that most authors before him had wrongly considered [Dem.] 58 
as private (οἱ πολλοί: Hyp. 26.1); this may suggest that Dem. 57 and [Dem.] 59 were also 
moved forward with [Dem.] 58 for the same reason. In relation to [Dem.] 58, Libanios 
deduced that the whole affair was a public one in view of the fact that the defendant was 
alleged to have broken three Athenian laws, for which the penalties were heavy fines and 
disfranchisement (Hyp. 26.4). Apart from that, he does not offer any specific evidence as 
to why Dem. 57 and [Dem.] 59 ought to be regarded as public rather than private. It may 
have been only the threat of slavery for Neaera in the latter case and the same possible 
penalty for Euxitheos in the former that suggested to Libanios to group these speeches 
under the classification of public.59  
                                                          
57 Gibson, ‘The Agenda of Libanius’ Hypotheses to Demosthenes’, pp. 179 and 189. It does seem likely 
that Libanios had access to more evidence for Demosthenes’ speeches than what survives today. This would 
certainly have had a bearing on his classification of Against Euboulides, see Introduction, p. 17. 
58 Gibson, ‘The Agenda of Libanius’ Hypotheses to Demosthenes’, pp. 187-9. 
59 R. Foerster, Libanii Opera VIII, pp. 645-7; ‘The Decree of Demophilus, 346-345 B.C.’, p. 197; Gibson, 
The Agenda of Libanius’ Hypotheses to Demosthenes’, p. 176. For a discussion regarding slavery, see 
Introduction, pp. 43-9. 
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The Greek text and translation for Libanios’ Hypothesis to Demosthenes’ Against 
Euboulides read as follows: 
ΥΠΟΘΕΣΙΣ 27  
[1] Γράφεται νόμος παρ᾽ Ἀθηναίοις γενέσθαι ζήτησιν πάντων τῶν 
ἐγγεγραμμένων τοῖς ληξιαρχικοῖς γραμματείοις, εἴτε γνήσιοι πολῖταί εἰσιν 
εἴτε μή, τοὺς δὲ μὴ γεγονότας ἐξ ἀστοῦ καὶ ἐξ ἀστῆς ἐξαλείφεσθαι, 
διαψηφίζεσθαι δὲ περὶ πάντων τοὺς δημότας, καὶ τοὺς μὲν 
ἀποψηφισθέντας καὶ ἐμμείναντας τῇ ψήφῳ τῶν δημοτῶν ἐξαληλίφθαι καὶ 
εἶναι μετοίκους, τοῖς δὲ βουλομένοις ἔφεσιν εἰς δικαστὰς δεδόσθαι, κἂν 
μὲν ἁλῶσι καὶ παρὰ τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, πεπρᾶσθαι, ἐὰν δ᾽ ἀποφύγωσιν, εἶναι 
πολίτας. [2] Κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν νόμον τοῦ ῾Αλιμουσίων δήμου 
διαψηφιζομένου ἀποψηφίζεται Εὐξίθεός τις, φάσκων δ᾽ ἑαυτὸν ὑπ᾽ 
Εὐβουλίδου ἐχθροῦ ὄντος κατεστασιάσθαι ἐφῆκεν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, καὶ 
ἐπιδείκνυσιν ἑαυτὸν ἐξ ἀστοῦ καὶ ἐξ ἀστῆς. Εἰ δὲ ἐτίτθευσεν ἡ μήτηρ μου, 
δι᾽ ἀπορίαν τοῦτ᾽ ἐποίησεν. Ὁ δὲ πατὴρ ἐξένιζε τῇ γλώττῃ, αἰχμάλωτος 
γενόμενος καὶ πραθείς. Δεῖ δὲ μὴ τὰ ἀτυχήματα προφέρειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ γένη 
ζητεῖν. 
[1] A law is enacted by the Athenians for an investigation to take place of 
everyone listed on the deme registers to determine whether they are 
legitimate citizens or not, and that those who have not been born of a male 
citizen and a female citizen are to be struck off the rolls, and for the 
demesmen to vote by ballot on all of them. Those who are disfranchised 
and abide by the vote of the demesmen are to be struck off the rolls and 
are deemed to be metics. Those who wish have been granted an appeal 
before a jury, and if they are also convicted by the court, they are to be 
sold as slaves, if they are acquitted, they are deemed to be citizens. [2] In 
accordance with this law, when the deme of the Halimousians has voted 
by ballot, a certain Euxitheos is disfranchised, but he asserts that he came 
to court having been persecuted by his enemy Euboulides, and he shows 
himself to have been born of a male citizen and a female citizen. ‘But if 
my mother was a wet-nurse, she did this because of poverty. And my father 
spoke with a foreign tongue, because he had been a captive and was sold 
as a slave’. One must not bring up the misfortunes, but examine the family 
line.  
In this Hypothesis, Libanios reveals the name of the speaker of Demosthenes’ 
Against Euboulides. Euxitheos’ name does not appear in the speech itself but it is supplied 
by Libanios, presumably from a document which was cited in a manuscript that was 
available to the author in the fourth century AD but regrettably has not been preserved. 
Libanios begins his Hypothesis by expressly tying the speech to a law which instigated 
an extraordinary scrutiny of all those registered in the Attic demes. Unfortunately, he does 
not identify the proposer of the law. In an earlier text, Dionysios similarly connects 
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Isaeus’ On Behalf of Euphiletos (Isae. 12) to a law which resulted in a deme-wide scrutiny 
of those listed in the deme registers (Isae. 16).60 Like Dionysios, Libanios goes on to 
provide the terms of the scrutiny which had been implemented under this law. The process 
they describe falls into two parts: the voting by ballot (διαψήφισις) in the demes and the 
appeal (ἔφεσις) to the court. Libanios, however, provides more detail than Dionysios by 
specifying that the men who were struck off the deme registers were those who were not 
born of two Athenian citizen parents. He then asserts that those who were disfranchised 
assumed metic status. Both Dionysios and Libanios claim that those who wished to appeal 
the deme’s decision took their case to court. If they were successful, they were reinstated 
as citizens but, if they lost their appeal, they were sold into slavery.61 It becomes clear 
that both authors are referring to the same law which instigated the extraordinary 
διαψήφισις of 346/5 BC.62 
The penalty of enslavement mentioned by Libanios has caused considerable 
debate. While both the author of the Athēnaiōn Politeia and Dionysios also state that 
slavery was the given punishment, nowhere in Euxitheos’ speech is enslavement 
explicitly stated as a potential penalty for losing his appeal. Recently, MacDowell has 
specifically cast doubt on Libanios’ account of the slavery penalty, on the grounds that 
Euxitheos only refers to becoming an outcast (see ἄπολιν at §70).63 However, since 
MacDowell fails to mention the reports provided by the Athēnaiōn Politeia and 
Dionysios, it may be that MacDowell’s scepticism of Libanios’ Hypothesis is 
unwarranted.64 As such, further research is required about whether or not slavery was 
indeed the penalty for the failed appeals arising out of the deme-wide extraordinary 
                                                          
60 For an overview of this speech, see Appendix 1, pp. 270-9. 
61 Dionysios adds that those who lost their appeal also had their property confiscated. This is certainly 
plausible in light of the law cited at [Dem.] 59.16, in which an alien man convicted of living with an 
Athenian citizen woman as husband and wife was to be sold into slavery and his property confiscated.  
62 See Introduction, pp. 25-43. 
63 MacDowell, Demosthenes the Orator, p. 288 n. 3. 
64 Harris arrives at a similar conclusion, in The Rule of Law in Action in Democratic Athens, p. 76 n. 52. 
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scrutiny. The penalty and the problems it generates will be discussed in a later section of 
this Introduction.65 
Libanios notes that Euxitheos describes the situation as being the result of his 
persecution by his enemy, Euboulides. During his appeal, Euxitheos maintains that his 
disfranchisement had come about because of a personal dispute between his family and 
that of Euboulides (see §§48 and 61). He accuses Euboulides of conspiring to have him 
ejected from the deme when the opportunity of the extraordinary scrutiny arose. 
Moreover, he claims that Euboulides abused his position and postponed the vote on 
Euxitheos until late in the day (see §12). With many of the demesmen having departed, 
Euboulides had his co-conspirators cast multiple votes against Euxitheos. But, regardless 
of the injustice administered by his opponent, the mainstay of the appeal is the veracity 
of Euxitheos’ claim to citizenship. Libanios’ description of the case appears to suggest 
that he, as a reader, was sufficiently satisfied by Euxitheos’ defence of his citizen status. 
Providing details about the suit, Libanios outlines the charges that Euxitheos 
claims have been brought against him by Euboulides. Euboulides has attacked the citizen 
status of both Euxitheos’ parents.66 Firstly, he states that Thoucritos’ foreign accent is 
proof of his foreign status (see §18). Next, he cites Nicarete’s menial employment as 
evidence of her non-citizen status (see §35). By stating that ‘one must not bring up the 
misfortunes, but examine the family line’, Libanios indicates his thorough understanding 
of Euxitheos’ defence against Euboulides’ charges.  
The details highlighted by Libanios’ Hypothesis provide a number of issues which 
require significant attention in a historical and social analysis of Against Euboulides. The 
                                                          
65 See Introduction, pp. 43-9. 
66 The necessary condition of two Athenian parents in order to attain citizenship will be discussed in the 
subsequent section, pp. 21-5. 
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sections which follow will examine these issues and give a full account of the legislation 
which instigated the appeal, the nature of the case, and its penalty. 
1.4: The re-enactment of Pericles’ citizenship law in 403/2 BC 
According to Libanios, the purpose of the extraordinary διαψήφισις was to 
determine the legitimacy of everyone listed on the deme registers; anyone who was 
discovered not to have been born of an Athenian father and an Athenian mother was 
disfranchised. Two citizen parents was a legal requirement for citizenship since the re-
enactment of a law by Pericles nearly sixty years before the extraordinary διαψήφισις of 
346/5 BC. Euxitheos’ opponents made accusations against both of his parents. He 
specifically defends his father’s citizen status by claiming that, even if Thoucritos was 
Athenian on one side only, he was entitled to citizenship because he had been born before 
the archonship of Eucleides (see §30). Here, Euxitheos refers to the revival of Pericles’ 
statute during Eucleides’ term in office in 403/2 BC. This section will discuss the re-
enactment of the citizenship law and its implications for the citizen body in order to 
understand the motivation behind the extraordinary διαψήφισις which led to Euxitheos’ 
appeal against his deme. 
During the archonship of Antidotos in 451/0 BC, Pericles passed a law limiting 
citizenship to those who had Athenian parentage on both sides.67 Unfortunately, no 
further information survives with regard to how the law was put into effect.68 It may be 
assumed that after the law was passed, only the sons of two Athenian parents were entitled 
                                                          
67 [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 26.4: ἐπὶ Ἀντιδότου διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν Περικλέους εἰπόντος ἔγνωσαν μὴ 
μετέχειν τῆς πόλεως, ὃς ἂν μὴ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἀστοῖν ᾖ γεγονώς. For an overview of Pericles’ law, see Appendix 
3, pp. 282-8. 
68 S. D. Lambert makes a case in favour of two fragmentary pieces of evidence being included in Pericles’ 
law, even suggesting that they might be extracts from the law itself: the first fragment is from Crateros’ 
fourth book (FGrH 342 F4 apud Suda s.v. ναυτοδίκαι Adler Ν86), and the second fragment is from 
Philochoros’ fourth book of his Atthis (FGrH 328 F35a apud Suda s.v. ὀργεῶνες Adler Ο510), in The 
Phratries of Attica, pp. 45-9. Since both fragments relate to phratry membership, it is his belief that Pericles’ 
law not only directly affected phratries but also made provisions for genuine admissions to them and against 
fraudulent ones. While his theory is certainly interesting, the very nature of his evidence makes it impossible 
to substantiate. 
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to be entered onto the lexiarchic register of their father’s deme (ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον; 
see §8). Should a deme make any fraudulent admissions, individual citizens could bring 
a public action against those they suspected of arrogation of Athenian citizenship (γραφὴ 
ξενίας).69 The official status of Pericles’ legislation during the Peloponnesian War (431-
404 BC) is unclear. Though no formal change to the requirement for citizenship appears 
to have been made,70 it does seem likely that social divisions between citizens and aliens 
had been relaxed during the period of the conflict.  
The evidence for measures taken after the Peloponnesian War to restrict 
citizenship once again is indicative. There were some brief regulations to introduce 
further qualifications for Athenian citizenship: as part of oligarchic rule in 411 BC, access 
to citizen rights was restricted to men who were able to be of service to the state by means 
of their possessions and persons (Thuc. 8.65.3; [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 29.5), and with the 
restoration of democracy in 403 BC, the possession of land became a requirement (Lys. 
34).71 Moreover, the Athenians were very reluctant to grant citizenship to outsiders who 
                                                          
69 A γραφὴ ξενίας was a public prosecution which was voluntarily brought against an individual alleged to 
be a foreigner usurping citizen rights; having been imprisoned until his trial, the defendant was brought 
before the court and was auctioned as a slave if he was found guilty (Isae. 3.37; Dem. Ep. 3.29; Dem. 
24.131 with schol.). Against Neaera ([Dem.] 59) is the only surviving speech which depicts a prosecution 
for a fraudulent claim to citizenship. Like other public suits, any qualified citizen might bring a γραφὴ 
ξενίας and thus measures were established to dissuade frivolous cases. Any accuser who abandoned his 
case or failed to obtain one fifth of the jury’s vote received a fine of a thousand drachmas and a prohibition 
against bringing another public prosecution in the future; for a discussion on the penalties for frivolous 
prosecution, see §8 (see also E. M. Harris, Democracy and the Rule of Law in Classical Athens, pp. 405-
22). Euxitheos states that Euboulides had previously obtained less than a fifth of the votes of the jurors in 
a γραφὴ ἀσεβείας (indictment for impiety), yet he was able to serve as one of the prosecutors on the deme’s 
behalf during Euxitheos’ appeal (see τὸ πέμπτον μέρος at §8). 
70 D. Ogden argues that the law was formally revoked, most likely in 411 BC, since Euxitheos’ statement 
(see §30) seems to imply that significant numbers of children had been born before 403/2 BC who had only 
one Athenian parent, in Greek Bastardy in the Classical and Hellenistic Periods, p. 77. However, one would 
expect even a single reference to such an event to be specifically noted in the source material, particularly 
in relation to the law being re-affirmed in 403/2 BC. Yet there is no evidence in any of the existing sources 
to suggest that Pericles’ law had been removed. Indeed, Pericles’ law does not appear to have been formally 
cancelled since Euripides’ Ion, written around the time of the Sicilian expedition of 415-13 BC, makes 
allusions to its requirements (668-75; cf. Heracles’ exclusion from succession rights because his mother 
was a foreigner, in Ar. Birds, 1649-70, which was performed in 414 BC). K. R. Walters finds it very 
doubtful that Pericles’ law was officially set aside given the lack of evidence from the end of the fifth 
century for Athenian citizens of mixed parentage, in ‘Perikles’ Citizenship Law’, p. 325. Though it cannot 
be definitively known, it would appear most likely that the law was merely ignored during the war rather 
than formally annulled. 
71 Walters makes a persuasive suggestion that the re-enactment of Pericles’ legislation was connected with 
the codification of Athenian laws, a process that was started in at least 411 BC and finally completed in 
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had helped them overthrow the Thirty ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 40.2; Aeschin. 3.195; [Plut.] X 
orat. 836a-b). After the restoration of the Athenian democracy, Pericles’ law was re-
enacted during the archonship of Eucleides in 403/2 BC (see πρὸ Εὐκλείδου at §30).72 
Once again, the Athenian state sought to ensure that only those born from two citizen 
parents had a share in the rights of citizenship. Several sources confirm the re-enactment 
of the law. The first, a fragment from Eumelos, states that a certain Nicomenes proposed 
a decree that no one born after the archonship of Eucleides should share in the rights of 
citizenship unless he can demonstrate that both of his parents were citizens.73 Here, the 
phrasing is quite similar to that provided in the Athēnaiōn Politeia for Pericles’ law 
([Arist.] 26.4).74 The final clause from this fragment, regarding those born before the year 
of Eucleides’ archonship, corresponds to the situation described by Euxitheos (see §30) 
and the speaker of Isaeus’ On the Estate of Ciron (8.43).  
While Eumelos makes no mention of bastardy, a second reference from Athenaeus 
states that Aristophon the orator proposed a law in 403/2 BC that whoever was not born 
of a citizen woman was a νόθος (bastard).75 Many scholars have taken the statements 
from Eumelos and Athenaeus as parts of the same law, even though the two writers appear 
to disagree over who proposed it.76 During his appeal, Euxitheos does refer to Aristophon 
                                                          
399 BC, in ‘Perikles’ Citizenship Law’, p. 326. For a discussion of the revision of the laws during this 
period, see A. R. W. Harrison, ‘Law-Making at Athens at the End of the Fifth Century B.C.’, pp. 26-35; A. 
L. Boegehold, ‘The Establishment of a Central Archive at Athens’, pp. 23-30; and A. Lanni, Law and 
Justice in The Courts of Athens, pp. 142-8. 
72 J. Blok raises the interesting point that both Pericles’ law and its re-enactment were introduced after the 
distressing and chaotic times of prolonged warfare and, therefore, the Athenians may have felt a general 
need to create order and face the future on a better basis than before, in ‘Perikles’ Citizenship Law’, p. 159. 
73 Eumelos, FGrH 77 F2 apud schol. Aeschin. 1.39: … Νικομένη τινὰ ψήφισμα θέσθαι μηδένα τῶν μετ᾽ 
Εὐκλείδην ἄρχοντα μετέχειν τῆς πόλεως, ἂν μὴ ἄμφω τοὺς γονέας ἀστοὺς ἐπιδείξηται, τοὺς δὲ πρὸ 
Εὐκλείδου ἀνεξετάστως ἀφεῖσθαι. 
74 Walters also draws attention to the similar wording presented in a subsequent passage of the Athēnaiōn 
Politeia, which refers to the constitution of the Athenians at that time and the fact that two citizen parents 
was still a requirement in the final decades of the fourth century BC ([Arist.] 42.1); he surmises that it must 
derive from the reformulation of Pericles’ original law during the archonship of Eucleides in 403/2 BC, in 
‘Perikles’ Citizenship Law’, pp. 316 and 324-7. 
75 Ath. 13.577b-c: Ἀριστοφῶν δ᾽ ὁ ῥήτωρ, ὁ τὸν νόμον εἰσενεγκὼν ἐπ᾽ Εὐκλείδου ἄρχοντος ὃς ἂν μὴ ἐξ 
ἀστῆς γένηται νόθον εἶναι. 
76 H. J. Wolff, ‘Marriage Law and Family Organization in Ancient Athens’, pp. 85-6; J. K. Davies, 
‘Athenian Citizenship’, p. 118; P. J. Rhodes, A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia, p. 331.  
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and his re-enactment of an earlier law, but it appears to relate to Solon’s law restricting 
trade in the marketplace to citizen men and women (see §32). Since the accounts of both 
Eumelos and Athenaeus essentially delineate that the possession of citizenship requires 
two citizen parents, it is indeed difficult to believe that they refer to two separate 
decrees.77  
It is likely that neither Pericles’ original citizenship law nor its re-enactment were 
retroactive, but that they were applicable to all those who had yet to be registered as 
citizens by 451/0 and 403/2 BC respectively.78 Euxitheos claims that his father’s 
citizenship was certain because Thoucritos was born before the archonship of Eucleides 
(see §30); yet he overlooks the fact that his father was not only born before the law was 
passed, but he was old enough to have served Athens in the Decelean War (413-404 BC; 
see §18). He must have turned eighteen years old before participating in the war effort 
and, therefore, he would have been enrolled in his deme long before 403/2 BC. The 
existence of an exemption for those already registered in their demes certainly implies 
that no deme-wide review of membership was carried out when Pericles first introduced 
the law or at its renewal.  
As Pericles’ citizenship law and its subsequent re-enactment restricted citizenship 
to those born of two citizen parents, the processes by which to scrutinise candidates for 
citizenship had to develop accordingly, for both future admissions and for occasions 
which warranted the re-evaluation of current membership. Thus the purpose of the 
                                                          
77 Walters maintains that the sources refer to two separate laws, and that Nicomenes’ decree only deals with 
citizenship while Aristophon’s law refers to legitimacy, in ‘Perikles Citizenship Law’, p. 322. However, A. 
R. W. Harrison offers the more plausible possibility that Aristophon’s law made the rule retrospective and 
Nicomenes’ decree simply reversed this particular clause, in The Law of Athens Vol. I, p. 26 n. 1. For the 
non-retroactive nature of Pericles’ law and its re-enactment, see n. 78 below. 
78 S. C. Humphreys convincingly argues that Pericles’ law and its later re-enactment in 403/2 BC were 
applicable to those born before they were passed, but who had not yet been enrolled in the demes at that 
time, in ‘The Nothoi of Kynosarges’, pp. 92-4. Scholars have generally agreed that the law had a non-
retroactive effect, see Rhodes, A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia, pp. 332-4; C. 
Patterson, ‘Those Athenian Bastards’, p. 64 n. 93; and E. Carawan, ‘Pericles the Younger and the 
Citizenship Law’, p. 383 n. 13.  
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διαψηφίσεις, both in ordinary and extraordinary circumstances, was to prevent aliens and 
the offspring of unlawful unions between citizens and aliens from assuming the rights of 
citizens. It is clear, then, that Pericles’ original law and its revival had a lasting impact on 
the behaviour and self-consciousness of the Athenians in relation to their citizenship. 
1.5: Demophilos’ decree and the extraordinary διαψήφισις of 346/5 BC 
Without the existence of any centralised process of citizen registration or state 
records of citizenship, the responsibility for scrutinising candidates for citizenship and 
maintaining a list of its admissions fell to the one hundred and thirty-nine Attic demes.79 
Both entry to the demes and ejections from them were executed by a διαψήφισις, carried 
out by the existing deme members. There were two types of διαψηφίσεις: an ordinary 
vote which was held for candidates seeking enrolment in a deme, and an extraordinary 
vote which could be undertaken by a deme as the means through which to review its own 
admissions or which was implemented as a result of a state decree requiring every deme 
to scrutinise its membership. This section will briefly examine the διαψήφισις process in 
both ordinary and extraordinary circumstances, the latter of which appears to have closely 
                                                          
79 After Cleisthenes’ establishment of the deme system in 508/7 BC (Hdt. 5.66-9; [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 21), the 
Attic demes began to control access to Athenian citizenship. However, the part played by the phratries with 
regard to citizenship after Cleisthenes’ reforms has been a much debated topic: those who believe that 
Cleisthenes’ deme system brought about the end of an essential connection between phratry membership 
and citizenship include H. T. Wade-Gery, ‘Studies in the Structure of Attic Society II’, pp. 17-29; A. 
Andrewes, ‘Philochoros on Phratries’, p. 13; Harrison, The Law of Athens Vol. I, pp. 64-5; F. J. Frost, 
‘Tribal Politics and the Civic State’, p. 67; Rhodes, A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia, 
pp. 70, 253 and 258; R. Osborne, Demos, pp. 72-4; D. Whitehead, The Demes of Attica, p. 97 n. 55; and P. 
B. Manville, The Origins of Citizenship in Ancient Athens, p. 24 n. 79. Those who maintain that phratry 
membership continued to be an important criterion of polis membership include C. Patterson, Pericles’ 
Citizenship Law of 451-450 B.C., pp. 10-11 and 26-7; and R. Sealey, The Athenian Republic, p. 4. In 
particular, Lambert maintains that the demes at least shared access to citizenship with the phratries, in The 
Phratries of Attica, pp. 261-7. While he acknowledges that Pericles’ law neither explicitly required an 
Athenian citizen to be a phratry member nor that the demes were obliged to consider the phratry credentials 
of those that had them before admission, Lambert argues that phratry membership was a matter of 
confirming Athenian descent whereas deme membership controlled the access to citizenship, pp. 25-57. 
His case is certainly persuasive; since neither the phratry nor the deme was exempt from corruption as a 
social body (for an example of phratry corruption, Dem. 44.41; for the deme, §§58 and 60-1, and Dem. 
44.44), any correlation between the two would be an effective way to circumvent fraud in one of those 
groups. Successful introductions to the phratries were frequently used as evidence in claims regarding 
citizenship (see §§23 and 54; Dem. 43.14; [Dem.] 59.59; Isae. 12.3, 8, 7.16-7, 8.19). Undoubtedly, rejection 
by a phratry would also have been considered relevant during an application for deme membership. For 
further details on phratry membership, see Appendix 5, pp. 293-7. 
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followed the former, and will analyse Demophilos’ decree of 346/5 BC which instigated 
the διαψήφισις process in which Euxitheos was ejected from his deme of Halimous. 
During an assembly of its members, a body of demesmen would implement an 
ordinary διαψήφισις in order to confirm or refute the citizenship of those applying for 
deme admission. Written in the second half of the fourth century BC, the Athēnaiōn 
Politeia is the only surviving source which describes the procedure that took place during 
that period. Athenian males normally submitted to such a vote at the age of eighteen, 
when the members of their intended demes made an annual scrutiny of those entering the 
deme for the first time ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 42.1).80 This vote took place during the deme’s 
assembly of its members and, since every Attic deme would carry out this process for 
new members at least once a year, it is likely that these διαψηφίσεις were coordinated to 
take place on or near the beginning of each deme’s administrative year (Lys. 21.1).81 With 
the dēmarch presiding over proceedings, the name of the candidate was read out before 
the assembled demesmen and any member who wished could object to the candidate’s 
admission on the grounds of at least one illegitimate parent.82 The dēmarch presumably 
administered the sacred oath to the members, which they took over sacrificial victims, 
and it was then the task of members to vote upon the age and legitimate birth of each of 
the new candidates.83 Those candidates deemed to be of age and legally born of two 
                                                          
80 For a summary of the debate regarding whether or not men were registered after reaching their eighteenth 
birthday (and were thus entering their nineteenth year) or were enrolled after entering their eighteenth year 
(after their seventeenth birthday), see M. Golden, ‘Demosthenes and the Age of Majority at Athens’, pp. 
25-38, and Rhodes, A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia, pp. 497-8. Since there was no 
registration process at birth, age would certainly have been a difficult factor to determine and so evidence 
of a candidate’s physical maturity was most likely the primary consideration for enrolment (cf. Ar. Wasps, 
578). 
81 See Rhodes, A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia, p. 497; Whitehead, The Demes of 
Attica, p. 103. For the location and frequency of the deme assemblies, see nn. 109 and 110 respectively. 
82 The dēmarch was the official who convened the deme’s assemblies, by virtue of his custody of the 
lexiarchic register, see §§8 and 26. As the presiding official, his role would also have included the 
supervision of the oath-taking during regular deme assemblies. Despite the fact that Euxitheos’ case came 
about as a result of an extraordinary διαψήφισις, the procedures which he describes do closely follow that 
of the ordinary διαψήφισις, see n. 83 below. For the dēmarch as the agent who executed the deme’s 
decisions, see Whitehead’s comprehensive discussion, in The Demes of Attica, pp. 122-30. 
83 The Athēnaiōn Politeia states that the two questions put before the demesmen are as follows: πρῶτον μὲν 
εἰ δοκοῦσι γεγονέναι τὴν ἡλικίαν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ νόμου, and εἰ ἐλεύθερός ἐστι καὶ γέγονε κατὰ τοὺς νόμους 
([Arist.] 42.1). With regard to the former condition, Rhodes states that the demesmen could be fined for 
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citizen parents were enrolled on the lexiarchic register. If a candidate was unsuccessful 
with regard to his age, he was not registered at that time. If the demesmen voted against 
a candidate’s free status during the διαψήφισις, that man did not become a citizen; if he 
was deemed to have been a slave, he was most likely sold or if he was found to be foreign 
but free, he was probably classed as a metic thereafter.84 The rejected candidate could 
either accept the deme’s judgement or bring an ἔφεσις before the jury-court (δικαστήριον) 
and face five prosecutors selected from his deme (κατήγοροι, [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 42.1).85 
This jury-court was presided over by the Thesmothetae ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 59.4).86 The 
Athēnaiōn Politeia only records two possible outcomes: if the appellant was unsuccessful, 
the candidate was sold as a slave but, if he was successful in court, the deme was obliged 
to admit him ([Arist.] 42.1).  
Unfortunately, there are no surviving accounts of appeals brought from an 
ordinary διαψήφισις, though there are certain indications of abuse in the system of deme 
enrolment which suggest ensuing disputes would have been brought before the lawcourt 
(see §§58 and 60-1; Dem. 44.44). All those who fulfilled the requirements of the 
διαψήφισις and those who were successful in a court appeal then had to pass a subsequent 
review by the Boulē in order to be accepted as cadets into their deme (this investigation 
by the Boulē was termed a δοκιμασία, [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 42.2; cf. Ar. Wasps, 578).87 The 
                                                          
accepting candidates who were younger than the required age, in A Commentary on the Aristotelian 
Athenaion Politeia, p. 499. The second question requires that two conditions are met in order to attain 
citizenship, since a candidate might be free but illegitimate if he was born out of wedlock. However, A. W. 
Gomme notes that the author of the Athēnaiōn Politeia makes no reference to the consequences which arose 
out of such cases, either out of carelessness in his writing or because no punishment followed, in ‘Two 
Problems of Athenian Citizenship Law’, p. 132. Gomme concludes that the candidate remained free but an 
alien, though a later prosecution might follow if perjury or fraud was suspected on the father’s part,  
84 Rhodes, A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia, p. 502. For a definition of the term 
μέτοικος, see D. Whitehead, The Ideology of the Athenian Metic, pp. 6-10. 
85 Cf. the similar phrasing used in IG II² 1205. An ἔφεσις was presumably initiated via the rejected 
candidate’s father or guardian, since only registered adult citizens could initiate court proceedings of this 
kind. 
86 Rhodes, A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia, p. 501; Whitehead, The Demes of Attica, 
p. 101. 
87 Cf. §62, Dem. 27.5, 44.1; Lys. 21.1, 10.31, 26.21, 32.9. The δοκιμασία was a general term used to 
describe an investigation held by either the Boulē or the court, in which the purpose was to confirm whether 
a man was to be accepted as a newly enrolled citizen or if he was formally qualified to hold the public office 
to which he had been appointed. B. G. Robertson has persuasively argued that the Boulē’s δοκιμασία of 
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fact that the demes’ decisions were subject to revisions by state-appointed bodies 
underscores the importance of the ordinary διαψήφισις procedure as a rite of passage to 
citizenship.  
One would expect that a man’s status as a citizen would have been certain after 
confirmation by the Boulē and his subsequent enrolment in his deme. However, as 
Euxitheos’ situation makes evident, this was not always the case. Since it was impossible 
to establish one’s parentage beyond any doubt, there were several occasions on which an 
Athenian man had to undergo an official review of his citizen status.88 One such 
occurrence came about when he was selected to hold office.89 But the unreliability of the 
deme registers meant that other occasions had a more extensive reach, namely when an 
extraordinary διαψήφισις was undertaken at deme level in order to scrutinise each existing 
member’s credentials for citizenship.  
First and foremost, a deme could hold an extraordinary διαψήφισις as the means 
through which to revise its lexiarchic register and to determine if there had been any 
improper enrolments. This could occur when accusations had been made against a number 
                                                          
young men for citizenship entailed physically examining the bodies of the youths to see if they were the 
proper age, see ‘The Scrutiny of New Citizens in Athens’, pp. 149-74. Robertson concludes that, by passing 
this test, a candidate’s adulthood was conferred upon him by the Boulē’s δοκιμασία. See also n. 47 in the 
Commentary. 
88 Should a deme member’s status be called into question at a later stage, he could allude to his initial 
recognition by the demesmen as proof of his belonging, just as Euxitheos does at §§61-2. This alone was 
not always enough to confirm one’s citizen status, as indicated by the previously mentioned abuses in the 
system of deme enrolment for political or financial gain. S. Lape summarises the situation by stating that, 
since there was no one act by which a father could definitely acknowledge and establish his paternity, there 
was no one act by which a citizen could secure his civic legitimacy once and for all, in Reproducing Athens, 
pp. 73-4. Given the apparent difficulty of maintaining citizenship indefinitely, her argument that acting 
Athenian and performing to communal expectations was central to the practice of democratic citizenship is 
highly persuasive. 
89 Candidates who were chosen had to undergo a δοκιμασία before they could assume office ([Arist.] Ath. 
Pol. 45.2; for generals, Lys. 15.2; for priests, Pl. Laws, 759d, and for those presiding over a court and those 
overseeing state business for more than thirty days, cf. Aeschin. 3.14). According to the author of the 
Athēnaiōn Politeia, both those appointed by lot and those elected by show of hands underwent this review 
([Arist.] 55.2) in order to ascertain that the candidates possessed the legal qualification for office rather 
than to establish their competence for the role; see Harrison, The Law of Athens Vol. II, pp. 201-7. The 
δοκιμασίαι for these magistrates came before a jury in a court, under the presidency of the Thesmothetae, 
but separate δοκιμασίαι proceedings were held in the Boulē for new members of that body and for the 
positions of the nine archōns ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 45.3; see D. M. MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens, 
pp. 167-8). The questions asked in the δοκιμασία proceedings are referred to by Euxitheos (see §§66-70; 
see also Aeschin. 1.28 and [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 55.3-4). 
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of its members or when there were suspicions about corruption in the deme’s 
administrative practices.90 Moreover, a διαψήφισις of this kind appears to have been the 
necessary action taken by a deme when it had to replace its register of members due to 
loss or destruction (either accidental, as initially suggested by Euxitheos at §26, or as a 
deliberate political move which he subsequently claims at §§60-2).91 While it is not 
known what regulations governed such διαψηφίσεις, it is clear that the demes themselves 
were responsible for the reassessment of their own membership and that this process 
closely followed that of the ordinary διαψήφισις. These scrutinies were informal events, 
held during an assembly of its members and under the supervision of its own dēmarch. 
As with the coming of age διαψηφίσεις, an oath was administered to the demesmen by 
the presiding dēmarch and the matter put before them on this occasion was whether or 
not they thought the individual in question to be a true and legitimate citizen. If the 
gathered demesmen voted against one of their members, he was struck off the lexiarchic 
register and subsequently expelled from the deme, as in the case of Euxitheos (see also 
Dem. 18.132-4).92 The Suda reports that any man who had been struck from the register 
would then be taken to the jury-court and tried for being a foreigner; if he was convicted, 
he was sold as a slave but if he was successful, he was reinstated into the citizen-body.93 
                                                          
90 Suda s.v. διαψήφισις, Adler Δ850: οἱ πολῖται συνίασιν ἕκαστοι κατὰ τοὺς αὑτῶν δήμους καὶ περὶ τῶν 
αἰτίαν ἐχόντων ἢ παρεγγεγραμμένων εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν ψῆφον φέρουσι κρύβδην. 
91 B. Haussoullier suggests that an alternative solution to the διαψήφισις could have been adopted, namely 
reconstructing the register by a communal effort of memory, in La Vie Municipale en Attique, pp. 52-3. 
Indeed, this might certainly have sufficed for a small deme like Halimous. Yet, one would be more inclined 
to agree with Whitehead’s conclusion that, if a simpler method had been available to replace the register, it 
is surprising that Euxitheos does not expressly say so since it would suit his argument to portray Antiphilos 
(the former dēmarch and father of his current opponent) in the worst possible light, in The Demes of Attica, 
p. 105. It may have been the case that an unknown Athenian law required that a διαψήφισις take place in 
every deme, regardless of size, when it was necessary to reconstruct or revise a deme register. But given 
that the incident in Halimous is the only surviving source which recounts the loss of a lexiarchic register, 
and that is only briefly referred to by a speaker who is the victim of a subsequent and different type of 
διαψήφισις, it cannot be conclusively known how other such losses were managed. 
92 A speech dated circa 343 BC, Dem. 18.132 uses the verb ἀποψηφίζομαι in relation to a man named 
Antiphon, who had been ‘voted-out’ from the citizen body at an unspecified time. Antiphon apparently left 
Athens after his ejection, since the speaker claims that he returned to Athens in order to burn the docks at 
the Piraeus for Philip II of Macedon at some point between 346 and 342 BC (see also Plut. Dem. 14.4; 
Dein. 1.63; Worthington, A Historical Commentary on Dinarchus, pp. 227-8).  
93 Suda s.v. Ἀποψηφισθέντα Adler Α3658: εἶτα εἰσήγετο εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον καὶ ἐκρίνετο ξενίας, καὶ εἰ μὲν 
ἑάλω, ἐπιπράσκετο ὡς ξένος: εἰ δὲ ἐκράτει, ἀνελαμβάνετο εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν. This tenth century AD 
Byzantine encyclopaedia was compiled by numerous authors, who had access to the texts of the Greek 
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It is not clear from this source, however, whether this subsequent process was initiated as 
a voluntary γραφὴ ξενίας or as an appeal against expulsion by the ejected man. The 
isolated and irregular nature of this type of διαψήφισις, and the lack of evidence about 
local proceedings from the Attic demes, make it impossible to establish any details about 
the procedure with any certainty. It was certainly fortunate that Euxitheos reports the loss 
of the lexiarchic register in his deme. He uses this information to bolster his claim to 
citizenship by referring to the fact that neither his father’s nor his own status was called 
into question during the earlier διαψήφισις in Halimous; a διαψήφισις which was initiated 
under quite different circumstances from the one which brought about his current 
disfranchised state.  
The demes could be compelled by the state to hold an extraordinary διαψήφισις 
to remove any intruders generally suspected as having infiltrated the deme system and 
appropriated the rights and privileges of citizens. This formal review, decreed by the 
Ecclēsia, entailed the widespread revision of the lexiarchic registers in every Attic deme 
and it was the responsibility of the deme itself to hold a vote on each of its members 
individually. The very existence of this type of διαψήφισις signals a persistent Athenian 
preoccupation with protecting citizenship, one which continued from Pericles’ restrictive 
legislation in 451/0 BC. Nevertheless, implementing a deme-wide scrutiny was an 
extreme measure and, as such, it would appear that it was a rare event. Indeed, only two 
such occasions when all Athenian citizens were uniformly examined, deme by deme, are 
known from the source material; the first in the mid-fifth century, and the second in the 
mid-fourth century which induced Euxitheos’ disfranchisement.94  
                                                          
poets and their scholia, as well as the Greek and Roman historians, and various different lexical and 
grammatical works. For a detailed overview of the Suda’s sources, see R. Tosi, ‘Suda’ in Brill’s New Pauly, 
published by Brill Online. 
94 The Athēnaiōn Politeia alleges that a διαψηφισμός took place in 510 BC after the tyranny of the 
Peististratids was overthrown ([Arist.] 13.5). However, if this account is accurate, such a review cannot 
have taken place in the demes since they were first established by Cleisthenes in 508/7 BC; see A. Diller, 
‘The Decree of Demophilus, 346-345 B.C.’, p. 203, and ‘Scrutiny and Appeal in Athenian Citizenship’, p. 
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The first extraordinary διαψήφισις, in 445/4 BC, followed a large gift of grain 
from Psammetichos of Egypt to be distributed among Athenian citizens during a famine 
and it revealed close to five thousand fraudulent enrolments (Philoch. FGrH 328 F119, 
apud. schol. Ar. Wasps, 718a-b; Plut. Per. 37.3-5).95 However, very little is known about 
proceedings during this enactment of the extraordinary διαψήφισις and there is no 
evidence to detail the procedure in the trials arising from it. Since Philochoros does not 
use either the term διαψήφισις or διαψηφισμός, some scholars have suggested that the 
widespread ejections at this time occurred as a result of a mass of γραφαὶ ξενίας; 
specifically, Diller maintains that the situation in 445/4 BC was similar to that presented 
in Aristophanes’ Wasps.96 A series of these prosecutions is certainly plausible given 
Plutarch’s statement that those convicted were sold into slavery. Alternatively, if the 
enslavements were to have followed failed appeals like those described by both Dionysios 
and Libanios after the extraordinary διαψήφισις of 346/5 BC,97 Plutarch’s statement 
                                                          
305, and Gomme, ‘Two Problems of Athenian Citizenship Law’, pp. 139-40. It may be the case that the 
author of the Athēnaiōn Politeia has mistakenly applied the term διαψηφισμός from his own day to refer to 
a scrutiny that took place in the phratries or genē ([Arist.] 21.2). Moreover, if one does accept the validity 
of this διαψηφισμός, it may be argued that it took place before a clear definition of the requirements for 
citizenship existed, see Manville, The Origins of Citizenship in Ancient Athens, p. 176. 
95 Since neither Philochoros nor Aristophanes refer to any specifications for the distribution among the 
Athenians, one must assume that in 445/4 BC those who received the grain were those who fulfilled the 
requirements for citizenship laid down by Pericles in 451/0 BC. Moreover, while both Philochoros and 
Plutarch present similar figures for those who were found to be illegally in possession of citizenship at this 
time, the former states that four thousand seven hundred and sixty men were ejected from the demes 
whereas the latter claims that nearly five thousand were enslaved. The fragment from Philochoros makes 
no mention of enslavement with regard to those who had been falsely enrolled in the demes. Since Plutarch 
may have relied on details from the Athēnaiōn Politeia regarding the annual scrutinies, one would be 
inclined to agree with E. Cohen that Plutarch has confused the number of those removed from the deme 
lists with that of those who were subsequently enslaved after failed appeals, in Ancient Athenian Maritime 
Courts, p. 170 n. 31. For a full discussion of the numbers portrayed in both Philochoros and Plutarch, see 
F. Jacoby, ‘Philochoros von Athen (328F119-120)’ in Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker III, pp. 
462-82. 
96Ar. Wasps, 718: καὶ ταῦτα μόλις ξενίας φεύγων ἔλαβες κατὰ χοίνικα κριθῶν. See Diller, ‘The Decree of 
Demophilus, 346-345 B. C.’, p. 204 (cf. Race Mixture Among the Greeks Before Alexander, p. 93 n. 42; 
for details on the γραφὴ ξενίας, see n. 64). The ambiguity of the sources is extended by the use of the terms 
ξενηλασία (expulsion of foreigners) and τὸ διακρίνειν (judgement) by the scholiast on Ar. Wasps, 718a-b. 
For other scholars who are inclined to believe that the action taken was a series of individual γραφαὶ ξενίας, 
see Jacoby, ‘Philochoros von Athen (328 F119-120)’ in Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker III, 
pp. 462-8, and Whitehead, The Ideology of the Athenian Metic, p. 151 (cf. The Demes of Attica, pp. 99-
100). However, Philochoros’ use of the rare term παρέγγραφοι (illegally enrolled members) may indicate 
that the author assumed a thorough scrutiny of the citizen lists had taken place (cf. παρέγγραπτοι in Aeschin. 
2.177); see P. Harding, The Story of Athens, p. 114. 
97 For slavery as the penalty after this event, see Introduction, pp. 43-9. 
32 
 
would have to imply that everyone who was rejected by the deme then made an appeal. 
To avoid this incredibly unlikely scenario, Gomme suggests that a διαψήφισις was indeed 
implemented in 445/4 BC but that the only lawsuits which ensued were a series of γραφαὶ 
ξενίας.98 His analysis is certainly persuasive in light of Plutarch’s reference to Pericles’ 
citizenship law enacted six years earlier (μόνους Ἀθηναίους εἶναι τοὺς ἐκ δυεῖν Ἀθηναίων 
γεγονότας); it is entirely plausible that the Athenian preoccupation with citizen numbers 
and eligibility would have occasioned a full review of the deme registers after receiving 
the Egyptian grain.  
It is fortunate that more details survive regarding the second extraordinary review. 
This διαψήφισις took place during the archonship of Archias: Harpocration cites 
Androtion and Philochoros for evidence that the scrutinies took place when Archias was 
archōn in 346/5 BC (see Androt. FGrH 324 F52 and Philoch. FGrH 328 F52 in Harp. 
s.v. διαψήφισις).99 The date of this general scrutiny appears to be corroborated by 
                                                          
98 Gomme, ‘Two Problems of Athenian Citizenship Law’, p. 135 n. 23 and p. 140. Still, the question remains 
as to which board presided over the trials. Gomme assumes that such trials were in the hands of the 
ξενοδίκαι, who were a specially appointed board for this occasion and not long after abolished; his argument 
follows that of A. Körte, in ‘Die attischen ΞΕΝΟΔΙΚΑΙ’, pp. 238-42. However, there is little in the 
surviving evidence to support Körte’s assertion that the ξενοδίκαι were established to oversee the γραφαὶ 
ξενίας after Pericles’ citizenship law of 451/0 BC (schon nach Perikles’ Bürgerschaftsgesetz), p. 239. In 
the sources, it would appear that the ναυτοδίκαι originally had charge of γραφαὶ ξενίας. In addition to cases 
regarding maritime contracts between merchants and sailors in the Piraeus (δίκαι ἐμπορικαί, see Lys. 17.5, 
8), this particular magistracy presided over fraudulent attempts at phratry admission in the fifth century, 
before Pericles’ law (Crateros’ fragment relates to those born of two foreign parents, FGrH 342 F4 in Suda 
s.v. ναυτοδίκαι Adler Ν86, see n. 63). In subsequent years, it would appear fitting for the γραφαὶ ξενίας to 
be assigned to the ναυτοδίκαι. Moreover, Körte’s suggestion that the ξενοδίκαι ceased to operate sometime 
before 437 BC and that their functions were thus transferred to the ναυτοδίκαι is also problematic, p. 240. 
Their name appears in fragmentary form at IG² II 46.144, which is dated circa 400 BC. However, the 
ναυτοδίκαι appear to have been abolished as an office by the middle of the fourth century and their 
responsibilities transferred to the Thesmothetae (for the γραφαὶ ξενίας, see [Dem.] 59.52, which is dated 
circa 342 BC; for the δίκαι ἐμπορικαί, see Dem. 33.1, which is dated no earlier than 341 BC; [Arist.] Ath. 
Pol. 59.3). Since neither the ξενοδίκαι nor the ναυτοδίκαι were specifically tied to trials arising from the 
situation in 445/4 BC, it cannot be known which board of magistrates was responsible for the γραφαὶ ξενίας 
at that time. 
99 Cf. Suda s.v. διαψήφισις Adler Δ851 and Dion. Hal. Din. 11. Dionysios lists two spurious public orations 
of Deinarchos, namely Against the Kerykes and Against Moschion, both of which he states were delivered 
in cases arising from the disfranchisements when Archias was archōn. Unfortunately, he provides very 
little detail about either case; however, the first appears to have been a case against the genos of the Kerykes 
and not against a deme, but the second speech could indeed have been delivered by a victim of the 
extraordinary διαψήφισις against his deme in a similar manner to that of Euxitheos against Euboulides. 
However, Dionysios may be problematic as source for classifying such speeches as elsewhere he lists 
Against Euboulides among a series of private lawsuits (ἰδιωτικοὶ λόγοι, Dem. 13); see Appendix 7, p. 307. 
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Aeschines’ Against Timarchos, a speech which is dated to 345 BC and which refers to 
the deme-wide review as a current event (1.77-8). Moreover, Aeschines ascribes this 
review to a motion proposed by the Athenian orator, Demophilos (1.86). In the same 
passage, he indicates that this man had previously introduced measures to deal with 
individuals who were attempting to bribe the Ecclēsia and also the courts (see also schol. 
Aeschin. 1.77, 86, 114-5, 2.182). Unlike the previous scrutiny of 445/4 BC, which was 
initiated in order to assess the eligibility of each member of the citizen body for the grant 
of grain, Demophilos proposed this review of the deme registers in the belief that a 
considerable number of individuals had found their way onto the list without the 
necessary citizen requirements (see §§3 and 49). Several specific reasons for 
Demophilos’ motion at this time have been suggested. The first is that it occurred in the 
wake of Philip II of Macedon’s expulsion of a large number of Athenians (or those 
pretending to be Athenians) from Thrace a few years earlier, who had been settlers in the 
region (Dem. 6.20).100 Other theories for the appearance of Demophilos’ proposal 
concern Athens’ economic stability at that time: one asserts that Athens had been 
experiencing a period of economic growth and political strength similar to that which 
induced Pericles’ restriction of citizen privileges in 451/0 BC,101 while another 
emphasises that such a period of stability had drawn to a close after fifteen years.102 After 
                                                          
100 M. H. Hansen, The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes, p. 95. The Athenian preoccupation 
with ‘pretend citizens’ and thus the need to protect citizen privileges is advocated by R. Zelnick-
Abramovitz, who views this as the context which brought about the enactment of the laws for manumitted 
slaves, in Not Wholly Free, p. 278. 
101 K. Kapparis, ‘Immigration and Citizenship Procedures in Athenian Law’, pp. 94-5. Kapparis’ theory 
certainly bears merit in light of the historical reality of the situation at that time. Worthington stresses the 
economic strains placed on Athens after the Social War (357-5 BC), in A Historical Commentary on 
Dinarchus, p. 71. The arguments for Athens’ financial difficulties in the years immediately following the 
end of the conflict are substantiated by comments made in two of Demosthenes’ speeches (Dem. 20.114, 
24.98). It was during this period of economic need, in the aftermath of the war, that Euboulos became 
politically active (355-42 BC) and served as Theoric commissioner. Under his leadership, Athens limited 
its activities abroad and pursued a policy orientated towards domestic recovery. As a result, revenues rose 
and the city did indeed experience a period of significant prosperity. For an overview of Euboulos’ career, 
see G. L. Cawkwell, ‘Eubulus’, pp. 47-67. 
102 G. Glotz details a series of difficulties facing the Athenians in 346 BC, including piracy and uncertain 
supply routes, in ‘Démosthène et les finances Athéniennes de 346 à 339’, p. 394. Building on this, J. J. 
Buchanan makes a striking connection between Demophilos’ motion and Athens’ economic straits after the 
costly Euboean campaign and the loss of the city of Olynthos to Philip II of Macedon in 348 BC, in 
Theorika, p. 64. Moreover, S. Lape argues that Demophilos’ proposal comes at a time when the fear of 
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being passed by the Ecclēsia, Demophilos’ motion required that each deme scrutinise its 
own members. The extent of the fraudulent admissions is not specifically recorded and it 
is not known how many lost their citizenship, although there are several indications that 
Demophilos’ decree caused a significant disturbance to the citizen body (see §§1-7; 
Aeschin. 1.77; in court in 343 BC, Aeschines expects goodwill on the ground of not being 
responsible for anyone’s expulsion, 2.182). It would appear that the extraordinary 
διαψήφισις had extensive repercussions throughout the demes.  
Most details about the extraordinary διαψήφισις of 346/5 BC derive from 
Euxitheos’ appeal and that of Euphiletos (Isae. 12), whose disfranchisements occurred as 
a result of this action.103 Although neither speaker directly refers to Demophilos by name, 
the commentators to these two speeches provide the connection. In his essay on Isaeus, 
dating to the first century BC, Dionysios associates Euphiletos’ speech with a law passed 
by the Athenians to hold a scrutiny of all those enrolled in the registers (Dion. Hal. Isae. 
16). Writing much later in the fourth century AD, Libanios uses similar terms to tie 
Demosthenes’ Against Euboulides to such a law, giving the terms of the decree under 
which it was initiated (Hyp. 27).104 Although Demophilos’ decree is not specifically 
named in relation to the law that they describe, it seems clear that both authors are 
referring to the same motion which instigated the διαψήφισις of that year. Nevertheless, 
the nature of the law reported by both Dionysios and Libanios has been much debated; 
                                                          
fraudulent citizens, rather than an actual increase in the usurpation of citizen rights, was the means through 
which to explain a downturn in Athenian fortunes with increasing military and diplomatic threats, in Race 
and Citizen Identity in the Classical Athenian Democracy, p. 215. 
103 Besides Against Euboulides and Isaeus’ On Behalf of Euphiletos, there are a couple of other references 
to cases which arose as a result of this extraordinary διαψήφισις. Having just mentioned Demophilos’ deme-
wide review (1.77-8, 86), Aeschines then provides an all too brief account of a certain Philotades and his 
case against the deme of Kydathenaeon (1.114-5). Further references emerge from speeches which are now 
lost but which may have occurred as a result of the same διαψήφισις. First is Isaeus’ Against Boeotos: the 
apparent accuser in this case, Boeotos, could be the same man who was indicted by his half-brother over 
his use of his name (Dem. 39) and also for the return of a dowry (Dem. 40); if so, the lost speech must 
relate to a case which took place after the two surviving speeches had been delivered, see Gomme, ‘Two 
Problems of Athenian Citizenship Law’, p. 125 n. 3. However, this Boeotos could equally be a nephew of 
the man referred to in Demosthenes’ speeches, see Davies, Athenian Propertied Families, p. 365. The 
second speech is Deinarchos’ Against Moschion (Dion. Hal. Din. 11; see n. 94). 
104 See Introduction, pp. 15-21. 
35 
 
significantly, Diller and Gomme disagree as to whether or not there was a standing law 
that enabled the Ecclēsia to decree a general scrutiny. Diller claims that the law described 
by Dionysios and Libanios was only a temporary measure, and that Demophilos’ decree 
carried two provisions: the temporary measure attested by the rhetoricians and orators, 
and the standing law attested by Aristotle.105 Gomme, however, argues that a standing 
law must have existed prior to 346/5 BC which enabled an extraordinary scrutiny to take 
place when the Ecclēsia voted for one by a decree, and that it was probably this same law 
which established the procedure of ordinary annual scrutinies; as such, Dionysios and 
Libanios are correct in speaking of a law, but they should also have referred to the separate 
decree which occasioned the speeches of both Euphiletos and Euxitheos.106 While 
Euphiletos’ incomplete speech makes no mention of either the law or decree which 
occasioned the extraordinary διαψήφισις, Euxitheos does expressly refer to a ψήφισμα 
(public decree, see §§7; cf. 30) and speaks of it as being a recent event (see §§2, 15, 49 
and 58). In 345 BC, Aeschines does not use the term decree, but refers to Demophilos’ 
πολιτεύματα or measures (1.86). Since no other extraordinary scrutiny from the fourth 
century is known from the source material, and one would certainly expect even a single 
reference to a similar upheaval of the citizen body occurring during that period, it is highly 
unlikely that these speeches could belong to another extraordinary διαψήφισις but that 
implemented by Demophilos’ decree of 346/5 BC. 
Moreover, details provided by the speeches of Euxitheos and Euphiletos have 
presented strong evidence in favour of dating both the speeches to circa 346/5 BC. The 
                                                          
105 ‘The Decree of Demophilus, 346-345 B.C.’, pp. 195-6. 
106 ‘Two Problems of Athenian Citizenship Law’, p. 124. Diller responds to Gomme’s article by stating that 
decrees of the Ecclēsia were bound not to be inconsistent with Athenian laws but did not have to be 
specifically authorised by one, in ‘Scrutiny and Appeal in Athenian Citizenship’, pp. 302-3. He claims that 
a standing law would imply that there were other general scrutinies besides that of Demophilos in 346/5 
BC, yet he fails to recognise any authenticity in the attested scrutiny of 445/4 BC. While it is true that the 
silence of the source material with regard to any other extraordinary scrutinies is compelling enough to 
believe that they were rare events, Diller’s failure to acknowledge the events surrounding the gift of grain 
from Egypt and its brief account in the source material lends more weight to Gomme’s argument. 
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date of Demophilos’ διαψήφισις also appears to correspond with Euxitheos’ age (§§40-2 
suggest that Euxitheos was the oldest of Nicarete’s children with Thoucritos, born before 
he was abroad with Thrasyboulos in 387 BC; by the time of the speech he must have been 
middle-aged given his political and religious involvements at §§46, 62 and 63). Whereas 
Demosthenes’ Against Euboulides appears to have been delivered soon after the 
διαψήφισις of 346/5 BC, possibly within a year of the extraordinary scrutiny taking place, 
Isaeus’ On Behalf of Euphiletos is more difficult to date given its fragmentary state.107 
Dionysios’ brief comments, however, and details provided by the speaker do correspond 
to Demophilos’ motion which instigated the extraordinary διαψήφισις. Kapparis’ 
convincing reading of the speech makes it highly probable that the demesmen of Erchia, 
who had been forced to admit the eighteen year old Euphiletos when he lodged a 
successful appeal against them, seized the opportunity of the extraordinary διαψήφισις of 
346/5 BC to have him removed from their register.108 This ulterior motive of the 
demesmen of Erchia is indeed comparable to the one alleged by Euxitheos’ defence, in 
which it is claimed that his opponent Euboulides sought his disfranchisement at the deme-
wide scrutiny due to both a political (see §§2, 7 and 17) and personal rivalry (see §61). 
The particulars of both cases are certainly important for demonstrating the opportunity to 
settle old scores afforded by such an extraordinary διαψήφισις as that which occurred in 
the middle of the fourth century BC. 
Like the ordinary διαψηφίσεις, the extraordinary διαψήφισις of 346/5 BC took 
place during a deme assembly and its procedure was closely akin to that described for the 
ordinary διαψήφισις in the Athēnaiōn Politeia. Some aspects of the review, however, are 
not specified in the source material; certain details provided by Euxitheos relating to the 
διαψήφισις in Halimous are not confirmed in other sources. For example, it cannot be 
                                                          
107 For the analytical problems encountered by scholars, see Appendix 1, pp. 270-9. 
108 Kapparis, ‘Immigration and Citizenship Procedures in Athenian Law’, pp. 86-91; cf. ‘Isaeus 12: On 
Behalf of Euphiletus’ in A. Wolpert and K. Kapparis, Legal Speeches of Democratic Athens, pp. 73-8. 
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definitively known whether or not a special deme assembly had to be called in order to 
facilitate the required voting or if the enactment of Demophilos’ decree occurred at the 
time of year when the demes typically held their meetings. In Against Euboulides, 
Euxitheos does bring attention to that fact that normal deme business was conducted at 
the meeting of the Halimousians before the voting actually took place (specifically 
speech-making and decrees, §9). This may either have been opportunistic on their part or 
it could simply signal the routine manner in which the extraordinary votes were held. 
Additionally, the location of the assembly for the deme’s extraordinary διαψήφισις may 
have been different.109 Euxitheos specifies that the assembly for Halimous took place in 
the city, a distance of thirty-five stades from the deme itself (an unspecified location in 
the ἄστυ, see §10). He also reports that the demesmen from Halimous, a small-medium 
sized deme with approximately eighty demesmen in 346/5 BC (sixty had been examined 
at §10 while more than twenty remained for the vote at §15), took two days to complete 
its διαψήφισις.110 Even if each of the one hundred and thirty-nine Attic demes only held 
                                                          
109 Numerous suggestions from individual deme decrees have given rise to the assumption that deme 
assemblies were held locally; see Haussoullier, La Vie Municipale en Attique, p. 5, and a more detailed 
discussion in Whitehead, The Demes of Attica, pp. 86-90. Yet, as E. Cohen has correctly noted, not a single 
local meeting is specifically attested in the source material, see The Athenian Nation, pp. 114-5. Indeed, 
Against Euboulides is the only source to depict a deme assembly in any detail and, for this gathering, the 
Halimousians met in the city for a specifically extraordinary διαψήφισις (see τοῦ ἄστεως §10). Cohen, 
however, argues that two pieces of epigraphical evidence confirm the regularity of assemblies being held 
in central Athens, namely the deme decree of Eleusinians from 332/1 BC and the earlier phratry decrees of 
the Demotionidae from 396/5 BC. However, he fails to take into account the specifics of these decrees. The 
decree from Eleusis depicts the deme elections of the Eleusinians as taking place in the Thesion (SEG 28 
103, 28), and its location in the city is one of the very few elements of the decree on which scholars agree, 
see Whitehead, The Demes of Attica, pp. 89-90; Cohen, The Athenian Nation, pp. 115-6; and E. Lupu, 
Greek Sacred Law, pp. 154-6. In spite of its ambiguities, the decree’s specification of the location of the 
assembly may rather signify that the Eleusinian assemblies were not normally held there. Furthermore, the 
first motion of the Demotionidae decrees relates to an extraordinary review of membership in that phratry 
(IG II² 1237), and made provision for the regular annual scrutinies to take place in the ἄστυ or city (lines 
63-4). Yet it cannot be overlooked that this decree refers to actions taken in a phratry and it was expressly 
termed as a διαδικασία. In some aspects, this process may have borne some similarities to an ordinary 
διαψήφισις procedure in a deme; for example, rejected candidates could make an appeal, and in the case of 
the Demotionidae, could face five representatives from that body (συνήγοροι, lines 26-45; the same right 
of appeal may have been applicable for the genē too, [Dem.] 59.59-61; Andoc. 1.127; Isae. 7.16-7; 8.19). 
Nevertheless, a major difference between the two can be seen in the fact that there was no subsequent state 
review for phratry admissions comparable to that undertaken by the Boulē for new demesmen (neither the 
phratries nor indeed the genē were considered to be official bodies comparable to the demes). 
110 A. W. Gomme assumes that Euxitheos is either understating the population of Halimous, or that the 
deme was over-represented in the Boulē, as its three seats would have required as many as two hundred 
demesmen, in The Population of Athens in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C., pp. 54-5. However, 
Osborne uses a more up-to-date population estimate and his own approximation that 32.5 demesmen aged 
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one assembly per calendar year for normal business, it would be difficult to believe that 
the city of Athens played host to all of them; demes situated further than Halimous and 
of varying sizes, required time and resources for their gatherings accordingly.111 It may 
thus have been the case that the extraordinary διαψήφισις of 346/5 BC required that 
proceedings take place in the city. It would certainly make sense in light of the widespread 
mistrust at that time and the consequential doubt cast on the deme’s ability to be stringent 
in its admission procedures.112 Furthermore, it is not known whether a deme meeting for 
the extraordinary διαψήφισις was actually supposed to be completed in a single day. 
Euxitheos only mentions the duration of the assembly while protesting at the late hour in 
which the vote on his citizenship credentials was taken; he asserts that it could have been 
postponed to the following day, when the deme reconvened the assembly in order to hear 
the remaining cases (see §§12 and 15, cf. §§9-10). Confining the meeting to a single day 
might have been possible if the deme had not spent time on regular business, but this 
would certainly have been difficult, if not unavoidable, for demes larger than Halimous. 
It is definitely plausible that the duration of the deme’s assembly depended on the size of 
the deme. Demophilos’ decree undoubtedly made the extraordinary διαψήφισις procedure 
compulsory in all the demes, yet some features of the meetings it generated are 
unfortunately not reported in the sources.  
                                                          
over thirty were required for each seat on the Athenian Boulē in order to calculate that Halimous needed 
about one hundred demesmen in order to fill its allocation of three councillors in the Boulē (βουλευταί), in 
Demos, pp. 43-4. Osborne’s figure is certainly more consistent with Euxitheos’ estimation of eighty 
members in 346/5 BC. 
111 In addition to the admission of new members, another function of the deme assembly was to appoint 
local officials for the deme and for the state. There are two examples in the source material of these duties 
being performed at the same meeting (Dem. 44.39; Isae. 7.27-8). While acknowledging that it may 
theoretically have been possible for a deme to function with just one assembly a year, Whitehead suggests 
that it would be more likely for each deme to need several assemblies during the year in order to fulfil all 
of its sacred and civil duties, in The Demes of Attica, p. 92. While these meetings need not have been 
frequent, as Cohen points out in The Athenian Nation, p. 116, larger demes may have required more 
assemblies than smaller demes and it was a matter for each dēmarch to convene an assembly whenever his 
deme required one (Harp. s.v. δήμαρχος).  
112 If the assemblies were all held in the city, it would be hard to believe Haussoullier’s claim that they were 
all held at the same time, La Vie Municipale en Attique, p. 41. Whitehead’s theory that they were held 
within a fixed period of time sounds more plausible, in The Demes of Attica, p. 108. 
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Matters are further complicated by the fact that our main source for the 
extraordinary διαψήφισις in the deme, Euxitheos, contends that procedures had been 
manipulated in Halimous. Before the names of the demesmen were read out, the 
assembled members took an oath to vote honestly on each man’s claim to citizenship 
before the voting commenced (see §§8-9). Part of this oath is presented in Euxitheos’ 
speech, specifically a clause which he claims Euboulides and his co-conspirators had 
removed (see §63). Irrespective of whether or not the speaker is telling the truth with 
regard to this alleged misconduct, it is Euboulides’ attested position as the demesman in 
charge of the oath and the lexiarchic register that is most interesting (see §8). These 
responsibilities would usually belong to the dēmarch during ordinary διαψηφίσεις.113 Yet 
Euxitheos does not explicitly refer to Euboulides as the dēmarch in Halimous; he only 
states that his opponent was the deme’s representative in the Boulē (βουλευτής, see §8). 
This has led to some ambiguity with regard to the capacity in which Euboulides appears 
to have been in charge of the proceedings at the deme assembly of Halimous: whether he 
was indeed the dēmarch at that time or whether he was fulfilling his obligations as a state-
appointed official for his deme during the extraordinary review.114 During Euxitheos’ 
appeal, however, Euboulides serves as one of the five deme representatives on behalf of 
the prosecution; as his only named opponent, Euboulides presumably took the lead role 
in representing the deme of Halimous (see §1; cf. [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 42.1, Aeschin. 1.114). 
In its fragmentary form, Euphiletos’ speech is of little help; his only reference to the 
dēmarch of Erchia is in relation to his earlier suit against the deme, before the 
                                                          
113 See n. 82. 
114 Whitehead deems Euxitheos’ wording at §8 to be a recognisable periphrasis for dēmarch, in The Demes 
of Attica, p. 88; cf. P. J. Rhodes, The Athenian Boule, p. 174 n. 3. Moreover, he suggests that the dual role 
may have been more due to necessity than just personal ambition on Euboulides’ part given that Halimous 
had three seats in the Boulē and only approximately eighty members in 346/5 BC, see n. 105. Yet R. Develin 
has questioned whether Euboulides was indeed Halimous’ dēmarch; he notes that Euxitheos’ omission of 
the term with regard to his opponent stands in stark contrast to his use of it elsewhere, for Antiphilos 
(Euboulides’ father, see §§26 and 60) and for himself (see §63), in ‘Euboulides’ Office and the Diapsephisis 
of 346/5 B.C.’, p. 76. Develin argues that control of proceedings under Demophilos’ decree was given to 
at least one of each deme’s βουλευταί, including administration of the oath and use of the lexiarchic register 
(by which he could then summon the demesmen), pp. 78-9. 
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extraordinary διαψήφισις of 346/5 BC (Isae. 12.11). With no further evidence to consult, 
the uncertainty remains with regard to who exactly officiated at the extraordinary review: 
whether it was the dēmarch as in the deme’s annual reviews, or the deme’s βουλευτής as 
a centrally-appointed official for a scrutiny that had been enforced by the state. 
During these proceedings, it appears that any of the demesmen present could 
speak either against or in favour of the individual who was the subject of the vote at that 
time. Euxitheos not only alleges that Euboulides seized this opportunity to speak against 
him but, more significantly, he declares that he failed to bring any witnesses from his 
deme or indeed the citizen body to support his accusations (see §11). Moreover, he 
informs the jury at his appeal that he had no witnesses in attendance at the assembly to 
support his claim to citizenship, blaming both the suddenness of the matter and the late 
hour of the vote (see §12). Although it is not necessary to believe either his excuse or his 
assertion that Euboulides stood alone in condemning him, the possibility of providing 
witnesses to support one’s claims must have been a genuine feature of the extraordinary 
διαψήφισις procedure in order for the court to follow his argument. He also speaks of an 
absence of proofs on Euboulides’ part (see §13). The introduction of witness testimonies 
and evidence during the review undoubtedly lengthened the duration of the assembly for 
demes with more than just a few dozen members; Euxitheos complains that his vote was 
the sixtieth of the day and that the meeting still had to be reconvened to fulfil its 
obligations but, given this process of testimonies and evidence, it may have been an 
unavoidable situation (see §15). With the matter being put to the vote, it seems that there 
were no repercussions for any deme member who made an accusation against the subject 
of the scrutiny. Given that Euxitheos’ defence maintains that Euboulides has seized the 
opportunity of the widespread διαψήφισις in order to settle both a personal and a political 
feud, it would have been rational for him to mention any possible penalties that his 
opponent has escaped for using the opportunity of Demophilos’ decree to expel his rival. 
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Likewise, there is no mention of any action taken against Antiphilos after nine men were 
intentionally but wrongfully expelled from the deme of Halimous due to his deceit over 
the register (see §60). Euxitheos’ accusations against both Antiphilos and his son 
Euboulides make it clear that deme members could use this procedure to act upon political 
or personal rivalries in an attempt to eject fellow demesmen without just cause. 
As Euxitheos complains that Euboulides and his co-conspirators had engineered 
the vote against him, he notes that the voting-pebbles (ψῆφοι) were placed in an urn (see 
καδίσκος at §13; also §§14, 16 and 61). It is not clear how these ballots were cast: whether 
a ‘guilty’ pebble and a ‘not guilty’ pebble were distributed to the Halimousians and the 
voter deposited his chosen verdict into a single urn, or if a single pebble was given to 
each of the demesmen and two urns were used to signify ‘guilty’ and ‘not guilty’ (cf. Lys. 
13.37, in which votes were placed openly on two tables).115 Moreover, he estimates that 
only thirty demesmen actually voted on his case (see §13), though seventy-three members 
had taken the vote (including himself, §9; eighty men were to be voted on, §§10 and 15). 
Regardless of whether or not one believes the speaker’s claim of fraud, a quorum may be 
inferred from the meeting of the Halimousians in which the extraordinary διαψήφισις was 
held. Two other demes record a similar quorum for voting to be conducted during a deme 
assembly: first, an inscription from the deme of Lower Paeania which dates between 450 
and 430 BC necessitated one hundred members be present (IG I³ 250.11-4), and a second 
from the deme of Myrrhinous required no fewer than thirty demesmen for its assemblies 
circa 340 BC (IG II² 1183.21-2). Depending on the size of the deme, it would be 
reasonable to believe that each one needed its own minimum figure for attendance at the 
meetings in which motions were to be passed. This corresponds to the quorum that was 
                                                          
115 For the use of the voting-pebbles as a formal ballot over a simple show of hands, see Whitehead’s 
discussion in The Demes of Attica, p. 93-4. He also comments on the unlikelihood that voting with leaves 
was used in deme assemblies, comparable to when the Boulē expelled members for failing in their duties 
(Aeschin. 1.110-2). 
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established for the Ecclēsia to conduct its business (a minimum of six thousand citizens, 
which was one-seventh to one-third of the total eligible).116 However, as Whitehead has 
astutely observed from his reading of the Paeania and Myrrhinous inscriptions, each 
deme’s quorum need not have been permanent and the figure could have been determined 
for specific circumstances.117 
If the demesmen voted against an individual in their deme, his name was thus 
struck from the lexiarchic register and he was expelled (ἀποψηφίζεσθαι),118 and he was 
no longer classed as a citizen. According to Libanios (Hyp. 27), those who were 
subsequently rejected by their deme had two options: they could accept the decision and 
become metics (as with ordinary scrutiny),119 or they could seek reinstatement by making 
an appeal to a jury-court, just as Euxitheos did in Against Euboulides. Becoming a metic 
would certainly place an individual at a disadvantage in Athenian society: losing citizen 
privileges such as owning property (presumably, any property previously held by the 
disfranchised would revert to his nearest male relative, on whom his citizenship was not 
dependant), while still being legally obliged to pay certain taxes and to perform military 
service.120 Diller argues that Demophilos’ decree introduced the provision for an ejected 
member to appeal the deme’s decision with a public indictment, stating that the only 
previous option had been to initiate a private suit against that body; he cites evidence 
found in On Behalf of Euphiletos in which the speaker refers to Euphiletos’ initial 
rejection by his deme and, specifically, his use of δίκη rather than ἔφεσις to contest their 
decision (Isae. 12.11).121 Indeed, Euxitheos appears to speak of the appeal as a new 
                                                          
116 M. H. Hansen, ‘How Many Athenians Attended the Ecclesia?’, p. 132. 
117 The Demes of Attica, pp. 94-5. 
118 See n. 92. 
119 See n. 84. 
120 For the most recent account of metic status in Athens, see D. Kamen, Status in Classical Athens, pp. 43-
61. 
121 Diller, ‘The Decree of Demophilus, 346-345 B.C.’, p. 201; cf. Race Mixture Among the Greeks Before 
Alexander, pp. 98-9. Diller also believes that Demophilos’ decree established uniformity in the scrutinies 
within the demes and that his measure determined the regular procedure, as detailed in the Athēnaiōn 
Politeia ([Arist.] 42.1), p. 205.  
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provision (see §6; also that many availed of this appeal process, see §2). However, 
Gomme contends that this was unlikely and that there had been similar, if not identical, 
appeal processes to that portrayed in Against Euboulides before Demophilos’ decree; he 
particularly refers to Euxitheos’ comment regarding those restored to his deme after the 
loss of the register (see §60).122 But since Euxitheos’ comment lacks any significant detail 
about what type of case was brought against the deme, Diller responds to Gomme’s 
argument by maintaining that it can be assumed that Euxitheos was referring to private 
cases taken against the deme, comparable to those taken against the phratries and genē.123 
Given that the evidence as a whole does not reveal when the appeal process was 
introduced, nor indeed when it was favoured over a private law suit, it cannot be 
definitively known whether Demophilos’ decree actually introduced the appeal procedure 
or whether it paved the way for this process to be a feature of even ordinary διαψηφίσεις. 
Regardless of whether or not the appeal was a new feature, it is obvious that the 
Athenian lawcourts had an essential role to play in managing any errors made by the 
demes in their administration of the extraordinary διαψήφισις of 346/5 BC. Indeed, 
Euxitheos describes the courts as a place of redemption for all those who have suffered 
wrongdoing (see §6, cf. §56). While his comments were certainly intended to flatter the 
jury he stood before, the truth of his words cannot be denied in that his appeal to the court 
was his only hope for reinstatement in the citizen body. 
1.6: Slavery as the penalty of a failed appeal against expulsion 
Euxitheos’ appeal to the jury-court was not a venture to be undertaken lightly. 
Unlike the voluntary γραφὴ ξενίας, which carried considerable risk for the prosecutor if 
he lost his case, the five elected accusers carried no personal responsibility and so suffered 
                                                          
122 Gomme, ‘Two Problems of Athenian Citizenship Law’, pp. 128-9, 136. 
123 Diller, ‘Scrutiny and Appeal in Athenian Citizenship’, pp. 307-8.; see also n. 103. 
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no penalty if the appeal against expulsion was upheld (see ἀνυπευθύνῳ at §5; just like at 
an ordinary διαψήφισις, [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 42.1).124 But the appeal process did carry a real 
risk for an appellant like Euxitheos. Both Libanios (Hyp. 27) and Dionysios (Isae. 16) 
state that if the court upheld the appeal, the defendant was reinstated; if not, he was sold 
into slavery. Nevertheless, the very notion of enslavement seems to be an overly harsh 
sentence for an appellant like Euxitheos, who was not specifically accused of being a 
slave by his opponents, but only of being of foreign descent. Nowhere in his speech does 
Euxitheos address a charge of being a slave; he does claim that his opponents call him a 
foreigner and a metic (see §§48 and 55). To what extent the statements of Libanios and 
Dionysios are reliable, then, requires further discussion. 
The penalty of enslavement as mentioned by both Dionysios and Libanios does 
correspond to the penalty reported by the Athēnaiōn Politeia for those having lost their 
appeals after a deme’s annual review. Describing the regular process of deme enrolment, 
the author of the Athēnaiōn Politeia states that those whose court appeals had been 
dismissed were sold by the state ([Arist.] 42.1). However, Gomme claims that this penalty 
was too extreme for appellants who were not considered to be citizens but were 
nevertheless believed to be free men; specifically, he argues that both Libanios and 
Dionysios were misled by the details provided by the Athēnaiōn Politeia.125 The cause of 
their confusion is the author’s apparent omission of the cases in which candidates were 
                                                          
124 For details on the γραφὴ ξενίας, see n. 69. Referring to Philotades’ appeal which arose out of the 
διαψήφισις of 346/5 BC in the deme of Kydathenaeon, Aeschines specifies that Timarchos took charge of 
the prosecution (ἐπιστὰς τῇ κατηγορίᾳ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαστηρίου, 1.114). The orator appears to suggest that there 
was no penalty for a prosecutor such as Timarchos if he abandoned the case (1.114-5). However, Harris 
notes that it is not clear what exactly the author meant in his use of προὔδωκεν in relation to the appeal, in 
Democracy and the Rule of Law in Classical Athens, pp. 411-2. He argues that Timarchos was not in a 
position to have the case dropped since the appellant Philotades would have remained expelled from 
Athenian citizenship. Instead, he argues that the use of προὔδωκεν indicates that Timarchos and his fellow 
prosecutors presented a weak case when representing their deme, thereby allowing the court to vote in 
favour of Philotades’ reinstatement (similar to a scheme described in Ar. Wasps, 691-5). His argument is 
convincing; had Timarchos been penalised for Philotades’ appeal being upheld, it would have been in 
Aeschines’ interest to blacken his character by referring to this punishment in addition to claiming that he 
had accepted bribes and broken his oath. 
125 Gomme, ‘Two Problems of Athenian Citizenship Law’, pp. 130-9. 
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illegitimate but free, namely those born of Athenian parents but out of wedlock (νόθοι) 
and those who were the offspring of aliens (μητρόξενοι and μέτοικοι), and that he only 
describes the situation whereby the rejected candidate was deemed to be a slave. Gomme 
contends that no such penalty was enforced unless it was determined that the appellant 
was actually a slave.126 Could the description of the penalty in the extraordinary review 
in Libanios and Dionysios then be based on a misunderstanding of the Athēnaiōn 
Politeia? 
I find it hard to believe that both authors were so deceived. In all respects, the 
extraordinary review process did follow that of the ordinary procedure for deme 
enrolments: from the vote itself during a deme assembly, to the possibility of appeal and 
the deme representatives in court.127 Moreover, Libanios’ report that those who abide by 
the deme’s decision were registered as metics is not detailed in the Athēnaiōn Politeia. In 
his commentary on the text, Rhodes finds no foundation for Libanios’ information, as 
such, he maintains that the rhetorician must have utilised another source.128 His argument 
thereby removes some of the difficulty which Gomme had perceived with Libanios’ 
account, and it thus seems more likely that other sources than the Athēnaiōn Politeia 
indicated that slavery was the stipulated penalty for those who chose to appeal their 
deme’s decision and subsequently lost. 
But what do the lawcourt speeches say with regard to the penalty for a failed 
appeal? Unfortunately, Aeschines makes no reference to enslavement in relation to the 
appeals which followed the deme-wide voting in Against Timarchos (1.77-8). The 
fragmentary nature of Isaeus’ On Behalf of Euphiletos means that, even if the speaker had 
specified what the penalty was for losing the appeal, it is no longer preserved in the 
                                                          
126 Both Jacoby and Harrison agree with Gomme’s conclusion: F. Jacoby on FGrH 324 F52 (Vol. 3B Suppl. 
II, p. 145 n. 33) and FGrH 328 F119 (Suppl. I, p. 463); Harrison, The Law of Athens Vol. II, p. 206. 
127 See Introduction, pp. 26-8. 
128 Rhodes, A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia, pp. 501-2. 
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existing text. In Against Euboulides, however, Euxitheos does refer to the potential 
outcome he will face if he loses his case against his deme, though he does not explicitly 
state what the penalty is for a failed appeal. In his opening address to the jury, Euxitheos 
declares that the danger he faces is great and involves disgrace, and even ruin 
(λογισαμένους τό τε μέγεθος τοῦ παρόντος ἀγῶνος καὶ τὴν αἰσχύνην at §1). When he 
returns to this subject towards the end of his speech, in addition to being a ruined man, 
Euxitheos suggests that exile was one of the potential outcomes of him losing the case: 
either ordered by the court, or a voluntary exile to avoid the shame of losing his citizen 
status and his subsequent appeal (ὥσπερ φυγάδος ἤδη μου ὄντος καὶ ἀπολωλότος at §65). 
There is no specification that this exile would be undertaken to escape being sold as a 
slave by the state, though it is not impossible. In his closing plea to the jury (see §70), 
Euxitheos speaks of losing the right to inter his mother in the family burial mounds 
(ἀπόδοτε μοι θάψαι εἰς τὰ πατρῷα μνήματα), being an outcast (ἄπολιν), and being 
deprived of his relatives (τῶν οἰκείων ἀποστερήσητε τοσούτων ὄντων τὸ πλῆθος) and 
complete ruin (ὅλως ἀπολέσητε). He again suggests having to leave Attica, but declares 
that he would rather commit suicide and still retain the option of being buried in his 
homeland (πρότερον γὰρ ἢ προλιπεῖν τούτους, εἰ μὴ δυνατὸν ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν εἴη σωθῆναι, 
ἀποκτείναιμ᾽ ἂν ἐμαυτόν, ὥστ᾽ ἐν τῇ πατρίδι γ᾽ ὑπὸ τούτων ταφῆναι). His final statements 
are definitely dramatic, but his lack of specific details means that his comments remain 
open to interpretation. 
 The ruin to which he repeatedly refers could simply signify the confiscation of 
his assets if he loses his appeal against expulsion. Dionysios does add that the appellant’s 
property was confiscated if he failed to prevail upon the jury (Isae. 16). This is plausible 
in light of evidence provided by another speech written by Isaeus, in which a speaker 
refers to losing his citizenship and his property if the jurors find in his opponent’s favour 
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and believe that his mother was not a citizen (Isae. 8.43).129 If slavery was indeed the 
penalty for losing their appeals, it seems strange that neither the speaker of On Behalf of 
Euphiletos nor the appellant in Against Euboulides specifically use its emotive value as 
they attempt to persuade a jury to vote in their favour at their respective cases. 
While on the one hand the speakers do not expressly confirm that slavery was the 
penalty for losing their appeals, on the other hand their silence does not unequivocally 
denote that enslavement was not the given sentence. Unfortunately, it is not known how 
many appeals were brought before the court after the extraordinary scrutiny of 346/5 BC. 
Yet several sources suggest that there were a large number of appeals. Euxitheos states 
that, whereas many were justly disfranchised after the extraordinary scrutiny, there were 
those who were wrongly expelled due to rivalry and the courts saved all those who had 
been persecuted as a result (see §§2-6). With the deme-wide review having recently 
occurred at the time of his speech, Aeschines describes going to court on numerous 
occasions to hear the appeals.130 Both speakers refer to the general Athenian discontent 
with regard to the usurpation of citizen rights, and such an attitude inevitably caused a 
large number of men to lose their citizenship.  
Both Rhodes and Harris propose that the penalty of slavery was a deliberately 
extreme measure to discourage frivolous litigation.131 Their argument is certainly credible 
if one thinks that the threat of enslavement may have deterred numerous appeals from 
being lodged before the court. Yet for those who did seek recourse in an appeal, it seems 
likely that an appellant who bemoaned the penalty of slavery would have little success in 
arousing sympathy from the jury. Instead, Euxitheos speaks of the gravity of the situation 
                                                          
129 The children were born to this woman after the re-enactment of Pericles’ citizenship law in 403/2 BC. 
For details on this law, see Introduction, pp. 21-5; cf. Appendix 3, pp. 282-8. 
130 Aeschin. 1.77-8: ἐπειδὰν προσστῶ πρὸς τὸ δικαστήριον καὶ ἀκροάσωμαι τῶν ἀγωνιζομένων. 
131 Rhodes, A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia, pp. 501-2; Harris, The Rule of Law in 
Action in Democratic Athens, p. 76 n. 52. 
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and the possible disgrace, in an attempt to motivate the jurors to vote in his favour on 
compassionate grounds.132 His threat of suicide would seem excessive if slavery was not 
the intended sentence, and if he faced disgrace and the loss of his property alone.  
Elsewhere in the source material, there are several indications that the severe 
penalty of slavery may have been the standard sentence for those who were found guilty 
of usurping Athenian citizenship. The possible enslavement of failed appellants in 346/5 
BC does correspond to the procedure that took place in the earlier extraordinary 
διαψήφισις in 445/4 BC. However, it is not clear whether or not the enslavements which 
were enforced after this scrutiny occurred as a result of a failed appeal or prosecution by 
a γραφὴ ξενίας.133 The punishment of slavery was consistently used in prosecutions for 
the usurpation of citizen rights. Two sources attributed to Demosthenes convey that 
anyone who was found guilty of appropriating the rights of an Athenian citizen was sold 
into slavery (Dem. 24.131, Ep. 3.29). It is known that this penalty was imposed on any 
resident alien who was convicted of living with a female citizen as husband and wife, 
from the law which is cited in a speech by Apollodoros ([Dem.] 59.16).134 Such 
prosecutions were heard by the Thesmothetae, the same board which presided over the 
appeals for those who were rejected at the ordinary διαψηφίσεις ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 
59.4).135 The common feature between the appeals arising from both ordinary and 
extraordinary διαψηφίσεις and the γραφαὶ ξενίας is the deliberate attempt by the 
defendant to assume citizen rights which he may or may not have been entitled to in 
actuality. Although these sources do not prove that slavery was the intended penalty for 
                                                          
132 In an attempt to neutralise the jury’s hostility towards him, Euxitheos may be using pathos (a strong 
emotional appeal) to establish goodwill without expressly referring to slavery. Pathos was a rhetorical 
technique employed by a speaker in order to stress the magnitude of the danger facing him and to arouse 
sympathy from audience (cf. Lys. 19.1). 
133 See n. 96. 
134 For a discussion of this law, see nn. 11 and 15 in Appendix 3. 
135 See n. 86. The Thesmothetae also took over responsibility for the γραφαὶ ξενίας, see n. 98. 
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failure in appeals against expulsion like that of Euxitheos, they do suggest that this at least 
was a likely possibility and one which would correspond to cases of a similar nature. 
Ultimately, however, it is impossible to ascertain what the penalty of slavery 
would mean for the failed appellant. The sentence may only have been implemented if 
the appellant remained in Athens. He may have had the opportunity to flee from the state 
and thus to live in exile as a free man.136 Alternatively, it may have been feasible for a 
failed appellant to arrange for his family members or friends to secure his release, 
provided that he was fortunate enough to belong to an affluent circle or that they were 
able to pool their resources in time to purchase his freedom before he could be sold 
elsewhere.  
The gravity of the intended slavery penalty for a failed appeal reflects the 
seriousness with which the Athenians regarded their citizenship, and the lengths to which 
they would go to prevent those without the necessary qualifications from having access 
to their rights and privileges. An appellant like Euxitheos came before the court as 
someone who was already suspected of usurping citizen rights and it is thus entirely 
plausible, if not indeed likely, that the Athenians would have sought to punish severely 
those who made a second attempt at obtaining citizenship through an appeal and were 
unable to convince a jury of their legitimacy.  
1.7: Concluding remarks 
A discussion regarding the possible outcome for Euxitheos’ appeal cannot but be 
speculative given the lack of official records of decisions from the Athenian lawcourts. 
For the most part, Euxitheos’ defence of his parents is indeed satisfactory. He provides a 
                                                          
136 The opportunity to escape from Athens was similar to that afforded to the defendant in intentional 
homicide trials. While the penalty for those convicted in such cases was death, the accused was allowed to 
go into exile voluntarily at any time up until the second set of trial speeches in court (Dem. 23.69; Antiph. 
5.13) 
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wealth of testimony from his father’s family, phratry members and demesmen to prove 
that his father was a citizen. In my opinion, Euxitheos successfully argues that his 
mother’s occupations, as a wet-nurse first and then a ribbon-seller in the marketplace, are 
evidence not of his birth but of her financial circumstances.  
The weaknesses in Euxitheos’ case, specifically his lack of evidence regarding his 
own credentials for citizenship (see §46), are quickly glossed over by Demosthenes and 
it is only through picking the case apart as a whole that they become apparent; a luxury 
of time that the Athenian jury in 346/5 BC did not have when deciding the outcome of 
his appeal. Judging Euxitheos’ case from the perspective of the listening jury, it would 
seem unlikely that they would have delivered any verdict other than one in favour of 
Euxitheos’ reinstatement. 
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2. Text and Translation 
ΔΗΜΟΣΘΕΝΟΥΣ 
ΕΦΕΣΙΣ ΠΡΟΣ ΕΥΒΟΥΛΙΔΗΝ 
[1] Πολλὰ καὶ ψευδῆ κατηγορηκότος ἡμων Εὐβουλίδου, καὶ βλασφημίας οὔτε 
προσηκούσας οὔτε δικαίας πεποιημένου, πειράσομαι τἀληθῆ καὶ τὰ δίκαια λέγων, ὦ 
ἄνδρες δικασταί, δεῖξαι καὶ μετὸν τῆς πόλεως ἡμῖν καὶ πεπονθότα ἐμαυτὸν οὐχὶ 
προσήκονθα ὑπὸ τούτου. δέομαι δ’ ἁπάντων ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, καὶ ἱκετεύω καὶ 
ἀντιβολῶ, λογισαμένους τό τε μέγεθος τοῦ παρόντος ἀγῶνος καὶ τὴν αἰσχύνην μεθ’ ἧς 
ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἁλισκομένοις ἀπολωλέναι, ἀκοῦσαι καὶ ἐμοῦ σιωπῇ, μάλιστα μέν, εἰ 
δυνατόν, μετὰ πλείονος εὐνοίας ἢ τούτου (τοῖς γὰρ ἐν κινδύνῳ καθεστηκόσιν εἰκὸς 
εὐνοϊκωτέρους ὑπάρχειν), εἰ δὲ μή, μετά γε τῆς ἴσης. [2] συμβαίνει δέ μοι τὸ μὲν καθ᾽ 
ἡμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, καὶ τὸ προσήκειν μοι τῆς πόλεως, θαρρεῖν καὶ πολλὰς ἔχειν 
ἐλπίδας καλῶς ἀγωνιεῖσθαι, τὸν καιρὸν δὲ τὸ παρωξύνθαι τὴν πόλιν πρὸς τὰς 
ἀποψηφίσεις φοβεῖσθαι· πολλῶν γὰρ ἐξεληλαμένων δικαίως ἐκ πάντων τῶν δήμων, 
συγκεκοινωνήκαμεν τῆς δόξης ταύτης οἱ κατεστασιασμένοι, καὶ πρὸς τὴν κατ’ ἐκείνων 
αἰτίαν, οὐ πρὸς τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸν ἕκαστος ἀγωνιζόμεθα, ὥστ’ ἐξ ἀνάγκης μέγαν ἡμῖν εἶναι 
τὸν φόβον. [3] οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καίπερ τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων, ἃ νομίζω περὶ τούτων αὐτῶν 
πρῶτον εἶναι δίκαια, ἐρῶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς. ἐγὼ γὰρ οἴομαι δεῖν ὑμᾶς τοῖς μὲν ἐξελεγχομένοις 
ξένοις οὖσιν χαλεπαίνειν, εἰ μήτε πείσαντες μήτε δεηθέντες ὑμῶν λάθρᾳ καὶ βίᾳ τῶν 
ὑμετέρων ἱερῶν καὶ κοινῶν μετεῖχον, τοῖς δ’ ἠτυχηκόσι καὶ δεικνύουσι πολίτας ὄντας 
αὑτοὺς βοηθεῖν καὶ σῴζειν, ἐνθυμουμένους ὅτι πάντων οἰκτρότατον πάθος ἡμῖν ἂν 
συμβαίη τοῖς ἠδικημένοις, εἰ τῶν λαμβανόντων δίκην ὄντες ἂν δικαίως μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν, ἐν 
τοῖς διδοῦσι γενοίμεθα καὶ συναδικηθείημεν διὰ τὴν τοῦ πράγματος ὀργήν. [4] ᾤμην μὲν 
οὖν ἔγωγε, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, προσήκειν Εὐβουλίδῃ, καὶ πᾶσιν δ’ ὅσοι νῦν ἐπὶ ταῖς 
ἀποψηφίσεσιν κατηγοροῦσιν, ὅσα ἴσασιν ἀκριβῶς λέγειν καὶ μηδεμίαν προσάγειν ἀκοὴν 
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πρὸς τὸν τοιοῦτον ἀγῶνα. οὕτω γὰρ τοῦτο ἄδικον καὶ σφόδρα πάλαι κέκριται, ὥστε οὐδὲ 
μαρτυρεῖν ἀκοὴν ἐῶσιν οἱ νόμοι, οὐδ’ ἐπὶ τοῖς πάνυ φαύλοις ἐγκλήμασιν, εἰκότως· ὅπου 
γὰρ εἰδέναι τινὲς ἤδη φήσαντες ψευδεῖς ἐφάνησαν, πῶς ἅ γε μηδ’ αὐτὸς οἶδεν ὁ λέγων, 
προσήκει πιστεύεσθαι; [5] ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅπου γε μηδ’ ὑπεύθυνον καθιστάνθα ἑαυτὸν ἔξεστιν, 
δι’ ὧν ἂν ἀκοῦσαι τις φῇ, βλάπτειν μηδένα, πῶς ἀνυπευθύνῳ γε λέγοντι προσήκει 
πιστεύειν ὑμᾶς; ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν οὗτος εἰδὼς τοὺς νόμους καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ προσῆκεν, ἀδίκως 
καὶ πλεονεκτικῶς τὴν κατηγορίαν πεποίηται, ἀναγκαῖον ἐμοὶ περὶ ὧν ἐν τοῖς δημόταις 
ὑβρίσθην πρῶτον εἰπεῖν. [6] ἀξιῶ δ’, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μηδέπω τὴν τῶν δημοτῶν 
ἀποψήφισιν ποιεῖσθαι τεκμήριον ὑμᾶς, ὡς ἄρ’ οὐχὶ προσήκει μοι τῆς πόλεως. εἰ γὰρ πάντ’ 
ἐνομίζετε τὰ δίκαια δυνήσεσθαι τοὺς δημότας διακρῖναι, οὐκ ἂν ἐδώκατε τὴν εἰς ὑμᾶς 
ἔφεσιν· νῦν δὲ καὶ διὰ φιλονικίαν καὶ διὰ φθόνον καὶ δι᾽ ἔχθραν καὶ δι᾽ ἄλλας προφάσεις 
ἔσεσθαί τι τοιοῦτον ἡγούμενοι, τὴν εἰς ὑμᾶς τοῖς ἀδικηθεῖσιν ἐποιήσατε καταφυγήν, δι’ 
ἣν καλῶς ποιοῦντες, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοὺς ἠδικημένους ἅπαντας σεσῴκατε. [7] 
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὃν τρόπον ἐν τοῖς δημόταις συνέβη τὴν διαψήφισιν γενέσθαι, φράσω 
πρὸς ὑμᾶς· τὸ γὰρ εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα πάντα λέγειν τοῦτ’ ἐγὼ ὑπολαμβάνω, ὅσα τις παρὰ 
τὸ ψήφισμα πέπονθεν ἀδίκως καταστασιασθείς, ἐπιδεῖξαι. 
[8] Εὐβουλίδης γὰρ οὑτοσί, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς ὑμῶν ἴσασι πολλοί, 
γραψάμενος ἀσεβείας τὴν ἀδελφὴν τὴν Λακεδαιμονίου τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων οὐ 
μετέλαβεν. ὅτι δὴ ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ ἀγῶνι τὰ δίκαια, τούτῳ δὲ τἀναντία ἐμαρτύρησα, διὰ 
ταύτην τὴν ἔχθραν ἐπιτίθεταί μοι. καὶ βουλεύων, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, καὶ κύριος ὢν τοῦ 
θ᾽ ὅρκου καὶ τῶν γραμμάτων ἐξ ὧν ἀνεκάλει τοὺς δημότας, τί ποιεῖ; [9] πρῶτον μέν, 
ἐπειδὴ συνελέγησαν οἱ δημόται, κατέτριψεν τὴν ἡμέραν δημηγορῶν καὶ ψηφίσματα 
γράφων. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἦν οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου, ἀλλ’ ἐπιβουλεύων ἐμοί, ὅπως ὡς ὀψιαίταθ’ 
ἡ διαψήφισις ἡ περὶ ἐμοῦ γένοιτο· καὶ διεπράξατο τοῦτο. καὶ τῶν μὲν δημοτῶν οἱ 
ὀμόσαντες ἐγενόμεθα τρεῖς καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα, ἠρξάμεθα δὲ τοῦ διαψηφίζεσθαι δείλης 
ὀψίας, ὥστε συνέβη, ἡνίκα τοὐμὸν ὄνομ’ ἐκαλεῖτο, σκότος εἶναι ἤδη· [10] καὶ γὰρ ἦν 
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περὶ ἐξηκοστόν, καὶ ἐκλήθην ὕστατος ἁπάντων τῶν ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ κληθέντων, ἡνίχα 
οἱ μὲν πρεσβύτεροι τῶν δημοτῶν ἀπεληλύθεσαν εἰς τοὺς ἀγρούς· τοῦ γὰρ δήμου ἡμῖν, ὦ 
ἄνδρες δικασταί, πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα στάδια τοῦ ἄστεως ἀπέχοντος καὶ τῶν πλείστων 
ἐκεῖ οἰκούντων, ἀπεληλύθεσαν οἱ πολλοί· οἱ δὲ κατάλοιποι ἦσαν οὐ πλείους ἢ τριάκοντα. 
ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἦσαν ἅπαντες οἱ τούτῳ παρεσκευασμένοι. [11] ἐπειδὴ δ’ ἐκλήθη τοὐμὸν 
ὄνομα, ἀναπηδήσας οὗτος ἐβλασφήμει κατ᾽ ἐμοῦ ταχὺ καὶ πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλῃ τῇ φωνῇ, 
ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν, μάρτυρα μὲν ὧν κατηγόρησεν οὐδένα παρασχόμενος οὔτε τῶν δημοτῶν 
οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν, παρεκελεύετο δὲ τοῖς δημόταις ἀποψηφίζεσθαι. [12] ἀξιοῦντος 
δέ μου ἀναβαλέσθαι εἰς τὴν ὑστεραίαν διά τε τὴν ὥραν καὶ τὸ μηδένα μοι παρεῖναι τό τε 
πρᾶγμα ἄφνω προσπεπτωκέναι, ἵνα τούτῳ τ’ ἐξουσία γένοιτο ὁπόσα βούλοιτο 
κατηγορῆσαι καὶ μάρτυρας εἴ τινας ἔχοι παρασχέσθαι, ἐμοί τε ἐκγένοιτο ἀπολογήσασθαι 
ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς δημόταις καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους μάρτυρας παρασχέσθαι· καὶ ὅ τι γνοίησαν περὶ 
ἐμοῦ, τούτοις ἤθελον ἐμμένειν· [13] οὗτος ὧν μὲν ἐγὼ προὐκαλούμην οὐδὲν ἐφρόντισεν, 
τὴν δὲ ψῆφον εὐθὺς ἐδίδου τοῖς παροῦσι τῶν δημοτῶν, οὔτ’ ἀπολογίαν οὐδεμίαν ἐμοὶ 
δοὺς οὔτ’ ἔλεγχον οὐδέν’ ἀκριβῆ ποιήσας. οἱ δὲ τούτῳ συνεστῶτες ἀναπηδήσαντες 
ἐψηφίζοντο. καὶ ἦν μὲν σκότος, οἱ δὲ λαμβάνοντες δύο καὶ τρεῖς ψήφους ἕκαστος παρὰ 
τούτου ἐνέβαλλον εἰς τὸν καδίσκον. σημεῖον δέ· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ψηφισάμενοι οὐ πλείους ἢ 
τριάκοντ᾽ ἦσαν, αἱ δὲ ψῆφοι ἠριθμήθησαν πλείους ἢ ἑξήκοντα, ὥστε πάντας ἡμᾶς 
ἐκπλαγῆναι. [14] καὶ ταῦθ’ ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγω, καὶ ὅτι οὔτ’ ἐδόθη ἡ ψῆφος ἐν ἅπασιν πλείους 
τ᾽ ἐγένοντο τῶν ψηφισαμένων, μάρτυρας ὑμῖν παρέξομαι. συμβαίνει δέ μοι περὶ τούτων 
τῶν μὲν φίλων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων μηδένα μάρτυρα παρεῖναι διά τε τὴν ὥραν καὶ διὰ 
τὸ μηδένα παρακαλέσαι, αὐτοῖς δὲ τοῖς ἠδικηκόσιν με χρῆσθαι μάρτυσιν. ἃ οὖν οὐ 
δυνήσονται ἔξαρνοι γενέσθαι, ταῦτα γέγραφα αὐτοῖς. λέγε. 
[ΜΑΡΤΥΡΙΑ] 
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[15] Εἰ μὲν τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, συνέβαινεν τοῖς Ἁλιμουσίοις περὶ ἁπάντων 
τῶν δημοτῶν διαψηφίσασθαι ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, εἰκὸς ἦν καὶ εἰς ὀψὲ ψηφίζεσθαι, ἵν’ 
ἀπηλλαγμένοι ἦσαν ποιήσαντες τὰ ὑμῖν ἐψηφισμένα. εἰ δὲ πλείους ἢ εἴκοσιν ὑπόλοιποι 
ἦσαν τῶν δημοτῶν, περὶ ὧν ἔδει τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ διαψηφίσασθαι, καὶ ὁμοίως ἦν ἀνάγκη 
συλλέγεσθαι τοὺς δημότας, τί ποτ᾽ ἦν τὸ δυσχερὲς Εὐβουλίδῃ ἀναβαλέσθαι εἰς τὴν 
ὑστεραίαν καὶ περὶ ἐμοῦ πρώτου τὴν ψῆφον διδόναι τοῖς δημόταις; [16] διότι, ὦ ἄνδρες 
δικασταί, οὐκ ἠγνόει Εὐβουλίδης ὅτι, εἰ λόγος ἀποδοθήσοιτο καὶ παραγένοιντό μοι 
πάντες οἱ δημόται καὶ ἡ ψῆφος δικαίως δοθείη, οὐδαμοῦ γενήσονται οἱ μετὰ τούτου 
συνεστηκότες. ὅθεν δ᾽ οὗτοι συνέστησαν, ταῦτα, ἐπειδὰν περὶ τοῦ γένους εἴπω, τότε, ἂν 
βούλησθε ἀκούειν, ἐρῶ. [17] νῦν δὲ τί δίκαιον νομίζω καὶ τί παρεσκεύασμαι ποιεῖν, 
ἄνδρες δικασταί; δεῖξαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐμαυτὸν Ἀθηναῖον ὄντα καὶ τὰ πρὸς πατρὸς καὶ τὰ 
πρὸς μητρός, καὶ μάρτυρας τούτων, οὓς ὑμεῖς ἀληθεῖς φήσετε εἶναι, παρασχέσθαι, τὰς δὲ 
λοιδορίας καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἀνελεῖν· ὑμᾶς δ’ ἀκούσαντας τούτων, ἐὰν μὲν ὑμῖν πολίτης ὢν 
κατεστασιάσθαι δοκῶ, σῴζειν, εἰ δὲ μή, πράττειν ὁποῖον ἄν τι ὑμῖν εὐσεβὲς εἶναι δοκῇ. 
ἄρξομαι δ’ ἐντεῦθεν. 
[18] Διαβεβλήκασι γάρ μου τὸν πατέρα, ὡς ἐξένιζεν· καὶ ὅτι μὲν ἁλοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν 
πολεμίων ὑπὸ τὸν Δεκελεικὸν πόλεμον καὶ πραθεὶς εἰς Λευκάδα, Κλεάνδρῳ περιτυχὼν 
τῷ ὑποκριτῇ πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους ἐσώθη δεῦρο πολλοστῷ χρόνῳ, παραλελοίπασιν, ὥσπερ 
δὲ δέον ἡμᾶς δι’ ἐκείνας τὰς ἀτυχίας ἀπολέσθαι, τὸ ξενίζειν αὐτοῦ κατηγορήκασιν. [19] 
ἐγὼ δ’ ἐξ αὐτῶν τούτων μάλιστα {ἂν} οἶμαι ὑμῖν ἐμαυτὸν Ἀθηναῖον ὄντ’ ἐπιδείξειν. καὶ 
πρῶτον μὲν ὡς ἑάλω καὶ ἐσώθη, μάρτυρας ὑμῖν παρέξομαι, ἔπειθ᾽ ὅτι ἀφικόμενος τῆς 
οὐσίας παρὰ τῶν θείων τὸ μέρος μετέλαβεν, εἶθ’ ὅτι οὔτ’ ἐν τοῖς δημόταις οὔτ’ ἐν τοῖς 
φράτερσιν οὔτ’ ἄλλοθι οὐδαμοῦ τὸν ξενίζοντα οὐδεὶς πώποτ’ ᾐτιάσατο ὡς εἴη ξένος. καί 
μοι λαβὲ τὰς μαρτυρίας. 
[ΜΑΡΤΥΡΙΑΙ] 
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[20] Περὶ μὲν τοίνυν τῆς ἁλώσεως καὶ τῆς σωτηρίας, ἣν συνέβη γενέσθαι τῷ πατρὶ 
δεῦρο, ἀκηκόατε. ὡς δ’ ὑμέτερος ἦν πολίτης, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί (τὸ γὰρ ὂν καὶ ἀληθὲς 
οὕτως ὑπάρχει), μάρτυρας καλῶ τοὺς ζῶντας ἡμῖν τῶν συγγενῶν τῶν πρὸς πατρός. κάλει 
δή μοι πρῶτον μὲν Θουκριτίδην καὶ Χαρισιάδην· ὁ γὰρ τούτων πατὴρ Χαρίσιος ἀδελφὸς 
ἦν τοῦ πάππου τοῦ ἐμοῦ Θουκριτίδου καὶ Λυσαρέτης τῆς ἐμῆς τήθης (ἀδελφὴν γὰρ ὁ 
πάππος οὑμὸς ἔγημεν οὐχ ὁμομητρίαν), θεῖος δὲ τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ ἐμοῦ· ἔπειτα Νικιάδην· 
[21] καὶ γὰρ ὁ τούτου πατὴρ Λυσανίας ἀδελφὸς ἦν τοῦ Θουκριτίδου καὶ τῆς Λυσαρέτης, 
θεῖος δὲ τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ ἐμοῦ· ἔπειτα Νικόστρατον· καὶ γὰρ ὁ τούτου πατὴρ Νικιάδης 
ἀδελφιδοῦς ἦν τῷ πάππῳ τῷ ἐμῷ καὶ τῇ τήθῃ, ἀνεψιὸς δὲ τῷ πατρί. καί μοι κάλει τούτους 
πάντας. σὺ δ᾽ ἐπίλαβε τὸ ὕδωρ.  
[ΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΣ] 
[22] Τῶν μὲν τοίνυν πρὸς ἀνδρῶν τῷ πατρὶ συγγενῶν ἀκηκόατε, ὦ ἄνδρες 
Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ μαρτυρούντων καὶ διομνυμένων <Ἀθηναῖον> εἶναι καὶ συγγενῆ τὸν ἐμὸν 
πατέρ’ αὑτοῖς· ὧν οὐδεὶς δήπου, παραστησάμενος τούς συνεισομένους 
αὑτῷ τὰ ψευδῆ μαρτυροῦντι, κατ᾽ ἐξωλείας ἐπιορκεῖ. λαβὲ δὴ καὶ τὰς τῶν πρὸς γυναικῶν 
τῷ πατρὶ συγγενῶν μαρτυρίας. 
[ΜΑΡΤΥΡΙΑΙ] 
[23] Οἱ μὲν τοίνυν ζῶντες οὗτοι τῶν συγγενῶν τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ πρὸς ἀνδρῶν καὶ 
πρὸς γυναικῶν μεμαρτυρήκασιν, ὡς ἦν ἀμφοτέρωθεν Ἀθηναῖος καὶ μετῆν τῆς πόλεως 
αὐτῷ δικαίως. κάλει δή μοι καὶ τοὺς φράτερας, ἔπειτα τοὺς γεννήτας. 
[ΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΣ] 
Λαβὲ δὴ καὶ τὰς τῶν δημοτῶν μαρτυρίας, καὶ τὰς τῶν συγγενῶν περὶ τῶν 
φρατέρων, ὡς εἵλοντό με φρατρίαρχον. 
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[ΜΑΡΤΥΡΙΑΙ] 
[24] Τὰ μὲν τοίνυν ὑπὸ τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ φρατέρων καὶ δημοτῶν καὶ γεννητῶν, 
ὧν προσήκει, μαρτυρούμενα ἀκηκόατε. ἐξ ὧν ἔστιν ὑμῖν εἰδέναι, πότερόν ποτ᾽ ἀστὸς ἢ 
ξένος ἦν ᾧ ταῦθ᾽ ὑπῆρχεν. καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὲν εἰς ἕν’ ἢ δύο ἀνθρώπους κατεφεύγομεν, εἴχομεν 
ἄν τιν’ ὑποψίαν παρεσκευάσθαι τούτους· εἰ δ’ ἐν ἅπασιν, ὅσοισπερ ἕκαστος ὑμῶν, 
ἐξητασμένος φαίνεται καὶ ζῶν ὁ πατὴρ καὶ νῦν ἐγώ, λέγω φράτερσι, συγγενέσι, δημόταις, 
γεννήταις, πῶς ἔνεστιν ἢ πῶς δυνατὸν τούτους ἅπαντας μὴ μετ’ ἀληθείας ὑπάρχοντας 
κατεσκευάσθαι; [25] εἰ μὲν τοίνυν εὔπορος ὢν ὁ πατὴρ χρήματα δοὺς τούτοις ἐφαίνετο 
πείσας συγγενεῖς αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοῦ φάσκειν εἶναι, λόγον εἶχεν <ἂν> ὑποψίαν τιν᾽ ἔχειν ὡς 
οὐκ ἦν ἀστός· εἰ δὲ πένης ὢν ἅμα συγγενεῖς τε παρείχετο τοὺς αὐτοὺς καὶ μεταδιδόντας 
τῶν ὄντων ἐπεδείκνυε, πῶς οὐκ εὔδηλον ὅτι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ προσῆκε τούτοις; οὐ γὰρ ἂν 
δήπου, εἴ γε μηδενὶ ἦν οἰκεῖος, χρήματ᾽ αὐτῷ προστιθέντες οὗτοι τοῦ γένους 
μετεδίδοσαν. ἀλλ᾽ ἦν, ὡς τό τ᾽ ἔργον ἐδήλωσεν καὶ ὑμῖν μεμαρτύρηται. ἔτι τοίνυν ἀρχὰς 
ἔλαχεν καὶ ἦρξεν δοκιμασθείς. καί μοι λαβὲ τὴν μαρτυρίαν. 
[ΜΑΡΤΥΡΙΑ] 
[26] Οἴεταί τις οὖν ὑμῶν ἐᾶσαί ποτ’ ἂν τοὺς δημότας ἐκεῖνον ξένον καὶ μὴ 
πολίτην ἄρχειν παρ’ αὑτοῖς, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἂν κατηγορεῖν; οὐ τοίνυν κατηγόρησεν οὐδὲ εἷς, 
οὐδ’ ᾐτιάσατο. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ διαψηφίσεις ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐγένοντο τοῖς δημόταις ὀμόσασιν 
καθ᾽ ἱερῶν, ὅτ᾽ ἀπώλετο αὐτοῖς τὸ ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον δημαρχοῦντος Ἀντιφίλου 
τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ Εὐβουλίδου, καί τινας ἀπήλασαν αὑτῶν· περὶ ἐκείνου δ’ οὐδεὶς οὔτ’ εἶπεν 
οὔτ’ ᾐτιάσατο τοιοῦτον οὐδέν. [27] καίτοι πᾶσίν ἐστιν ἀνθρώποις τέλος τοῦ βίου 
θάνατος, καὶ περὶ ὧν μὲν ἄν τις ζῶν αἰτίαν σχῇ {περὶ τοῦ γένους}, δίκαιον τοὺς παῖδας 
τὴν ἀειλογίαν παρέχειν· περὶ ὧν δ’ ἂν μηδεὶς αὐτὸν ζῶντα καταιτιάσηται, πῶς οὐ δεινὸν 
εἰ τοὺς παῖδας ὁ βουλόμενος κρινεῖ; εἰ μὲν τοίνυν περὶ τούτων μηδεὶς λόγος ἐξητάσθη, 
δῶμεν τοῦτο λεληθέναι· εἰ δ’ ἐδόθη καὶ διεψηφίσαντο καὶ μηδὲν ᾐτιάσατο πώποτε 
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μηδείς, πῶς οὐ δικαίως ἂν ἐγὼ κατ’ ἐκεῖνον Ἀθηναῖος εἴην, τὸν τελευτήσαντα πρὶν 
ἀμφισβητηθῆναι τοῦ γένους αὐτῷ; ὡς δὴ ταῦτ’ ἀληθῆ λέγω, καλῶ καὶ τούτων μάρτυρας. 
[ΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΣ] 
[28] Ἔτι τοίνυν παίδων αὐτῷ τεττάρων γενομένων ὁμομητρίων ἐμοὶ καὶ 
τελευτησάντων, ἔθαψε τούτους εἰς τὰ πατρῷα μνήματα, ὧν ὅσοιπέρ εἰσι τοῦ γένους 
κοινωνοῦσι· καὶ τούτων οὐδεὶς οὐκ ἀπεῖπεν πώποτε, οὐκ ἐκώλυσεν, οὐ δίκην ἔλαχεν. 
καίτοι τίς ἔστιν ὅστις ἂν εἰς τὰ πατρῷα μνήματα τοὺς μηδὲν ἐν γένει τιθέναι ἐάσαι; ὡς 
τοίνυν καὶ ταῦτ’ ἀληθῆ λέγω, λαβὲ τὴν μαρτυρίαν. 
[ΜΑΡΤΥΡΙΑ] 
[29] Περὶ μὲν τοίνυν τοῦ πατρός, ὡς Ἀθηναῖος ἦν, ταῦτ’ ἔχω λέγειν, καὶ μάρτυρας 
παρέσχημαι τοὺς ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν τούτων ἐψηφισμένους εἶναι πολίτας, μαρτυροῦντας ἐκεῖνον 
ἑαυτοῖς ἀνεψιὸν εἶναι. φαίνεται δὲ βιοὺς ἔτη τόσα καὶ τόσα ἐνθάδε, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ πώποτε 
ὡς ξένος ἐξετασθείς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τούτους ὄντας συγγενεῖς καταφεύγων, οὗτοι δὲ καὶ 
προσδεχόμενοι καὶ τῆς οὐσίας μεταδιδόντες ὡς αὑτῶν ἑνί. [30] τοῖς χρόνοις τοίνυν οὕτω 
φαίνεται γεγονὼς ὥστε, εἰ καὶ κατὰ θάτερα ἀστὸς ἦν, εἶναι πολίτην προσήκειν αὐτόν· 
γέγονε γὰρ πρὸ Εὐκλείδου. περὶ δὲ τῆς μητρὸς (καὶ γὰρ ταύτην διαβεβλήκασί μου) λέξω, 
καὶ μάρτυρας ὧν ἂν λέγω, καλῶ. καίτοι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐ μόνον παρὰ τὸ ψήφισμα 
τὰ περὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν διέβαλλεν ἡμᾶς Εὐβουλίδης, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους, οἳ 
κελεύουσιν ἔνοχον εἶναι τῇ κακηγορίᾳ τὸν τὴν ἐργασίαν τὴν ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ ἢ τῶν πολιτῶν 
ἢ τῶν πολιτίδων ὀνειδίζοντά τινι. [31] ἡμεῖς δ᾽ ὁμολογοῦμεν καὶ ταινίας πωλεῖν καὶ ζῆν 
οὐχ ὅντινα τρόπον βουλόμεθα. καὶ εἴ σοί ἐστιν τοῦτο σημεῖον, ὦ Εὐβουλίδη, τοῦ μὴ 
Ἀθηναίους εἶναι ἡμᾶς, ἐγώ σοι τούτου ὅλως τοὐναντίον ἐπιδείξω, ὅτι οὐκ ἔξεστιν ξένῳ 
ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ ἐργάζεσθαι. καί μοι λαβὼν ἀνάγνωθι πρῶτον τὸν Σόλωνος νόμον. 
[ΝΟΜΟΣ] 
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[32] Λαβὲ δὴ καὶ τὸν Ἀριστοφῶντος· οὕτω γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτον 
ἔδοξεν ἐκεῖνος καλῶς καὶ δημοτικῶς νομοθετῆσαι, ὥστ᾽ ἐψηφίσασθε πάλιν τὸν αὐτὸν 
ἀνανεώσασθαι. 
[ΝΟΜΟΣ] 
Προσήκει τοίνυν ὑμῖν βοηθοῦσι τοῖς νόμοις μὴ τοὺς ἐργαζομένους ξένους 
νομίζειν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς συκοφαντοῦντας πονηρούς. ἐπεί, ὦ Εὐβουλίδη, ἔστι καὶ ἕτερος περὶ 
τῆς ἀργίας νόμος, ᾧ αὐτὸς ἔνοχος ὢν ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἐργαζομένους διαβάλλεις. [33] ἀλλὰ γὰρ 
τοσαύτη τις ἀτυχία ἐστὶν περὶ ἡμᾶς νῦν, ὥστε τούτῳ μὲν ἔξεστιν ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος 
βλασφημεῖν καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν, ὅπως μηδενὸς τῶν δικαίων ἐγὼ τύχω· ἐμοὶ δ’ ἐπιτιμήσετε 
ἴσως, ἐὰν λέγω ὃν τρόπον οὗτος ἐργάζεται περιὼν ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ εἰκότως· ἃ γὰρ ὑμεῖς 
ἴστε, τί δεῖ λέγειν; σκοπεῖτε δή· νομίζω γὰρ ἔγωγε τὸ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ ἡμᾶς ἐργάζεσθαι 
μέγιστον εἶναι σημεῖον τοῦ ψευδεῖς ἡμῖν αἰτίας τοῦτον ἐπιφέρειν. [34] ἣν γάρ φησιν 
ταινιόπωλιν εἶναι καὶ φανερὰν πᾶσιν, προσῆκεν δήπουθεν εἰδότας αὐτὴν πολλοὺς ἥτις 
ἐστὶ μαρτυρεῖν, καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀκοήν, ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν ξένη ἦν, τὰ τέλη ἐξετάσαντας τὰ ἐν τῇ 
ἀγορᾷ, εἰ ξενικὰ ἐτέλει, καὶ ποδαπὴ ἦν ἐπιδεικνύντας· εἰ δὲ δούλη, μάλιστα μὲν τὸν 
πριάμενον, εἰ δὲ μή, τὸν ἀποδόμενον ἥκειν καταμαρτυροῦντα, εἰ δὲ μή, τῶν ἄλλων τινά, 
ἢ ὡς ἐδούλευσεν ἢ ὡς ἀφείθη ἐλευθέρα. νῦν δὲ τούτων μὲν ἀπέδειξεν οὐδέν, 
λελοιδόρηκεν δέ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐδὲν ὅ τι οὔ. τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ὁ συκοφάντης, αἰτιᾶσθαι 
μὲν πάντα, ἐξελέγξαι δὲ μηδέν. [35] ἔπειτα κἀκεῖνο περὶ τῆς μητρὸς εἴρηκεν, ὅτι 
ἐτίτθευσεν. ἡμεῖς δέ, ὅτε ἡ πόλις ἠτύχει καὶ πάντες κακῶς ἔπραττον, οὐκ ἀρνούμεθα 
τοῦτο γενέσθαι· ὃν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ὧν ἕνεκα ἐτίτθευσεν, ἐγὼ σαφῶς ὑμῖν ἐπιδείξω. μηδεὶς 
δ’ ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δυσχερῶς ὑπολάβῃ· καὶ γὰρ νῦν ἀστὰς γυναῖκας πολλὰς 
εὑρήσετε τιτθευούσας, ἃς ὑμῖν καὶ κατ᾽ ὄνομα, ἐὰν βούλησθε, ἐροῦμεν. εἰ δέ γε πλούσιοι 
ἦμεν, οὔτ’ ἂν τὰς ταινίας ἐπωλοῦμεν οὔτ’ ἂν ὅλως ἦμεν ἄποροι. ἀλλὰ τί ταῦτα κοινωνεῖ 
τῷ γένει; ἐγὼ μὲν οὐδὲν οἶμαι. [36] μηδαμῶς, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, τοὺς πένητας ἀτιμάζετε 
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(ἱκανὸν γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὸ πένεσθαι κακόν), μηδέ γε τοὺς ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ζῆν ἐκ τοῦ δικαίου 
προαιρουμένους· ἀλλ’ ἀκούσαντες, ἐὰν ὑμῖν ἐπιδεικνύω τῆς μητρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους οἵους 
προσήκει εἶναι ἀνθρώποις ἐλευθέροις, ἃ οὗτος καταιτιᾶται περὶ αὐτῆς, ταύτας τὰς 
διαβολὰς ἐξομνυμένους, καὶ μαρτυροῦντας αὐτὴν ἀστὴν οὖσαν εἰδέναι, οὓς ὑμεῖς φήσετε 
πιστοὺς εἶναι, δικαίαν ἡμῖν θέσθε τὴν ψῆφον. [37] ἐμοὶ γὰρ ἦν πάππος, ὦ ἄνδρες 
Ἀθηναῖοι, τῆς μητρὸς πατήρ, Δαμόστρατος Μελιτεύς. τούτῳ γίγνονται τέτταρες παῖδες, 
ἐκ μὲν ἧς τὸ πρῶτον ἔσχεν γυναικὸς θυγάτηρ καὶ υἱὸς ᾧ ὄνομ᾽ Ἀμυθέων, ἐκ δὲ τῆς 
ὕστερον, Χαιρεστράτης, ἡ μήτηρ ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ Τιμοκράτης. τούτοις δὲ γίγνονται παῖδες, τῷ 
μὲν Ἀμυθέωνι Δαμόστρατος, τοῦ πάππου τοὔνομ᾽ ἔχων, καὶ Καλλίστρατος καὶ Δεξίθεος. 
καὶ ὁ μὲν Ἀμυθέων ὁ τῆς μητρὸς ἀδελφὸς τῶν ἐν Σικελίᾳ στρατευσαμένων καὶ 
τελευτησάντων ἐστίν, καὶ τέθαπται ἐν τοῖς δημοσίοις μνήμασιν· καὶ ταῦτα μαρτυρήσεται. 
[38] τῇ δ᾽ ἀδελφῇ αὐτοῦ συνοικησάσῃ Διοδώρῳ Ἁλαιεῖ υἱὸς γίγνεται Κτησίβιος. καὶ 
οὗτος μὲν ἐτελεύτησεν ἐν Ἀβύδῳ μετὰ Θρασυβούλου στρατευόμενος, ζῇ δὲ τούτων ὁ 
Δαμόστρατος ὁ τοῦ Ἀμυθέωνος, τῆς μητρὸς ἀδελφιδοῦς τῆς ἐμῆς. τῆς δὲ Χαιρεστράτης 
τῆς ἐμῆς τήθης τὴν ἀδελφὴν λαμβάνει Ἀπολλόδωρος Πλωθεύς· τούτων γίγνεται 
Ὀλύμπιχος, τοῦ δ᾽ Ὀλυμπίχου Ἀπολλόδωρος, καὶ οὗτος ζῇ. καί μοι κάλει αὐτούς. 
[ΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΣ] 
[39] Τούτων μὲν τοίνυν ἀκηκόατε μαρτυρούντων καὶ διομνυμένων· τὸν δὲ {καὶ 
ὁμομήτριον} καὶ κατ᾽ ἀμφότερ᾽ ἡμῖν συγγενῆ καλῶ, καὶ τοὺς υἱεῖς αὐτοῦ. τῷ γὰρ 
Τιμοκράτει τῷ τῆς μητρὸς ἀδελφῷ τῆς ἐμῆς <τῷ> ὁμοπατρίῳ καὶ ὁμομητρίῳ γίγνεται 
Εὐξίθεος, τοῦ δ᾽ Εὐξιθέου τρεῖς υἱεῖς· οὗτοι πάντες ζῶσιν. καί μοι κάλει τοὺς 
ἐπιδημοῦντας αὐτῶν. 
[ΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΣ] 
[40] Λαβὲ δή μοι καὶ τὰς τῶν φρατέρων τῶν συγγενῶν τῶν τῆς μητρὸς καὶ 
δημοτῶν μαρτυρίας, καὶ ὧν τὰ μνήματα ταὐτά. 
60 
 
[ΜΑΡΤΥΡΙΑΙ] 
Τὰ μὲν τοίνυν τοῦ γένους τοῦ τῆς μητρὸς οὕτως ὑμῖν ἐπιδεικνύω, καὶ πρὸς ἀνδρῶν 
καὶ πρὸς γυναικῶν ἀστήν. τῇ δὲ μητρὶ τῇ ἐμῇ γίγνεται, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον 
ἐκ Πρωτομάχου, ᾧ αὐτὴν ὁ Τιμοκράτης ὁμομήτριος καὶ ὁμοπάτριος ὢν ἀδελφὸς ἔδωκεν, 
θυγάτηρ, εἶτα ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ ἐμοῦ ἐγώ. ὃν δὲ τρόπον τῷ πατρὶ τῷ ἐμῷ συνῴκησεν, 
ταῦθ’ ὑμᾶς ἀκοῦσαι δεῖ· καὶ γὰρ ἃ περὶ τὸν Κλεινίαν αἰτιᾶται καὶ τὸ τιτθεῦσαι τὴν μητέρα 
καὶ ταῦτα πάντα ἐγὼ σαφῶς ὑμῖν διηγήσομαι. [41] ὁ Πρωτόμαχος πένης ἦν· ἐπικλήρου 
δὲ κληρονομήσας εὐπόρου, τὴν μητέρα βουληθεὶς ἐκδοῦναι πείθει λαβεῖν αὐτὴν 
Θούκριτον τὸν πατέρα τὸν ἐμόν, ὄνθ’ ἑαυτοῦ γνώριμον, καὶ ἐγγυᾶται ὁ πατὴρ τὴν μητέρα 
τὴν ἐμὴν παρὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ αὐτῆς Τιμοκράτους Μελιτέως, παρόντων τῶν τε θείων 
ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἄλλων μαρτύρων· καὶ τούτων ὅσοι ζῶσι, μαρτυρήσουσιν 
ἡμῖν. [42] μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα χρόνῳ ὕστερον παιδίων αὐτῇ δυοῖν ἤδη γεγενημένων, καὶ τοῦ 
μὲν πατρὸς στρατευομένου καὶ ἀποδημοῦντος μετὰ Θρασυβούλου, αὐτὴ δ’ οὖσα ἐν 
ἀπορίαις ἠναγκάσθη τὸν Κλεινίαν τὸν τοῦ Κλειδίκου τιτθεῦσαι, τῷ μὲν εἰς ἔμ’ ἥκοντι 
κινδύνῳ νῦν μὰ τὸν Δία οὐχὶ συμφέρον πρᾶγμα ποιήσασα (ἀπὸ γὰρ ταύτης τῆς τιτθείας 
ἅπασα ἡ περὶ ἡμᾶς γέγονεν βλασφημία), τῇ μέντοι ὑπαρχούσῃ πενίᾳ ἴσως καὶ ἀναγκαῖα 
καὶ ἁρμόττοντα ποιοῦσα. [43] φαίνεται τοίνυν οὐχ ὁ ἐμὸς πατὴρ πρῶτος, ὦ ἄνδρες 
Ἀθηναῖοι, λαβὼν τὴν ἐμὴν μητέρα, ἀλλ’ ὁ Πρωτόμαχος, καὶ παῖδας ποιησάμενος καὶ 
θυγατέρα ἐκδούς· ὃς καὶ τετελευτηκὼς ὅμως μαρτυρεῖ τοῖς ἔργοις ἀστὴν ταύτην καὶ 
πολῖτιν εἶναι. ὡς οὖν ταῦτ’ ἀληθῆ λέγω, κάλει μοι πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς τοῦ Πρωτομάχου 
υἱεῖς, ἔπειτα τοὺς ἐγγυωμένῳ παρόντας τῷ πατρὶ καὶ τῶν φρατέρων τοὺς οἰκείους, οἷς 
τὴν γαμηλίαν εἰσήνεγκεν ὑπὲρ τῆς μητρὸς ὁ πατήρ, εἶτα Εὔνικον Χολαργέα τὸν τὴν 
ἀδελφὴν λαβόντα τὴν ἐμὴν παρὰ τοῦ Πρωτομάχου, εἶτα τὸν υἱὸν τῆς ἀδελφῆς. κάλει 
τούτους.  
[ΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΣ] 
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[44] Πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἂν οἰκτρότατα, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πάντων ἐγὼ πεπονθὼς εἴην, 
εἰ τῶν συγγενῶν ὄντων τοσούτων τουτωνὶ καὶ μαρτυρούντων καὶ διομνυμένων ἐμοὶ 
προσήκειν, μηδεὶς μηδενὶ τούτων ἀμφισβητῶν ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶ πολῖται, ἐμὲ ψηφίσαισθ’ εἶναι 
ξένον; λαβὲ δή μοι καὶ τὴν τοῦ Κλεινίου καὶ τὴν τῶν συγγενῶν αὐτοῦ μαρτυρίαν· οἳ 
ἴσασιν δήπου τίς οὖσά ποτε ἡ ἐμὴ μήτηρ ἐτίτθευσεν αὐτόν. οὐ γὰρ ἃ τήμερον ἡμεῖς 
φαμέν, εὔορκον αὐτοῖς μαρτυρεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἃ πάντα τὸν χρόνον ᾔδεσαν τὴν ἡμετέραν μὲν 
μητέρα, τιτθὴν δὲ τούτου νομιζομένην. [45] καὶ γὰρ εἰ ταπεινὸν ἡ τιτθή, τὴν ἀλήθειαν οὐ 
φεύγω· οὐ γὰρ εἰ πένητες ἦμεν, ἠδικήκαμεν, ἀλλ’ εἰ μὴ πολῖται· οὐδὲ περὶ τύχης οὐδὲ 
περὶ χρημάτων ἡμῖν ἐστὶν ὁ παρὼν ἀγών, ἀλλ’ ὑπὲρ γένους. πολλὰ δουλικὰ καὶ ταπεινὰ 
πράγματα τοὺς ἐλευθέρους ἡ πενία βιάζεται ποιεῖν, ἐφ’ οἷς ἐλεοῖντ’ ἄν, ὦ ἄνδρες 
Ἀθηναῖοι, δικαιότερον ἢ προσαπολλύοιντο. ὡς γὰρ ἐγὼ ἀκούω, πολλαὶ καὶ τιτθαὶ καὶ 
ἔριθοι καὶ τρυγήτριαι γεγόνασιν ὑπὸ τῶν τῆς πόλεως κατ᾽ ἐκείνους τοὺς χρόνους 
συμφορῶν ἀσταὶ γυναῖκες, πολλαὶ δ᾽ ἐκ πενήτων πλούσιαι νῦν. ἀλλ᾽ αὐτίχ᾽ ὑπὲρ τούτων. 
νῦν δὲ τοὺς μάρτυρας κάλει. 
[ΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΣ] 
[46] Οὐκοῦν ὅτι μὲν καὶ τὰ πρὸς μητρός εἰμ’ ἀστὸς καὶ τὰ πρὸς πατρός, τὰ μὲν ἐξ 
ὧν ἄρτι μεμαρτύρηται μεμαθήκατε πάντες, τὰ δ’ ἐξ ὧν πρότερον περὶ τοῦ πατρός. λοιπὸν 
δέ μοι περὶ ἐμαυτοῦ πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰπεῖν, τὸ μὲν ἁπλούστατον οἶμαι καὶ δικαιότατον, ἐξ 
ἀμφοτέρων ἀστῶν ὄντα με, κεκληρονομηκότα καὶ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ γένους, εἶναι 
πολίτην· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ προσήκοντα πάντα ἐπιδείξω μάρτυρας παρεχόμενος, ὡς 
εἰσήχθην εἰς τοὺς φράτερας, ὡς ἐνεγράφην εἰς τοὺς δημότας, ὡς ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν τούτων 
προεκρίθην ἐν τοῖς εὐγενεστάτοις κληροῦσθαι τῆς ἱερωσύνης τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ, ὡς ἦρχον 
ἀρχὰς δοκιμασθείς. καί μοι κάλει αὐτούς. 
[ΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΣ] 
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[47] Οὔκουν δεινόν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, εἰ μὲν ἔλαχον ἱερεύς, ὥσπερ προεκρίθην, 
δεῖν ἄν με καὶ αὐτὸν θύειν ὑπὲρ τούτων καὶ τοῦτον μετ᾽ ἐμοῦ συνθύειν, νῦν δὲ τοὺς 
αὐτοὺς τούτους ἐμὲ μεθ’ αὑτῶν μηδὲ συνθύειν ἐᾶν; φαίνομαι τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, 
τὸν μὲν ἄλλον χρόνον ἅπαντα παρὰ πᾶσιν τοῖς νῦν κατηγοροῦσι πολίτης ὡμολογημένος· 
[48] οὐ γὰρ ἂν δήπου τόν γε ξένον καὶ μέτοικον, ὡς νῦν φησιν Εὐβουλίδης, οὔτ᾽ ἀρχὰς 
ἄρχειν οὔθ᾽ ἱερωσύνην κληροῦσθαι μεθ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ προκριθέντα εἴασεν· καὶ γὰρ οὗτος ἦν 
τῶν κληρουμένων καὶ προκριθέντων. οὐδέ γ᾽ ἄν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, παλαιὸς ὢν ἐχθρὸς 
ἐμοὶ τοῦτον τὸν καιρὸν περιέμενεν, ὃν οὐδεὶς ᾔδει γενησόμενον, εἴπερ τι συνῄδει 
τοιοῦτον. [49] ἀλλ’ οὐ συνῄδει· διόπερ τὸν μὲν ἄλλον ἅπαντα χρόνον δημοτευόμενος 
μετ᾽ ἐμοῦ καὶ κληρούμενος οὐδὲν ἑώρα τούτων, ἐπειδὴ δ᾽ ἡ πόλις πᾶσα τοῖς ἀσελγῶς 
εἰσπεπηδηκόσιν εἰς τοὺς δήμους ὀργιζομένη παρώξυντο, τηνικαῦτα μοι ἐπεβούλευσεν. 
ἦν δ᾽ ἐκεῖνος μὲν ὁ καιρὸς τοῦ συνειδότος αὑτῷ τἀληθῆ λέγειν, ὁ δὲ νυνὶ παρὼν ἐχθροῦ 
καὶ συκοφαντεῖν βουλομένου. [50] ἐγὼ δ’, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί (καί μοι πρὸς Διὸς καὶ θεῶν 
μηδεὶς θορυβήσῃ, μηδ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ᾧ μέλλω λέγειν ἀχθεσθῇ), ἐμαυτὸν Ἀθηναῖον ὑπείληφα 
ὥσπερ ὑμῶν ἕκαστος ἑαυτόν, μητέρ᾽ ἐξ ἀρχῆς νομίζων ἥνπερ εἰς ὑμᾶς ἀποφαίνω, καὶ οὐχ 
ἑτέρας μὲν ὢν ταύτης δὲ προσποιούμενος· πατέρα πάλιν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸν αὐτὸν 
τρόπον. [51] καίτοι εἰ τοῖς ἐξελεγχομένοις ὧν μέν εἰσιν ἀποκρυπτομένοις, ὧν δ᾽ οὐκ εἰσὶν 
προσποιουμένοις, δίκαιον ὑπάρχειν παρ᾽ ὑμῖν τοῦτο σημεῖον ὡς εἰσὶ ξένοι, ἐμοὶ δήπου 
τοὐναντίον ὡς εἰμὶ πολίτης. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ξένην καὶ ξένον τοὺς ἐμαυτοῦ γονέας 
ἐπιγραψάμενος μετέχειν ἠξίουν τῆς πόλεως· ἀλλ᾽ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον συνῄδειν, ἐζήτησ᾽ ἂν ὧν 
φήσω γονέων εἶναι. ἀλλ’ οὐ συνῄδειν, διόπερ μένων ἐπὶ τοῖς οὖσιν δικαίως γονεῦσιν 
ἐμαυτῷ τῆς πόλεως μετέχειν ἀξιῶ. 
[52] Ἔτι τοίνυν ὀρφανὸς κατελείφθην, καὶ φασίν με εὔπορον εἶναι καὶ τῶν 
μαρτύρων ἐνίους ὠφελουμένους μοι μαρτυρεῖν συγγενεῖς εἶναι. καὶ ἅμα μὲν κατ᾽ ἐμοῦ 
λέγουσιν τὰς ἐκ τῆς πενίας ἀδοξίας καὶ περὶ τὸ γένος διαβάλλουσιν, ἅμα δὲ δι’ εὐπορίαν 
φασὶ πάντα με ὠνεῖσθαι. [53] ὥστε πότερα χρὴ αὐτοῖς πιστεύειν; ἐξῆν δὲ δήπου τούτοις, 
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εἰ νόθος ἢ ξένος ἦν ἐγώ, κληρονόμοις εἶναι τῶν ἐμῶν πάντων. εἶθ’ οὗτοι μικρὰ λαμβάνειν 
καὶ κινδυνεύειν ἐν ψευδομαρτυρίοις καὶ ἐπιορκεῖν μᾶλλον αἱροῦνται ἢ πάντ’ ἔχειν, καὶ 
ταῦτ’ ἀσφαλῶς, καὶ μηδεμιᾶς ἐξωλείας ὑπόχους ἑαυτοὺς ποιεῖν; οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα, ἀλλ’ 
οἶμαι συγγενεῖς ὄντες τὰ δίκαια ποιοῦσι, βοηθοῦντες αὑτῶν ἑνί. [54] καὶ ταῦτ’ οὐχὶ νῦν 
πεπεισμένοι ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ παιδίον ὄντα με εὐθέως ἦγον εἰς τοὺς φράτερας, εἰς 
Ἀπόλλωνος πατρῴου {ἦγον}, εἰς τἄλλα ἱερά. καίτοι οὐ δήπου παῖς ὢν ἐγὼ ταῦτ᾽ ἔπειθον 
αὐτοὺς ἀργύριον διδούς. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ πατὴρ αὐτὸς ζῶν ὀμόσας τὸν νόμιμον τοῖς 
φράτερσιν ὅρκον εἰσήγαγέν με, ἀστὸν ἐξ ἀστῆς ἐγγυητῆς αὑτῷ γεγενημένον εἰδώς, καὶ 
ταῦτα μεμαρτύρηται. [55] εἶτα ἐγὼ ξένος; ποῦ μετοίκιον καταθείς; ἢ τίς τῶν ἐμῶν 
πώποτε; ποῦ πρὸς ἄλλους δημότας ἐλθών, καὶ οὐ δυνηθεὶς ἐκείνους πεῖσαι δεῦρ’ ἐμαυτὸν 
ἐνέγραψα; ποῦ τί ποιήσας ὧν ὅσοι μὴ καθαρῶς ἦσαν πολῖται πεποιηκότες φαίνονται; 
οὐδαμοῦ, ἀλλ’ ἁπλῶς, ἐν οἷς ὁ πάππος ὁ τοῦ πατρός, ὁ ἐμός, <ὁ> πατήρ, ἐνταῦθα καὶ 
αὐτὸς φαίνομαι δημοτευόμενος. καὶ νῦν πῶς ἄν τις ὑμῖν σαφέστερον ἐπιδείξειεν μετὸν 
τῆς πόλεως αὑτῷ; [56] ἐνθυμείσθω γὰρ ἕκαστος ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοὺς ἑαυτῷ 
προσήκοντας τίν’ ἄλλον ἂν δύναιτο ἐπιδεῖξαι τρόπον ἢ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐμοί, μαρτυροῦντας, 
ὀμνύοντας, πάλαι τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ὄντας; 
Διὰ ταῦτα τοίνυν ἐγὼ πιστεύων ἐμαυτῷ κατέφυγον εἰς ὑμᾶς. ὁρῶ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες 
Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐ μόνον τῶν ἀποψηφισαμένων Ἁλιμουσίων ἐμοῦ κυριώτερ᾽ ὄντα τὰ 
δικαστήρια, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς βουλῆς καὶ τοῦ δήμου, δικαίως· κατὰ γὰρ πάντα αἱ παρ᾽ ὑμῖν 
εἰσι κρίσεις δικαιόταται. 
[57] Ἐνθυμεῖσθε τοίνυν κἀκεῖνο, ὅσοι τῶν μεγάλων δήμων ἐστέ, ὡς οὐδέν’ 
ἀπεστερεῖτε οὔτε κατηγορίας οὔτ’ ἀπολογίας. καὶ πόλλὰ ἀγαθὰ γένοιτο πᾶσιν ὑμῖν τοῖς 
δικαίως τούτῳ τῷ πράγματι χρησαμένοις, ὅτι καὶ τῶν ἀναβαλέσθαι δεομένων οὐκ 
ἀφῄρησθε τὸ παρασκευάσασθαι· ᾧ καὶ τοὺς συκοφαντοῦντας καὶ δι᾽ ἔχθραν 
ἐπιβουλεύοντας ἐξηλέγχετε. [58] καὶ ὑμᾶς μὲν ἄξιον ἐπαινεῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοὺς 
δὲ καλῷ καὶ δικαίῳ πράγματι μὴ καλῶς χρησαμένους ψέγειν. ἐν οὐδενὶ τοίνυν εὑρήσετε 
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τῶν δήμων δεινότερα γεγενημένα τῶν παρ’ ἡμῖν. οὗτοι γὰρ ἀδελφῶν ὁμομητρίων καὶ 
ὁμοπατρίων τῶν μέν εἰσιν ἀπεψηφισμένοι, τῶν δ᾽ οὔ, καὶ πρεσβυτέρων ἀνθρώπων 
ἀπόρων, ὧν τοὺς υἱεῖς ἐγκαταλελοίπασιν· καὶ τούτων ἂν βούλησθε, μάρτυρας παρέξομαι. 
[59] ὃ δὲ πάντων δεινότατον οἱ συνεστηκότες πεποιήκασιν (καί μοι πρὸς Διὸς καὶ θεῶν 
μηδεὶς ὑπολάβῃ δυσκόλως, ἐὰν τοὺς ἠδικηκότας ἐμαυτὸν πονηροὺς ὄντας ἐπιδεικνύω· 
νομίζω γὰρ ὑμῖν τὴν τούτων πονηρίαν δεικνὺς <εἰς> αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα λέγειν τὸ γενόμενόν 
μοι)· οὗτοι γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, βουλομένους τινὰς ἀνθρώπους ξένους πολίτας 
γενέσθαι, Ἀναξιμένην καὶ Νικόστρατον, κοινῇ διανειμάμενοι πέντε δραχμὰς ἕκαστος 
προσεδέξαντο. καὶ ταῦτ᾽ οὐκ ἂν ἐξομόσαιτο Εὐβουλίδης οὐδ᾽ οἱ μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ μὴ οὐκ 
εἰδέναι. καὶ νῦν τούτων οὐκ ἀπεψηφίσαντο. τί οὖν οὐκ ἂν οἴεσθε τούτους ἰδίᾳ ποιῆσαι, 
οἳ κοινῇ ταῦτ’ ἐτόλμων; [60] πολλούς, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, οἱ μετ’ Εὐβουλίδου 
συνεστῶτες καὶ ἀπολωλέκασιν καὶ σεσῴκασιν ἕνεκ᾽ ἀργυρίου. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ πρότερον (ἐρῶ 
δ’ εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι) δημαρχῶν ὁ Εὐβουλίδου πατήρ, ὥσπερ εἶπον, 
Ἀντίφιλος, τεχνάζει βουλόμενος παρά τινων λαβεῖν ἀργύριον, καὶ ἔφη τὸ κοινὸν 
γραμματεῖον ἀπολωλέναι, ὥστ’ ἔπεισε διαψηφίσασθαι τοὺς Ἁλιμουσίους περὶ αὑτῶν, καὶ 
κατηγορῶν δέκα τῶν δημοτῶν ἐξέβαλεν, οὓς ἅπαντας πλὴν ἑνὸς κατεδέξατο τὸ 
δικαστήριον. καὶ ταῦτα πάντες ἴσασιν οἱ πρεσβύτεροι. [61] πολλοῦ γ’ ἔδεόν τινας 
ἐγκαταλιπεῖν τῶν μὴ Ἀθηναίων, ὅπου καὶ τοὺς ὄντας πολίτας συνιστάμενοι ἐξέβαλον, 
οὓς τὸ δικαστήριον κατεδέξατο. καὶ ὢν ἐχθρὸς τῷ ἐμῷ πατρὶ τότε οὐ μόνον οὐ 
κατηγόρησεν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τὴν ψῆφον ἤνεγκεν ὡς οὐκ ἦν Ἀθηναῖος. τῷ τοῦτο δῆλον; ὅτι 
ἁπάσαις ἔδοξεν δημότης εἶναι. καὶ τί δεῖ περὶ τῶν πατέρων λέγειν; ἀλλ᾽ Εὐβουλίδης αὐτὸς 
οὑτοσί, ἡνίκα ἐνεγράφην ἐγὼ καὶ ὀμόσαντες οἱ δημόται δικαίως πάντες περὶ ἐμοῦ τὴν 
ψῆφον ἔφερον, οὔτε κατηγόρησεν οὔτ᾽ ἐναντίαν τὴν ψῆφον ἤνεγκεν· καὶ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα 
πάλιν ἐμὲ πάντες ἐψηφίσαντο δημότην. καὶ εἴ φασίν με τοῦτο ψεύδεσθαι, ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐμοῦ 
ὕδατος ὅστις βούλεται τούτων τἀναντία μαρτυρησάτω. [62] εἰ τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες 
Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο δοκοῦσιν οὗτοι λέγειν μάλιστ’ ἰσχυρόν, ὡς ἀπεψηφίσαντό μου νῦν οἱ 
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δημόται, ἐγὼ τετράκις ἐπιδεικνύω πρότερον ὅτε ὁσίως ἄνευ συστάσεως ἐψηφίσαντο, καὶ 
ἐμὲ καὶ τὸν πατέρα δημότας αὑτῶν εἶναι ψηφισαμένους, πρῶτον μέν γε τοῦ πατρὸς 
δοκιμασθέντος, εἶτ᾽ ἐμοῦ, εἶτ’ ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ διαψηφίσει, ὅτε ἠφάνισαν οὗτοι τὸ 
γραμματεῖον· τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον προκρίναντες ἐμὲ ἐψηφίσαντο ἐν τοῖς εὐγενεστάτοις 
κληροῦσθαι τῆς ἱερωσύνης τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ. καὶ ταῦτα πάντα μεμαρτύρηται. 
[63] Εἰ δὲ δεῖ τὴν δημαρχίαν λέγειν, δι’ ἣν ὠργίζοντό μοί τινες, ἐν ᾗ διάφορος 
ἐγενόμην εἰσπράττων ὀφείλοντας πολλοὺς αὐτῶν μισθώσεις τεμενῶν καὶ ἕτερ᾽ ἃ τῶν 
κοινῶν διηρπάκεσαν, ἐγὼ μὲν ἂν βουλοίμην ὑμᾶς ἀκούειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος 
ὑπολήψεσθε ταῦτ᾽ εἶναι. ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἔχω δεικνύναι τεκμήριον ὡς συνέστησαν· ἔκ τε 
γὰρ τοῦ ὅρκου ἐξήλειψαν τὸ ψηφιεῖσθαι γνώμῃ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ καὶ οὔτε χάριτος ἕνεκ᾽ οὔτ᾽ 
ἔχθρας· [64] καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο φανερὸν ἐγένετο καὶ ὅτι ἱεροσυλήσαντες τὰ ὅπλα (εἰρήσεται 
γάρ), ἃ ἐγὼ ἀνέθηκα τῇ Ἀθηνᾷ, καὶ τὸ ψήφισμα ἐκκολάψαντες ὃ ἐμοὶ ἐψηφίσαντο οἱ 
δημόται, συνώμνυον οὗτοι ἐπ’ ἐμὲ οἱ ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ τὰ κοινὰ εἰσπραχθέντες. καὶ εἰς τοσοῦτ’ 
ἀναιδείας ἐληλύθασιν, ὥστ’ ἔλεγον περιόντες ἐμὲ τῆς ἀπολογίας ἕνεκα ταῦτα ποιῆσαι. 
καὶ τίς ὑμῶν ἂν καταγνοίη μου τοσαύτην μανίαν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ὥστε τηλικούτων 
ἕνεκα πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα τεκμηρίων ἄξια θανάτου διαπράξασθαι, καὶ ἃ ἐμοὶ φιλοτιμίαν 
ἔφερεν, ταῦτ’ ἀφανίζειν; [65] τὸ δὲ πάντων δεινότατον οὐ δήπου γε φήσαιεν ἂν ἐμὲ 
κατασκευάσαι. οὐ γὰρ ἔφθη μοι συμβᾶσ’ ἡ ἀτυχία καὶ εὐθύς, ὥσπερ φυγάδος ἤδη μου 
ὄντος καὶ ἀπολωλότος, τούτων τινὲς ἐπὶ τὸ οἰκίδιον ἐλθόντες <τὸ> ἐν ἀγρῷ νύκτωρ 
ἐπεχείρησαν διαφορῆσαι τὰ ἔνδοθεν· οὕτω σφόδρ’ ὑμῶν καὶ τῶν νόμων κατεφρόνησαν. 
καὶ ταῦτα τοὺς εἰδότας, ἐὰν βούλησθε, καλοῦμεν. 
[66] Πολλὰ δ’ ἔχων καὶ ἄλλ’ ἐπιδεῖξαι, ἃ τούτοις ἐστὶν διαπεπραγμένα καὶ ἅ εἰσιν 
ἐψευσμένοι, ἡδέως μὲν ἂν ὑμῖν λέγοιμι, ἐπειδὴ δε ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος νομίζετ’ εἶναι, 
ἐάσω. ἀναμνήσθητε δ’ ἐκείνων καὶ θεάσασθε, ὡς πολλὰ καὶ δίκαια ἔχων πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἥκω. 
ὥσπερ γὰρ τοὺς θεσμοθέτας ἀνακρίνετε, ἐγὼ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐμαυτὸν ὑμῖν ἀνακρινῶ. 
‘ὦ ἄνθρωπε, τίς ἦν σοι πατήρ;’ ἐμοί Θούκριτος. [67] ‘οἰκεῖοί τινες εἶναι μαρτυροῦσιν 
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αὐτῷ;’ πάνυ γε, πρῶτον μέν γε τέτταρες ἀνεψιοί, εἶτ’ ἀνεψιαδοῦς, εἶθ’ οἱ τὰς ἀνεψιὰς 
λαβόντες αὐτῷ, εἶτα φράτερες, εἶτ’ Ἀπόλλωνος πατρῴου καὶ Διὸς ἑρκείου γεννῆται, εἶθ᾽ 
οἷς ἠρία ταὐτά, εἶθ’ οἱ δημόται πολλάκις αὐτὸν δεδοκιμάσθαι καὶ ἀρχὰς ἄρξαι, καὶ αὐτοὶ 
διεψηφισμένοι φαίνονται. τὰ μὲν τοίνυν περὶ τοῦ πατρὸς πῶς ἂν ὑμῖν δικαιότερον ἢ 
καθαρώτερον ἐπιδείξαιμι; καλῶ δ᾽ ὑμῖν τοὺς οἰκείους, εἰ βούλεσθε. τὰ δὲ περὶ τῆς μητρὸς 
ἀκούσατε. [68] ἐμοὶ γάρ ἐστιν μήτηρ Νικαρέτη Δαμοστράτου θυγάτηρ Μελιτέως. ταύτης 
τίνες οἰκεῖοι μαρτυροῦσιν; πρῶτον μὲν ἀδελφιδοῦς, εἶτα τοῦ ἑτέρου ἀδελφιδοῦ δύο υἱοί, 
εἶτ’ ἀνεψιαδοῦς, εἶθ’ οἱ Πρωτομάχου υἱεῖς τοῦ λαβόντος τὴν ἐμὴν μητέρα πρότερον, εἶθ’ 
ὁ τὴν ἀδελφὴν τὴν ἐμὴν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ Πρωτομάχου γήμας Εὔνικος Χολαργεύς, εἶθ’ υἱὸς τῆς 
ἀδελφῆς. [69] ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ φράτερες τῶν οἰκείων αὐτῆς καὶ δημόται ταῦτα 
μεμαρτυρήκασι. τίνος οὖν ἂν προσδέοισθε; καὶ γὰρ ὅτι κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ὁ πατὴρ ἔγημεν 
καὶ γαμηλίαν τοῖς φράτερσιν εἰσήνεγκεν μεμαρτύρηται. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ ἐμαυτὸν 
ἐπέδειξα πάντων μετειληφότα ὅσων προσήκει τοὺς ἐλευθέρους. ὥστε πανταχῇ δικαίως 
καὶ προσηκόντως ἡμῖν ἂν προσθέμενοι τὴν ψῆφον εὐορκοίητε. [70] ἔτι τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες 
δικασταί, τοὺς ἑννέα ἄρχοντας ἀνακρίνετε, εἰ γονέας εὖ ποιοῦσιν. ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦ μὲν πατρὸς 
ὀρφανὸς κατελείφθην, τὴν δὲ μητέρ’ ἱκετεύω ὑμᾶς καὶ ἀντιβολῶ διὰ τοῦτον τὸν ἀγῶνα 
ἀπόδοτέ μοι θάψαι εἰς τὰ πατρῷα μνήματα καὶ μή με κωλύσητε, μηδ’ ἄπολιν ποιήσητε, 
μηδὲ τῶν οἰκείων ἀποστερήσητε τοσούτων ὄντων τὸ πλῆθος, καὶ ὅλως ἀπολέσητε. 
πρότερον γὰρ ἢ προλιπεῖν τούτους, εἰ μὴ δυνατὸν ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν εἴη σωθῆναι, ἀποκτείναιμ᾽ 
ἂν ἐμαυτόν, ὥστ᾽ ἐν τῇ πατρίδι γ᾽ ὑπὸ τούτων ταφῆναι. 
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Demosthenes’  
Against Euboulides 
[1] Since Euboulides has brought many false accusations against me, and has 
made slanderous statements that are neither fitting nor just, I will endeavour to show, men 
of the jury, by speaking what is true and just, that I share in the right of citizenship and I 
have unduly suffered from this man. I ask all of you, men of the jury, and I beg and 
beseech you, considering both the magnitude of this present trial and the shame that it 
involves for those who have been ruined by convictions, listen to me also and in silence, 
indeed especially so, if you are able, with greater goodwill than towards this man (for it 
seems likely that you are more favourable to those who are placed in danger), but if not, 
indeed with equal goodwill. [2] And as it happens, men of the jury, I am confident with 
regard to the merits of my case and my claim to citizenship and I have great hopes of 
doing well in court, but I happen to fear the occasion and that the city has been provoked 
into carrying out disfranchisements; for while many have been justly driven out from all 
of the demes, we who have been victimised by political rivals have a joint share of this 
reputation, and we also fight the charge against them and not just the charges in our own 
individual cases, so that the fear is necessarily great. [3] Nevertheless, despite this 
situation, I will first speak to you of what I believe to be just about these very things. For 
I think it is necessary for you to treat with severity those who have been exposed as 
foreigners, if neither having persuaded you nor having asked your consent, they have 
secretly and forcibly shared in your sacred rites and civil privileges; but it is necessary 
for you to help and to save those who have met with misfortune and can prove themselves 
to be citizens, bearing in mind that the most pitiable state of all would befall us having 
been wronged if, when we should rightly belong among those exacting the penalty with 
you, we should be with those paying the penalty and should be wronged alike because of 
the anger which the matter arouses. [4] And so I thought, men of the jury, it was fitting 
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for Euboulides and also all those who now bring accusations in cases of disfranchisement 
to state that which they know accurately and to bring forward no hearsay in a trial such 
as this. For in reality this practice has long been deemed very unjust, so that the laws do 
not permit giving hearsay as evidence, not even in altogether trivial complaints, and 
rightly so; for when those who claimed to have knowledge were then shown to be lying, 
how indeed can it be fitting to believe someone who speaks about that which he himself 
has no personal knowledge? [5] Yet surely when it is not permitted for someone to harm 
anyone else through that which he says he has heard, even having made himself 
responsible for it, how can it be proper for you to believe someone speaking without 
accountability? Well since this man, knowing the laws and indeed more than is fitting, 
has made this accusation unjustly and for his own advantage, it is necessary for me to 
speak first of how I was abused amongst the demesmen. [6] And I ask of you, Athenian 
men, not yet to take my disfranchisement as proof that it is not fitting for me to have 
citizenship. For if you believed that the demesmen were able to settle all cases justly, you 
would not have allowed the right of appeal to yourselves; but even now believing 
something of this sort would happen on account of rivalry and envy and enmity and other 
pretexts, you made yourselves a place of refuge for those who suffered wrongdoing, 
through which acting properly, Athenian men, you have saved all those who have been 
wronged. [7] And so I will first speak to you about the manner in which the voting by 
ballot actually took place amongst the demesmen; for I take this as speaking on the same 
matter at hand in every way, demonstrating how much a man who has been unjustly 
victimised by his political rivals has suffered, contrary to the decree. 
[8] For as many of you know, Athenian men, this man here, Euboulides, indicted 
the sister of Lacedaemonios for impiety but did not get a fifth of the share of votes. 
Because I gave testimony in that trial, which was just but in opposition to this man, on 
account of this personal enmity over that event, he is attacking me. And being a member 
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of the Boulē, men of the jury, and the man in charge of the oath and the register from 
which the demesmen were summoned, what does he do? [9] First, when the demesmen 
were gathered, he wasted the day by making speeches and proposing decrees. This was 
not by accident, but because he was plotting against me, so that the vote about me would 
be as late as possible; and he accomplished this. And seventy-three of us demesmen who 
swore the oath began voting in the late afternoon, so that it happened that it was already 
dark by the time my name was called. [10] For I was about sixtieth, and I was called last 
of all of those summoned that day, when the older demesmen had left for the countryside; 
for our deme, members of the jury, is thirty-five stades away from the city and most of 
the demesmen live there, so many had left; and those who remained were not more than 
thirty. But amongst these were all those who had been suborned by this man. [11] And 
when my name was called, this man jumped up and immediately slandered me, at great 
length and in a loud voice, just like now, he brought forward no witness who accused me, 
neither from the demesmen nor the rest of the citizens, but he urged the demesmen to vote 
to disfranchise me. [12] And I requested that the vote on me be adjourned until the next 
day because of both the late hour and that there was nobody present to speak on my behalf, 
the matter had come about so suddenly, so that the reason behind my request would be 
for this man to make as many accusations as he wished and to bring forward any witnesses 
that he might have, and it would grant me the opportunity to defend myself before all the 
demesmen and to bring forward my relatives as witnesses; and I was willing to abide by 
whatever they might decide about me. [13] This man paid no attention to what I proposed, 
but he immediately put the vote to the demesmen who were present, and he neither 
allowed me a defence speech nor produced any genuine proof. And the conspirators with 
this man leaped up and voted. It was also dark, and taking two and three votes each from 
this man they put them in the voting urn. And this is the evidence for it: for those who 
voted were not more than thirty in number, but the votes that were counted were more 
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than sixty, so that all of us were stunned. [14] And I will bring forward witnesses before 
you to testify that I speak these things truthfully, that the vote was not given to all the 
demesmen and that there were more votes cast than those who had voted. But it happens 
that none of my friends or other Athenians were present on my behalf as a witness about 
these matters because of the late hour and because I did not summon anybody, and instead 
I am making use of those very men who wronged me as my witnesses. And so I have put 
these things in writing for them, which they will not be able to deny. [To the clerk] Read 
it. 
[DEPOSITION] 
[15] Moreover, men of the jury, if it had happened that the Halimousians had 
voted about all of the demesmen on that day, it was reasonable to vote until late, so that 
they would have fulfilled the terms of your decree before departing. But if there were 
more than twenty demesmen left who had to be voted on the next day, and it was in any 
case necessary for the demesmen to gather again, what was the difficulty for Euboulides 
to adjourn to the next day and to give the demesmen the vote about me first? [16] Because, 
men of the jury, Euboulides knew well that if I were allowed to make a speech and all the 
demesmen were present on my behalf and the vote was justly given, his fellow 
conspirators would be useless. As soon as I have spoken about my lineage, then I will tell 
you the reason why these men conspired against me, if you wish to hear these things. [17] 
And now what do I think to be just and what am I prepared to do, men of the jury? I am 
prepared to show you that I myself am an Athenian on both my father’s side and my 
mother’s, and to present witnesses to these matters, who you will agree are honest, and to 
refute the insults and accusations. And, after you have heard these things, if I seem to you 
to be a citizen who has been victimised by my political rivals, then save me, but if not, 
act in whatever manner seems to you to be pious. And I will begin from here. 
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[18] For they have slandered my father, because he spoke with a foreign accent; 
and they have omitted the fact that he was captured by the enemy during the Decelean 
War and was sold into slavery in Leucas; having fallen in with Cleander the actor, he was 
brought safely here to his relatives after a very long time; and as if it were right for us to 
be ruined on account of those misfortunes, they have accused him of speaking with a 
foreign accent. [19] But most of all I think that these very facts will show you that I myself 
am an Athenian. And I will present witnesses to you first that he was captured and was 
rescued, then that having returned he received a share of the property from his uncles, and 
furthermore that nobody ever accused him, neither amongst the demesmen nor amongst 
the phratry members nor anywhere else, of being a foreigner despite having a foreign 
accent. [To the clerk] Take the depositions. 
[DEPOSITIONS] 
[20] Therefore you have heard about the capture and the safe return, how it 
happened for my father to be here. And to prove that he was your fellow citizen, men of 
the jury, (for this is the truth of the case), I will call as witnesses my surviving relatives 
on my father’s side. First call Thoucritides and Charisiades; for the father of these men, 
Charisios, was a brother of my grandfather Thoucritides and of my grandmother Lysarete 
(for my grandfather married his sister who was born from a different mother), and 
Charisios is my father’s uncle. Then call Niciades; [21] for the father of this man, 
Lysanias, was a brother of Thoucritides and of Lysarete, and my father’s uncle. Then call 
Nicostratos; for the father of this man, Niciades, was nephew to my grandfather and 
grandmother, and my father’s first cousin. Call all these men. [To the clerk] And you, 
stop the water clock. 
[WITNESSES] 
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[22] Therefore you have heard, Athenian men, my father’s male relatives both 
giving testimony and swearing under oath that my father was an Athenian and a kinsman 
to them; surely none of them swore falsely, standing beside those who will know him to 
be giving false testimony, and bringing down utter destruction on himself. [To the clerk] 
Now take the depositions of my father’s female relatives.  
[DEPOSITIONS] 
[23] Therefore my father’s living relatives on both the male and the female side 
have given testimony that he was an Athenian on both sides and justly entitled to the right 
of citizenship. [To the clerk] Now call the members of his phratry, then the members of 
his genos. 
[WITNESSES] 
Now take the depositions of the demesmen, and those of my relatives about the 
members of the phratry, to show that they elected me phratriarch.  
[DEPOSITIONS] 
[24] You have heard then the testimonies of the appropriate people, from my 
relatives and members of my phratry and the demesmen and members of the genos. From 
them, it is possible for you to have learned whether someone who has this backing was a 
citizen or a foreigner. For if we sought the support of one or two men, we would be subject 
to some suspicion that we had suborned them; but if it is clear that my father, while he 
was alive, and now I, have been tested in all the groups, as many as each of you belong 
to, I refer to the phratry members, kinsmen, demesmen and members of the genos, how 
it is likely or how is it possible to have suborned all these men to be fake relatives? [25] 
Now if it was shown that my father was rich and gave money to these men to persuade 
them to say that they were his relatives, it would be reasonable to have some suspicion 
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that he was not a citizen; but as he was a poor man, if he both brought forward these same 
men as his relatives and proved that they gave him a share of their property, how is it not 
abundantly clear that he is truly related to them? For surely, if he was related to none of 
them, they would not have admitted him into their genos and also given him money. But 
he was their relative, as both their action has shown and as they have testified to you. And 
furthermore he was selected to offices by lot and having been approved by scrutiny he 
held office. [To the clerk] Take the deposition.  
[DEPOSITION] 
[26] And so do any of you think that the demesmen would allow that man as a 
foreigner and non-citizen to hold office among them, but would not prosecute him? Well, 
not a single person prosecuted him, nor accused him. Yet emergency votes were taken by 
the demesmen, who had sworn over sacrifices, when their deme register was lost while 
Antiphilos, Euboulides’ father, was serving as dēmarch and they ejected some of their 
members; but nobody said anything about my father nor made any such accusation. [27] 
And yet for all men death is the end of life and, for whatever reason a man might be 
accused while alive, it is right that his children always have to account for his conduct; 
but about matters which nobody accused him while alive, is it not terrible that someone 
wishing to do so can now put his children on trial for these things? Now if no account of 
these matters was tested, let us grant that this issue has escaped notice; but if an account 
was given and the demesmen voted by ballot and no one ever made an accusation, how 
would I not be justly considered an Athenian on account of my father, since he died before 
his lineage was disputed? As these statements of mine are true, I call witnesses to these 
things too. 
[WITNESSES] 
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[28] And furthermore, four sons were born to my father from the same mother as 
myself and, when they died, he buried them in the ancestral burial mounds, which are 
shared by as many as share in the genos; and none of these men ever forbade it, none 
prevented it nor brought a suit. And yet who is there that would allow anybody not in 
their genos to be placed in their ancestral burial mounds? Therefore as these statements 
of mine are true, [to the clerk] take the deposition.  
[DEPOSITION] 
[29] Now concerning my father, that he was Athenian, I have this to say, and I 
have brought forward as witnesses those who these very conspirators have voted to be 
citizens, to testify that my father was their first cousin. And it is clear that he lived for so-
and-so many years here in Athens, and that he was never once tested as a foreigner, but 
he sought the support of these people as relatives, and they accepted him and gave him a 
share of their property as one of their own. [30] Therefore it is shown in this way that he 
was born during a period when, even if he was a citizen on only one side, he was entitled 
to be considered a citizen; for he was born before the archonship of Eucleides. And I will 
speak about my mother (for they also slander me with regard to this woman), and I will 
call witnesses to that which I say. And yet, Athenian men, Euboulides’ slander of us 
which concerns doing business in the marketplace is not only contrary to the decree but 
also against the laws, which order that anyone reproaching any male or female citizens 
for doing business in the marketplace is liable for slander. [31] And we admit to selling 
ribbons and to not living in the manner we wish. And if this is a sign to you, Euboulides, 
of us not being Athenians, I will show you the very opposite of this, that it is not 
permissible for a foreigner to do business in the marketplace. [To the clerk] Take first the 
law of Solon and read it.  
[LAW] 
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[32] Now take also the law of Aristophon; for, Athenian men, it was thought that 
this man Solon so wisely and justly made this law that you voted to renew it again.  
[LAW] 
It is proper for you, then, supporting the laws, not to think that those doing 
business in the marketplace are foreigners, but to think that those engaging in sykophancy 
are wicked people. Since, Euboulides, there is also another law regarding idleness, to 
which you yourself are liable even as you slander us for doing business. [33] But there is 
such a great misfortune on us now that it is permitted for this man to slander us on 
irrelevant matters and to do all these things so that I obtain no justice; and perhaps you 
will criticise me, if I speak of the business which this man does as he goes about the city, 
and rightly so; for what need is there to say what you already know? Consider this then; 
for I believe our working in the agora to be the greatest sign of the false accusations that 
he brings against us. [34] For of course it was fitting for many people who have 
knowledge of who my mother is, and as he says she is a ribbon-seller and seen by 
everybody, to give testimony and not from hearsay alone; and if she was a foreigner, they 
ought to have examined the tax register in the market, to see if she paid the foreigner tax, 
and to see if it shows what country she came from; and if she was a slave, the man who 
bought her should by all means have come to give testimony against her and if not him 
then the man who sold her and if not him then some other man to give testimony either 
that she was a slave or that she had been set free. But even now he has produced none of 
these and, as it seems to me, there is no abuse which he has not used. For this is what a 
sykophant is, someone who makes all kinds of accusations, but proves nothing. [35] He 
has also said this about my mother, that she was a wet-nurse. And we do not deny that 
this happened, when the city suffered misfortune and everyone fared badly; but I will 
show you clearly in what manner and for what reasons she was a wet-nurse. But none of 
you, Athenian men, should take it up wrongly; for even now you will find many citizen 
76 
 
women are working as wet-nurses, who I will identify by name to you, if you wish. And 
if we were indeed wealthy, we would not be selling ribbons nor would we be utterly 
without means. But what do these things have to do with lineage? Nothing, I think. [36] 
Do not, men of the jury, dishonour the poor (for their poverty is a sufficient evil), nor 
indeed those choosing to work and to live honestly. But, having heard me out, if I show 
you that my mother’s relatives are such men as is fitting for free citizens to be, and they 
deny on oath the slanders of which Euboulides accuses her and give testimony that they 
know her to be a citizen, men whom you will say are trustworthy, cast your vote for us 
according to justice. [37] For my grandfather, Athenian men, my mother’s father, was 
Damostratos of Melite. To this man, four children were born, from his first wife he had a 
daughter and a son who is named Amytheon, and from his second wife, Chaerestrate, he 
had my mother and Timocrates. And to these there were children, Amytheon had 
Damostratos, having the same name as his grandfather, and Callistratos and Dexitheos. 
And my mother’s brother Amytheon is among those who served and died in Sicily, and 
has been buried in the public burial mounds; and testimony will be given to these things. 
[38] And to Amytheon’s sister, having married Diodoros of Halae, a son was born named 
Ctesibios. And this man died in Abydos serving with Thrasyboulos. Of these men 
Amytheon’s son Damostratos still lives, my mother’s nephew. And Apollodoros of 
Plotheia married the sister of my grandmother Chaerestrate; Olympichos was born to 
them, and a son Apollodoros to Olympichos, and this man lives. [To the clerk] Also call 
them to me.  
[WITNESSES] 
[39] Well then you have heard these men giving testimony and swearing under 
oath; and I will also call the man who is related to us on both sides, and his sons. For 
Timocrates, my mother’s brother from the same father and mother, had a son Euxitheos, 
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and there are three sons to Euxitheos; and all these men are living. [To the clerk] Also 
call those who are in town.  
[WITNESSES] 
[40] [To the clerk] Now also take my depositions from the phratry members of 
my mother’s relatives and from the demesmen, and those who share the same burial 
mounds. 
[DEPOSITIONS] 
Now, as to the matter of my mother’s lineage, I can show you in this way that she 
is a citizen on both the male side and the female side. Timocrates, men of the jury, being 
my mother’s brother from the same father and mother, first gave her in marriage to 
Protomachos, and she had a daughter by him, then she had me by my father. But, about 
the manner in which she married my father, it is necessary for you to hear; for Euboulides 
even makes accusations about Cleinias and my mother being a wet-nurse, and all these 
things I will describe to you clearly. [41] Protomachos was a poor man; but because he 
was acquiring the inheritance of a wealthy epiklēros and, having wished to give my 
mother in marriage, he persuaded my father Thoucritos, being an acquaintance of his, to 
take her. And my father was betrothed to my mother by her brother Timocrates of Melite, 
while both his uncles were present and other witnesses; and they will give testimony for 
us, as many of these men that are living. [42] Some time after this, when two children had 
already been born to my mother, my father was serving as a soldier and was abroad with 
Thrasyboulos; because she was in dire straits, she was compelled to nurse Cleinias the 
son of Cleidicos. By Zeus, she acted in a manner none too fortunate for the danger which 
is now upon me (for all the slander about us has come from her nursing), but she was 
doing what was perhaps both necessary and fitting in her existing poverty. [43] Therefore 
it is clear, Athenian men, that my father was not the first to have received my mother in 
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marriage, but Protomachos was, and he produced children and gave his daughter in 
marriage; he who even having died still gives testimony to her being both a native and 
citizen by his deeds. Therefore as these statements of mine are true, call first 
Protomachos’ sons, then those present at her betrothal to my father and the kinsmen from 
the phratry, who my father brought in for the marriage-feast on behalf of my mother, next 
Eunicos of Cholargos who has received my sister in marriage from Protomachos, and 
next my sister’s son. [To the clerk] Call these men. 
[WITNESSES] 
[44] And so how would my plight not be most pitiable of all, Athenian men, if in 
spite of so many of these relatives giving testimony and swearing under oath to be related 
to me, and though nobody claims that any of these men are not citizens, you should vote 
that I am a foreigner? Then also take the deposition of Cleinias and his relatives; who 
know, of course, who my mother was when she served as wet-nurse to him. For, to be 
faithful to their oaths, they must not attest what we claim today but what they had known 
the whole time about the woman thought to be my mother and wet-nurse to this man. [45] 
For even if the nurse is a lowly thing, I do not avoid the truth; for we have done nothing 
wrong if we were poor, but only if we were not citizens; the present trial is neither about 
fortune nor about our money, but it concerns our lineage. Poverty compels free men to do 
many servile and lowly tasks, for which they should be more justly pitied, Athenian men, 
rather than being ruined. For as I hear, many citizen women have become nurses and 
wool-workers and grape-pickers by the misfortunes of the city at that time, and many who 
were poor then are now rich. But more regarding these matters presently. [To the clerk] 
And now call the witnesses. 
[WITNESSES] 
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[46] Therefore you have all learned that I am a citizen on both my mother’s side 
and on my father’s, from the things that have just been testified to and from the earlier 
testimony about my father. And it remains for me to speak to you about myself; I think it 
is most clear-cut and most just, that I being from two citizen parents and having inherited 
both the property and the lineage, am a citizen. But nevertheless I will also provide all the 
relevant things by bringing witnesses to the fact that I was introduced to the phratry 
members, that I was entered into the register of the demesmen, that I was chosen by these 
same men to draw lots with men of the best lineage for the priesthood of Heracles, and 
that having been approved by scrutiny I held offices. [To the clerk] Call them. 
[WITNESSES] 
[47] Therefore is it not terrible, men of the jury, if I was chosen by lot as priest 
when I was initially selected, I personally would have been required to sacrifice on behalf 
of these demesmen and Euboulides would have been required to join in the sacrifice with 
me, but now these same men do not allow me to sacrifice with them? Now I make it clear, 
Athenian men, that all throughout the past I have been acknowledged as a citizen by all 
those who now bring accusations. [48] For surely he would not allow a foreigner and a 
metic, as Euboulides now says I am, either to hold offices or to draw lots with himself 
after being initially selected for the priesthood; for this man was also among those who 
were initially selected and drew lots. Since he is an old enemy of mine, Athenian men, he 
indeed would not have waited for this particular time, which nobody knew would come 
to pass, if he really knew something such as this about me not being a citizen. [49] But 
he did not know anything of the sort; hence for all the rest of the time, while belonging 
to the same deme as me and drawing lots, he saw none of these things; but when the entire 
city had been provoked to anger by those who had outrageously infiltrated the demes, 
only then did he plot against me. That earlier occasion was the right time to speak for 
someone who was sure of the truth to speak but right now, the present time, is for an 
80 
 
enemy and someone wishing to engage in sykophancy. [50] But, men of the jury, (and by 
Zeus and the gods let nobody make a commotion, or be annoyed at what I am about to 
say) I hold myself to be Athenian just as each of you holds himself to be, believing from 
the beginning that my mother is the woman of whom I have given an account to you, and 
I am not pretending to be her son while being the son of another; likewise for my father, 
Athenian men, the same thing goes. [51] And yet if it is right of you to hold this as a sign 
that they are foreigners, that those who are proven to be hiding their true identity and to 
be pretending to be who they are not, surely the opposite should hold for me as proof that 
I am a citizen. For having registered a foreign woman and man as my parents, I would 
not expect to share in the right of citizenship; but if I had known any such thing, I would 
have sought people who I could say are my parents. But I did not know any such thing, 
hence standing by those who are my real parents, I expect to share in the right of 
citizenship. 
[52] And furthermore I was left fatherless, and yet they say that I am wealthy and 
that some of the witnesses are being paid by me to testify that they are my relatives. One 
minute they speak against me for the dishonour of my poverty and they slander my 
lineage, but then the next they say that because of my wealth I am able to buy everything. 
[53] And so which of the two allegations by them should one believe? And surely it was 
possible for these relatives, if I indeed was a bastard or a foreigner, to be heirs to all my 
property. Is it believable if these men choose to receive a small amount and run the risk 
of a suit for giving false testimony and committing perjury, rather than having everything 
and doing these things safely, and without anybody making themselves liable to utter 
destruction? This is not the case, but I believe that being my relatives, they are doing the 
right thing in helping one of their own. [54] And they are not doing these things because 
they have been persuaded by me, but because when I was a child they immediately 
brought me to the phratry members, and to the sacred place of Ancestral Apollo, and to 
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the other sacred places. And yet surely being a child I did not persuade them to do these 
things by giving them money. Yet while my father himself was alive, having sworn the 
customary oath to the phratry members, he introduced me, knowing me to be his citizen 
son from a citizen wife who was lawfully married to him, and they have given testimony 
to these things. [55] Then am I a foreigner? Where did I pay the metic’s tax? Or who of 
my family ever did? Have I gone to other demesmen and, not being able to persuade them 
to enrol me, did I register myself here in Halimous? Where did I do any of the things 
which all those who were not genuine citizens are seen to have done? Nowhere, but quite 
simply, I also clearly belong to that same deme in which my father’s grandfather, my own 
grandfather, my father belong. And now how could someone show you more clearly that 
he shares in the right of citizenship? [56] Let each of you consider, Athenian men, what 
other way he would be able to show that his relatives were always the same right from 
the start rather than my own way, by giving testimony after swearing an oath?  
Therefore believing in myself on account of these things, I appealed to you. For I 
see, Athenian men, that the lawcourts are more powerful not only than those 
Halimousians who disfranchised me, but also than the Boulē and the Ecclēsia, and rightly 
so; for in all respects your judgements are most just. 
[57] Now consider this too, all of you who belong to the large demes, that you 
have deprived no one of either the right to make an accusation or the right to make a 
defence. And let there be many good things for all you who have dealt fairly with this 
matter, because you also did not hinder the preparation of those asking to adjourn; by 
which you also exposed the sykophants and those plotting on account of personal enmity. 
[58] You are worthy of praise, Athenian men, but those who have wrongly dealt with this 
honourable and fair matter are worthy of blame. Now in none of the demes will you find 
worse things having happened than in ours. For, those who are brothers born of the same 
mother and the same father, these men have disfranchised some but not others, and have 
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disfranchised older men without means, but have left behind their sons as citizens; and I 
will bring forward witnesses about these things, should you wish it. [59] But the worst of 
all the things which the conspirators have done (and by Zeus and the gods, let no one take 
offence with me if I show those who have wronged me as being wicked; for I believe that 
in showing the wickedness of these men I am speaking on the same subject of what 
happened to me); for these conspirators, Athenian men, admitted some foreigners, 
Anaximenes and Nicostratos, who wished to become citizens, and having divided the 
money for this they each received a share of five drachmas. And neither Euboulides nor 
those with him would deny these things on oath stating that they did not know about them. 
And yet they did not disfranchise these men now in the latest review. And so what do you 
think that these men would not do in private matters, men who dared to do these things 
in public? [60] The conspirators with Euboulides, men of the jury, have both destroyed 
and have saved many men on account of money. Even at an earlier time (and I will speak 
on the same matter at hand, Athenian men) while Euboulides’ father Antiphilos was 
serving as dēmarch, just as I said, he used trickery wishing to take money from some 
people, and he said that the deme register had been lost, and thus he persuaded the 
Halimousians to revise their deme list, and accusing ten of the demesmen he expelled 
them, all of whom bar one were readmitted by the lawcourt. And the elders know of all 
these things. [61] It is far from likely that they left behind any who were not Athenians, 
when they were conspiring to expel even those being citizens, whom the lawcourt 
readmitted. And being an enemy of my father at that time, not only did he not accuse him 
but neither did he cast his vote that he was not Athenian. How is this proved? Because he 
was considered to be a deme member by all. And why is it necessary to speak about our 
fathers? Euboulides himself, at the time when I was entered into the register and all the 
demesmen cast their vote about me after swearing an oath, neither accused me nor cast 
an opposing vote; for even on this occasion they again all voted me a deme member. And 
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if they say I am lying about this, let whoever wishes give testimony to the contrary in the 
time allotted to me. [62] Therefore, Athenian men, if my opponents seem to advocate this 
strong argument that the demesmen disfranchised me on this occasion, I can show that 
four times previously, when they voted piously without any conspiracy, they voted both 
me and my father to be members of their deme, indeed first when my father was approved 
by scrutiny, then me, then in the earlier voting by ballot at the time when these men did 
away with the register; and lastly having initially selected me, when they voted that I draw 
lots with men of the best lineage for the priesthood of Heracles. And all of these things 
have been testified to. 
[63] And if it is necessary to speak of my service as dēmarch, on account of which 
some were angry at me, and during which I became unpopular by exacting owed rents for 
sacred precincts from many of them and other debts which they pilfered from public 
property, I would like for you to hear it from me, but perhaps you will take these things 
to be outside the matter at hand. And I also have this to show as proof that they have 
conspired: for they removed from the oath the clause to vote according to their most just 
judgement and not on account of favour or hatred. [64] For this also became public 
knowledge and also that these men, from whom I exacted the public money, then 
conspired against me and stole the sacred arms (for it will be said) which I dedicated to 
Athena, and defaced the stone decree which the demesmen voted in my honour. And they 
have gone to a level of such shamelessness, that going around the place they said I was 
doing these things myself on account of my defence. And who of you would judge me on 
such madness, men of the jury, so as to commit an act worthy of death on account of such 
important evidence, and to ruin the things which brought me honour? [65] But surely they 
would not say that I contrived the worst thing of all. No sooner had misfortune befallen 
me when immediately, just as if I was already an exile and a ruined man, some of these 
men came to my cottage in the country at night and attempted to plunder the things within; 
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thus they held so much contempt for you and the laws. And, if you wish, I will call those 
who know these things. 
[66] And I also have many other things that I could show, crimes which have been 
committed by these men and lies which they have told, and I would gladly tell you, but 
since you consider them to be beyond the matter, I will leave them out. But remember 
and observe the following, that I have come to you having many and just arguments. For 
just as you questioned the Thesmothetae, I will question myself in the same manner before 
you. ‘Sir, who was your father?’ Thoucritos was my father. [67] ‘Are there any relatives 
that give testimony for him?’ Of course, indeed first there are his four first cousins, then 
the son of a first cousin, next those having received his female first cousins in marriage, 
then members of his phratry, next the members of his genos who share Ancestral Apollo 
and Zeus of the Household, then those who share the same burial mounds, then the 
demesmen give testimony that he has often been approved by scrutiny and held office, 
and they themselves having decided it by a vote make it clear. Therefore about the matters 
concerning my father how could I show them to you more fairly or more clearly? But I 
will call my relatives before you, if you wish. Now listen to the matters concerning my 
mother. [68] For my mother is Nicarete, daughter of Damostratos of Melite. Who of this 
woman’s relatives give testimony? First her nephew, then the two sons of another 
nephew, next a son of her first cousin, then the sons of Protomachos having received my 
mother first, then Eunicos of Cholargos having married my sister from Protomachos, then 
my sister’s son. [69] Yet even the members of her relatives’ phratry and the demesmen 
have given testimony to these things. And so what could you need besides? For testimony 
has also been given that my father married according to the laws and that he held a 
marriage-feast for the members of his phratry. And in addition these things, I also proved 
that I myself have been sharing in everything which is fitting for free citizen males. So 
that in every respect you would be faithful to your oath having cast your vote justly and 
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fittingly in our favour. [70] Moreover still, men of the jury, you question the nine archons 
whether they treat their parents well. I was left orphaned by my father, but as for my 
mother, I beg and beseech you through this trial to give me back the right to bury her in 
the ancestral mounds and not to prevent me, or to make me an outcast, or to rob me of 
such a multitude of relatives, and bring me to complete ruin. For rather than abandoning 
them, if it is not possible to be saved by them, I would kill myself, so that I could be 
buried in my homeland. 
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3. Commentary 
§§1-7: προοίμιον 
In his introduction, Euxitheos reveals what he claims to fear most about his present 
circumstance: the anger of the Athenians had provoked them into implementing 
disfranchisements (§2). The state’s current passion could very well lead to his conviction, 
which he equates with both shame and ruination (§1). Nonetheless, in spite of his 
desperate situation, Euxitheos seeks to dissociate himself from those who have been 
rightly ejected by the deme and attempts to obtain favour with the jury by agreeing with 
the Athenians’ policy of severely punishing those who had been exposed as foreigners 
(§3). His observations on correct procedure naturally lead to criticism of the manner of 
Euboulides’ prosecution (§4). 
[1] Πολλὰ καὶ ψευδῆ κατηγορηκότος: ‘many false accusations’. The actions which 
the speaker’s opponent has taken against him are summed up in his opening words. 
Demosthenes applies a similar technique to several other speeches, specifically by using 
the very first word to stress an opponent’s behaviour: καταψευδομαρτυρηθείς in Dem. 
45.1 and ὑβρισθείς in Dem. 54.1, cf. αἴτιος in Dem. 44.1. Accusing an opponent of bring 
false charges against him was a common tactic at the beginning of a speech, and part of 
a rhetorical topos on conspiracy (παρασκευή: Andoc. 1.1; Aeschin. 3.1). It is clear that 
such an opening was intended to have an immediate and striking impact on a jury. The 
speaker, Euxitheos, will appeal his disfranchisement on the basis that the deme’s decision 
was corrupt (§§8-14).1 He sets out to prove that he was the victim of a conspiracy (§§15-
6), and he claims that his ejection was the result of a personal feud between his family 
                                                     
1 The speaker’s name does not appear in the text but is supplied by Libanios’ Hyp. 27; see Introduction, p. 
18. 
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and his opponent’s (§§48 and 61). For Euxitheos’ frequent use of the motif of conspiracy, 
see συγκεκοινωνήκαμεν τῆς δόξης ταύτης οἱ κατεστασιασμένοι at §2. 
ἡμων: ‘me’. The proper translation of this first-person plural pronoun is ‘us’. It seems 
likely that Demosthenes used the plural pronoun to formally represent a collective 
viewpoint. While the accusations levelled at Euxitheos by his opponent did indeed centre 
on the status of his parents (§§17-45 and 52-6), he alone was the only member of his 
family to be disfranchised by the deme. As such, the singular ‘me’ suitably denotes the 
effect of the allegations on Euxitheos and that he was the only appellant in this case. Cf. 
the translation of ἡμῖν in μετὸν τῆς πόλεως ἡμῖν below. 
Εὐβουλίδου: ‘Euboulides’. Euboulides is identified as Euxitheos’ accuser. Naming an 
opponent in the opening sentence is a frequent feature of Demosthenes’ public and private 
speeches (Dem. 21.1, 22.1, 23.1, 24.1, 27.1, 28.1, 29.1, 30.1, 37.1, 38.1, 39.1, 41.1, 44.1, 
54.1). It is highly likely that Euboulides was one of five prosecutors appointed by the 
deme to argue for Euxitheos’ appeal to be overturned: five men were elected by the deme 
to serve as its representatives in appeals held after an ordinary διαψήφισις ([Arist.] Ath. 
Pol. 42.1), and this procedure was closely followed in the appeals which were initiated 
after the extraordinary διαψήφισις of 346/5 BC (IG II² 1205).2 But since Euxitheos only 
refers to Euboulides throughout his speech (naming him fifteen times in total: §§4, 8, 15, 
16, 26, 30, 31, 32, 48, 59, 60, 61), it appears that he took the lead in making the deme’s 
case before the court (in a separate case, Aeschines notes that his opponent Timarchos 
took charge of the prosecution in Philotades’ appeal against disfranchisement, 1.114). 
Euboulides may have obtained this position due to the political office he held within the 
deme. Euxitheos states that his opponent serves as a βουλευτής, a councillor representing 
                                                     
2 For a thorough discussion of both processes, see Introduction, pp. 25-43. For the evidence provided by 
the Athēnaiōn Politeia, see Rhodes’ detailed analysis, in A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion 
Politeia, p. 501. 
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his deme (see βουλεύων at §8). Additionally, the speaker lists several official duties 
which Euboulides carried out during the extraordinary διαψήφισις procedure: being in 
charge of the oath and summoning the demesmen from the register (see κύριος ὢν τοῦ θ᾽ 
ὅρκου, τῶν γραμμάτων and ἐξ ὧν ἀνεκάλει τοὺς δημότας at §8), making speeches and 
proposing decrees (see κατέτριψεν τὴν ἡμέραν δημηγορῶν καὶ ψηφίσματα γράφων at §9), 
initiating the vote (see τὴν δὲ ψῆφον εὐθὺς ἐδίδου at §13) and supplying the voting 
pebbles, and having the ability to adjourn a deme assembly (see τί ποτ᾽ ἦν τὸ δυσχερὲς 
Εὐβουλίδῃ ἀναβαλέσθαι εἰς τὴν ὑστεραίαν at §15). Because of these responsibilities, it 
has often been assumed that Euboulides was the current dēmarch. However, Euxitheos 
does not specify that his opponent actually held this office, though he explicitly states 
elsewhere in the text that both he himself and Euboulides’ father had held this office in 
the past (for Euxitheos, see §63; for Antiphilos, see §§26 and 60). For Euboulides’ alleged 
lack of personal liability as a prosecutor in this case, see ἀνυπευθύνῳ at §5; cf. τὸ πέμπτον 
μέρος at §8. 
ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί: ‘men of the jury’. Most legal cases came before one of the popular 
courts (the δικαστήρια of the fifth century BC derived from the Solonian ἡλιαία: Ar. 
Knights, 897; Paus. 1.28.8; both Dem. 21.47 and Antiph. 6.21 speak of suits which were 
referred to the court by the Thesmothetae). These cases were decided by a panel drawn 
from a pool of about six thousand citizen males over the age of thirty. Panels were selected 
by lot and were paid to hear the various suits coming before a single court for the duration 
of a year. They varied in size according to the seriousness of the alleged offence or the 
amount of money involved. The word δικασταί, however, has caused considerable 
difficulty regarding its translation; while most scholars opt for ‘jury’, some prefer the 
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term ‘judges’.3 Neither word suitably conveys the role undertaken by the δικασταί. This 
body of men wielded considerable legal power given the fact that their verdict was 
binding and that there was no provision for appeal to a higher tribunal. However, they did 
not receive any professional instruction in the relevant laws pertaining to a case nor did 
they have any guidance with regard to relevancy during the proceedings by a presiding 
judge. Since the functions of such a panel are most similar to those performed by a modern 
jury,4 I have employed the term ‘jury’ throughout my translation. Addressing the jury at 
the beginning of a speech is common feature in Athenian forensic oratory. But the formula 
by which a logographer directs his argument towards the jury at the start of a speech and 
also during it can vary. In this speech, Demosthenes uses both ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί (sixteen 
times) and ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι (‘Athenian men’; twenty times); two expressions which he 
employs throughout his body of writing.5 Of the two, the latter addresses the jurors as 
representatives of the city as a whole; indeed it appears to have been the proper way to 
address the Ecclēsia at the opening of a speech (Dem. 18.1, 19.1, 20.1, 21.2, 22.4, 23.1, 
24.6, 25.8). Euxitheos’ more frequent use of ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι was probably intended 
to remind the jury that they were acting on behalf of the state and that they were not to be 
influenced by the deme-level prejudice against him. Certainly, the random selection of 
jurors and their power of judicial review prompted Euxitheos to feel that he was safe from 
the conspiracy which he had faced during the vote of his deme (see on ὁρῶ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες 
                                                     
3 I refer to the choices made by a mere selection of recent translators of Demosthenes’ speeches; for ‘jury’, 
see Bers, Demosthenes, Speeches 50-57 (2003), MacDowell, Demosthenes, Speeches 27-38 (2004), and R. 
Waterfield (trans.) and C. Carey, Demosthenes, Selected speeches (2014); for ‘judges’, see C. Carey, Trials 
from Classical Athens (1997), E. M. Harris, Demosthenes, Speeches 20-22 (2008), and Scafuro, 
Demosthenes, Speeches 39-49 (2011). 
4 For a succinct summary of the differences between ancient Athenian and modern legal practices, see S. 
C. Todd, The Shape of Athenian Law, pp. 82-3. 
5 Isaeus consistently applies the formula ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί in Euphiletos’ case (fourteen times in the 
fragmentary Isae. 12), though he rarely uses it in his other existing speeches (he primarily uses ὦ ἄνδρες in 
his inheritance cases). 
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Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐ μόνον τῶν ἀποψηφισαμένων Ἁλιμουσίων ἐμοῦ κυριώτερ᾽ ὄντα τὰ 
δικαστήρια, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς βουλῆς καὶ τοῦ δήμου, δικαίως at §56). 
μετὸν τῆς πόλεως ἡμῖν: ‘I share in the right of citizenship’. In line with ἡμῶν (above), 
ἡμῖν has also been translated into singular form for the purpose of clarity. By claiming 
that he is entitled to citizenship, Euxitheos refers to the fact that civic rights and privileges 
were restricted to those who were of Attic decent on both their paternal and maternal lines. 
In 451/0 BC, Pericles passed a law limiting citizenship to those who had Athenian 
parentage on both sides.6 Then, after falling into obscurity during the Peloponnesian War, 
the law was subsequently re-enacted in 403/2 BC. Euxitheos specifically refers to this 
later legislation as proof of his father’s citizenship, since he had been born before its re-
enactment (see §30).7 The Athenians’ self-consciousness with regard to their citizenship 
continued in the decades which followed; their preoccupation with preventing those who 
were illegitimate, foreign or slave from usurping citizen privileges such as owning land 
and accessing the state’s decision-making bodies subsequently culminated in the 
extraordinary διαψήφισις of 346/5 BC,8 and ultimately Euxitheos’ disfranchisement. 
λογισαμένους τό τε μέγεθος τοῦ παρόντος ἀγῶνος καὶ τὴν αἰσχύνην: ‘considering both 
the magnitude of this present trial and the shame’, sc. ‘you’, the unexpressed object of 
ἀντιβολῶ (‘I beseech’). The ‘magnitude’ and ‘the shame’ signify the penalty that 
Euxitheos will face if he loses his appeal against the deme. However, nowhere in the 
speech does he explicitly state what that penalty was; he only speaks of exile (ὥσπερ 
φυγάδος ἤδη μου ὄντος καὶ ἀπολωλότος at §65) and complete ruin (ὅλως ἀπολέσητε at 
§70). Libanios’ introduction to the speech claims that those who accepted their deme’s 
                                                     
6 See Appendix 3, pp. 282-8. 
7 For a detailed discussion of this renewal, see Introduction, pp. 21-5. 
8 See Introduction, pp. 25-43. 
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rejection during the extraordinary διαψήφισις of 346/5 BC were registered as metics, but 
those who appealed it and lost were sold as slaves (Hyp. 27).9 While it is impossible to 
determine the veracity of this from Euxitheos’ case alone, a thorough discussion of the 
evidence provided by other sources does indeed suggest that enslavement was plausible.10 
τοῖς ἁλισκομένοις ἀπολωλέναι: ‘those who have been ruined by convictions’. In order 
to emphasise further the ‘magnitude’ of his appeal, as noted above, Euxitheos calls on the 
jury to think of the recent disfranchisement cases in which men’s lives were allegedly 
devastated by losing their appeals for reinstatement. If the penalty for a failed appeal was 
not slavery, but merely to remain disfranchised and be compelled to register as a metic, 
would the lives of such men really have been ruined? Metic status would not have 
prevented the disfranchised man from living or working in Athens, though the loss of 
civic rights would have prevented him from voting and owning land, and he would have 
been required to abide by certain conditions set by the Athenian state (such as paying the 
metic’s tax, ποῦ μετοίκιον καταθείς at §55). It is possible that men who were former 
citizens felt that being reduced to metic status was indeed a bleak existence. Therefore, 
Euxitheos’ comment about ruin need not be taken literally, but rather it may simply be a 
plea directed towards the emotions of the Athenian jurors and their citizenship 
sensibilities.  
καὶ ἐμοῦ: ‘to me also’. Euboulides had already presented his case before the court. The 
accuser, serving as the prosecution in court, spoke first and the defendant second. See 
also, ἀδίκως καὶ πλεονεκτικῶς τὴν κατηγορίαν πεποίηται at §5. 
σιωπῇ: ‘in silence’. Athenian juries had a reputation for being vocal during a hearing (see 
§§50 and 59; cf. Dem. 45.6; Pl. Rep. 492b, Laws, 876b). In Euxitheos’ case, the need for 
                                                     
9 See Introduction, pp. 15-21. 
10 See Introduction, pp. 43-9. 
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the jury’s goodwill was especially great. The appeal of a former citizen expelled by his 
deme for wrongly exercising citizen rights would have been an acutely provocative 
subject for an Athenian jury and could have easily roused strong reactions. The recent 
extraordinary διαψήφισις had caused a significant disturbance amongst the citizen body 
and had undoubtedly produced much public resentment towards those who had been 
found by the demes to be usurping citizen rights. Subsequent comments by Euxitheos 
during his speech confirm the widespread tension at that time (see τὸ παρωξύνθαι τὴν 
πόλιν πρὸς τὰς ἀποψηφίσεις at §2, διὰ τὴν τοῦ πράγματος ὀργήν at §3, and ἐπειδὴ δ᾽ ἡ 
πόλις πᾶσα τοῖς ἀσελγῶς εἰσπεπηδηκόσιν εἰς τοὺς δήμους ὀργιζομένη παρώξυντο at §49; 
cf. Aeschin. 1.77, 2.182). 
μετὰ πλείονος εὐνοίας: ‘with greater goodwill’. An effective rhetorical method to 
persuade an audience was captatio benevolentiae (Aristotle states that a defendant ought 
to make a listener well-disposed to his case in his introduction, Rh. 1415a35). 
Demosthenes frequently avails himself of this feature throughout his forensic speeches: 
Dem. 23.4, 27.3, 34.1, 35.5, 37.3, 38.2, 40.4, 45.1, 54.2. Euxitheos asks the jurors to listen 
to him in silence with ‘greater goodwill’ than they did to Euboulides, or to at least show 
him ‘equal’ (ἴσος) favour. This may indicate that the prosecution’s case had been well-
received. 
(τοῖς γὰρ ἐν κινδύνῳ καθεστηκόσιν εἰκὸς εὐνοϊκωτέρους ὑπάρχειν): ‘for it seems 
likely that you are more favourable to those who are placed in danger’. This appeal to the 
jury’s sentiment can also be found in other lawcourt speeches ([Dem.] 59.1; Andoc. 1.6; 
Lys. 19.3). As such, it seems to be a common practice for a litigant to refer to his perceived 
danger at the outset of his speech. 
[2] καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς: ‘the merits of my case’. Dilts has followed Schaefer’s amendment of 
ἡμᾶς, rather than the manuscript reading ὑμᾶς (‘your’, which would denote the jurors’ 
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role in the matter).11  Here, the reference to himself conforms to the subsequent τὸ 
προσήκειν μοι τῆς πόλεως. 
τὸ παρωξύνθαι τὴν πόλιν πρὸς τὰς ἀποψηφίσεις: ‘the city has been provoked into 
carrying out disfranchisements’. Euxitheos makes his first direct reference to the recent 
deme-wide διαψήφισις and the disfranchisements of former citizens that it brought about 
(see also τὴν διαψήφισιν at §7).12 He stresses the Athenians’ emotional attachment to 
their citizenship and their resentment towards even the notion that illegitimate men had 
assumed their citizen rights and privileges. Euxitheos returns to this motif of the city’s 
anger at §49. His comment strongly suggests that the Athenians had ejected numerous 
men from their citizen body as a result of an extraordinary διαψήφισις. 
συγκεκοινωνήκαμεν τῆς δόξης ταύτης οἱ κατεστασιασμένοι: ‘we who have been 
victimised by political rivals have a joint share of this reputation’. In this context, ‘we’ 
refers to Euxitheos and those allegedly like him who were disfranchised after being 
falsely accused of illegally claiming citizenship by their personal enemies. His use of the 
verb καταστασιάζω is particularly strong in furthering his claim of a conspiracy (the verb 
is applied again at §§7 and 17; the notion of a conspiracy is further propounded by his 
use of συνίστημι at §§13, 16, 59, 60, 61 and 63). Euxitheos claims that he is being wrongly 
subjected to the same judgment made about those justly expelled from their demes and 
wishes to dissociate himself from them.  
οὐ πρὸς τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸν ἕκαστος: ‘not just the charges in our own individual cases’, 
Euxitheos speaks of having to deal with the circumstances of past disfranchisement cases 
in which those at the centre were guilty. 
                                                     
11 M. R. Dilts (ed.), Demosthenis Orationes IV (2009), p. 253; cf. W. Rennie (ed.), Demosthenis Orationes 
III (1963), p. 253. For G. H. Schaefer’s edition, see Apparatus criticus et exegeticus ad Demosthenem 
(1824-7). 
12 For a full discussion of this extraordinary event, see Introduction, pp. 25-43. 
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[3] οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καίπερ τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων: ‘Nevertheless, despite this 
situation’. In their study of the grammar used in Greek literature, Denniston and Dover 
find that οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ was used to present a supplementary argument which takes such a 
precedence over the previous argument that it appears to contrast with it rather than 
reinforce it (also found in Dem. 8.8, 34.4, 37.23, 38.11; Arist. Pol. 1262a14, 1264a11, 
1276b36).13 Their analysis corresponds to Demosthenes’ use of this phrase here: οὐ μὴν 
ἀλλὰ marks a change in Euxitheos’ line of reasoning, from the perceived conspiracy 
against him to the jury’s ability to save him, as he moves from an unjust topic to a just 
one. He employs the phrase again at §46. 
τοῖς μὲν ἐξελεγχομένοις ξένοις οὖσιν: ‘to those who have been exposed as foreigners’. 
Those who were voted out of their demes were reduced to metic status. They could either 
abide by their deme’s decision or lodge an appeal before the court. If a jury voted in 
favour of the appellant, he was re-registered in his deme and thereby reinstated as citizen. 
However, the penalty which he faced if the jury voted against him may have been as 
severe as enslavement.14 
εἰ μήτε πείσαντες μήτε δεηθέντες ὑμῶν: ‘if neither having persuaded you nor having 
asked your consent’. Pericles’ citizenship law of 451/0 BC and its subsequent re-
enactment in 403/2 BC confined civic rights to persons of citizen birth on both the 
maternal and paternal sides.15 However, legal provisions were made to enable the state to 
bestow citizenship on those who had served the city as benefactors. The Ecclēsia was 
required to convene twice and to conduct a secret ballot of at least six thousand Athenians 
at its second meeting before a decree for the conferral of citizenship could be passed (the 
                                                     
13 J. D. Denniston and K. J. Dover, The Greek Particles, pp. 28-30. 
14 For a thorough discussion of slavery as the possible penalty, see Introduction, pp. 43-9. 
15 See Introduction, pp. 21-5. 
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procedure for naturalisation is described in [Dem.] 59.88-92).16 Euxitheos reminds the 
jurors that, without the necessary condition of Athenian parentage, the only legal route to 
citizenship was by seeking the permission of the Athenian people. Of course, bribing an 
Athenian family or even a deme official was the illicit way for an individual to obtain 
Athenian citizenship. Euxitheos’ use of πείθω appears to be a direct reference to paying 
or bribing one’s way onto the citizen registers (see πείθει at §41) but, since he must 
subsequently deny that he was one such man (§52), he does not dwell on the matter here. 
By addressing them directly as ‘you’ (ὑμῶν), the speaker accentuates the jury’s civic duty 
and sharpens the contrast between their ability to punish and their ability to save (see also 
οὐκ ἂν ἐδώκατε τὴν εἰς ὑμᾶς ἔφεσιν at §6 below, and οὕτω γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, 
τοῦτον ἔδοξεν ἐκεῖνος καλῶς καὶ δημοτικῶς νομοθετῆσαι, ὥστ᾽ ἐψηφίσασθε πάλιν τὸν 
αὐτὸν ἀνανεώσασθαι at §32). 
τῶν ὑμετέρων ἱερῶν καὶ κοινῶν: ‘your sacred rites and civil privileges’. Here, κοινῶν 
denotes the political rights which belonged to an Athenian citizen: membership of the 
Ecclēsia, eligibility to hold public office and the potential to serve as juror. The term 
ἱερῶν refers to the participation of an individual in rituals, ceremonies and sacrifices by 
virtue of their Athenian citizenship: roles in the cults belonging to the state and the social 
groups,17 and the right to hold priesthoods. While membership in the tribes (φυλαί), 
phratries and genē was exclusively reserved for citizens, metics were allowed partial 
participation in both deme and state religion (see also τόν γε ξένον καὶ μέτοικον at §48).18 
                                                     
16 For a comprehensive study of the evidence regarding the naturalisation procedure, see M. J. Osborne, 
Naturalization in Athens Vols. 1-4 (1981-3). Osborne suggests that ἀνδραγαθία (‘manly virtue’; which 
[Dem.] 59.89 claims was required by a man in order for the state to bestow citizenship) was a part of 
Pericles’ citizenship law, Naturalization in Athens Vol. 3, p. 144. However, K. Kapparis’ analysis of the 
use of this condition has shown that the Ecclēsia interpreted it quite loosely, in Apollodoros ‘Against Neaira’ 
[D.59], pp. 364-5. As such, I find that there is very little merit to Osborne’s theory. 
17 The deme, phratry and genos; for a description of the functions of these social groups, see Appendices 
4-6, pp. 289-301. 
18 Whitehead provides a brief overview of a metic’s ‘extremely limited’ involvement in Athenian religious 
practices, in The Ideology of the Athenian Metic, pp. 86-9. 
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However, the privileges of citizenship proved too tempting for some; fourth century Attic 
oratory frequently refers to instances wherein foreigners, the children of slaves, and those 
of illegitimate unions managed to pass as full citizens (Dem. 21.149-50; [Dem.] 59.113; 
Aeschin. 2.76; Lys. 30.2, 5-6, 27-30). Euxitheos makes it clear that he has no sympathy 
for those foreigners who are found guilty of participating in affairs solely reserved for 
Athenian citizens. 
βοηθεῖν καὶ σῴζειν: ‘to help and to save’. While appeals for help are common in lawcourt 
speeches, Demosthenes often uses these two verbs concurrently as the means to draw on 
a jury’s sympathy (Dem. 8.46, 74, 14.11, 18.88, 28.20, 36.59). This is a feature which 
does not appear in the same manner in the works of other Attic orators. In this sentence, 
βοηθεῖν opposes χαλεπαίνειν, just as δεικνύουσι opposes ἐξελεγχομένοις. 
ἡμῖν ἂν συμβαίη τοῖς ἠδικημένοις: ‘would befall us having been wronged’. Unlike the 
above examples of ἡμων and ἡμῖν (§1) which were translated as the singular, here ἡμῖν 
has been literally translated as the first person plural. The speaker includes himself in the 
category of unfortunate men and would have the jury believe that he was among those 
who were wrongly accused of usurping Athenian citizenship and subsequently 
disfranchised.  
εἰ τῶν λαμβανόντων δίκην ὄντες ἂν δικαίως μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν: ‘if we should rightly belong 
among those exacting justice with you’. Literally, ‘we should rightly be a part of’: τῶν 
λαμβανόντων is a partitive genitive. 
διὰ τὴν τοῦ πράγματος ὀργήν: ‘because of the anger which the matter arouses’. For the 
agitation felt by the Athenian people at the perceived misappropriation of citizenship, see 
σιωπῇ at §1 and ἐπειδὴ δ᾽ ἡ πόλις πᾶσα τοῖς ἀσελγῶς εἰσπεπηδηκόσιν εἰς τοὺς δήμους 
ὀργιζομένη παρώξυντο at §49. 
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[4] ᾤμην: ‘I thought’, i.e. before the trial started. Now that Euboulides has spoken 
before the jury (see καὶ ἐμοῦ at §1), Euxitheos criticises the poor foundation on which his 
opponent has apparently built his case against him and his use of unsubstantiated claims. 
He subsequently reminds the jury of the illegality of presenting hearsay as evidence, see 
οὐδὲ μαρτυρεῖν ἀκοὴν ἐῶσιν οἱ νόμοι below. 
νῦν ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀποψηφίσεσιν κατηγοροῦσιν: ‘now bring accusations in cases of 
disfranchisement’. The use of ἐπί and the dative case suggest lawsuits ‘arising out of 
disfranchisement’ rather than ‘with the intention of obtaining disfranchisement’. 
οὐδὲ μαρτυρεῖν ἀκοὴν ἐῶσιν οἱ νόμοι: ‘the laws do not permit giving hearsay as 
evidence’. The use of hearsay from a living person was not admitted as evidence in 
Athenian lawcourts, although citing the words of the deceased was. The only other form 
of second-hand information which was legally permissible was the written testimony of 
anyone who was sick or abroad. This testimony was recorded in the presence of a set of 
witnesses, who would then appear in court themselves and confirm that the given 
deposition matched the one given by the absent witness. The testimony of the absentee 
was called ἐκμαρτυρία (‘a deposition taken outside’; as opposed to μαρτυρία, just ‘a 
deposition’). The law which details the rules regarding hearsay is paraphrased in [Dem.] 
46.6-8 (cf. Aeschin. 2.19; Isae. 3.18-21; Dem. 35.10-4). This speech reports that both the 
absent witness and the one submitting his testimony were then liable to an action for 
giving false testimony. But it seems that Euboulides has no such deceased or absent 
witnesses. By referring to the unjust practice of using hearsay as evidence, Euxitheos 
condemns the manner in which his opponent has led the prosecution against him and he 
continues in his criticism of the lack of evidence for the claims that Euboulides has made. 
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[5] ὑπεύθυνον: ‘responsible’, i.e. being liable to action for giving false testimony 
(δίκη ψευδομαρτυριῶν; actual suits include Dem. 29, 44 and 45, and [Dem.] 46 and 47). 
See also κινδυνεύειν ἐν ψευδομαρτυρίοις at §53. 
ἀνυπευθύνῳ: ‘without accountability’. Five prosecutors were elected by the deme to 
serve as its representatives during an appeal (see Εὐβουλίδου at §1). As such, he was not 
pursuing the lawsuit on his own initiative. Unlike the prosecutors in ordinary γραφαί who 
faced penalties for failing to obtain one-fifth of the vote (see τὸ πέμπτον μέρος at §8), 
Euboulides would bear no personal liability if he lost the case (cf. Aeschin. 1.114-5).19 
εἰδὼς τοὺς νόμους καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ προσῆκεν: ‘knowing the laws and indeed more than is 
fitting’. Athenian laws were intended to serve ordinary citizens (Dem. 20.93) but, without 
any professional instruction for either juries or litigants, their knowledge of the legal 
system was often fairly basic. Any understanding of the laws derived from the very 
experience of bringing a suit or serving on a jury. Indeed, conversations with friends and 
family members could impart knowledge of a past case and details of a particular ruling 
([Dem.] 59.110). However, an overt familiarity with the laws and partaking in frequent 
litigation drew a common suspicion. This sentiment stemmed from fears regarding false 
prosecutions for personal profit or sykophancy (for details about the sykophant, see τοὺς 
συκοφαντοῦντας πονηρούς at §32 and τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ὁ συκοφάντης at §34). As such, 
speakers in the lawcourt often express their fears of being seen as legally meddlesome or 
litigious (Dem. 39.1 and 56.14, cf. 54.17). Euxitheos alleges that Euboulides has detailed 
knowledge of the laws and plays upon the jury’s suspicion in order to prejudice them 
against his opponent. 
                                                     
19 See n. 124 in the Introduction. 
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ἀδίκως καὶ πλεονεκτικῶς τὴν κατηγορίαν πεποίηται: ‘has made this accusation 
unjustly and for his own advantage’. The speaker’s use of the perfect tense once again 
indicates that his opponent spoke first during the trial (see also καὶ ἐμοῦ at §1). The word 
πλεονεκτικῶς is often translated as ‘greedy’, but I have used ‘for his own advantage’ in 
order to convey better Euxitheos’ accusation that Euboulides profited from his 
disfranchisement (πλεονεκτικῶς is also used at Dem. 22.56, 24.168, 25.24 and 29.27; Isoc. 
12.243). Euxitheos returns to Euboulides’ financial greed towards the end of his speech, 
claiming that he also benefitted from the questionable status of others (see κοινῇ 
διανειμάμενοι πέντε δραχμὰς ἕκαστος προσεδέξαντο at §59 and ἕνεκ᾽ ἀργυρίου at §60). 
ὑβρίσθην: ‘I was abused’. The word ὕβρις proffers numerous translations: ‘wantonness’, 
‘insolence’, ‘arrogance’, ‘violence’ and ‘outrageous behaviour’. In a legal sense, it 
denotes the more serious injuries inflicted on a person with the intent to cause shame or 
dishonour (Dem. 37.33, 45.4; including assault and battery, Dem. 21.35, Isoc. 20.2; rape, 
Dein. 1.23; and forced confinement, Isae. 8.41). As presented in the existing source 
material, however, the Athenian law against ὕβρις does not actually outline the acts which 
constituted deliberately excessive or unrestrained abuse. It only states that any qualified 
citizen could indict a man in a γραφὴ ὕβρεως for assaulting a man, woman or child, 
regardless of whether they were free or slave (Dem. 21.47; Aeschin. 1.15). Those who 
were found guilty faced a penalty chosen by the jury on that day; this could consist of a 
fine payable to the state or, in the most extreme cases, the penalty of death (Dem. 21.49; 
Aeschin. 1.16; Dein. 1.23). As such, it was far more serious than a charge of common 
assault (the private δίκη αἰκίας; Dem. 54.1), for which the successful plaintiff merely 
received a financial sum approved by the court. The only existing speech which was 
delivered in a γραφὴ ὕβρεως is Demosthenes’ Against Medias (Dem. 21).20 It is clear 
                                                     
20 I follow Harris’ convincing analysis that Dem. 21 is a speech which was delivered in a γραφὴ ὕβρεως, 
in Demosthenes, Speeches 20-22, pp. 79-81. 
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from the sources that the Athenian attitude towards ὕβρις was one of zero tolerance; it 
was held in such contempt that it warranted the state’s involvement through the public 
γραφή procedure and a limitless penalty.21 Euxitheos portrays Euboulides’ treatment of 
him as hubristic in an attempt to blacken his character and, by sensationalising his 
behaviour, to signal to the jury that his opponent was the real criminal. Like Euxitheos, 
the speaker of On Behalf of Euphiletos also uses the verb ὑβρίζειν to denote the deme’s 
conduct towards his brother (καὶ ἀδίκως ὑβρίσθη ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ συστάντων, Isae. 
12.12). This word would have undoubtedly impressed upon a jury’s moral awareness. 
[6] μηδέπω: ‘not yet’. Euxitheos asks that the jury not be prejudiced against him for 
already having been disfranchised by his deme. While the members of larger demes may 
not have all known one another personally, the διαψήφισις procedure appears to have 
allowed for any demesman present at the assembly to speak either in favour or against a 
man before the vote was held (see §§11 and 12).22 Therefore, the ability to share any 
particulars about one another gave the deme the theoretical advantage of being able to 
vote based on local knowledge. Since Euxitheos’ deme was only small to medium in size 
(see τῶν μὲν δημοτῶν οἱ ὀμόσαντες ἐγενόμεθα τρεῖς καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα at §9 and τοῖς 
Ἁλιμουσίοις at §15), it would be natural to suppose that its members would be familiar 
with one another. The juries who heard the appeals after the extraordinary διαψήφισις of 
346/5 BC, however, were not likely to have known the individuals involved in a particular 
case and thus they would have been initially inclined to give credence to the deme’s 
decision. Indeed, Aeschines reports that the personal knowledge of the deme was 
referenced frequently by prosecutors in their opening arguments to justify the actions of 
that body during this widespread review (1.78). Euboulides may even have claimed that 
                                                     
21 For a comprehensive study of ὕβρις in both Athenian law and literature, see N. R. E. Fisher’s Hybris 
(1992), particularly pp. 36-85. 
22 See also the discussion of the actual διαψήφισις process, Introduction, pp. 25-43. 
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his deme had sufficient knowledge of its own members rightly to eject anyone falsely in 
possession of citizenship. Euxitheos’ use of μηδέπω certainly anticipates the jury’s 
inclination to support the decision of the deme and, as such, he must convince them that 
the vote against him was biased. 
οὐκ ἂν ἐδώκατε τὴν εἰς ὑμᾶς ἔφεσιν: ‘you would not have allowed the right of appeal 
to yourselves’. Continuing to urge the jurors not to allow his deme’s vote to influence 
theirs, Euxitheos reminds them that the provision of appeal was made to counteract any 
unjust decisions by the demes. He appears to speak of the appeal as a new measure; Diller 
cites this passage while arguing that Demophilos’ decree introduced the provision for an 
ejected member to appeal the deme’s decision with a public indictment.23  While he 
proposes an interesting theory, there is nothing in the surviving sources to confirm it and, 
as such, Euxitheos’ comment may simply refer to the established appeal process that was 
in place for both ordinary and extraordinary διαψηφίσεις. 
Here, the speaker once again directly addresses the jury as representatives of the Athenian 
people and, thus, as the collective body who govern the state through their participation 
in the Ecclēsia (see εἰ μήτε πείσαντες μήτε δεηθέντες ὑμῶν at §3). However, his attempt 
at flattery could have miscarried if the jurors, who were nevertheless members of a deme 
themselves, took offence at his slight of a deme’s capacity to settle its own disputes. To 
avoid any further prejudice on their part, he must show that the decision of his own deme 
to disfranchise him was particularly corrupt.24 
νῦν δὲ καὶ διὰ φιλονικίαν καὶ διὰ φθόνον καὶ δι᾽ ἔχθραν καὶ δι᾽ ἄλλας προφάσεις 
ἔσεσθαί τι τοιοῦτον ἡγούμενοι: ‘but even now believing something of this sort would 
happen on account of rivalry and envy and enmity and other pretexts’. ‘Of this sort’ 
                                                     
23 See n. 121 in the Introduction. 
24 For details regarding the ἔφεσις and its use in both ordinary and extraordinary διαψηφίσεις, see Appendix 
7, pp. 302-13. 
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signifies Euxitheos’ disfranchisement, which he will contend is a perversion of justice as 
a result of Euboulides’ personal hostility towards him. Throughout his speech, Euxitheos 
makes several references to the existence of a personal enmity between himself and 
Euboulides (§§8, 48 and 61). His claim is certainly plausible. There were no state 
prosecutors in the Athenian legal system: any citizen had the right to initiate a private suit 
on behalf of an injured party, and could also seek justice in the public court for abuses in 
political offices and for crimes against the state.25 With the onus for litigation resting with 
the private citizen, the ability to prosecute on the basis of personal or political animosities, 
or even a desire for self-enrichment, was a real problem in Athens (cf. Dem. 39.3, Aeschin. 
1.1; see τοὺς συκοφαντοῦντας πονηρούς at §32). The use of the courts in this manner was 
only tolerated in so far as the charge was justified and it was in the interest of the state 
(Lycourg. 1.6; see §§49, 57 and 63) but, in some cases, measures were put in place to 
deter frivolous suits (see τὸ πέμπτον μέρος at §8). It is clear that Euxitheos wants the 
jurors to believe that his case is indeed a present example of such an abuse of the legal 
system. 
καλῶς ποιοῦντες: ‘acting properly’. When καλῶς or εὖ is used with the verb ποιεῖν it 
becomes an adverbial formula of approbation (Dem. 1.28, 20.110, 23.143).  
τοὺς ἠδικημένους ἅπαντας σεσῴκατε: ‘you have saved all those who have been 
wronged’. Having potentially offended the jury by slighting a deme’s competence in 
settling its own disputes, Euxitheos makes another attempt at flattering them by appealing 
directly to the jurors’ vanity (cf. κατὰ γὰρ πάντα αἱ παρ᾽ ὑμῖν εἰσι κρίσεις δικαιόταται at 
§56 and οὐδέν᾽ ἀπεστερεῖτε at §57). Clearly, Athenian jurors liked to imagine themselves 
as the guardians of justice (Dem. 39.14; cf. the dēmos too, Ar. Knights, 1121-1150). His 
                                                     
25 For a brief classification of legal cases, see Appendix 7, pp. 303-4. Occasionally, the Ecclēsia or the 
Boulē appointed official prosecutors for particular cases; for a concise overview, see MacDowell, The Law 
in Classical Athens, pp. 61-2. 
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implicit plea is for the jury not to spoil their purported impeccable record by subsequently 
voting in favour of Euboulides and the prosecution. 
[7] τὴν διαψήφισιν: ‘voting by ballot’.26 Euxitheos was disfranchised when the deme 
was compelled by the state to hold an extraordinary review of its membership under 
Demophilos’ decree of 346/5 BC (see παρὰ τὸ ψήφισμα below). The speaker also refers 
to a previous occasion on which the demesmen were obliged to hold an extraordinary 
vote, but that was only required in his deme alone on account of the supposed loss of its 
register of members (see ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ διαψηφίσεις ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐγένοντο τοῖς δημόταις 
at §26). 
εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα πάντα λέγειν: ‘speaking on the same matter at hand in every way’. 
This is the first of three occasions that Euxitheos justifies the inclusion of a particular 
statement to the case in this way (see <εἰς> αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα at §59, and ἐρῶ δ᾽ εἰς αὐτὸ 
τὸ πρᾶγμα at §60). On two other occasions he makes a point of excluding statements 
which ought to have no bearing on the case (cf. ἔξεστιν ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος βλασφημεῖν 
at §33, ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος ὑπολήψεσθε ταῦτ᾽ εἶναι at §63, and ἔξω τοῦ 
πράγματος at §66). This restraint corresponds to a requirement reported in the Athēnaiōn 
Politeia, written circa 320 BC, which states that litigants in δίκαι took an oath to speak 
to the point ([Arist.] 67.1). However, there are few references to such a rule in non-
homicide cases before this (ἀφέμενοι τῶν εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα λόγων in Aeschin. 1.178, 
εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα λέγουσιν in Aeschin. 3.197; cf. πότερον ἀγνοοῦντες ὅτι περὶ τοῦ 
πράγματος προσήκει λέγειν in Lys. 9.1, 2-3).27 This suggests that, if such a requirement 
                                                     
26 For a full analysis of the διαψήφισις process in both ordinary and extraordinary circumstances, see 
Introduction, pp. 25-43. 
27 Speeches made before the court of the Areopagos or even referring to the homicide courts were compelled 
to abide by the rule of relevancy and make frequent mention of it, for example: Lys. 3.46; Lycourg. 1.11-
13; cf. Antiph. 5.11 (the speaker in this murder case was specifically tried under an ἔνδειξις κακουργίας, 
an indictment for wrongdoing, rather than the regular δίκη φόνου for homicide), 6.9. It thus appears that 
the homicide courts had definite restrictions in place against matters that did not directly pertain to the 
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had been established before 346/5 BC, it had little effect in practice on the litigants’ 
arguments before the popular courts. Alternatively, it is possible that this rule was adopted 
not long before the date of the speech, perhaps in connection to the extraordinary 
διαψήφισις and the large number of appeals that it brought about (cf. §2). If this provision 
was introduced to more efficiently manage the increase in appeals and to thus curtail the 
demands on time for each, it must have been considered an advantageous measure to 
extend to private cases for it to have become general procedure by the time of the 
Athēnaiōn Politeia.28 Therefore, Euxitheos’ repetition that he is keeping to the point 
would not only serve to remind the jury that he is abiding by the new rule but it is an 
attempt to win their favour by assuring them that he will not waste their time on irrelevant 
claims. The jury may even have called for Euxitheos to stick to the point during his 
speech,29 and hence his anticipation of what could irritate those listening shows an acute 
awareness of the expectations of his audience; see §§50 and 59 for his direct appeals for 
them to remain calm.  
παρὰ τὸ ψήφισμα: ‘contrary to the decree’. Euxitheos justifies his inclusion of the 
upcoming narrative by stating that his disfranchisement was executed against the very 
legal decree which had ordered the extraordinary διαψήφισις on all the members of the 
Attic demes.30 The cause of this measure, according to Euxitheos, was the Athenians’ 
anger towards those who had illicitly enrolled in the demes (see ἐπειδὴ δ᾽ ἡ πόλις πᾶσα 
                                                     
charge, a different provision than the oath reported by the Athēnaiōn Politeia. For a discussion of relevancy 
in both the popular courts and the homicide courts, see A. Lanni, Law and Justice in the Courts of Classical 
Athens, pp. 41-114. 
28 Notably, Lanni finds that neither Euxitheos’ phraseology nor the few allusions to this ‘rule’ in other 
lawcourt speeches indicate that there was a law which required the speaker to keep to the point, in Law and 
Justice in the Courts of Classical Athens, p. 100. However, she fails to explain suitably Euxitheos’ apparent 
preoccupation with relevancy if there was no such regulation for the appeals.  
29 See V. Bers, ‘What to believe in Demosthenes 57’, p. 237. For jurymen’s interjections, see n. 68. 
30 Euxitheos explicitly refers to a decree in connection with the recent extraordinary διαψήφισις; Gomme 
cites this expression as evidence that such a decree must have been separate to a standing law which 
facilitated it, in ‘Two problems of Athenian Citizenship Law’, p. 124. His argument comes in response to 
Diller, ‘The Decree of Demophilus, 346-345 B. C.’, pp. 193-205. For a discussion of both viewpoints and 
their bearing on the decree of Demophilos, see Introduction, pp. 34-5. 
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τοῖς ἀσελγῶς εἰσπεπηδηκόσιν εἰς τοὺς δήμους ὀργιζομένη παρώξυντο at §49) and so its 
aim was to remove those who had usurped citizen rights. Since the sources indicate that 
there were two such extraordinary scrutinies, one in the mid-fifth century and the second 
in the mid-fourth century, it has been established that Euxitheos was disfranchised as a 
result of the latter.31 Given that the widespread scrutiny sought to remove illegal aliens, 
Euxitheos must subsequently prove to the jury that he was born of two citizen parents and 
thus that his ejection violated the terms of Demophilos’ decree (see also παρὰ τὸ ψήφισμα 
at §30).  
ἀδίκως καταστασιασθείς: ‘has been unjustly victimised by his political rivals’. See 
συγκεκοινωνήκαμεν τῆς δόξης ταύτης οἱ κατεστασιασμένοι at §2 (this verb is also used 
at §17). 
 
§§8-14: διήγησις 
Though Euxitheos’ case relates to civic status rather than events, he includes a narrative 
in order to inform the jurors of the circumstances surrounding his ejection from the deme 
and the alleged manipulation of the vote, so that they might not be so disposed to accept 
the deme’s decision (cf. §6). He must now show in what manner the process had been 
corrupt. The inclusion of this narrative is also surprising in light of the fact that Euxitheos 
already had a strong case without it; unlike Euphiletos who had already undergone a legal 
challenge to his citizen status,32 it appears that no suit had ever been brought against 
Euxitheos and concerns about his status had only emerged after Demophilos’ 
unforeseeable decree of 346/5 BC. 
                                                     
31 For details on both, and the unlikelihood that others occurred and went unmentioned in the sources, see 
Introduction, pp. 25-43. 
32 See Appendix 1, pp. 270-9. 
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[8] οὑτοσί: ‘this man here’, cf. §61. Dilts accepts Rennie’s οὑτοσί in place of οὗτος, 
which is conveyed in several manuscripts.33 This amendment makes sense in terms of 
Demosthenes’ abundant use of this form elsewhere.34  
ὡς ὑμῶν ἴσασι πολλοί: ‘as many of you know’. Rather than introducing any witnesses 
to support his statement, Euxitheos claims that many of the jurors are familiar with the 
incident involving Euboulides that he is about to describe. His appeal to common 
knowledge is a device that he repeats again at §§33 and 60 (see ἃ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ἴστε, τί δεῖ 
λέγειν and ταῦτα πάντες ἴσασιν οἱ πρεσβύτεροι, respectively). ‘As many of you know’ is 
a variation of a rhetorical topos frequently used in the corpus of the orators (Antiph. 6.36, 
41; Lys. 10.1; Dem. 19.19, 21.1-2, 24.128, 39.2, 16, 25, 54.31; [Dem.] 49.13). In a large 
body of jurors, each individual might suppose that he alone was ignorant of what was 
allegedly common knowledge and this device would use their shame at their own 
ignorance to secure their agreement.35 But, it should not be assumed that such claims are 
true. In Dem. 40.53, Mantitheos asserts that this was a technique that could be employed 
when the speaker had no evidence to bring forward (ὥστε περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ μαρτυρίας 
παρασχέσθαι, ταῦτα φήσει ὑμᾶς εἰδέναι, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ὃ πάντες ποιοῦσιν οἱ μηδὲν 
ὑγιὲς λέγοντες; cf. Arist. Rh. 1408a32-6). Indeed, Euxitheos offers no proof that this event 
ever took place. 
γραψάμενος ἀσεβείας: ‘indicted … for impiety’. Throughout his speeches, Demosthenes 
mentions both real and potential lawsuits for impiety: Dem. 22.2, 24.7 cf. 21.51, 35.48. 
                                                     
33 Dilts (ed.), Demosthenis Orationes IV, p. 255; cf. Rennie (ed.), Demosthenis Orationes III, p. 254. 
34 The following examples are not modern emendations: Dem. 18.83, 114, 159, 209, 223, 243; 19.19, 23, 
46, 73, 113, 144, 175, 179, 197, 209, 211, 214, 287, 304; 20.94; 21.14, 85, 101, 164, 185; 23.13, 24, 62, 73, 
80, 82, 121, 127; 24.9, 26, 29, 57, 72, 145, 208; 25.58, 79, 94; 32.4, 5, 7, 17; 33.6, 9, 32; 34.12, 46; 35.15, 
17, 28, 30, 31, 36, 37, 41; 36.2, 8, 9, 26, 28, 47, 56; 37.3, 42; 39.5, 25, 27; 40.18, 28, 35, 53; 41.1; 42.23; 
43.11, 14, 15, 26, 29, 41, 47, 48, 50, 82; 44.1, 2, 7, 10, 13, 22, 32, 34, 40, 42, 44, 46, 47, 48, 53, 55, 61; 
45.5, 7, 36, 40, 53, 56; 48.5, 6, 17, 20, 22, 23, 28, 30, 31, 36, 51, 53; 54.7, 8, 15, 24; 56.5, 6, 7, 49. 
35 For a detailed discussion of this rhetorical topos and further examples from the speeches, see J. Ober, 
Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens, pp. 148-51. 
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But two cases involving the prosecution of women particularly stand out from the others. 
Ninon was a priestess who was charged with impiety for selling love potions and mocking 
the mysteries, and she was subsequently put to death (Dem. 39.2, 40.9, cf. 19.281 with 
schol; Joseph. Ap. 2.267) Similarly, Theoris was either a seer (Philoch. FGrH 382 F60 
apud Harp. s.v. Θεωρὶς) or a priestess (Plut. Dem. 14.4) who was also condemned to death 
along with her family for practising magic (Dem. 25.79-80). The severity of these 
sentences makes the gravity of the offences abundantly clear; the Athenians did not 
tolerate irreverence and the transgression of sacred law. While such prosecutions for 
impiety may indeed have stemmed from genuine religious suspicions, lawsuits of this 
kind also could be used as the means through which to attack a personal enemy. As with 
the γραφὴ ὕβρεως (see ὑβρίσθην at §5), the offences which pertained to the γραφὴ 
ἀσεβείας were particularly hard to define; as such, this charge was often used to pursue a 
political rival in court, particularly through his female relatives.36  
τὴν ἀδελφὴν τὴν Λακεδαιμονίου: ‘the sister of Lacedaemonios’. Euxitheos alleges that 
the hostility between himself and Euboulides arose from his opposing testimony in the 
latter’s indictment of Lacedaemonios’ sister for impiety, presumably in the same year or 
earlier. The name of Lacedaemonios’ sister is deliberately omitted by the speaker in 
keeping with Athenian convention; while a man was recognised by his own name and 
designations from his paternal line, a respectable woman’s name was not spoken in public 
but she was identified through association with her κύριος (guardian; see Dem. 39.9).37 
Fortunately, an inscription dating circa 347 BC reveals that her name was Plangon and 
                                                     
36 For the highly politicised nature of impiety lawsuits, see D. Cohen, Law, Sexuality and Society, pp. 203-
17; S. C. Todd, ‘Lysias Against Nikomachos’, p. 115 n. 23; E. Eidinow, ‘Patterns of Persecution’, pp. 9-
35. 
37 For an in-depth discussion regarding the avoidance of Athenian women’s names on the part of the orators, 
see Schaps, ‘The Woman Least Mentioned’, pp. 323-30. 
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that she was the daughter of Promachos of Alopeke (SEG 12.193).38 It is thus likely that 
the Lacedaemonios who is referred to as the brother of Satyros of Alopeke in another 
lawcourt speech, dated between 343 and 340 BC, is the same man ([Dem.] 59.45). 
Lacedaemonios himself presumably had a role in public life though nothing else is known 
of him or his career. One would be inclined to agree with Diller’s observation that his 
very obscurity is suggestive of his prominence being short-lived. 39  Despite the 
importance of establishing Euboulides’ animosity towards him in his own case, Euxitheos 
fails to bring Lacedaemonios or indeed any witness to verify his account of their pre-
existing conflict. 
τὸ πέμπτον μέρος: ‘a fifth share’. In general, the γραφαί appear to have given rise to 
higher penalties for those who were found guilty, and some to have awarded a successful 
plaintiff a more significant monetary reward than the δίκαι did.40 As a result of these 
financial rewards, false prosecutions became an inevitable drawback in the Athenian legal 
system (see also τοὺς συκοφαντοῦντας πονηρούς at §32). Thus, in order to deter frivolous 
cases, bringing a γραφή placed the prosecutor at risk of a heavy fine of a thousand 
drachmas if he either abandoned the case after initiating proceedings or if he failed to 
receive at least a fifth share of the jurors’ votes at trial (Dem. 21.47, 23.80, 24.7; [Dem.] 
26.9, 58.6; [Andoc.] 4.18).41 Furthermore, some sources suggest that a failed prosecution 
                                                     
38 For this inscription, see J. C. Threpsiades, ‘Τὸ εὕρημα τοῦ Κεραμεικοῦ’, pp. 59-63. The deme Alopeke 
was situated approximately two kilometres south-east of Athens and belonged to the tribe Antiochis. Its 
most famous deme members include the statesman and military commander, Aristeides (circa 520s-467 
BC), and the philosopher, Socrates (circa 470-399 BC). 
39 Diller, ‘Scrutiny and Appeal in Athenian Citizenship’, p. 303. 
40 For a brief explanation of these two types of legal cases, see Appendix 7, pp. 303-4. In most γραφαί, the 
Athenian state rather than the prosecutor collected the fine from a convicted defendant. However, certain 
procedures granted a portion of the collected fine to the successful prosecutor: ἀπογραφαί ([Dem.] 53.2), 
φάσεις, and some γραφαὶ ξενίας ([Dem.] 59.52). For further details on these cases, see Christ, The Litigious 
Athenian, pp. 138-43. 
41 The fine of one thousand drachmas was equal to ten minas; the daily wage of a skilled workman rose 
from one drachma in the mid-fifth century BC to approximately two or two and a half drachmas in the later 
fourth century BC (IG II-III² 1672-3, dating to 329/8 and 327/6 BC), and thus the fine of one thousand 
drachmas was the equivalent of between four hundred and five hundred days’ wages for a skilled workman. 
For further details on these rates of pay, see Rhodes, A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia, 
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of this kind would cause the litigant to be banned from bringing a similar action in the 
future (Dem. 18.266, 21.103; [Dem.] 53.1; Andoc. 1.33, 76).42 Moreover, if he neglected 
to pay the fine to the Athenian treasury, he was publicly disgraced and lost his civic 
privileges until the debt was settled (ἀτιμία; [Dem.] 58.48-9; Andoc. 1.73). If Euxitheos’ 
account of the unsuccessful indictment of Lacaedaemonios’ sister is to be believed, 
Euboulides must have received such a penalty. However, there are a number of potential 
outcomes to consider with regard to this penalty and his ensuing involvement in the 
prosecution of Euxitheos. Firstly, Euboulides may have duly paid his fine to be rid of the 
ἀτιμία.43 Secondly, the ban from further prosecutions may have only centred on the same 
type of γραφή and may not have extended to other public actions.44 This would mean that 
participation in the appeals arising from an extraordinary διαψήφισις were not covered 
by the prohibition, perhaps because they arose from a deme’s vote and not from a public 
prosecution brought by an individual. And finally, it may have been the case that 
Euboulides’ prominence in the public life of the deme (see below) resulted in a lesser or 
partial penalisation. This would make sense if he had prosecuted Lacedaemonios’ sister 
as a deme official and would correspond to the unaccountability of the five prosecutors 
in an appeal (see ἀνυπευθύνῳ at §5). Unfortunately, Euxitheos provides no further detail 
with regard to this failed prosecution. Without any further comment on the penalty which 
Euboulides may have received or indeed how long ago this trial took place, it is not 
possible to decide which one of these plausible scenarios was the most likely. 
διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἔχθραν ἐπιτίθεταί μοι: ‘on account of this personal enmity over that 
event, he is attacking me’. This open opposition in a public suit and his subsequent failure 
                                                     
p. 691, and Ober, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens, pp. 129-30. For the value of money in the fifth and 
fourth centuries BC, see A. H. M. Jones, Athenian Democracy, p. 135 n. 1. 
42 For this penalty, see MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens, p. 64.  
43 Harrison suggests that the ban from bringing further γραφαί also ended with the payment of the fine, in 
The Law of Athens Vol. II, p. 83. 
44 As argued by Hansen, in Apagoge, Endeixis and Ephegesis against Kakourgoi, Atimoi and Pheugontes, 
pp. 63-5. 
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to secure sufficient votes was likely to have affected Euboulides’ political ambitions for 
the worse and he probably held Euxitheos responsible. A personal feud was a fairly 
standard motive in Athenian lawsuits, but it was only tolerated in so far as the applied 
charge was justified and the prosecution was in the interest of the state (see §6). Euxitheos 
seeks to persuade the jury that Euboulides’ action against him was a perversion of justice, 
which was motivated by revenge. But, although the speaker alludes to this enmity 
between himself and Euboulides again at §48 (and even the animosity between their 
fathers at §61), he does not actually prove that Euboulides held any particular resentment 
against him. His lack of witnesses to attest to its existence on Euboulides’ part means that 
this alleged enmity can only be taken as a personal observation.  
βουλεύων: ‘being a member of the Boulē’. Euxitheos informs the jury that Euboulides 
was a βουλευτής or representative of the deme on the Council of Five Hundred, known 
as the Boulē. Euboulides’ position is corroborated by an honorific decree from 346/5 BC 
(IG II² 218, 6-7). The five hundred βουλευταί were appointed from the ten Attic tribes, 
with each tribe appointing fifty men from among the demes according to their individual 
populations. These men, at least thirty years of age and belonging to the three upper social 
classes (i.e. the πεντακοσιομέδιμνοι, ἱππεῖς and ζευγῖται, but not the lowest class, the 
θῆτες), were selected by lot and could only serve twice in their lifetime. The role of 
βουλευτής could be very demanding since the Boulē met every day, except for public 
holidays and days of ill omen ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 43.3), and each deme was obliged to 
provide a proportionate number of βουλευταί. Using the average male life expectancy for 
that period and society, it has been determined that a minimum population of 
approximately thirty-two men over thirty years old was required for a deme to fulfil its 
bouleutic quota.45 The survival of epigraphic evidence from the mid-fourth century has 
                                                     
45 Osborne, Demos, pp. 43-4. 
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further facilitated the calculation of the number of councillors provided by each deme at 
that time. Thus, with three seats in the Boulē in the fourth century BC (IG II² 1700, 77, 
IG II² 1742, 10; SEG 19.149), the deme of Halimous needed approximately one hundred 
of its male citizens to fill the positions each year.46 In fact, Euxitheos indicates that at the 
time of the speech there were no less than eighty: his case was about the sixtieth on the 
deme’s list for scrutiny, with more than twenty to review after it (see §§10 and 15). If a 
deme could not meet its bouleutic quota, its members may have been compelled to serve 
simultaneously in more than one office. Although it cannot be known for certain whether 
or not Euboulides also served as dēmarch (see ἐξ ὧν ἀνεκάλει τοὺς δημότας below), 
Euxitheos refers to his role as βουλευτής in order to draw the jury’s attention to the fact 
that he held such a position of responsibility and how he subsequently abused it with his 
conduct during the διαψήφισις. 
κύριος ὢν τοῦ θ᾽ ὅρκου: ‘the man in charge of the oath’. All the demesmen, including 
the deme officials, swore an oath before the extraordinary διαψήφισις to vote honestly 
upon the validity of each man’s claim to membership (the speaker estimates that seventy-
three demesmen took this vote at §9). Such an oath, sworn over religious sacrifices, was 
likewise used at the annual διαψήφισις for the enrolment of new members ([Arist.] Ath. 
Pol. 42.1 cf. §61 and Isae. 7.28) and at the δοκιμασία (scrutiny to hold public office: 
[Arist.] Ath. Pol. 55.3-5).47 Moreover, Euxitheos reveals that a similar oath was taken for 
the emergency διαψήφισις occasioned by the loss of the deme register in Halimous (see 
§26). He also presents one of the clauses of the oath taken by the demesmen at the 
extraordinary διαψήφισις; a clause which he claims Euboulides had removed, presumably 
                                                     
46 Whitehead, The Demes of Attica, pp. 88-9 n. 11. 
47 For the δοκιμασία to assume public office, see ἀρχὰς ἔλαχεν καὶ ἦρξεν δοκιμασθείς at §25 and ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ 
ἂν κατηγορεῖν at §26; for the δοκιμασία specifically held before being appointed as one of the 
Thesmothetae, see τοὺς θεσμοθέτας ἀνακρίνετε at §66. For the Boulē’s δοκιμασία of newly enrolled 
citizens after the annual διαψήφισις in a deme, see Introduction, pp. 27-8. 
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in his capacity as oath administrator (see ἔκ τε γὰρ τοῦ ὅρκου ἐξήλειψαν τὸ ψηφιεῖσθαι 
γνώμῃ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ καὶ οὔτε χάριτος ἕνεκ᾽ οὔτ᾽ ἔχθρας at §63). Given that the dēmarch 
normally convened and presided over deme assemblies (see §26), it is tempting to assume 
that dispensing the oath at events such as the διαψήφισις proceedings fell to him. 
However, Euboulides is not explicitly labelled a dēmarch in the text (unlike his father 
Antiphilos at §§26 and 60, and Euxitheos himself at §63). And, since it was not unheard 
of for duties between the dēmarch and the deme’s βουλευταί to overlap (cf. [Dem.] 50.6, 
8), Euboulides’ official role in charge of the oath at the extraordinary διαψήφισις may 
have been based simply on his position as βουλευτής (see βουλεύων above; also ἐξ ὧν 
ἀνεκάλει τοὺς δημότας below).  
τῶν γραμμάτων: ‘the register’. The γράμματα (list) was the deme’s official register of 
its members, which Euxitheos successively refers to in various ways: τὸ ληξιαρχικὸν 
γραμματεῖον at §26 (cf. Isae. 7.27; Dem. 44.35; Lycourg. 1.76; τὰ γραμματεῖα τὰ 
ληξιαρχικὰ in Isoc. 8.88), τὸ κοινὸν γραμματεῖον at §60 (cf. τὰ κοινὰ γραμματεῖα in SEG 
2.7.20-1), and simply τὸ γραμματεῖον at §62 (cf. Dem. 44.37). Each deme was responsible 
for the scrutiny of candidates presented for enrolment and so it updated its own record of 
members under the supervision of the dēmarch. The dēmarch was normally the custodian 
of the actual register (Dem. 44.37; schol. Ar. Clouds, 37; Harp. s.v. δήμαρχος; Suda, s.v. 
δήμαρχος Adler Δ420). Euxitheos’ reference to Euboulides being in charge of the register 
during the extraordinary διαψήφισις might indicate that the latter served as dēmarch at 
that time, though it is far from certain (see ἐξ ὧν ἀνεκάλει τοὺς δημότας below). 
Moreover, one also learns from the speaker that a previous dēmarch of Halimous had lost 
the register some years before (namely Euboulides’ father, Antiphilos, see §26). 
Euxitheos later claims that the loss of the register was a fraud (§60) but, as he is the only 
source for this alleged deceit, one cannot know whether or not this incident resulted in 
subsequent registers being removed from the care of the dēmarch. The gravity of the 
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situation, however, can be measured by the fact that a compulsory διαψήφισις had to be 
held to reconstruct the deme’s record. The register was crucial; since there was no central 
archive of polis inhabitants in Athens, these lists not only recorded deme membership but 
they constituted a record of the collective citizen body. But such administration at local 
level meant that entries could be falsified and open to abuse. The need to implement the 
widespread διαψήφισις in 346/5 BC is itself evidence that some demes had become 
unreliable in their own scrutinies for admission and that improper records had been made 
(see τὴν διαψήφισιν and παρὰ τὸ ψήφισμα at §7). Euxitheos’ removal from Halimous’ 
register as a result of this διαψήφισις was, according to him, another such abuse of the 
record at the hands of a deme official. Without his name on the register, Euxitheos and 
other such men struck from the lists needed the testimony of live witnesses, preferably 
relatives and fellow members from their demes and phratries, to prove their descent and 
claims to citizenship (see τοὺς οἰκείους μάρτυρας παρασχέσθαι at §12).  
ἐξ ὧν ἀνεκάλει τοὺς δημότας: ‘from which the demesmen were summoned’. Although 
the speaker does not explicitly state that Euboulides was Halimous’ dēmarch, some of the 
duties which he ascribes to him suggest that his opponent may have held this office in 
addition to that of βουλευτής. It would appear that the demesmen of Halimous were 
summoned by the official in charge of the deme register. Whitehead finds that only the 
dēmarch could convene the assembly, specifically by virtue of his control of the deme 
register.48 If Euboulides was indeed βουλευτής and dēmarch, his dual role in the deme 
may have been the result of more than just personal ambition. As already noted (see 
βουλεύων above), the bouleutic quota was not met in the deme of Halimous in 346/5 BC 
and so Euboulides’ duplication of roles may have been brought about through necessity. 
Moreover, his role as βουλευτής presumably obliged him to spend much of his time in 
                                                     
48 Whitehead, The Demes of Attica, pp. 88 and 122. 
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the city and thus he may have used his authority as dēmarch to have the deme unusually 
convene in the city (see τοῦ ἄστεως at §10). If this was the case, Euboulides was very 
fortunate in that his dēmarchy coincided with the widespread διαψήφισις and he could 
thus use both of his positions to exact revenge on Euxitheos. However, the speaker’s 
failure to confirm that his opponent was dēmarch caused Develin to propose that 
Demophilos’ decree gave control of the διαψήφισις proceedings in each deme to one or 
more of its own βουλευταί; granting them access to the deme registers and the ability to 
summon the demesmen for the vote, and even to administer the oath.49 His argument is 
certainly persuasive in light of the fact that the widespread διαψήφισις had been brought 
about by illicit enrolments and improper procedures under the supervision of the 
dēmarchs.  
[9] κατέτριψεν τὴν ἡμέραν δημηγορῶν καὶ ψηφίσματα γράφων: ‘he wasted the 
day by making speeches and proposing decrees’ (for γράφων cf. Dem. 1.19, 18.25, 79). 
This is the only detailed description of a deme ἀγορά (assembly) from surviving sources. 
Under the supervision of the dēmarch (for details regarding this office, see ὅτ᾽ ἀπώλετο 
αὐτοῖς τὸ ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον δημαρχοῦντος Ἀντιφίλου τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ 
Εὐβουλίδου at §26), the internal administrative and financial business was conducted at 
these assemblies in much the same manner as the Athenian Ecclēsia.50 Essentially, each 
deme governed its own local affairs: it owned property that could be leased out, it 
supervised communal religious cults (for example ὡς ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν τούτων προεκρίθην ἐν 
τοῖς εὐγενεστάτοις κληροῦσθαι τῆς ἱερωσύνης τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ at §46) and maintained the 
upkeep of sacred spaces, and it extracted taxes from those residing within the deme (as at 
§63). However, we cannot ascertain whether Euboulides was truly wasting the day with 
                                                     
49 Develin, ‘Euboulides’ Office and the Diapsephisis of 346/5 B.C.’, p. 76. 
50 Haussoulier, La Vie Municipale en Attique, p. 5. 
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his speeches and proposals since it is not known what deme business required attention 
before the vote had to be taken. By addressing these matters before the scrutiny, 
Euboulides may have wanted to avoid the inconvenience of convening another ἀγορά so 
soon after this one had taken place and asking the Halimousians to travel the thirty-five 
stades back to the city (see τῶν πλείστων ἐκεῖ οἰκούντων at §10; Euxitheos does ask to 
reconvene the next day, see ἀναβαλέσθαι εἰς τὴν ὑστεραίαν at §12), but the speaker fails 
to provide any detail as to the content of the speeches and decrees. 
τοῦτο δ᾽ ἦν οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου: ‘This was not by accident’, refers to Euboulides 
making speeches and proposing decrees (for a comparable use of ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου, cf. 
Dem. 54.32, 56.14). This appears to suggest that the order in which the demesmen were 
to be scrutinised had already been decided before the ἀγορά took place but, since 
Euxitheos claims that the vote on his case took him by surprise (§12), the order may have 
been known only to the deme officials and those subject to the vote only found out at the 
assembly. 
τῶν μὲν δημοτῶν οἱ ὀμόσαντες ἐγενόμεθα τρεῖς καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα: ‘seventy-three of 
us demesmen who swore the oath’. Euxitheos asserts that seventy-three demesmen took 
the oath before voting (though he was apparently able only to estimate the number of 
those who actually cast ballots at §13, see οὐ πλείους ἢ τριάκοντ᾽ ἦσαν). This number 
apparently did not constitute all of the demesmen; he subsequently states that the vote on 
his citizenship was about sixtieth on the list of scrutinies (§10) and he was followed by 
more than twenty (§15). As a result of this discrepancy, Gomme finds that Euxitheos 
either understates the number of demesmen present at that meeting or that the deme was 
over-represented in the Boulē.51 I find that the latter is more plausible, as the bouleutic 
                                                     
51 Gomme finds the latter reason more plausible than the former, given that it was a small deme and was 
liable to suffer considerable damage to its population if catastrophe struck, in The Population of Athens in 
the Fifth and Fourth Centuries, pp. 54-5. 
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quota for a single deme was not likely to have been immediately modified by the state in 
the case of a sudden and localised decrease in population. Adjusting the quota for a small 
to medium deme, like Halimous, may have been overlooked for several decades. 
σκότος: ‘dark’. See σκότος at §13. 
[10] οἱ μὲν πρεσβύτεροι τῶν δημοτῶν: ‘the older demesmen’. The deme’s ἀγορά was 
convened in the city (see τοῦ ἄστεως below) and, for the average Athenian, the normal 
means of travel between the city and their deme would have been on foot. If proceedings 
drew on into the evening, older members of the deme would certainly need to leave the 
assembly earlier in order to return home before the light faded. Attic roads could be 
particularly treacherous at night, not only leaving their users vulnerable to thieves but to 
the hazards of poor road conditions (roads often served also as watercourses, see Dem. 
55.6). 52  The departure of these senior demesmen would certainly have been a 
disadvantage to Euxitheos’ scrutiny, since these men were likely to have been most 
familiar with his family history and would have been able to object to any blatant 
victimisation on Euboulides’ part.  
Moreover, several of Euxitheos’ living paternal relatives belonged to his father’s 
generation and were probably old men (§§20-21). Their age and the late hour of the vote 
may explain why none of them were present at the assembly in order to support Euxitheos 
during the vote on his citizenship (see §14). Both they and Euxitheos may have been 
confident enough of his status to allow them to depart. Unfortunately, however, the 
speaker does not specifically relate that his elderly relatives were amongst those who 
departed (cf. the alternative explanation that Euxitheos bribed suspicious relatives to 
appear in court, see §52).  
                                                     
52 For a general overview of the rudimentary nature of Greek roads, see W. K. Pritchett, Studies in Ancient 
Topography, pp. 151-8. 
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τοῦ ἄστεως: ‘from the city’. The speaker reveals that the deme’s ἀγορά for the 
extraordinary διαψήφισις took place in Athens, though he does not specify the exact 
whereabouts. Since Euxitheos’ speech is the only source to present any detail with regard 
to a deme ἀγορά and its location, it is not clear whether the city was the normal meeting 
place or if the special circumstances had required it. One would reasonably expect the 
routine meetings of the demesmen to take place locally rather that to envisage a scenario 
in which members of all one hundred and thirty-nine Attic demes regularly travelled to 
the city for each and every ἀγορά.53 There are several possibilities which may account for 
the Halimousians meeting in Athens on this occasion. First and foremost, Demophilos’ 
decree (see τὴν διαψήφισιν at §7) may have changed the normal practice and stipulated 
that the demes meet at a neutral setting in the city for a vote on each of its members. 
Alternatively, Euboulides’ role as βουλευτής could have required him to be in the city at 
that time and so the ἀγορά was relocated to Athens for his convenience (see βουλεύων 
and ἐξ ὧν ἀνεκάλει τοὺς δημότας at §8). Specifically, if Euboulides’ tribe was serving as 
πρυτάνεις at the time of the widespread διαψήφισις, he and the other βουλευταί of 
Halimous were obliged to remain in Athens; each tribal contingent held this presidency 
in rotation for one-tenth of the year, a period of thirty-five or thirty-six days ([Arist.] Ath. 
Pol. 43.2), managing the daily business of the Boulē and presiding over all treaties and 
public acts. However, since Euxitheos makes no mention of either the decree or 
Euboulides’ political duties, it is impossible to determine the specific reason why the 
ἀγορά took place in the city. Rather than to appear undemocratic, Euxitheos protests at 
the excessive length of the meeting instead of the fact that the deme assembly was held 
                                                     
53 Whitehead observes that general probabilities favour the likelihood that the ἀγοραί normally took place 
within the boundaries of each deme, in The Demes of Attica, pp. 88-90. N. F. Jones arrives at a similar 
conclusion in his analysis of the demes’ ἀγοραί, in The Associations of Classical Athens, pp. 87-8. 
Nevertheless, no surviving source definitively shows that a deme assembly was held within the deme 
locality. Four inscriptions from different demes direct that their decrees be placed in their local marketplace: 
IG II² 1188, 31-3 (Eleusis); IG II² 1174, 13-4, 17-8 (Halae Aexonides); IG II² 1176, 20 (Piraeus); IG II² 
1180, 24-5 (Sounion). Unfortunately, these inscriptions do not confirm that the deme assemblies which 
decided the decrees also took place there. 
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in Athens; this location particularly impacted upon his case, not only as it caused the older 
deme members to leave before the vote on his citizenship (see above) but it was probably 
also cited by Euboulides as the primary reason for not reconvening the ἀγορά the next 
day (see ἀναβαλέσθαι εἰς τὴν ὑστεραίαν at §12). 
τῶν πλείστων ἐκεῖ οἰκούντων: ‘most of the demesmen live there’, i.e. within the deme 
locality. Halimous lay thirty-five stades away from the city, a distance of just over six 
kilometres (for the location of the deme, see τοῖς Ἁλιμουσίοις at §15). After Cleisthenes’ 
tribal reforms in the last decade of the sixth century (Hdt. 5.66-9; [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 21.3), 
membership of a deme was inherited through the paternal line. Thus, citizens did not 
necessarily have to live in or near the deme to which they belonged. Euxitheos’ remark 
was inserted to explain the situation to the predominant number of city-dwellers on the 
jury.54 If Euboulides had delayed the proceedings of the ἀγορά by making speeches and 
proposing decrees, as the speaker claims (see κατέτριψεν τὴν ἡμέραν δημηγορῶν καὶ 
ψηφίσματα γράφων at §9), the vote on his citizenship would not have occurred so late 
and he would not have felt the need to ask for the deme to reconvene the next day 
(ἀναβαλέσθαι εἰς τὴν ὑστεραίαν at §12), which would undoubtedly have been an 
inconvenience to all those living in the countryside.  
οὐ πλείους ἢ τριάκοντα: ‘not more than thirty’. At first glance, there is nothing 
significant about the reported number of remaining demesmen at the meeting. Elsewhere, 
however, an average number of thirty men appears in a decree belonging to the deme 
Myrrhinous as the minimum required for a vote to take place (dating circa 340 BC, IG 
II² 1183, 21-3).55 While there is no specific evidence to suggest that the deme of Halimous 
                                                     
54 M. H. Hansen presents a convincing analysis of Attic settlement patterns in the fourth century BC in his 
article, ‘Political Activity and the Organisation of Attica in the fourth century B. C.’, pp. 227-38 (see in 
particular pp. 234-5). 
55 The deme of Myrrinhous was located on the south-eastern coast of Attica. A similar quorum was required 
for Lower Paeania, a deme located on the eastern side of Mount Hymettos, in the previous century (circa 
450-430 BC, IG I³ 250, 11-14). 
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required a certain number of members to be present at the deme ἀγορά, a quorum of thirty 
demesmen out of approximately eighty registered members in 346/5 BC (see §§9 and 15) 
certainly seems plausible. If Halimous did indeed require a minimum number of voters 
per meeting, this figure may have varied depending on the nature of the deme’s 
business.56 
ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἦσαν ἅπαντες οἱ τούτῳ παρεσκευασμένοι: ‘But amongst these were all 
those who had been suborned by this man’, i.e. amongst the demesmen present at the 
ἀγορά. The verb παρασκευάζω is regularly used in a negative sense in forensic speeches 
(see also παρεσκευάσθαι τούτους at §24; Dem. 20.45, 29.28; [Dem.] 47.8, 59.9, 120). 
Rather than providing any testimony against Euxitheos, the role of these men was to cast 
additional ballots against him and thus falsify the deme’s decision on his citizenship (see 
§13). 
[11] ἐβλασφήμει κατ᾽ ἐμοῦ ταχὺ καὶ πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλῃ τῇ φωνῇ: ‘immediately 
slandered me, at great length and in a loud voice’. As with ἀναπηδήσας in the previous 
line, Euxitheos again emphasises the suddenness and forcefulness of his opponent’s 
interjection. References to speakers dominating proceedings with their particularly loud 
or strong voices are not uncommon in oratory (Dem. 19.199, 206, 339; Isoc. 5.81, 12.9-
10; Isae. 6.59; cf. speaking in a loud voice was considered a particularly annoying trait to 
possess, Dem. 37.52, 55, 45.77, and Theophrastos equates it to boorishness, ἀγροικία, 
Char. 4). 
                                                     
56  Whitehead notes the specific circumstances of the Myrrinhous and Lower Paeania decrees, and 
persuasively suggests that a quorum was only necessary for deme assemblies which had to deal with 
business that was unattractive to the ordinary demesmen, in The Demes of Attica, p. 94, see n. 45 in 
particular.  
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ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν: ‘just like now’, i.e. at the present trial. Euboulides as the prosecutor 
would have spoken first (see καὶ ἐμοῦ at §1), and Euxitheos’ comment here suggests that 
he presented his case before the jury just as vigorously as he did before the demesmen.  
μάρτυρα μὲν ὧν κατηγόρησεν οὐδένα παρασχόμενος: ‘he brought forward no witness 
who accused me’. In light of this comment and the speaker’s subsequent statement about 
having no one with him to support his claim to citizenship at the διαψήφισις (τὸ μηδένα 
μοι παρεῖναι τό τε πρᾶγμα ἄφνω προσπεπτωκέναι at §12), it must have been possible for 
both the deme officials and those subjected to the vote to make prior arrangements for 
witnesses to be present.  
[12] ἀναβαλέσθαι εἰς τὴν ὑστεραίαν: ‘be adjourned until the next day’. Euxitheos 
claims that he requested an adjournment, though the witnesses who he subsequently 
summons at §14 were supposedly present to confirm the manner of the demesmen’s vote 
and not specifically his call for a deferral (cf. οὐ δυνήσονται ἔξαρνοι γενέσθαι). For 
Euxitheos to inform the jury that he made such a request, however, does confirm that it 
must have been possible for a deme to reconvene its ἀγορά on a second day. However, 
given the distance of the deme of Halimous from the city (it was just over six kilometres, 
see §§9 and 10), it may be presumed that to do so would have been an inconvenience to 
the demesmen. Although it is highly plausible that a normal deme meeting lasted no 
longer than a day,57 the scrutinies brought about as a result of the widespread διαψήφισις 
may have required longer meetings, depending on the size of the deme and the number 
of members. A small to medium sized deme like Halimous (with between seventy-three 
and eighty registered demesmen in 346/5 BC, see §§9 and 15) could have divided its 
caseload over two days so as not to rush proceedings. Since daylight had faded by the 
                                                     
57 Whitehead finds it ‘arguably likely’ that the duration of a normal deme meeting was one day, although 
he also makes the point that there is no evidence to confirm or refute this in the source material, see The 
Demes of Attica, p. 108 n. 110. 
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time the speaker’s name was called (see §§9 and 13), Euxitheos’ petition for an 
adjournment thus seems reasonable, albeit troublesome for his fellow demesmen. Yet the 
additional time to prepare his defence may not have altered the outcome of the 
demesmen’s vote if Euboulides was as determined to exact his revenge as was claimed 
(as previously seen at §§8-9; if Euxitheos’ allegations of his opponent’s vote-rigging are 
indeed true, see οἱ δὲ λαμβάνοντες δύο καὶ τρεῖς ψήφους ἕκαστος παρὰ τούτου at §13). 
τὴν ὥραν: ‘the late hour’. In general, ὥρα refers to an unspecified period of time, whether 
of the year, month, or day. Here, Euxitheos uses this term in relation to the time of day 
(which he repeats again at §14; see also Dem. 54.4, 26; cf. Dem. 54.30, 56.3). 
τὸ μηδένα μοι παρεῖναι τό τε πρᾶγμα ἄφνω προσπεπτωκέναι: ‘that there was nobody 
present to speak on my behalf, the matter had come about so suddenly’. By declaring that 
neither he nor Euboulides had any witnesses with them (see μάρτυρα μὲν ὧν κατηγόρησεν 
οὐδένα παρασχόμενος at §11), Euxitheos implies that it was normal procedure to allow 
the testimony of witnesses and counter-witnesses at the διαψήφισις. A statement in Isaeus’ 
On the Estate of Pyrrhos appears to support this suggestion, whereby the speaker claims 
that it was normal practice to bring support in a situation which might involve litigation 
(3.19). But, given the significant nature of the διαψήφισις, it appears odd that there was 
nobody present at the deme’s ἀγορά who could or even would speak on Euxitheos’ behalf. 
Firstly, one would presume that the relatives of his father, since they also had to belong 
to the deme of Halimous, would have been present at the deme’s ἀγορά for at least part 
of the day. Their absence when Euxitheos’ name was called could be explained by their 
lack of knowledge as to the order in which the votes were to be taken (see τοῦτο δ᾽ ἦν 
οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου at §9), and even an overconfidence in the remaining demesmen 
voting in his favour if they ultimately departed before it took place. Yet, Euxitheos’ claim 
that the matter came about all of a sudden does not suffice as an excuse for not providing 
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any witnesses, since it later appears that he deliberately did not summon any (see τῶν μὲν 
φίλων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων μηδένα μάρτυρα παρεῖναι at §14). Neglecting to ensure 
that he had the support of any family members during the deme ἀγορά stands as a 
particular weakness in Euxitheos’ case, given that one of his main arguments has been 
that there was a pre-existing animosity between him and Euboulides (see διὰ ταύτην τὴν 
ἔχθραν ἐπιτίθεταί μοι at §8). It seems odd that he apparently had no idea that Euboulides 
would use his official position during the διαψήφισις to in some way influence the 
proceedings against him. 
τοὺς οἰκείους μάρτυρας παρασχέσθαι: ‘to bring forward my relatives as witnesses’. 
Given the unreliability of the deme registers, witness testimonies from a man’s family 
and community were crucial to account for his claim to citizenship (see τῶν γραμμάτων 
at §8). For the speaker, witnesses who could verify the civic status of his parents and both 
his familial and social connections were the only means through which to prove that he 
should rightfully be reinstated as a citizen. Though he failed to produce his relatives to 
those assembled at the deme’s ἀγορά, Euxitheos will bring them forward to testify before 
the jury during his appeal. 
[13] τὴν δὲ ψῆφον εὐθὺς ἐδίδου: ‘but he immediately put the vote’. ἡ ψῆφος refers to 
the pebble used in voting, mentioned repeatedly by Euxitheos (§§14 and 16, cf. §61). This 
is the regular expression to describe putting a matter to a vote. By referring to Euboulides 
being in charge of initiating the vote and supplying the assembled demesmen with the 
necessary pebbles (see οἱ δὲ λαμβάνοντες δύο καὶ τρεῖς ψήφους ἕκαστος παρὰ τούτου 
below), Euxitheos emphasises again this abuse of his role as a deme official (though he 
fails to specify whether these duties were affiliated with his role as βουλευτής or as 
Halimous’ dēmarch, see §§8 and 26). 
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οἱ δὲ τούτῳ συνεστῶτες: ‘and the conspirators with this man’. The verb συνίστημι is 
commonly used to denote two or more men banding together to scheme against another 
party (Dem. 34.34; Lys. 22.17, cf. 30.10; Thuc. 8.66.2; Xen. Cyr. 1.1.2; Ar. Knights, 843, 
Lys. 577). The accusation of a conspiracy is referred to repeatedly throughout the speech, 
at §§2, 7, 13, 15-6, 17, 59, 60, 61, and 63 (see also Πολλὰ καὶ ψευδῆ κατηγορηκότος at 
§1; for a similar claim, see Isae. 12.12: καὶ ἀδίκως ὑβρίσθη ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ 
συστάντων). The speaker’s use of καταστασιάζεσθαι at §§2, 7 and 17 further propounds 
his claim of a rivalry between them. 
σκότος: ‘dark’. Unfortunately, Euxitheos does not disclose just how dark it was at the 
time of the balloting: whether it was still twilight or whether the light had completely 
faded. It is not possible to identify what time of year this appeal took place and so it 
cannot be estimated how many hours of daylight were available on average at that time. 
On the one hand, if Euxitheos’ account of the additional votes is true (see below), the 
light must have been very poor indeed for the scheme to work; on the other, his 
subsequent claim that the demesmen ‘were stunned’ suggests that there was enough light 
for them to observe the discernible difference between the tally and the number of men 
present. As Euxitheos is so vague, it is only clear that the departure of the older members 
of the deme before nightfall (see οἱ μὲν πρεσβύτεροι τῶν δημοτῶν at §10) and the 
encroaching darkness would have been favourable conditions for anyone conspiring to 
manipulate the vote against him. However, the speaker makes no mention of anyone else 
protesting at the late hour, particularly the twenty or so demesmen whose cases were to 
be heard after his own (see §15). 
οἱ δὲ λαμβάνοντες δύο καὶ τρεῖς ψήφους ἕκαστος παρὰ τούτου: ‘and taking two and 
three votes each from this man’. In addition to the darkness, Euxitheos also notes that 
alleged vote-rigging was further facilitated by the fact that Euboulides was the official 
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who handed out the ballots, either in his official capacity as βουλευτής or possibly as 
dēmarch (see §§8 and 26; later evidence suggests that it was indeed the dēmarch that 
distributed the ballots at the ἀγορά: schol. Ar. Clouds, 37; Harp. s.v. δήμαρχος; Suda, s.v. 
δήμαρχος Adler Δ420).  
εἰς τὸν καδίσκον: ‘in the voting urn’. The voting process in deme assemblies appears to 
have been administered in much the same manner as the vote which took place in the 
lawcourts (Dem. 43.10; Lycourg. 1.149; cf. Isae. 11.21, 23). In the courts, jurors were 
given two voting pebbles each, one for the plaintiff and one for the defendant. There were 
also two urns in which the pebbles were deposited; a bronze urn received the cast vote 
and a wooden urn for the unused pebble ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 68.3). However, it is not clear 
from Euxitheos’ use of the singular τὸν καδίσκον whether just one urn was used for the 
διαψήφισις or whether he was only referring to the urn in which the votes were cast. 
Further details provided by the Athēnaiōn Politeia state that the bronze urn was 
constructed in such a way as to prevent voters from depositing more than one pebble 
([Arist.] 68.3). Since Euxitheos fails to provide any witness testimony to verify that there 
were even suspicions of vote-fixing and resorts to claiming that his fellow demesmen 
were ‘stunned’ by the outcome in an effort to influence the jury (see ὥστε πάντας ἡμᾶς 
ἐκπλαγῆναι below), his account must not be readily accepted as true. 
οὐ πλείους ἢ τριάκοντ᾽ ἦσαν: ‘were not more than thirty in number’. According to 
Euxitheos’ estimation, thirty out of the seventy-three demesmen who swore the oath (see 
τῶν μὲν δημοτῶν οἱ ὀμόσαντες ἐγενόμεθα τρεῖς καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα at §9) were actually 
present to make a decision on the speaker’s claim to citizenship, which seems reasonable 
given the late hour. 
ὥστε πάντας ἡμᾶς ἐκπλαγῆναι: ‘so that all of us were stunned’. If the speaker is telling 
the truth about the demesmen’s reaction to the tally, it is strange that he does not report 
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that any of those present asked for a recount. Moreover, he does not summon any of them 
to acknowledge their mutual shock or even to express concerns about possible vote-
tampering.  
[14] ὅτι … πλείους τ᾽ ἐγένοντο τῶν ψηφισαμένων: ‘that there were more votes cast 
than those who had voted’. If Euxitheos is to be believed, this would be a significant 
example of vote-fixing at deme level. However, the witnesses that Euxitheos provides for 
this are the men he claims conspired with Euboulides, and it is therefore highly 
improbable that they supported his statement regarding the manipulated vote (see αὐτοῖς 
δὲ τοῖς ἠδικηκόσιν με below).58 
τῶν μὲν φίλων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων μηδένα μάρτυρα παρεῖναι: ‘none of my friends 
or other Athenians were present on my behalf as a witness’. A particular flaw in Euxitheos’ 
argument is that he brought no witnesses with him to speak on his behalf before the 
demesmen (see also τὸ μηδένα μοι παρεῖναι τό τε πρᾶγμα ἄφνω προσπεπτωκέναι at §12; 
cf. καὶ διὰ τὸ μηδένα παρακαλέσαι below). It is yet more surprising that no neutral party 
spoke out in his favour, since Euxitheos acknowledges that not all of those present at the 
ἀγορά were conspiring with Euboulides (cf. ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἦσαν ἅπαντες οἱ τούτῳ 
παρεσκευασμένοι at §10, and ὥστε πάντας ἡμᾶς ἐκπλαγῆναι at §13). It thus appears that 
amongst the thirty demesmen, those whom the speaker deems to have actually voted, 
none felt wholly satisfied with Euxitheos’ claim to citizenship so as to speak on his behalf. 
It may even have been the case that these men had sufficient doubts actually to vote 
against him themselves.  
                                                     
58 Litigants normally summoned witnesses who would be favourable to them or their case, usually friends 
or neutral parties to support their account of events. Occasionally, however, a litigant might have to rely on 
a hostile witness to confirm their testimony in court or swear an oath of disclaimer (cf. Aeschin. 1.47; Isae. 
9.18). 
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καὶ διὰ τὸ μηδένα παρακαλέσαι: ‘and because I did not summon anybody’. For the 
expectation that Euxitheos would have brought witnesses with him to the διαψήφισις 
proceedings, see τὸ μηδένα μοι παρεῖναι τό τε πρᾶγμα ἄφνω προσπεπτωκέναι at §12; cf. 
παραγένοιντό μοι πάντες οἱ δημόται at §14.  
αὐτοῖς δὲ τοῖς ἠδικηκόσιν με: ‘those very men who wronged me’ (cf. the speaker’s use 
of strong vocabulary with regard to his opponent, Πολλὰ καὶ ψευδῆ κατηγορηκότος at 
§1). The men that Euxitheos is referring to here do not include Euboulides or the deme 
officials, for a litigant could not compel his opponent to be a witness (a law to this effect 
is quoted at [Dem.] 46.10: τοῖν ἀντιδίκοιν ἐπάναγκες εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθαι ἀλλήλοις τὸ 
ἐρωτώμενον, μαρτυρεῖν δὲ μή). This rule refers to the preparations at the pre-trial 
examination, or ἀνάκρισις, at which a litigant questioned his opponent in front of 
witnesses and gave him an opportunity to review the documents he would have read aloud 
to the court (for a picture of proceedings at this preliminary stage, see Dem. 48.23; [Dem.] 
52.22; Isae. 6.12-5). During these proceedings, both parties were obliged to cooperate 
with one another but this did not carry over to the main trial before a jury. Rather, he 
refers to the demesmen present at his scrutiny; those he claims are the fellow conspirators 
with Euboulides.59 These men were unlikely to admit to any misconduct on their own or 
Euboulides’ part if they had truly acted dishonourably to have him disfranchised. But 
calling witnesses who were allegedly hostile towards him would certainly help to 
persuade the jury, since they were not likely to have Euxitheos’ best interests in mind by 
acknowledging any part of his story. These men are the first witnesses that Euxitheos 
calls upon in his appeal. 
                                                     
59 Harrison has produced a valuable and detailed overview of the witnesses’ role in the judicial process, in 
The Law of Athens Vol. II, pp. 136-47; in particular, see pp. 138-43 on the litigant’s power to compel 
reluctant witnesses. 
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οὐ δυνήσονται ἔξαρνοι γενέσθαι: ‘which they will not be able to deny’. Euxitheos has 
written a deposition (see ταῦτα γέγραφα αὐτοῖς below) which will be read out to the jury 
by a clerk. The witnesses he has summoned before the court could not alter the 
information it contained, they could only confirm the content or swear an oath that they 
had not been present (this process of denying knowledge of a matter on oath was known 
as ἐξωμοσία; cf. καὶ ταῦτ᾽ οὐκ ἂν ἐξομόσαιτο Εὐβουλίδης οὐδ᾽ οἱ μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ μὴ οὐκ 
εἰδέναι at §59).60 By Euxitheos’ own admission, these were the men who had wronged 
him and one can thus suppose that they would only acknowledge such details as the 
lateness of the vote, and possibly that he had sought an adjournment (see above; cf. 
ἀναβαλέσθαι εἰς τὴν ὑστεραίαν at §12).  
ταῦτα γέγραφα αὐτοῖς: ‘I have put these things in writing for them’. The speaker’s use 
of the future tense of δύναμαι (above) may suggest that Euxitheos is offering a previously 
unseen deposition, which was only possible in cases which had not been submitted to 
public arbitration (most δίκαι went to arbitration, while the γραφαί did not).61 It may have 
been the case that Euxitheos was able to introduce apparently new evidence during the 
appeal proceedings in his capacity as the defendant.62 Yet, it is difficult to believe that 
litigants in a γραφή were expected to speak before the court without the necessary 
knowledge to address all the charges laid against them by the other party. It seems most 
likely that, in cases where arbitration was not necessary, evidence was committed to 
                                                     
60 For a recent, in-depth discussion of this process, see C. Carey, ‘The Witness’s Exomosia in the Athenian 
Courts’, pp. 114-9. 
61 For further details on arbitration, see Appendix 1, pp. 269-75. For a brief overview of the introduction of 
new written evidence during the fourth century BC for γραφαί and other such suits which did not pass 
before an arbitrator, see R. J. Bonner, Evidence in Athenian Courts, pp. 48-52. 
62 A possible explanation similarly tendered by Gomme, in ‘Two Problems of Athenian Citizenship Law’, 
p. 128. 
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writing at the ἀνάκρισις.63 Ultimately, however, there is no definitive evidence to confirm 
whether the contents of this document had been divulged at a preliminary investigation.  
 
§§15-65: πίστεις 
At §§16-17, the speaker focuses on proving that Euboulides’ motives were dishonest. In 
§§17-65, Euxitheos offers proof that he satisfies the conditions for citizenship. Because 
the status of Euxitheos’ parents had been called into question, he must prove to the jury 
that both his father and his mother were indeed citizens. First, to prove his father 
Thoucritos’ citizen status (§§18-30), he calls various living relatives of his father as 
witnesses and details their familial connection to him (§§20-3, although he is not named 
until §41). The subsequent passages relate to his mother Nicarete (§§30-45, although she 
is not named until §68), her family relationships (§§37-9), and how Thoucritos was her 
second marriage (§§40-3). 
[15] τοῖς Ἁλιμουσίοις: ‘the Halimousians’. This is the speaker’s first mention of the 
name of his deme. Belonging to the Leontis tribe (schol. Ar. Birds, 496; cf. Harp. s.v. 
Ἁλιμουσιοι), Halimous lay on the western coast of Attica and probably derived its name 
from its location near the shore.64 It was situated between Aexone and Phaleron (Str. 
9.1.21), thirty-five stades from the city (a distance of just over six kilometres, §10).65 In 
Euxitheos’ day, Halimous can be classified as a small to medium sized deme (with 
between seventy-three and eighty registered demesmen in 346/5 BC, see τῶν μὲν 
δημοτῶν οἱ ὀμόσαντες ἐγενόμεθα τρεῖς καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα at §9). In addition to the cult of 
                                                     
63 G. M. Calhoun persuasively argues that in the first quarter of the fourth century BC litigants were 
henceforth obliged to submit their initial formal statements of accusation or denial in writing, in ‘Oral and 
Written Pleading in Athenian Courts’, pp. 177-93. Gomme rather tentatively asserts that an offer of new 
evidence was a rhetorical device used to refer back to details which were made clear during the ἀνάκρισις, 
in ‘Two Problems of Athenian Citizenship Law’, p. 128. 
64 H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, s.v. ἅλῐμος. 
65 The site was identified by a decree as being near the modern Alimos and Agios Kosmas, see J. J. E. 
Hondius, ‘A New Inscription of the Deme Halimous’, pp. 151-60. 
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Heracles (see ὡς ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν τούτων προεκρίθην ἐν τοῖς εὐγενεστάτοις κληροῦσθαι τῆς 
ἱερωσύνης τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ at §46), the deme had a temple dedicated to Demeter 
Thesmophoros (Paus. 1.31.1) and held a festival in the goddess’ honour. It was during 
such celebrations and on the deme’s promontory of Cape Colias that Plutarch places 
Solon devising his successful strategy against the Megarians; a victory which 
subsequently led to the Attic conquest of Salamis (Plut. Sol. 8.4). Yet Halimous is 
undoubtedly most famous for being the deme to which the historian, Thucydides, 
belonged (Plut. Cim. 4.2). 
ποιήσαντες τὰ ὑμῖν ἐψηφισμένα: ‘they would have fulfilled the terms of your decree’, 
Euxitheos makes yet another reference to the recent decree of Demophilos, and the 
widespread διαψήφισις it induced (see τὸ παρωξύνθαι τὴν πόλιν πρὸς τὰς ἀποψηφίσεις 
at §2, and also §§7, 49, 58). Dilts accepts Wolf’s correction ὑμῖν; whereas several 
manuscripts have ἡμῖν.66 This emendation certainly correlates with the speaker’s other 
direct addresses to the jury (see εἰ μήτε πείσαντες μήτε δεηθέντες ὑμῶν at §3); the jury 
represented the Athenian people and, specifically, the Ecclēsia which had approved the 
enactment of Demophilos’ decree (cf. οὐκ ἂν ἐδώκατε τὴν εἰς ὑμᾶς ἔφεσιν at §6). 
τί ποτ᾽ ἦν τὸ δυσχερὲς Εὐβουλίδῃ ἀναβαλέσθαι εἰς τὴν ὑστεραίαν: ‘what was the 
difficulty for Euboulides to adjourn to the next day’. The formula of ἀναβαλέσθαι and εἰς 
τὴν ὑστεραίαν is also used at §12 and Dem. 21.84. It is not clear in what capacity 
Euboulides would have had the authority to delay actions to be taken at the deme 
assembly, whether as βουλευτής or as dēmarch (see §§8 and 26). 
[16] παραγένοιντό μοι πάντες οἱ δημόται: ‘all the demesmen were present on my 
behalf’. Euxitheos wants the jury to believe that, had he been given time to prepare fully, 
                                                     
66 Dilts (ed.), Demosthenis Orationes IV, p. 257; cf. Rennie (ed.), Demosthenis Orationes III, p. 256. For 
H. Wolf’s edition, see Demosthenis et Aeschinis opera (1604). 
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he would have been able to present his case along with a supporting body of demesmen. 
As noted earlier, however, this does not correspond with his earlier comments that he had 
full knowledge of Euboulides’ hostility towards him before the διαψήφισις and that, in 
spite of this awareness, he failed to bring any witnesses with him to his deme’s ἀγορά to 
endorse his claim to citizenship (see τὸ μηδένα μοι παρεῖναι τό τε πρᾶγμα ἄφνω 
προσπεπτωκέναι at §12 and τῶν μὲν φίλων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων μηδένα μάρτυρα 
παρεῖναι at §14). Elsewhere in his speech, the speaker refers to his own active 
participation in his deme (see §§49 and 55).67 But, for Euxitheos’ present purposes, he 
needs to present the vote as corrupt due to Euboulides’ personal vendetta against him and 
to emphasise where he has evidence from deme members to support him. 
ἡ ψῆφος δικαίως δοθείη: ‘the vote was justly given’. For the ψῆφος, see τὴν δὲ ψῆφον 
εὐθὺς ἐδίδου at §13. By once again asserting that his case could have been left until the 
next day, Euxitheos wants the jury to believe that the vote on his citizenship would not 
have been corrupted. Since the status of all members did not have to be decided on that 
day (see ἀναβαλέσθαι εἰς τὴν ὑστεραίαν at §12), he implies that the deferment of his case 
would have ensured that a greater number of deme members voted on the matter (since 
the speaker claims that only thirty remained at the assembly by the time his case was 
heard, see οὐ πλείους ἢ τριάκοντα at §10), and presumably there would have been fewer 
opportunities for Euboulides and his co-conspirators to influence the vote (for the 
speaker’s claim that the vote on his case was corrupt, see οἱ δὲ λαμβάνοντες δύο καὶ τρεῖς 
ψήφους ἕκαστος παρὰ τούτου at §13). Euxitheos presents himself here as a victim of 
improper procedures. 
                                                     
67 For a comprehensive overview on deme membership and the workings of the deme itself, see Appendix 
4, pp. 289-92. 
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οἱ μετὰ τούτου συνεστηκότες: ‘his fellow conspirators’. For the use of the verb 
συνίστημι to denote a conspiracy, see οἱ δὲ τούτῳ συνεστῶτες at §13 (it is used again in 
Euxitheos’ speech at §§59, 60, 61 and 63). Before delving into his own family history, 
Euxitheos sets out prove that Euboulides’ motives were dishonest.  
ὅθεν δ᾽ οὗτοι συνέστησαν: ‘I will tell you the reason why these men conspired against 
me’. Having already accused Euboulides of conspiring with others to fix the vote against 
him (see §13), Euxitheos promises to reveal to the court what the cause of the conspiracy 
was after he has spoken about his lineage. However, Euxitheos does not return to the topic. 
While he makes a fleeting reference to a disagreement over rents due when he himself 
served as a debt-collector (see ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἔχω δεικνύναι τεκμήριον ὡς συνέστησαν at 
§63; for debt-collection as a duty of the dēmarch, see ὅτ᾽ ἀπώλετο αὐτοῖς τὸ ληξιαρχικὸν 
γραμματεῖον δημαρχοῦντος Ἀντιφίλου τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ Εὐβουλίδου at §26), which may 
have made him generally unpopular within the Halimous community, he fails to explain 
the conflict between himself and Euboulides satisfactorily. Since Euxitheos’ primary 
concern was to address the charges set out by Euboulides, a discussion about an apparent 
rivalry between the two men may have been considered irrelevant (for the irrelevancy 
rule, see εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα πάντα λέγειν at §7). But one would expect an account of why 
these men conspired against him to be most advantageous to his case for wrongful 
disfranchisement. On the other hand, his ambiguity with regard to the cause of Euboulides’ 
hostility may be deliberate to influence the jury on an issue that was difficult to prove 
before the court. For similar promises made by the speaker to present information which 
ultimately does not emerge, see §§35, 45, 58 and 65. 
ἂν βούλησθε ἀκούειν: ‘if you wish to hear’. Euxitheos appeals to the jury’s desire to hear 
specific material in an attempt to win their favour (cf. §§35, 58 and 65). In fact, this 
technique is used more often in Euxitheos’ individual speech than in any other forensic 
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speech (similar requests from a speaker for the jurors to make their wishes known occur 
in Dem. 23.18-9; [Dem.] 59.20; Hyp. 1.20; Aeschin. 2.24). It is likely that it featured 
more prominently in speeches written for others, since an experienced speechwriter 
would be able to predict what information was likely to appeal to a jury. This technique 
not only emphasised the speaker’s willingness to provide the details that they wanted but 
this conditional statement added an element of extemporaneity to a commissioned speech. 
Naturally, an Athenian jury would have expected a truthful presentation from each litigant, 
befitting both his status in society and his role as prosecutor or defendant during the 
proceedings; rather than reciting a speech which was aimed merely at winning a case, 
they would presumably value an argument aimed at revealing the truth of the matter. 
There is evidence that a jury did indeed interject during proceedings in order to make 
their feelings about a topic known to the speaker (Dem. 18.52, 45.6; [Dem.] 58.31; 
Aeschin. 2.4).68 In view of the fact that Euxitheos does not return to the topic (see ὅθεν 
δ᾽ οὗτοι συνέστησαν above), it may be supposed that either the jury did not verbalise its 
wish to hear of the cause of Euxitheos’ stated conspiracy or that the speaker simply 
continued on regardless. 
[17] νῦν δὲ: ‘And now’. In the previous passage, Euxitheos informed the jury that he 
was going to speak about his lineage (§16). Before he turns his attention to his descent 
though, he first anticipates the jury’s reaction after hearing his witnesses. By making a 
connection between justice, family ties and honesty, Euxitheos introduces his argument 
by referring to the social norms which an Athenian jury valued most.69 
                                                     
68 For a thorough discussion of courtroom interjections, see V. Bers, ‘Dikastic Thorubos’, pp. 1-15. If the 
jurors had shouted the speaker down during a trial, it could have prompted a series of revisions before the 
speech was published, indicating that he had been willing to omit some of what he had intended to say. 
69 A. Lanni presents a detailed analysis of the presence of informal social norms in Athenian forensic 
speeches, such as the repeated allusions to family and friends, moderation and loyal service to the state, in 
‘Social Norms in the Courts of Ancient Athens’, pp. 691-736. References like those made by Euxitheos 
support Lanni’s theory that the speechwriters must have believed that the jurors would be influenced by the 
mention of such customs. 
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δεῖξαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐμαυτὸν Ἀθηναῖον ὄντα καὶ τὰ πρὸς πατρὸς καὶ τὰ πρὸς μητρός: 
‘to show you that I myself am an Athenian on both my father’s side and my mother’s’. In 
346/5 BC, citizenship was a matter of being born of two Athenian parents ([Arist.] Ath. 
Pol. 42.1; this law was initially established by Pericles in 451/0 BC, see εἰ μήτε πείσαντες 
μήτε δεηθέντες ὑμῶν at §3, and was re-enacted in 403/2 BC, see πρὸ Εὐκλείδου at §30).70 
With no birth records or any physical evidence to offer as proof of his lineage, the speaker 
must assure those listening that he will present verifiable witnesses to confirm his 
statements about his parentage. In addition, Euxitheos will later attempt to convince the 
jury that his parents were lawfully married; he produces witnesses to his father’s betrothal 
to his mother (see ἐγγυᾶται at §41) and to the wedding-feast that his father held for 
members of the phratry (see οἷς τὴν γαμηλίαν εἰσήνεγκεν ὑπὲρ τῆς μητρὸς ὁ πατήρ at 
§43), and he confirms that his father had successfully passed the scrutiny to hold office 
which required that he be married in accordance with the laws (see ἀρχὰς ἔλαχεν καὶ 
ἦρξεν δοκιμασθείς at §25; see also ὅτι κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ὁ πατὴρ ἔγημεν at §69). 
However, Euxitheos does not stipulate whether being born in wedlock was actually 
another criterion of the citizenship law. The Athēnaiōn Politeia is also silent with regard 
to the issue of legitimacy and citizenship. As a result, the question of whether or not 
bastards born of two Athenian parents who were not lawfully betrothed or married could 
still claim citizenship cannot be answered with any satisfaction based on the surviving 
evidence. 71  It is only clear that such offspring needed the alleged father openly to 
acknowledge paternity before admission into his genos, phratry or deme (Dem. 39.1-4, 
24), but they still remained at risk of an attack on their status during official scrutinies as 
they lacked the guarantee of legitimacy which was bestowed on those born from marriage. 
                                                     
70 See Introduction, pp. 21-5. 
71 Scholarly opinion is divided on the topic of whether or not the illegitimate children of two Athenian 
parents were admitted to citizenship; see n. 12 in Appendix 3. For the use of the term νόθος to describe a 
child born of a non-Athenian mother, see ἐξῆν δὲ δήπου τούτοις, εἰ νόθος ἢ ξένος ἦν ἐγώ, κληρονόμοις 
εἶναι τῶν ἐμῶν πάντων at §53. 
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As such, Euxitheos focuses on the possession of two Athenian parents as the prerequisite 
for citizenship and their marriage as the proof of his legitimate qualification for it. 
τὰς δὲ λοιδορίας καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἀνελεῖν: ‘and to refute the insults and accusations’. 
Specifically, Euxitheos’ task is to disprove his opponent’s charges against his parents: 
first, his father’s accent (§18) and then his mother’s employment in menial labour (§30). 
ἐὰν μὲν ὑμῖν πολίτης ὢν κατεστασιάσθαι δοκῶ: ‘if I seem to you to be a citizen who 
has been victimised by my political rivals’. By propounding the notion that his accusers 
have victimised him due to a personal rivalry (as indicated by his use of the verb 
καταστασιάζω at §§2 and 7, cf. §63), Euxitheos seeks to persuade the jury that these men 
seized the opportunity provided by the recent decree of Demophilos (see τὴν διαψήφισιν 
at §7) to accuse him falsely of claiming citizen rights and to subject him to the same 
judgement as those who had been justly expelled from their demes as a result. 
πράττειν ὁποῖον ἄν τι ὑμῖν εὐσεβὲς εἶναι δοκῇ: ‘act in whatever manner seems to you 
to be pious’. The speaker asks the jurors to abide by the sacred oath that they had sworn 
before joining the panel. At the beginning of each year, the panel of potential jurors swore 
the dikastic oath to vote in accordance with the laws and decrees of the Athenian people 
(Dem. 20.118, 23.96, 24.149–51, 39.37, 40; cf. Poll. Onom. 8.122).72 Several speakers 
make a point of reminding the jury to vote according to their oath (Dem. 39.37: λοιπὸν 
ἡγοῦμαι τοῦτο ὑμῖν ἐπιδεῖξαι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς οὐ μόνον εὐορκήσετε, ἂν ἃ ἐγὼ 
λέγω ψηφίσησθε; Andoc. 1.9: ψηφίζεσθαι κατὰ τοὺς ὅρκους; Lys. 19.11: εὐορκότατον 
νομίζητε εἶναι, τοῦτο ψηφίσασθαι; cf. Lys. 10.32; Isae. 2.47; Aeschin. 3.6; Dem. 36.61, 
45.88). Such reminders were meant to focus the jurors’ attention on the speaker’s 
                                                     
72 A. C. Scafuro reconstructs this oath from several passages in the Attic orators, in The Forensic Stage, p. 
50. For a detailed discussion of the use of the dikastic oath in Athenian lawcourt speeches, see S. Johnstone, 
Disputes and Democracy, pp. 33-42.  
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supposedly more reasonable argument and to grant it an air of authority.73 Similarly, 
Euxitheos prompts those listening to act in keeping with their religious practices and, in 
doing so, he flatters them by referring to their crucial role as jurors in upholding Athenian 
values (cf. εὐορκοίητε at §69). 
 
§§18-30: Euxitheos’ father 
According to Euxitheos, Euboulides has claimed that Thoucritos’ foreign accent is 
evidence of his non-citizen status. The speaker counters this accusation by explaining that 
his father was captured during the Decelean War and was subsequently sold abroad as a 
slave (§18). Euxitheos adduces a wealth of testimony from his father’s family (§§20-2), 
phratry members and demesmen (§23) to prove that Thoucritos was Athenian. He also 
refers to the fact that his father was selected to hold office, and that no previous charges 
had ever been made against him (§25). 
[18] Διαβεβλήκασι γάρ μου τὸν πατέρα, ὡς ἐξένιζεν: ‘For they have slandered my 
father, because he spoke with a foreign accent’. Euxitheos first addresses the expressed 
doubts concerning his father’s citizen status due to his foreign accent (he turns to the 
accusation against his mother at §30). It must have been the case that his father was able 
to speak the Attic dialect but with a noticeably different intonation (see πραθεὶς εἰς 
Λευκάδα below). But it would be hard to believe that a non-Athenian accent alone would 
serve as evidence against those who were not citizens. Both the Old Oligarch and Plato 
attest to the fact that there was a vast mixture of accents and dialects in the city ([Xen.] 
                                                     
73 Alternatively, Sommerstein proposes that the frequency of such reminders was due to the fact that the 
oath was sworn by a panel of jurors at the beginning of the year, rather than before each separate trial (Isoc. 
15.21), and so these cues were employed when a significant period of time had elapsed since it was taken: 
see A. H. Sommerstein and A. J. Bayliss, Oath and State in Ancient Greece, pp. 69-70 n. 35. While his 
theory is certainly plausible, I am inclined to believe that the reminders were intended to do more than just 
refresh the jury’s memory with regard to the oath they had taken in the months prior to a trial; it was a 
rhetorical tool with which a speaker could lead the jurors to believe that a vote in his favour would be the 
means through which to uphold their sacred pledge. 
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Ath. Pol. 2.8; Pl. Lysis, 223a, Prt. 341c). Foreign visitors, metics, and citizens who had 
spent significant time abroad all added to this diversity of accents in Athens; as a result, 
Euboulides’ accusation that Thoucritos ‘spoke with a foreign accent’ could hardly stand 
as the basis of definitive proof of his non-citizen status. Of the two specific accusations 
made against his parents, the charge laid against Euxitheos’ father was certainly the 
weaker argument in the prosecution’s case.  
ἁλοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων: ‘captured by the enemy’. Though Euxitheos does not 
expressly say, it would seem as though his father was captured in battle. To be eligible 
for military service, Thoucritos must have been at least eighteen years old to participate 
in the Athenian war effort. 
ὑπὸ τὸν Δεκελεικὸν πόλεμον: ‘during the Decelean War’. The Decelean War is the name 
given to the latter part of the Peloponnesian War, from 413-404 BC (Strabo, 9.396; also 
known as the Ionian War, see Thuc. 8.11.3). After the disastrous Athenian attempt to 
conquer the island of Sicily, the Spartans renewed their efforts in 413 BC by occupying 
and fortifying Decelea, a small Attic town that was one hundred and twenty stades from 
Athens (approximately twenty-one kilometres, Thuc. 7.19). Thucydides claims that the 
Spartans moved to Decelea on the advice of the exiled Athenian general, Alcibiades 
(Thuc. 6.91-3, 7.18); this action changed how Sparta conducted its war efforts and, as 
such, it significantly contributed to Athens’ eventual defeat in the last decade of the 
Peloponnesian War. Possession of Decelea meant that the Spartans had a strategically 
important garrison near to the city and control over one of the main roads in Attica. 
Moreover, the Attic countryside was under constant threat of raids and the Athenians had 
lost access to vital supplies, such as the silver mines at Laureion, thereby crippling their 
economy. If Euxitheos’ father served at the start of the Decelean War, he must have been 
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born by 431 BC since he must have turned eighteen years old in order to join the Athenian 
ranks (for details pertaining to his father, see Θούκριτον τὸν πατέρα τὸν ἐμόν at §41).74 
πραθεὶς εἰς Λευκάδα: ‘was sold into slavery in Leucas’. Leucas, an island in the Ionian 
Sea, lies opposite the coast of Acarnania on the north-western coast of Greece. Having 
been colonised by Corinthian settlers circa 625 BC, the island remained loyal to its 
mother-city during the Classical period and thus was an ally of Sparta during the 
Peloponnesian War. Since there was no common set of rules which governed the 
treatment of those captured in battle and the maintenance of prisoners of war would have 
been a burden to either side, enslavement was often practised as an alternative to their 
execution if no ransom was offered for their return. Thoucritos was enslaved after his 
capture and Euxitheos states that his father was sold in Leucas. Presumably, Thoucritos’ 
accent was affected by the western dialect spoken in Leucas.75  
Κλεάνδρῳ περιτυχὼν τῷ ὑποκριτῇ: ‘having fallen in with Cleandros the actor’. 
Euxitheos claims that his father’s release was brought about by an encounter with an actor 
named Cleandros. While nothing certain is known regarding this Cleandros, there are a 
couple of inscriptions which bear the same name and correspond to the correct period in 
time: one inscription records a competition between the tragic actors Cleandros and 
Aristomedes in Rhodes and cannot be dated any later than the first quarter of the fourth 
century BC (IGUR I 223, 5), while another reveals that a certain Cleandros won the 
Athenian Dionysia in 387 BC (IG II² 2318, 200). Elsewhere, a tentative familial 
connection may be made between the actor named by Euxitheos and the Cleandros 
                                                     
74 If Thoucritos only joined the Athenian forces in the final years of the war, then he had to have been born 
by 422 BC at the latest. However, marriage patterns in Classical Athens demonstrate that it was normal for 
a man to marry at an older age and a woman at an earlier age, see C. A. Cox, Household Interests, pp. 68-
129. If Thoucritos was born circa 422 BC, he would have been much closer in age to Nicarete, who was 
born no later than 420 BC (see παιδίων αὐτῇ δυοῖν ἤδη γεγενημένων at §42), and this later date for his birth 
thus seems unlikely. 
75 The dialect of Leucas was the same as its mother-city, see C. D. Buck, The Greek Dialects, p. 11. 
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mentioned in the anonymous Life of Aeschylus, who was hired by Aeschylos a generation 
before (Vit. Aesch. 15; he may have been his grandfather). It may be supposed that this 
Cleandros was abroad in Leucas as part of a touring theatrical troupe. Renowned actors 
were not only invited to travel abroad and perform for foreign rulers but their celebrity 
status could attract requests for them to use their skills in public speaking as political 
ambassadors. Thettalos, who acted on the Athenian stage at the start of the latter half of 
the fourth century, was a favourite of Alexander the Great and he accompanied the king 
on his expedition to the East (Plut. Alex. 29.1-3, Mor. 334d-c). Alexander even sent 
Thettalos to Caria as his emissary to arrange a marriage on his behalf (Plut. Alex. 10.1-3). 
Successful actors like Thettalos were granted considerable privileges and could amass a 
fortune under the protection of such a patron. If we accept Euxitheos’ story to be true, a 
couple of issues remain unresolved. Firstly, the speaker does not explain how Cleandros 
came into contact with his enslaved father, or whether they had known each other 
previously. Furthermore, one can only guess at how the release of his father was 
accomplished: either Cleandros bought Thoucritos and set him free, perhaps with an 
agreement of receiving money from his family upon his return to Athens, or he contacted 
Thoucritos’ relations to arrange for them to buy his freedom directly. Euxitheos does 
present witnesses to confirm his story in the subsequent passage (see μάρτυρας ὑμῖν 
παρέξομαι at §19) though, unfortunately, we are not told what information they provided 
to the court. On the other hand, even if Euxitheos’ account is false, he must have expected 
the jury to believe a rescue story with a travelling actor. There may be some support in 
Solon’s claims to have repatriated many Athenians in the sixth century who had been sold 
abroad as slaves and no longer knew Attic Greek (fr. 36 West).76 While these men were 
sold into slavery due to poverty, the effect on their language skills does bestow 
                                                     
76 M. L. West, Greek Lyric Poetry, p. 82. See also S. Colvin, Dialect in Aristophanes, p. 52. 
 139 
plausibility on Euxitheos’ explanation that his father’s accent had changed as a result of 
his enslavement while abroad on military duty. 
πολλοστῷ χρόνῳ: ‘after a very long time’. The speaker does not specify at what stage 
during the Decelean War his father was captured or precisely how long he served as a 
slave; Thoucritos was presumably released before 395 BC in order to have married 
Nicarete by that date (see Θούκριτον τὸν πατέρα τὸν ἐμόν at §41) and to have had two 
children by her by 387 BC (see ἀποδημοῦντος μετὰ Θρασυβούλου at §42). I agree with 
Lacey’s suggestion that a period of enslavement of no less than a decade, but not much 
more than fifteen years, was necessary in order to develop a noticeably foreign accent.77 
Indeed, his estimate of a decade seems most credible if one assumes that Thoucritos 
continued to be held at the end of the war in 404 BC down until 395 BC. 
[19] ἐξ αὐτῶν τούτων: ‘these very facts’. Euxitheos counters Euboulides’ accusation 
against Thoucritos by using his father’s foreign accent as a support in his own appeal. 
Despite such an obvious change in the way he spoke, the speaker maintains that since his 
return to Athens Thoucritos was nevertheless accepted by his family (see ἔπειθ᾽ ὅτι 
ἀφικόμενος τῆς οὐσίας παρὰ τῶν θείων τὸ μέρος μετέλαβεν below), deme (see μάρτυρας 
ὑμῖν παρέξομαι below), and phratry (see ἐν τοῖς φράτερσιν below). 
μάρτυρας ὑμῖν παρέξομαι: ‘I will present witnesses to you’. That Euxitheos is able to 
produce witnesses to support his story of his father’s capture abroad and subsequent safe 
return to Athens does grant him credibility (see Κλεάνδρῳ περιτυχὼν τῷ ὑποκριτῇ at §18). 
These witnesses were presumably fellow demesmen. 
ἔπειθ᾽ ὅτι ἀφικόμενος τῆς οὐσίας παρὰ τῶν θείων τὸ μέρος μετέλαβεν: ‘then that 
having returned he received a share of the property from his uncles’. Thoucritos was able 
                                                     
77 W. K. Lacey, ‘The Family of Euxitheus (Demosthenes LVII)’, p. 59.  
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to recover his share of the family property from his uncles, Charisios and Lysanias, upon 
his return to Athens (for these uncles, see Χαρίσιος ἀδελφὸς ἦν τοῦ πάππου τοῦ ἐμοῦ 
Θουκριτίδου καὶ Λυσαρέτης τῆς ἐμῆς τήθης at §20, and ὁ τούτου πατὴρ Λυσανίας 
ἀδελφὸς ἦν τοῦ Θουκριτίδου καὶ τῆς Λυσαρέτης at §21). Euxitheos does not specify what 
this property was comprised of or its size. Lacey persuasively concludes that the property 
was merely farm-land which, given the challenging nature of Greek agriculture, would 
have been difficult for Thoucritos to make an ample living from (see πένης ὢν at §25) 
and would explain Nicarete’s destitution in Thoucritos’ absence (see ἐν ἀπορίαις at 
§42).78 Euxitheos also refrains from specifying from whom it was passed. If the property 
had belonged solely to Thoucritides I, Thoucritos’ father, then Thoucritos would not have 
merely received a share of the property but all of it; Athenian law dictated that property 
should pass from father to son and Thoucritos appears to have been an only child 
(Euxitheos does not refer to any living or deceased siblings of his father). Accordingly, 
this property must have belonged to Thoucritos’ unnamed grandfather. In Athens, the law 
made provision for a man with more than one son to leave his estate to all of them equally, 
with no rule of primogeniture to give the eldest son an advantage over his younger 
brothers. Since the equal division of inheritance was expected, willing sons either co-
owned the property and shared its income, or they mutually divided it or drew lots.79 In 
order for Thoucritos’ uncles to have possession of the family property, Thoucritides I 
must have died before his own father passed away, who then in turn died while Thoucritos 
                                                     
78 Lacey, ‘The Family of Euxitheus (Demosthenes LVII)’, p. 59. However, Lacey’s dates of Nicarete’s 
hardships during 405-3 BC are, in my judgement, a little early. He places her financial difficulties during 
the time when Thoucritos was absent during the Decelean War (see ὑπὸ τὸν Δεκελεικὸν πόλεμον at §18) 
and states that this was probably the same campaign that Euxitheos mentions later in the text, specifically 
when Nicarete had two young children to support and her husband was abroad with Thrasyboulos (παιδίων 
αὐτῇ δυοῖν ἤδη γεγενημένων and ἀποδημοῦντος μετὰ Θρασυβούλου at §42). But Lacey’s allusion to the 
city’s misfortune would also be applicable to the first decades of the fourth century and the economic 
hardships experienced at that time. See also n. 191. 
79 Comments made in the lawcourt speeches indicate that it was more common for sons to remain the joint 
owners of the familial estate: Lys. 32; Dem. 44.10, 18. However, there are some references to the division 
of the inheritance: Dem. 36.11, 48.12. See Harrison, The Law of Athens Vol. I, pp. 239-43, and MacDowell, 
The Law in Classical Athens, p. 92. 
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was taken captive. Thoucritides I’s share would have passed to his son but, in his absence, 
Charisios and Lysanias retained full possession unless he should return to claim his stake. 
By referring to this property, Euxitheos’ purpose is to demonstrate the family’s 
acceptance of Thoucritos upon his return to Athens (a vital argument that he continues at 
§28, see ἔθαψε τούτους εἰς τὰ πατρῷα μνήματα). If Charisios and Lysanias had doubted 
Thoucritos’ identity, or had even sought to keep the property themselves, they could have 
publicly challenged his claim. But their undisputed transferral of the property must prove, 
as Euxitheos would have the jury believe, that they recognised Thoucritos as their kin. 
ἐν τοῖς φράτερσιν: ‘amongst the phratry members’. This, Euxitheos’ first reference to 
the social group to which both his father and he belonged, is indeed significant since 
Athenian descent was as fundamental to being a member of an Attic phratry as it was to 
being a citizen.80 Euxitheos later calls some members of his phratry as witnesses at §23 
(see τοὺς φράτερας) and makes reference to his admission into this group at §54 (see με 
εὐθέως ἦγον εἰς τοὺς φράτερας). Isaeus also uses this technique in his defence of 
Euphiletos (12.3, 8). Since the phratry and the deme were two separate institutions, it is 
reasonable that both litigants emphasise evidence from their fellow phratry members as 
both had been ejected by their demes. 
[20] μὲν τοίνυν: ‘Therefore’. Following Dilts, I include τοίνυν here.81 The addition of 
the adverb is consistent with the speaker’s practice after depositions and laws in order to 
continue with the speech: cf. §§22, 23, 24, 28, 29, 32, 39 and 40. Demosthenes only omits 
conjunctions from the speech when another document is called for immediately: §§23, 
31-2 and 39-40. 
                                                     
80 For details regarding the phratry (roughly ‘brotherhood’) and how it worked, see Appendix 5, pp. 293-7. 
81 Dilts (ed.), Demosthenis Orationes IV, p. 258. In Rennie’s edition of the text, he follows the several 
manuscripts which omit τοίνυν from the passage, see Demosthenis Orationes III, p. 257. 
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τῆς ἁλώσεως καὶ τῆς σωτηρίας: ‘the capture and the safe return’. For Thoucritos’ 
capture while serving abroad during the Decelean War and subsequent enslavement, see 
§18. His eventual return to Athens and his family is discussed by the speaker at §19.  
μάρτυρας καλῶ τοὺς ζῶντας ἡμῖν τῶν συγγενῶν τῶν πρὸς πατρός: ‘I will call as 
witnesses my surviving relatives on my father’s side’. Euxitheos presents the jury with a 
brief overview of his father’s living relatives (§§20-2). Of these relatives, Euxitheos calls 
more attention to the male line than the female. He refers to these female relatives as a 
group (see τὰς τῶν πρὸς γυναικῶν τῷ πατρὶ συγγενῶν μαρτυρίας at §22). Tracing his 
patriline, however, Euxitheos individually names the male relatives whom he will call as 
witnesses and outlines their relationship to his father. Ultimately, their male gender 
granted them access to the social, political and economic spheres in the polis while the 
female gender did not. Membership of the genos, phratry and the deme were imparted by 
the male line. As a result, the testimony from Thoucritos’ male relatives was more 
relevant with regard to confirming his civic status. 
Θουκριτίδην καὶ Χαρισιάδην: ‘Thoucritides and Charisiades’. 82  As the sons of 
Thoucritos’ uncle, Charisios, Thoucritides II and Charisiades were first cousins to the 
speaker’s father and first cousins once removed to the speaker himself.83 The fact that 
Euxitheos’ grandfather and a first cousin of his father share the same name could suggest 
that name derives from the paternal line through his great grandfather, who may even 
have borne the name himself (see τοῦ πάππου τοὔνομ᾽ ἔχων at §37). 
                                                     
82 All the names listed in this and subsequent passages are arranged in Table 2, pp. 268-9. See also Davies’ 
overview of the family tree, in Athenian Propertied Families, pp. 93-5. 
83 Whitehead notes that a certain Charisandros, honoured for religious duties between 330 and 325 BC, 
could conceivably be the son of this Charisiades (SEG 2.7, 3, 11-3) and that a likely descendant was 
Charisandros of Halimous, a ὁπλομάχος (drill sergeant) of the ephēbes in the 240s BC (IG II² 766, 10, 41-
2), in The Demes of Attica, p. 435. 
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Χαρίσιος ἀδελφὸς ἦν τοῦ πάππου τοῦ ἐμοῦ Θουκριτίδου καὶ Λυσαρέτης τῆς ἐμῆς 
τήθης: ‘Charisios, was a brother of my grandfather Thoucritides and of my grandmother 
Lysarete’. Charisios was the father of Thoucritides II and Charisiades. He may have been 
a non-eponymous archōn in the first half of the fourth century. 84  Davies identifies 
Charisios as a full brother to Euxitheos’ paternal grandfather, Thoucritides I (see also ὁ 
τούτου πατὴρ Λυσανίας ἀδελφὸς ἦν τοῦ Θουκριτίδου καὶ τῆς Λυσαρέτης at §21).85 
However, as Bicknell has indicated, this would cast little doubt on Thoucritides I’s 
Athenian descent as the status of Charisios and his sons went unchallenged.86 It would be 
more reasonable to assume that Thoucritides I had a different mother than his brother 
Charisios, and his sister Lysarete (Euxitheos’ paternal grandmother, see below). Charisios 
would thus be a full-brother to Lysarete but a half-brother to Thoucritides I. The fact that 
the speaker describes Charisios and Thoucritides II as brothers, without noting the half-
sibling relationship, is not unusual since he does not make the distinction between himself 
and his half-sister from his own mother’s first marriage (see τοὺς τοῦ Πρωτομάχου υἱεῖς 
at §43). Charisios therefore stands as uncle to Thoucritos and great uncle to the speaker. 
(ἀδελφὴν γὰρ ὁ πάππος οὑμὸς ἔγημεν οὐχ ὁμομητρίαν), θεῖος δὲ τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ ἐμοῦ: 
‘(for my grandfather married his sister who was born from a different mother), and 
Charisios is my father’s uncle’. Dilts has accepted Rennie’s rearrangement of this 
sentence, whereas the manuscripts placed the first clause after θεῖος δὲ τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ 
ἐμοῦ at the end of the section.87 The adjustment to the text certainly gives a more natural 
word order to the sentence. Here, Euxitheos specifies that his grandfather Thoucritides I 
                                                     
84 No. 9, lines 13-4, in B. Meritt, ‘Greek Inscriptions’ (1936), pp. 390-3. 
85 Davies, Athenian Propertied Families, p. 94. 
86 P. J. Bicknell, ‘Thoukritides’ mother’, p. 114. 
87 Dilts (ed.), Demosthenis Orationes IV, p. 258; cf. Rennie (ed.), Demosthenis Orationes III, p. 257. Rennie 
briefly discusses the displacement of this clause in an earlier article, see ‘Demosthenes LVII. 20’, p. 192. 
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and his grandmother Lysarete were half-siblings, born from different mothers.88 It is 
likely that Thoucritides I was older than Lysarete, and the offspring of his father’s first 
marriage. Though there are a number of sources which relate to a marriage between half-
siblings, this is one of two cases in which it explicitly emphasises that the man and wife 
involved are homopatric siblings (i.e. those with the same father but not the same mother; 
for the other case, see Plut. Them. 32, in which Themistocles’ daughter marries her half-
brother). Such marriages were permitted under Athenian law, only if the two siblings 
shared the same father and not the same mother; however, the evidence for this law only 
survives in later sources: Nep. Cim. 1.2; Philo, de Spec. Leg. III, 4.22. It was prohibited 
for homometric siblings (i.e. those with the same mother but not the same father) to marry 
to avoid property accumulation, since it would be possible to inherit two estates by having 
two different fathers, but the evidence for this law is also late in date (schol. Ar. Clouds, 
1371). It is worthy of note that, although Thoucritides I and Lysarete were homopatric 
siblings, not all of Thoucritos’ relatives were related to his father (Lysarete’s mother 
appears to have been married twice, see πρῶτον μέν γε τέτταρες ἀνεψιοί at §67) but they 
were each related to Lysarete (§§20-2). 
ἔπειτα Νικιάδην: ‘Then call Niciades’. As the son of Thoucritos’ uncle, Lysanias, 
Niciades was a first cousin to the speaker’s father and a first cousin once removed to 
Euxitheos himself. 
[21] ὁ τούτου πατὴρ Λυσανίας ἀδελφὸς ἦν τοῦ Θουκριτίδου καὶ τῆς Λυσαρέτης: 
‘for the father of this man, Lysanias, was a brother of Thoucritides and of Lysarete’. 
Davies categorises Lysanias as a full brother to Thoucritides I, as he does Charisios.89 Yet 
                                                     
88 It seems to have been acceptable for speakers to refer to Athenian women by name in court after their 
deaths; women who such men probably would not have been willing to name while they were alive: Dem. 
44.9-10, 45.74; see also ἐκ δὲ τῆς ὕστερον, Χαιρεστράτης at §37. For a further details, see Schaps, ‘The 
Woman Least Mentioned’, p. 328. 
89 Davies, Athenian Propertied Families, p. 94. 
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it seems more probable that Lysanias and Charisios had a different mother than their 
brother Thoucritides I. Like Charisios and his sons, the citizen status of Lysanias and both 
his son Niciades and his grandson Nicostratos appears to have been uncontested (for 
Charisios, see Χαρίσιος ἀδελφὸς ἦν τοῦ πάππου τοῦ ἐμοῦ Θουκριτίδου καὶ Λυσαρέτης 
τῆς ἐμῆς τήθης at §20). Bicknell also draws attention to the similarity of the name of 
Lysanias and Lysarete as positive indication of their full sibling relationship.90 Lysanias 
was Thoucritos’ uncle and great uncle to the speaker. 
ἔπειτα Νικόστρατον: ‘Then call Nicostratos’. Davies lists Nicostratos as the grandson 
of a third brother of Thoucritides, and son of another Niciades. 91  But there is no 
specification in the text that there is more than one Niciades, therefore one is inclined to 
take it as Bicknell does that he is grandson of Lysanias.92 Thus, with Nicostratos as the 
son of Niciades, he is a first cousin once removed to Thoucritos and second cousin to 
Euxitheos. This Nicostratos may be the same man who served as ταμίας (treasurer) of 
Athena in 340/39 BC (IG II² 1455, 5) and who was listed on the bouleutic catalogue of 
335/4 BC (IG II² 1700, 82).93 By naming his father’s relatives and presenting details of 
their lineage in this manner, Euxitheos attempts to make his witnesses seem more 
important than their number alone could imply in an attempt to speak to his legitimacy.  
ἀνεψιὸς δὲ τῷ πατρί: ‘and my father’s first cousin’. Since Euxitheos subsequently refers 
to four first cousins at §67 (see πρῶτον μέν γε τέτταρες ἀνεψιοί), it has been widely 
accepted that the name of the fourth cousin has been omitted by the manuscripts. 
                                                     
90 Bicknell, ‘Thoukritides’ mother’, p. 114. 
91 Davies, Athenian Propertied Families, p. 95.  
92 Bicknell, ‘Thoukritides’ mother’, p. 115. 
93  Davies notes that Nicostratos’ service as treasurer meant that he was or at least claimed to be a 
πεντακοσιομέδιμνος, although this may not have meant very much by 340 BC (cf. [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 47.1, 
in which the author claims that the man elected to this office was poor), see Athenian Propertied Families, 
p. 93. As a result, he persuasively argues that he belonged to a family of small means and that its members 
were unable to escape their inherited positions in society. Comments made by Euxitheos about his family 
members living in poverty certainly support Davies’ conclusions (§§25, 34-6, 41 and 45).  
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Thompson, however, has argued that Thoucritos’ maternal grandmother (Lysarete’s 
mother, not Thoucritides I’s) was married twice and that she had one or more children 
with her first husband; under Attic kinship reckoning, the offspring of one such child 
would thus be Euxitheos’ maternal cousin. 94  While Thompson makes an interesting 
suggestion, it has to be noted that there is no further evidence to confirm or deny his 
theory regarding the fourth cousin. 
σὺ δ᾽ ἐπίλαβε τὸ ὕδωρ: ‘And you, stop the water-clock’. Any case which came before 
the Athenian courts had to be settled on that date.95 Whereas only one public case could 
be tried by a jury on a particular day, several private cases could be heard in a single day 
([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 67.1). But prompt decisions were facilitated by timing speeches with 
the use of a water-clock or a κλεψύδρα (literally, a ‘water thief’). 96  Aristophanes’ 
references to the κλεψύδρα confirm its use in the Athenian lawcourts from as early as the 
last quarter of the fifth century (Ar. Ach. 693, Wasps, 93, 856), but by the mid-fourth 
century the word ὕδωρ was used in court as a synonym for the time allotted to each litigant 
by this vessel (see also ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐμοῦ ὕδατος at §61; cf. ἐν τῷ ἐμῷ ὕδατι at Dem. 18.139, 
19.57, and [Dem.] 50.2). The κλεψύδρα itself was a small water-filled pot with a hole in 
the base through which the water was allowed to trickle out (schol. Ar. Ach. 693a; Suda 
s.v. κλεψύδρα Adler Κ1743), and the speaker had to finish his speech when all the water 
had been drained away. During private cases, however, the hole in the κλεψύδρα was 
closed with a bung while the clerk read out laws, documents and witness depositions; a 
member of the jury was chosen by lot to perform this duty of stopping and then re-starting 
the κλεψύδρα, he is referred to as ‘the man at the water’ (ἐπὶ τὸ ὕδωρ, [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 
                                                     
94 W. E. Thompson, ‘The Prosopography of Demosthenes, LVII’, pp. 89-91. 
95 I. Worthington has disputed this and argued that, in some cases, political trials could last for two or three 
days, in ‘The Duration of an Athenian Political Trial’, p. 205. However, scholarly consensus is that even 
the most serious public trials were completed in a day. 
96 A. L. Boegehold, The Lawcourts at Athens, pp. xxvi and 27.  
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66.2).97 During the case, each speaker was allowed a certain number of χόες, or measures 
of water contained in a pitcher, which was determined by the type of suit and the value 
of the claim being sought.98 Both Young and Rhodes estimate that one χοῦς emptied in 
three minutes; while Boegehold’s more recent analysis maintains that one χοῦς is equal 
to more than four minutes, he recognises that six minutes is the mean time for a κλεψύδρα 
holding two χόες to discharge its contents.99 Despite the variance in time measurements, 
it is important to note that the water-clock did ensure that the same amount of time was 
allotted to both the prosecutor and the defendant, each having an equal opportunity to 
make their case. There was no obligation, however, for either party to use up all of his 
allowance and he could ask for his remaining water to be poured out (see ἐξέρα τὸ ὕδωρ 
at Dem. 36.62, 38.28).  
Apart from Euxitheos’ call for the water to be stopped here, this exact formula is utilised 
in several definitively private speeches (σὺ δ᾽ ἐπίλαβε τὸ ὕδωρ, Dem. 45.8, 54.36; Isae. 
2.34, 3.12, 76) and, as such, it seems to be more a feature of private legal actions. This 
appears to correspond with a statement contained within the Athēnaiōn Politeia, in which 
the author describes how public cases are timed by the διαμεμετρημένη ἡμέρα (measured 
day); specifically, he relates that the flow was not stopped in actions conducted in a 
διαμεμετρημένη ἡμέρα but rather that each party received an equal amount of water 
([Arist.] 67.3-5; cf. Xen. Hell. 1.7.23, Aeschin. 2.126, Harp. s.v. διαμεμετρημένη ἡμέρα). 
                                                     
97 The practice of stopping the flow of water from the κλεψύδρα for the presentation of documents meant 
that a litigant could effectively extend the amount of time allotted to him to deliver his case. By utilising 
this tactic, however, he risked annoying the jury with tedious information which drew their attention away 
from his first-hand account of events. For the stoppage of water during Euxitheos’ speech, see Appendix 7, 
pp. 309-11. 
98  The Athēnaiōn Politeia records the time allowances for δίκαι: for those worth over five thousand 
drachmas, both the plaintiff and defendant were allowed ten χόες for the first speech and three for the 
second; for δίκαι between the value of one thousand and five thousand drachmas, both parties were allowed 
seven χόες for the first speech and then two for the second; for those suits worth less than one thousand 
drachmas, five χόες and then two χόες were given for the respective speeches; the parties in a διαδικασία 
(suit to decide between claimants) were only granted one speech each and that was measured in six χόες 
([Arist.] 67.2). 
99 S. Young, ‘An Athenian Clepsydra’, p. 281; Rhodes, A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion 
Politeia, p. 720; Boegehold, The Lawcourts at Athens, p. 77.  
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However, it is not clear from this increasingly fragmentary section of the Athēnaiōn 
Politeia that all public suits were measured in this particular way.100 
ΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΣ: ‘[WITNESSES]’. This is the first instance of Euxitheos presenting 
witnesses to the court (he has previously only had depositions read to the jury, at §§15 
and 19). At a trial, the witnesses had to appear before the court in person and either go up 
to or onto the speaker’s raised platform (βῆμα), where he himself would recite his own 
testimony or assent to its contents as a clerk read it aloud (for references to the use of this 
platform in the lawcourts, see Dem. 48.31; Aeschin. 3.207).101 In the fourth century BC, 
this testimony was most commonly composed with the litigant before the trial and its 
details may have first been made public at a preliminary hearing ([Dem.] 46.11). In court, 
a witness neither provides any additional information to the jury ([Dem.] 46.6) nor does 
he submit to questions during his testimony.102 However, he was compelled to accept 
responsibility for the truth of his pre-written statement as his evidence could be 
challenged by the opposing litigant before the jury delivered its verdict ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 
68.4), leaving him at risk of a subsequent δίκη ψευδομαρτυριῶν (suit for false testimony, 
see κατ᾽ ἐξωλείας at §22). 
The aim of every litigant in the Athenian courtroom was to present himself surrounded 
by a close network of respectable and law-abiding kinsmen, neighbours and fellow 
members of the various social groups, and so he selected witnesses who were typically 
                                                     
100 For further discussion on Euxitheos’ reference to the water-clock and its importance to the debate 
regarding whether or not Against Euboulides is a public or private case, see Appendix 7, pp. 302-13. 
101 For a general synopsis of the functions of a witness both before and after the trial, see G. Thür, ‘The 
Role of the Witness in Athenian Law’, pp. 146-69.  
102 S. C. Humphreys convincingly argues that, if the possibility of cross-questioning witnesses was ever 
possible, it was certainly abolished in 378/7 BC when the introduction of written testimonies was made 
compulsory, see ‘Social Relations on Stage’, p. 356 n. 6. Amongst the evidence which she cites, she 
persuasively counters the use of two legal speeches as proof that witness questioning was in fact available 
at the start of the fourth century BC: Andoc. 1.14 records a litigant delivering the testimony for his witness 
and the latter agreeing with each statement that is made, and Isae. 3.79 reveals that the speaker urges the 
jury to question his opponent, in what was most likely a call for heckling rather than serious cross-
examination. 
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relations or personal supporters of his in order to depict himself as an upstanding member 
of the community.103 Family members were particularly important witnesses in cases 
regarding legitimacy or inheritance since they were expected to have first-hand 
information about their kinsmen and could thus validate any relationship claims. Both the 
unnamed speaker of Isaeus’ On Behalf of Euphiletos and Euxitheos call on multiple 
kinsmen in order to defend their individual rights to citizenship. The witnesses that 
Euxitheos specifically calls upon at this particular stage in his speech are family members 
who could verify his father’s citizen status, but unfortunately it cannot be known what 
specific information their testimonies contained.104 
[22] διομνυμένων: ‘swearing under oath’. Any citizen male who was summoned to 
appear as a witness in court had three options: he could give evidence, swear an oath of 
disclaimer that he knew nothing of the matter (ἐξωμοσία: see Dem. 19.176; Poll. Onom. 
8.37, 55; Suda, s.v. ἐξωμόσαθαι Adler Ε1797), or he could refuse to comply and face a 
subsequent fine (κλητεύειν: [Dem.] 59.28; Aeschin. 1.46). 105  Surviving evidence 
indicates that different conditions applied to Athenian women who were required to 
testify in a legal dispute; it appears that a woman could affirm her knowledge outside of 
the court through swearing an oath (for example, two speakers challenge their opponents 
to agree to an oath but none are ultimately taken, see Dem. 29.33, 55.27; cf. Dem. 39.3, 
40.41; Lys. 32.11-18), otherwise she could consent for her κύριος to give testimony on 
her behalf in court (see οἱ τὰς ἀνεψιὰς λαβόντες αὐτῷ at §67). Euxitheos, however, claims 
                                                     
103 Humphreys has produced a comprehensive study of witness testimonies from the corpus of Athenian 
court speeches and suitably observes that the main concern of a litigant was to demonstrate that he had the 
solid support of a large body of kin, in ‘Social Relations on Stage’, pp. 313-69. 
104 Thür’s analysis of formulas in both written and oral testimonies is particularly interesting, though there 
is no specific indication in Euxitheos’ text to suggest that his relatives were bound by a traditional formula 
in their given witness statements, see ‘The Role of the Witness in Athenian Law’, pp. 152-60. 
105 For a brief overview, see Harrison, The Law of Athens Vol. II, pp. 136-47, and MacDowell, The Law in 
Classical Athens, pp. 243-4. For the more detailed discussion of witness ἐξωμοσία, see Carey, ‘The 
Witness’s Exomosia in the Athenian Courts’, pp. 114-9. For the process of κλητεύειν, see S. C. Todd, ‘The 
Purpose of Evidence in Athenian Courts’, pp. 24-5. 
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that all of his witnesses swore an oath before giving their testimonies about his parents’ 
status (cf. §§39, 44 and 56). It is not specified in his speech at what stage during 
proceedings this oath was administered, nor indeed whether it was taken on a voluntary 
basis or if Demophilos’ decree required alleged relatives to testify under oath to an 
appellant’s citizenship.106 
<Ἀθηναῖον> εἶναι: ‘was an Athenian’. Dilts rightly maintains Dobree’s addition of 
Ἀθηναῖον to the text.107 Since Euxitheos had to defend his father’s citizen status, the 
inclusion makes contextual sense. 
παραστησάμενος τούς συνεισομένους αὑτῷ τὰ ψευδῆ μαρτυροῦντι: ‘standing beside 
those who will know him to be giving false testimony’. Euxitheos’ argument is 
conspicuously weak here. Since these men will supposedly testify that Thoucritos was an 
Athenian citizen and one of their kinsmen, either all of them are telling the truth or they 
are lying. In the latter case, they must have consented to tell the same lie to the court and 
thus would have no concern regarding contradictory testimony from one of their group. 
κατ᾽ ἐξωλείας: ‘bringing down utter destruction on himself’. Having agreed to give 
testimony, each witness made himself responsible for its contents. The destruction refers 
to the witness presenting false evidence after he had sworn a sacred oath (the speaker 
refers to it again at §53: μηδεμιᾶς ἐξωλείας ὑπόχους ἑαυτοὺς ποιεῖν; cf. Dem. 54.40-1; 
witnesses in homicide cases also curse themselves with potential perjury: [Dem.] 59.10; 
Aeschin. 2.87; in addition to speakers in the Ecclēsia: [Dem.] 49.66; Aeschin. 3.99; Dein. 
2.16). But it was only possible to test the truth of the testimony delivered during a trial 
                                                     
106 For details on the decree, see Introduction, pp. 25-43. L. Gernet suggests that the decree compelled men 
to swear to their kinship with the appellant, in ‘Sur le discours pour Euphiletos attribué à Isée’, pp. 174-5. 
While his theory is certainly interesting, there is no further evidence regarding the terms of Demophilos’ 
decree with which to support it. 
107 Dilts (ed.), Demosthenis Orationes IV, p. 258; cf. Rennie (ed.), Demosthenis Orationes III, p. 258. For 
P. P. Dobree’s edition, see Adversaria critica (1874). 
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after the verdict had been given. A δίκη ψευδομαρτυριῶν could be brought if one party 
contested his opponent’s witness testimony, and a successful conviction probably entailed 
a fine for the amount of the damage. A third condemnation for false testimony carried the 
penalty of ἀτιμία (Hyp. 2.12). A female witness, however, could not be held legally 
responsible for the perjury or the false testimony of her κύριος (see οἱ τὰς ἀνεψιὰς 
λαβόντες αὐτῷ at §67). By reminding the jurors that his father’s relatives would have 
risked deadly repercussions for giving false testimonies, Euxitheos attempts to persuade 
them that his witnesses must be telling the truth with regard to Thoucritos’ citizen status. 
τὰς τῶν πρὸς γυναικῶν τῷ πατρὶ συγγενῶν μαρτυρίας: ‘the depositions of my father’s 
female relatives’. In this passage, the speaker distinguishes between the testimony given 
by his father’s male relatives (τῶν μὲν τοίνυν πρὸς ἀνδρῶν τῷ πατρὶ συγγενῶν ἀκηκόατε) 
and that given by his female kin (see also μάρτυρας καλῶ τοὺς ζῶντας ἡμῖν τῶν συγγενῶν 
τῶν πρὸς πατρός at §20). He differentiates between them again in his summary of 
witnesses at §67. It makes sense for Euxitheos to prioritise the evidence provided by 
Thoucritos’ male relatives over that of his female kin since men took precedence in 
Athenian inheritance law, and their acceptance of his father as a lawful citizen would have 
borne more legal sway. 
[23] ὡς ἦν ἀμφοτέρωθεν Ἀθηναῖος: ‘that he was an Athenian on both sides’. Since 
Thoucritos was born before the archonship of Eucleides in 403/2 BC, it was only 
necessary for him to have one Athenian parent (see πρὸ Εὐκλείδου at §30). But Euxitheos 
stresses that his father was an Athenian from both his paternal and maternal lines in order 
to strengthen Thoucritos’ claim to citizenship and thereby his own. 
τοὺς φράτερας: ‘the members of his phratry’. See ἐν τοῖς φράτερσιν at §19.108  
                                                     
108 For a fuller note on the phratries and their functions, see Appendix 5, pp. 293-7. 
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τοὺς γεννήτας: ‘the members of his genos’. Euxitheos subsequently summons the 
members of his father’s genos (commonly translated as ‘clan’) in order to confirm his 
admission into their group. Though it was not necessary to belong to a genos in order to 
obtain Athenian citizenship, the speaker uses Thoucritos’ admission to this group as proof 
of his civic status since their conditions were stricter than those required by the state.109 
As a γεννητής, his father was not portrayed as being wealthy or particularly prominent in 
Attic society; Euxitheos speaks of Nicarete’s financial hardship in her husband’s absence 
for military duty at §42, and he later refers to his and his mother’s lowly way of life after 
his father’s death at §31 (for confirmation of Thoucritos’ death, see §§27, 52 and 54). But 
the speaker does claim a noble bloodline for himself (see ὡς ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν τούτων 
προεκρίθην ἐν τοῖς εὐγενεστάτοις κληροῦσθαι τῆς ἱερωσύνης τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ at §46).110 
Euxitheos could have claimed genos membership through his father, although he never 
calls upon the γεννῆται to attest to his own citizenship as he does for his father (see 
κεκληρονομηκότα καὶ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ γένους at §46; he claims he had been introduced 
to the cult worship of Apollo at §54, which he specifies is sacred to the genos of his father 
at §67, and there is the implication at §24 that he could have been scrutinised by the genos 
along with his father). Ultimately, with Thoucritos as a confirmed member of the genos, 
Euxitheos establishes yet another proof of his father’s citizenship and seeks to assure the 
jury that, at least through his father, he too ought to be judged a citizen. 
τὰς τῶν δημοτῶν μαρτυρίας: ‘the depositions of the demesmen’. With this reference to 
the demesmen, the speaker has now presented testimonies to attest to his father’s 
citizenship from the four main groups of the Athenian social structure to which he 
                                                     
109 For details on the role of the genos in Athenian society, see Appendix 6, pp. 298-301. F. Bourriot’s 
collection of the textual and archaeological evidence for the genē remains the most comprehensive study 
on the subject, see his two-volume work Recherches sur la nature du genos (1976). 
110 Andrewes makes a persuasive case in favour of a genos becoming the elite of a phratry, in ‘Philochoros 
on Phratries’, pp. 1-15. 
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belonged: the family, the phratry, the genos, and the deme (he does the same for his 
mother Nicarete with regard to her male relatives’ membership, see τὰς τῶν φρατέρων 
τῶν συγγενῶν τῶν τῆς μητρὸς καὶ δημοτῶν μαρτυρίας at §40). 
τὰς τῶν συγγενῶν περὶ τῶν φρατέρων: ‘those of my relatives about the members of the 
phratry’. The testimonies from Euxitheos’ relatives, along with that of the demesmen, are 
to confirm Euxitheos’ appointment as phratriarch for his phratry (see φρατρίαρχον 
below). Instead of calling on unconnected members of the phratry, Euxitheos utilises 
evidence provided by his undoubtedly subjective relatives about a phratry matter. It 
appears strange that the phratry members he initially called as witnesses at the start of this 
passage do not also give testimony regarding his phratriarchy. This may cast uncertainty 
on whether or not Euxitheos actually was chosen as phratriarch but, since some phratry 
members were already present as his witnesses, it would be unlikely that the speaker could 
claim to have held office without incurring their open objections in court. 
φρατρίαρχον: ‘phratriarch’. Euxitheos had served as phratriarch, the chief officer of a 
phratry. Existing evidence with regard to this office is quite sparse. Lambert notes that 
there are only five named phratriarchs from known phratries; of these five, we possess 
the most information about Euxitheos’ service to his phratry from the details he provides 
in this speech.111 For the most part, the functions of the phratriarch seem to have been 
similar to those of the dēmarch (two dēmarchs are mentioned in this speech: Euboulides’ 
father at §§26 and 60, and the speaker at §§63-4; for the possibility of Euboulides holding 
the same office, see ὅτ᾽ ἀπώλετο αὐτοῖς τὸ ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον δημαρχοῦντος 
Ἀντιφίλου τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ Εὐβουλίδου at §26). During his term in office, most likely a 
year-long position like that of the dēmarch, the phratriarch was responsible for phratry 
                                                     
111 Apart from Euxitheos, the other identified phratriarchs are Pantacles of Oion, Deceleicon from the 
Demotionidae/Deceleieis, Callicles and Diopeithes of Myrrhinous from the Dyaleis, and Cichonides of 
Gargettos from the Medontidae, in Lambert, The Phratries of Attica, pp. 231-2. 
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administration: he presided over the admissions procedures and performed the duties of 
bursar (collecting rents etc. due to the phratry, IG II² 1241, 34-55), registrar (with the 
phratry priest, IG II² 1237, 18-29), religious functionary and disciplinary officer. Of the 
responsibilities of the phratriarch, the admission procedures were the most important, 
particularly with regard to the state, since they controlled access to Athenian citizenship 
(see §19). It may be assumed that the phratriarch was responsible for summoning group 
assemblies in much the same manner as the dēmarch. The phratriarch also had a role to 
play in external activities, including acting on behalf of the phratry in the sale or leasing 
of landed estates (epigraphic evidence records that a certain Ariston represents his 
unnamed phratry in a sale of land, IG II² 1600). But one point of contrast between the 
phratriarch and his deme counterpart is that of the method of appointment; according to 
Euxitheos, the phratriarch was elected to hold office whereas external evidence suggests 
that the dēmarch was most probably appointed by lot.112 Moreover, another difference 
was the number of men who were appointed to this office in a single term; there is no 
surviving evidence for any deme having selected more than one dēmarch,113 but it seems 
to have been possible for larger phratries to elect more than one phratriarch.114 Beyond 
being a citizen, there do not appear to be any particular conditions for eligibility attached 
to the office. Lambert notes that Euxitheos makes no mention of any special qualifications 
needed to be elected phratriarch and one would expect him to relate any which would 
then strengthen his case as a citizen.115 It is interesting that Euxitheos calls demesmen 
rather than the phratry members to provide testimony about his phratriarchy. But rather 
than casting doubt on Euxitheos’ appointment as phratriarch (see τὰς τῶν συγγενῶν περὶ 
                                                     
112 For the method of appointment for the dēmarch, see Whitehead, The Demes of Attica, pp. 115-6. 
113 Whitehead, The Demes of Attica, p. 59 with n. 85. 
114 In the early third century, there were two phratriarchs in the Dyaleis and Therricleidae phratries (IG II² 
1241, 5-7; SEG 32.150, 9-10), and Lambert argues for more than one phratriarch in the Demotionidae 
phratry earlier in the fourth century BC (IG II² 1237, 11-2), see The Phratries of Attica, pp. 225-6. 
115 Lambert, The Phratries of Attica, p. 229 n. 135, and pp. 122-3. 
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τῶν φρατέρων above), Lambert persuasively suggests that the speaker’s phratry may have 
overlapped closely with the deme Halimous in the same manner as the Deceleieis phratry 
did with the deme Decelea.116 The speaker’s primary intention by mentioning his time 
serving the phratry in this capacity is that his fellow members had no concerns regarding 
his father’s citizen status. 
[24] πότερόν ποτ᾽ ἀστὸς ἢ ξένος ἦν ᾧ ταῦθ᾽ ὑπῆρχεν: ‘whether someone who has 
this backing was a citizen or a foreigner’. Euxitheos’ use of the word ἀστός in opposition 
to ξένος here is particularly interesting. Since his witnesses have just given their 
testimonies regarding Thoucritos’ citizen status, one might expect the speaker to employ 
the term πολίτης.117 Aristotle expressly differentiates between the civil rights of the ἀστός 
and the additional political rights of the πολίτης (Pol. 1278a34).118 If Euxitheos only had 
his father in mind when making this statement before the jury, πολίτης ought to have been 
the more appropriate term. However, his use of ἀστός might be better understood by a 
passage from the Athēnaiōn Politeia; the author uses πολῖται to refer to the men who 
shared in the rights of Athenian citizenship but specifically utilises ἀστοί to denote both 
the men and women of citizen birth from whom this citizenship was transmitted ([Arist.] 
26.3, cf. 42.1). If Euxitheos had both of his parents in mind when making this statement 
before the court, his use of the term ἀστός does make sense. He must defend the citizen 
status of both his father and his mother in order to convince the jury of his own entitlement 
to citizenship (cf. his use of ἀστός in reference to Thoucritos’ parentage at §30, see εἰ καὶ 
                                                     
116 Lambert, The Phratries of Attica, p. 71 n. 54, cf. p. 109 n. 52. 
117 Both ἀστός and πολίτης express a civil connection to the community; with the former deriving from the 
ἄστυ (settlement), and the latter from the πόλις (city). The two nouns make an early appearance in the 
Homeric poems, although neither is applied in a legal sense (ἀστός: Il. 11.242, Od. 13.192; πολίτης: Il. 
2.780, 2.806, 15.558, 22.429, Od. 7.131, 17.206). 
118 Two earlier sources appear to make a similar distinction between the two terms, though they offer no 
such explanation for their doing so (Thuc. 6.54.2; [Dem.] 59.107). But a clear division is not always 
exhibited in the sources. Indeed, the term ἀστός could be used in reference to political rights, though it is 
rare (Ar. Birds, 33-4, Eccl. 459-60). 
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κατὰ θάτερα ἀστὸς ἦν). It is worthy of note that Whitehead makes an alternative proposal 
regarding the speaker’s choice in terminology; irrespective of the true distinction between 
ἀστός and πολίτης, he contends that the contrast between ἀστός and ξένος became a 
traditional cliché.119 In light of the frequency with which these two terms are used in 
opposition to one another in Greek literature, his argument certainly bears merit (Pind. 
Ol. 7.89-90; Hdt. 2.160.4, 3.8.2; especially at Athens: Thuc. 2.34.4, 2.36.4, 6.27.2, 6.30.2; 
[Dem.] 46.22, 59.16; [Andoc.] 4.10; Lys. 6.17, 12.35; Pl. Ap. 30a, Rep. 563a). Ultimately, 
it appears that Euxitheos’ use of ἀστός was intended to signal a civic status bestowed by 
a person’s birth right, and not one which was specifically granted by gender or legal age. 
While ἀστός is translated as ‘citizen’ here in order to convey Euxitheos’ differentiation 
between citizen status and foreign, the feminine form has also been translated as ‘native’ 
elsewhere in the speech when it was applied alongside the female from of πολίτης (see 
ἀστὴν ταύτην καὶ πολῖτιν εἶναι at §43). 
παρεσκευάσθαι τούτους: ‘we had suborned them’. In an earlier passage, Euxitheos 
accuses Euboulides of having induced a number of the demesmen to vote against him at 
the deme assembly (cf. ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἦσαν ἅπαντες οἱ τούτῳ παρεσκευασμένοι at §10). 
Here he claims that, since so many men from the various social groups can verify his 
account with regard to Thoucritos’ citizen status, it would be highly unlikely for him to 
have bribed such a great number to testify in his favour. The body of witnesses which 
Euxitheos can bring with him to court is certainly a strength in his case. 
ὅσοισπερ ἕκαστος ὑμῶν: ‘as many as each of you belong to’. Though the content of the 
depositions was not recorded, it is clear from the context that they must have confirmed 
that both he and his father passed the scrutinies for the various social groups. Moreover, 
Euxitheos attempts to identify with the jury by appealing to their individual experience 
                                                     
119 Whitehead, The Ideology of the Athenian Metic, p. 60. 
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of having gone through similar admission procedures themselves. There is certainly an 
element of flattery to this comment (cf. his further attempts at adulation, §§56-7); while 
deme membership was compulsory, not all jury members would have belonged to a 
phratry or genos but they may have wished to do so. 
γεννήταις: ‘members of the genos’. By including the genos in his list of social groups in 
which he has been tested, Euxitheos suggests that he had been successfully admitted to 
this group.120 However, nowhere in his speech does he openly confirm that he is indeed 
a genos member, though he does confirm his father’s membership (see τοὺς γεννήτας at 
§23). 
[25] εἰ μὲν τοίνυν εὔπορος ὢν ὁ πατὴρ χρήματα δοὺς τούτοις ἐφαίνετο πείσας 
συγγενεῖς αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοῦ φάσκειν εἶναι: ‘Now if it was shown that my father was rich 
and gave money to these men to persuade them to say that they were his relatives’. See 
χρήματ᾽ αὐτῷ προστιθέντες οὗτοι τοῦ γένους μετεδίδοσαν below. 
λόγον εἶχεν <ἂν> ὑποψίαν τιν᾽ ἔχειν ὡς οὐκ ἦν ἀστός: ‘it would be reasonable to have 
some suspicion that he was not a citizen’. Here, Dilts follows Schaefer in supplying ἂν.121 
The combination of ἔχω and λόγος signify a statement of theory or reasoning and, when 
                                                     
120 Andrewes, however, has an altogether different theory regarding Euxitheos’ allusion to the γεννῆται; he 
sees this statement as evidence that Thoucritos did not actually belong to a genos, in ‘Philochoros on 
Phratries’, pp. 6-9. Andrewes proposes that the reference to the γεννῆται here (and also at §§23 and 67) 
only reveals that the genos formed the elite of Thoucritos’ phratry and controlled the cults therein. While 
his theory that Thoucritos’ father was not a member does provide one explanation as to why Euxitheos has 
nothing to say about his own admission to the genos, it is by no means the only one. Taking a more 
straightforward view of the matter, it seems more plausible that here Euxitheos simply sought to flatter the 
jury by assuming that they all belonged to genē. Nothing overtly suggests that the speaker’s references 
elsewhere were anything but confirmation for Thoucritos’ communal belonging; one would expect that 
Euboulides would have taken full advantage of Thoucritos’ lack of membership in the genos in his case 
against Euxitheos, and the speaker would then have attempted in some way to explain his exclusion before 
the jury. Therefore, there is no solid reason to doubt that Thoucritos belonged to a genos. 
121 Dilts (ed.), Demosthenis Orationes IV, p. 259; cf. Rennie (ed.), Demosthenis Orationes III, p. 259. See 
Schaefer, Apparatus criticus et exegeticus ad Demosthenem (1824-7). 
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taken with the infinitive verb, Schaefer’s addition appropriately represents the potential 
optative. 
πένης ὢν: ‘he was a poor man’. The word πένης bears the sense of a man with little means, 
as opposed to one who is completely without (πτωχός, ‘beggar’). Since Euxitheos does 
not specify what kind of property his father received from his family or even what size it 
was (see ἔπειθ᾽ ὅτι ἀφικόμενος τῆς οὐσίας παρὰ τῶν θείων τὸ μέρος μετέλαβεν at §19), 
it is still plausible that he found it difficult to make an ample living from it to support a 
wife and children upon his return from Leucas (for his enslavement see πραθεὶς εἰς 
Λευκάδα at §18). Thoucritos’ poverty would certainly explain why Nicarete found it so 
difficult to cope financially in his absence; she had to resort to working as a wet-nurse 
(see ἐν ἀπορίαις at §42) and then as a ribbon-seller (see ταινίας πωλεῖν at §31). However, 
Euxitheos may have indeed exaggerated his father’s financial situation in order to induce 
the jury’s pity and discredit any claim that his father bought witnesses. Subsequent 
statements made by the speaker indicate that, at the time of the speech, he was financially 
comfortable (see πολλαὶ δ᾽ ἐκ πενήτων πλούσιαι νῦν at §45), if not particularly wealthy 
(§§52, 64 and 65). Unfortunately, is impossible to tell how much of this apparent fortune 
he had actually inherited and how much he had acquired.  
χρήματ᾽ αὐτῷ προστιθέντες οὗτοι τοῦ γένους μετεδίδοσαν: ‘they would not have 
admitted him into their genos and also given him money’. Having dismissed claims that 
he had suborned men to speak on his behalf (see παρεσκευάσθαι τούτους at §24), 
Euxitheos reverses the claim that his father was rich enough to bribe witnesses (see above) 
and states that their relatives actually gave Thoucritos money. For the irony, see §§26 and 
48. 
 159 
ἀλλ᾽ ἦν, ὡς τό τ᾽ ἔργον ἐδήλωσεν καὶ ὑμῖν μεμαρτύρηται: ‘But he was their relative, 
as both their action has shown and as they have testified to you’. For a similar linguistic 
expression, cf. ἐδήλωσε δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ ἔργον at Dem. 56.13. 
ἀρχὰς ἔλαχεν καὶ ἦρξεν δοκιμασθείς: ‘he was selected to offices by lot and having been 
approved by scrutiny he held office’. The speaker’s point is that his father’s citizen status 
could have been challenged at any of the scrutinies that he underwent before he took up 
office. No public office, whether it was appointed by sortition such as these referred to 
here, or election, or indeed πρόκριτοι (selection from a preliminary list, see §§46-8 and 
62), could be ratified without the candidate having passed the δοκιμασία. This process 
verified the candidate’s eligibility with regard to his birth and character, and whether or 
not there were any existing preclusions to prevent him from assuming the role such as 
holding the same office previously or having lost his civic rights through ἀτιμία 
(‘dishonour’). A candidate also had to have been married according to Athenian law in 
order to hold office (see ὅτι κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ὁ πατὴρ ἔγημεν at §69). The juries heard 
appeals from candidates who were subsequently rejected at the δοκιμασία ([Arist.] Ath. 
Pol. 55.2).  
Euxitheos does not specify which offices his father held, only that they were selected by 
lot, but he probably refers to those within his deme (see καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ τὸν πατέρα δημότας 
αὑτῶν εἶναι ψηφισαμένους, πρῶτον μέν γε τοῦ πατρὸς δοκιμασθέντος, εἶτ᾽ ἐμοῦ at §62). 
He does, however, support his account of his father’s term in office with a deposition. 
Seeing as Thoucritos must have passed the scrutiny in order to hold office, Euxitheos 
employs it as a further proof of his father’s citizen status. 
[26] ἐκεῖνον ξένον καὶ μὴ πολίτην: ‘that man as a foreigner and non-citizen’, this is 
heavy irony, see §48; cf. §25. 
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ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἂν κατηγορεῖν: ‘but would not prosecute him?’. During a δοκιμασία procedure, 
prospective officials had to answer a series of questions (cf. §§66-7), before those 
overseeing the proceedings asked if anyone wished to bring a charge against the candidate 
([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 55.4: ἐπειδὰν δὲ παράσχηται τοὺς μάρτυρας, ἐπερωτᾷ ‘τούτου βούλεταί 
τις κατηγορεῖν;’). If an objection was made, the matter was brought to trial and was put 
to the vote after both the accusation and the rebuttal were heard. If no charge was made, 
those present at the δοκιμασία voted immediately. Euxitheos asks the jury to consider the 
likelihood of the demesmen of Halimous allowing his father to hold office instead of 
bringing a suit against him if there was any doubt with regard to his citizen status.  
ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ διαψηφίσεις ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐγένοντο τοῖς δημόταις: ‘Yet emergency votes 
were taken by the demesmen’. A διαψήφισις was undertaken on the rare occasions when 
a deme had to review the registration of its members because of improper enrolments (see 
τὴν διαψήφισιν at §7) or when the deme register had to be reconstructed. 122  Here, 
διαψηφίσεις ἐξ ἀνάγκης refers to votes taken out of necessity when the register was lost 
(see ὅτ᾽ ἀπώλετο αὐτοῖς τὸ ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον δημαρχοῦντος Ἀντιφίλου τοῦ 
πατρὸς τοῦ Εὐβουλίδου below). The plural of διαψήφισις is used in order to refer to the 
vote on each demesman. This compulsory vote due to the loss of the register is again 
referred to at §61. 
ὀμόσασιν καθ᾽ ἱερῶν: ‘who had sworn over sacrifices’. A similar oath was sworn by the 
demesmen present at the annual enrolment of new members ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 42.1; cf. 
κύριος ὢν τοῦ θ᾽ ὅρκου at §8). 
ὅτ᾽ ἀπώλετο αὐτοῖς τὸ ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον δημαρχοῦντος Ἀντιφίλου τοῦ 
πατρὸς τοῦ Εὐβουλίδου: ‘when their deme register was lost while Antiphilos, 
                                                     
122 For a full analysis of this process, see Introduction, pp. 26-30. 
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Euboulides’ father, was serving as dēmarch’. This is the first mention of the name of 
Euboulides’ father, Antiphilos. Nothing else is known about Antiphilos other than the 
information provided by Euxitheos that he held the office of dēmarch in Halimous before 
346/5 BC (two honorific decrees which mention Antiphilos’ name only confirm that he 
was Euboulides’ father: IG II² 218, 5-6 and IG II³ 302, 6-9). Moreover, this statement is 
also the speaker’s first explicit reference to the office of the dēmarch. The dēmarchy was 
a public office, held for a year, and each dēmarch was selected by lot from among the 
deme’s members. The Athēnaiōn Politeia reports that the position was established under 
Cleisthenes ([Arist.] 21.5), and the author probably included it among the offices that 
could only be held once in a man’s lifetime ([Arist.] 62.3). Since every deme presumably 
had its own dēmarch, those selected for this office should be regarded as polis officials 
working at a local level.123 Their responsibilities included implementing matters agreed 
upon at their own deme assembly and applying regulations laid down by the state: from 
erecting inscriptions to implementing decrees, offering sacrifices and maintaining sacred 
spaces, ensuring the proper burial of members of the deme (Dem. 43.57-8), and collecting 
debts and taxes from their fellow demesmen.124 Regarding this final duty, Euxitheos 
pointedly asserts that his official role as debt-collector caused at least some of the hostility 
towards him, see §§63-4. 
Unlike Antiphilos and Euxitheos himself (see εἰ δὲ δεῖ τὴν δημαρχίαν λέγειν at §63), 
Euboulides is never expressly called a dēmarch at any stage in the text but it may be 
possible that he also held this office as some of his official duties, as stated in the text, 
normally fell to the dēmarch (see κύριος ὢν τοῦ θ᾽ ὅρκου at §8; κατέτριψεν τὴν ἡμέραν 
                                                     
123 Whitehead lists the evidence which explicitly confirms their existence in around thirty demes and 
concludes that every deme had such an official, and indeed, no more than one at a time, see The Demes of 
Attica, pp. 58-9 nn. 84-5. 
124 For a full discussion of the functions and character of the dēmarch as agent of his deme assembly and 
as agent of the state, see Whitehead’s The Demes of Attica, pp. 121-38. He also argues that because of the 
responsibilities of the dēmarch, it may be surmised that the candidate pool for the office was reduced by 
selecting only those ‘willing and able’ and then casting lots between those believed to be competent enough 
to satisfy its requirements, see p. 139. 
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δημηγορῶν καὶ ψηφίσματα γράφων at §9; τὴν δὲ ψῆφον εὐθὺς ἐδίδου at §13; τί ποτ᾽ ἦν 
τὸ δυσχερὲς Εὐβουλίδῃ ἀναβαλέσθαι εἰς τὴν ὑστεραίαν at §15). The speaker’s earlier 
reference to Euboulides’ custody of the deme register appears to tie him specifically to 
the role since it was the dēmarch who was normally responsible for its supervision (for 
both the register and Euboulides’ care of it, see τῶν γραμμάτων and ἐξ ὧν ἀνεκάλει τοὺς 
δημότας at §8). With the register in the custody of one man and probably kept at his 
residence, it was at risk of both accidental damage and deliberate destruction. At this stage 
in his speech, Euxitheos refers to the prior loss of Halimous’ register as a fact but, when 
he returns to the topic of Antiphilos’ dēmarchy again, he claims that his opponent’s father 
was being deceitful about the loss of the register in order to blackmail fellow demesmen 
(see τεχνάζει βουλόμενος παρά τινων λαβεῖν ἀργύριον, καὶ ἔφη τὸ κοινὸν γραμματεῖον 
ἀπολωλέναι at §60) and to expel his personal enemies (see ὅπου καὶ τοὺς ὄντας πολίτας 
συνιστάμενοι ἐξέβαλον at §61). We cannot know for certain if Euxitheos is telling the 
truth about Antiphilos’ corruption or indeed how frequently allegations such as this 
occurred, but dēmarchs abusing their position and interfering with the register was 
certainly a plausible event (one speech mentions a corrupt dēmarch who entered a name 
illegally, [Dem.] 47.37). Since the year of Antiphilos’ dēmarchy is not known, we cannot 
know when the register was lost and the compulsory votes were carried out by the 
demesmen. Apart from his reference to these events occurring during Antiphilos’ 
dēmarchy, the only details that Euxitheos provides are that the elders could recall this 
event (ταῦτα πάντες ἴσασιν οἱ πρεσβύτεροι at §60) and that his father was not challenged 
in terms of his legitimacy (καὶ ὢν ἐχθρὸς τῷ ἐμῷ πατρὶ τότε οὐ μόνον οὐ κατηγόρησεν, 
ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τὴν ψῆφον ἤνεγκεν ὡς οὐκ ἦν Ἀθηναῖος at §61).  
καί τινας ἀπήλασαν αὑτῶν: ‘and they ejected some of their members’. Euxitheos notes 
that some deme members were indeed ejected as a result of the compulsory votes by ballot 
(see ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ διαψηφίσεις ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐγένοντο τοῖς δημόταις above). He later states 
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that ten were expelled, nine of whom were subsequently reinstated (see καὶ κατηγορῶν 
δέκα τῶν δημοτῶν ἐξέβαλεν, οὓς ἅπαντας πλὴν ἑνὸς κατεδέξατο τὸ δικαστήριον at §60). 
Crucially, however, Thoucritos was not amongst those who were cast out after Antiphilos’ 
compulsory votes, as the speaker subsequently confirms at §61. While Euxitheos’ main 
point is to convey that nobody had ever made any allegations against his father’s status, 
despite the fact there had been an ample opportunity for them to do so with the loss of the 
register, his comment also highlights the lack of transparency in the διαψήφισις procedure. 
Management at a local level and the manner in which the voting was conducted facilitated 
abuses in this process for the sake of settling political disputes and personal rivalries. 
Without the ability to provide physical evidence to confirm his citizen status, it was very 
difficult for a man to counter any prejudiced accusations that might be laid against him 
during a deme’s διαψήφισις. 
[27] καίτοι πᾶσίν ἐστιν ἀνθρώποις τέλος τοῦ βίου θάνατος: ‘And yet for all men 
death is the end of life’. The same formula is utilised in Dem. 18.97, with πέρας in place 
of τέλος (πέρας μὲν γὰρ ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου θάνατος). However, it does not 
appear elsewhere in the Attic orators. With this statement, Euxitheos refers to the death 
of his father; this must have occurred at some stage before the speaker came of age (see 
ἔτι τοίνυν ὀρφανὸς κατελείφθην at §52 and με εὐθέως ἦγον εἰς τοὺς φράτερας at §54), 
though no details are given regarding the date or even circumstances. 
καὶ περὶ ὧν μὲν ἄν τις ζῶν αἰτίαν σχῇ {περὶ τοῦ γένους}, δίκαιον τοὺς παῖδας τὴν 
ἀειλογίαν παρέχειν: ‘for whatever reason a man might be accused while alive, it is right 
that his children always have to account for his conduct’. Dilts maintains Taylor’s 
deletion of περὶ τοῦ γένους, because he similarly considers it to be spurious.125 The 
                                                     
125 Dilts (ed.), Demosthenis Orationes IV, p. 260; cf. Rennie (ed.), Demosthenis Orationes III, p. 259. For 
J. Taylor’s edition, see Demosthenous, Aischinou, Deinarchou kai Demadou ta sozomena (1748-57). 
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possible accusations to which the speaker refers must denote a wide range of offences for 
which future generations inherit the blame for the conduct of their ancestors. Euxitheos’ 
statement demonstrates the ancient Greek notion that the family existed as a single entity 
in which both honour, and the more forceful dishonour, carried from generation to 
generation. This concept of ‘inherited guilt’ had a long history behind it, though it is first 
explicitly defined in Solon’s poem, Elegy to the Muses (fr. 13, 25-32 West).126 Here, 
Solon relates how a man may escape retribution himself but, in due course, his children 
or subsequent descendants will be punished. This belief was so widespread and influential 
that it echoed throughout Greek literature.127 It also appears in Attic oratory, especially 
in cases of impiety and perjury (Lys. 6.20; Isoc. 11.25; Lycourg. 1.79). Such sources, 
when viewed in conjunction with Euxitheos’ statement, make it abundantly clear that the 
Athenian family existed as a single unit both legally and morally, and that a son inherited 
his father’s crimes in exactly the same manner as he received his estate. 
πῶς οὐ δεινὸν εἰ τοὺς παῖδας ὁ βουλόμενος κρινεῖ: ‘is it not terrible that someone 
wishing to do so can now put his children on trial for these things?’. Dilts adheres to 
Bekker’s use of the future κρινεῖ, rather than the present form κρίνει which appears in 
some of the manuscripts.128 The future tense rightly conveys Euxitheos’ description of a 
possibility rather than a fact. 
                                                     
126 For Solon’s poem, see West, Greek Lyric Poetry, p. 77. E. R. Dodds describes the concept related by 
Solon as ‘the characteristic archaic doctrine’, in The Greeks and the Irrational, pp. 33-4, 150-6. Notably, 
however, R. Parker was the first scholar to analyse the earlier presence of inherited guilt in Homer for cases 
of oath-breaking (which was an offence against the gods: Hom. Il. 4.158-65; cf. Hes. Works and Days, 282-
5); see Miasma, pp. 198-206.  
127 In the most recent comprehensive study of the matter, R. Gagné tracks the appearance of this concept 
from Homer and Hesiod, to its use by Herodotus and to its pervasive presence in Attic drama; see Ancestral 
Fault in Ancient Greece (2013). Moreover, Gagné argues that the phrase ‘inherited guilt’ carries Christian 
connotations and so he prefers the label of ‘ancestral fault’ instead. 
128 Dilts (ed.), Demosthenis Orationes IV, p. 260; cf. Rennie (ed.), Demosthenis Orationes III, p. 259. For 
I. Bekker’s edition, see Oratores Attici (1823). 
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καλῶ καὶ τούτων μάρτυρας: ‘I call witnesses to these things too’. Since the original 
deme register was allegedly lost during Antiphilos’ dēmarchy and its replacement was 
created under corrupt practices (see §§26 and 60), Euxitheos lays a greater emphasis on 
witness testimony in order to verify his father’s belonging (see also καὶ ταῦτα πάντα 
μεμαρτύρηται at §62). Not only was it crucial for these witnesses to confirm that nobody 
accused Thoucritos during the vote to reconstruct the register, but they presumably also 
verified that the newly created register did indeed list him amongst its members. 
[28] Ἔτι τοίνυν παίδων αὐτῷ τεττάρων γενομένων ὁμομητρίων ἐμοὶ: ‘And 
furthermore, four sons were born to my father from the same mother as myself’. Four 
other sons were born from the marriage of Thoucritos and Nicarete and, if one accepts 
Euxitheos’ account of his parents’ relationship, they were thus his full siblings. With 
Nicarete’s birth year estimated to be no later than 420 BC (see παιδίων αὐτῇ δυοῖν ἤδη 
γεγενημένων at §42) and her marriage to Thoucritos assigned to 395 BC (see Θούκριτον 
τὸν πατέρα τὸν ἐμόν at §41), she must have been an old woman in her early seventies by 
the time of the appeal in 346/5 BC. 129  Despite having had more than six children, 
Euxitheos’ speech indicates that only one daughter survived from Nicarete’s first 
marriage to Protomachos (see θυγάτηρ at §40 and παῖδας ποιησάμενος at §43) and that 
the speaker himself outlived her subsequent children from Thoucritos (see below). With 
so many deceased offspring, Gernet posits that Euxitheos was a metic who had bought 
his way into a poor Athenian family and had concealed himself by borrowing one of their 
names (cf. §§52-3). 130  Such practices were not unknown (Isae. 12.2). However, if 
                                                     
129 In opposition to Davies, Lacey places Nicarete’s marriage to Thoucritos between 410 and 405 BC before 
his participation during the Decelean War, specifically having Euxitheos and a second child by him before 
he left, in ‘The Family of Euxitheus (Demosthenes LVII)’, p. 59. He also dates her financial difficulties to 
405-403 BC, making Nicarete less than twenty years old when she had borne a daughter to Protomachos 
and her first two children to Thoucritos. Yet his dates seem a little early in light of other evidence from the 
text (see nn. 74 and 182) and Davies’ dates seem to me to be more likely. 
130 L. Gernet, Plaidoyers Civils Tome IV, p. 11. S. C. Humphreys draws a somewhat similar conclusion, 
wherein both Thoucritos and Nicarete were passing Euxitheos off as their legitimate son and that their poor 
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Gernet’s theory is correct, all of Euxitheos’ purported relatives must have been lying to 
the court. Alternatively, if Euxitheos was indeed born a metic, he could have been 
smuggled into Thoucritos and Nicarete’s family in infancy.131 It is not implausible that 
Nicarete’s work as wet-nurse (§42) brought her into contact with a rich metic family and 
that she was paid a substantial sum to raise Euxitheos as her own citizen child. The 
advantage of this second hypothesis is that it allows for the speaker’s extended family to 
be telling the truth to the best of their knowledge. If nobody other that Nicarete and the 
baby’s birth mother knew the details of Euxitheos’ birth, then Euboulides would have had 
no evidence of this event to use in court. 
ἔθαψε τούτους εἰς τὰ πατρῷα μνήματα: ‘he buried them in the ancestral burial mounds’ 
(see also εἶθ᾽ οἷς ἠρία ταὐτά at §67; cf. τὰ ἱερὰ τὰ πατρῷα at Isae. 2.46 and ἱερὰ πατρῷά 
at Dein. 2.17). Euxitheos’ four brothers were all dead before his appeal. Unfortunately, 
the speaker provides no detail as to how and when they died. His reference to their burial 
in the ancestral mounds was intended to serve as the final proof of his father’s acceptance 
by his family (completing the line of defence which he began at §19). In another lawcourt 
speech, the speaker Sositheos utilises the fact that the defendant’s father and grandfather 
were not buried in the ancestral burial place as proof that his opponent bears no relation 
to the family (Dem. 43.79-81). Only those recognised as kin, whether by blood or through 
adoption, were buried in the family grave; to admit those considered to be outsiders to the 
oikos, such as illegitimate offspring, would have dishonoured one’s ancestors. A passage 
from the Athēnaiōn Politeia reveals that a candidate at the δοκιμασία was asked whether 
                                                     
relatives had been bribed to go along with the deception, in ‘Kinship Patterns in the Athenian Courts’, pp. 
60-2. 
131 For the treatment of supposititious children, see A. Powell, Athens and Sparta, pp. 364-8; Ogden, Greek 
Bastardy in the Classical and Hellenistic Periods, pp. 108-10. K. McGroarty has conducted a wide-ranging 
survey of the extant sources which refer to the practice of fraudulently introducing a child into an oikos and 
subsequently presenting it as a legitimate heir, in ‘Swapping the Swaddling’ (2015). McGroarty’s study 
gives due consideration to the possibility that the wife acted alone and in secret, and that the husband also 
engaged in this activity in collusion with his wife. Of the two scenarios, the existence of the latter would 
indeed remove some of the practical difficulties related to bringing a supposititious child into the household. 
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he has family tombs and where they are: εἶτα ἠρία εἰ ἔστιν καὶ ποῦ ταῦτα ([Arist.] 55.3; 
cf. ἀπόδοτέ μοι θάψαι εἰς τὰ πατρῷα μνήματα at §70). Familial bonds and obligations 
continued after death and, for those who could afford it, burials with or alongside one’s 
kin were most desirable (Dem. 43.57-8; Isae. 6.64-5; it was important that someone dear 
to the deceased carried out the proper funerary rites, Isae. 4.19, 9.4, 7). This facilitated 
Athenian religious practices that were required to maintain the family connection: 
including regular visits to the tombs, bringing food and drink offerings, and taking gifts 
and items with which to decorate the monumental stele (Hdt. 4.26; Pl. Laws, 717e; Isae. 
6.51, 65, 7.30, 32, 9.7).132 Indeed, having one’s worst enemies perform these rites over 
the burial mound was a very real fear for an Athenian (Isae. 1.10, 9.36). Worse still was 
having no burial (Andoc. 1.138; Lycourg. 1.45). Ultimately, it is clear from the source 
material that the ability to refer to burial in a family grave is an important point in 
establishing one’s claim to citizenship. Thoucritos’ burial of four of his sons in his 
ancestral mounds openly acknowledges their recognisable citizen status and Euxitheos 
uses this as proof of his own. 
ὧν ὅσοιπέρ εἰσι τοῦ γένους κοινωνοῦσι: ‘which are shared by as many as share in the 
genos’. Euxitheos ascribes a common burial ground to all members of his genos, since 
the members are all part of the same descent group. By mentioning the fact that the 
members of the genos share this burial ground, Euxitheos indirectly identifies his 
deceased brothers as recognised members of the genos and also emphasises his family’s 
continued relationship to this exclusive group.  
                                                     
132 Apart from celebrating the birthdays of deceased relatives, Wyse finds that yearly visits were made to 
family burial mounds on the day of ‘all souls’, during the Athenian festival of the Anthesteria (roughly 
February); see W. Wyse on Isae. 2.46, in The Speeches of Isaeus, pp. 269-71. R. Garland provides further 
detail in The Greek Way of Death, pp. 66-8, 104-120; see especially pp. 106-7 for group burial mounds. 
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[29] μάρτυρας παρέσχημαι τοὺς ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν τούτων ἐψηφισμένους εἶναι πολίτας: 
‘I have brought forward as witnesses those who these very conspirators have voted to be 
citizens’. The witnesses that Euxitheos refers to here are those who were related to his 
father through the male line, listed at §§20-1: Thoucritides II and Charisiades (first 
cousins once removed to the speaker), and Niciades (another first cousin once removed) 
and his son Nicostratos (a second cousin). These men belonged to the same deme as 
Thoucritos and Euxitheos and, since they did not face trial themselves, they thus had to 
have passed both the annual scrutiny for enrolling new members (see κύριος ὢν τοῦ θ᾽ 
ὅρκου at §8),133 and the emergency deme διαψήφισις when the register was lost (ἀλλὰ 
μὴν καὶ διαψηφίσεις ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐγένοντο τοῖς δημόταις at §26). Euxitheos exploits the 
fact that his relatives’ citizen status has gone unquestioned and brings them before the 
jury as crucial witnesses of both his father’s right to citizenship and his own. 
μαρτυροῦντας ἐκεῖνον ἑαυτοῖς ἀνεψιὸν εἶναι: ‘to testify that my father was their first 
cousin’. These witnesses confirmed their relationship with the speaker’s father, and with 
the exception of Nicostratos who was in fact a first cousin once removed (ἀνεψιαδοῦς), 
they were all first cousins to Thoucritos. 
 
§§30-45: Euxitheos’ mother 
The subsequent passages primarily concern Euxitheos’ mother, Nicarete (first named at 
§68). Insofar as they can be reconstructed from Euxitheos’ speech, the accusations which 
Euboulides has made against Nicarete centre on her lowly employment: initially as a wet-
nurse (§35), and then as a ribbon-seller (§34). Without the ability to own land in Attica, 
most metics engaged in trade and manufacture.134 Euboulides must have asked the jury 
                                                     
133 For deme membership, see also Appendix 4, pp. 289-92. 
134 For an overview of the Athenian privileges which were denied to metics, see τόν γε ξένον καὶ μέτοικον 
at §48. 
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to suppose that because many metics are employed in this field those who are seen 
engaging in retail are most likely to be metics. Though he plays upon the common 
prejudices against menial occupations, trade was by no means closed to Athenian citizens. 
Nicarete’s sex is also relevant. The seclusion of Athenian women was a custom and ideal 
established by their male counterparts. In principle, respectable wives of citizens were 
supposed to be segregated from men other than their immediate family and were occupied 
by domestic chores. Yet, in practice, such separation was only attainable for the upper 
classes. Inevitably, Athenian women who belonged to poor families had to work outside 
the confines of the home in order to supplement the income of their household. But 
ideological pressure meant that there was a marked difference between work undertaken 
by women in remote or private spaces, such as agricultural work or even midwifery, and 
that carried out in the public gaze (cf. φανερὰν πᾶσιν at §34), such as work in the ἀγορά 
(marketplace). Nicarete’s exposure in public may have been financially necessary but it 
was nonetheless highly unfavourable for an Athenian woman. 
[30] εἰ καὶ κατὰ θάτερα ἀστὸς ἦν: ‘even if he was a citizen on only one side’. For the 
use of this terminology, see πότερόν ποτ᾽ ἀστὸς ἢ ξένος ἦν ᾧ ταῦθ᾽ ὑπῆρχεν at §24 and 
ἀστὴν ταύτην καὶ πολῖτιν εἶναι at §43. 
γέγονε: ‘he was born’. The perfect tense is employed by the speaker to suggest that there 
were implications from this event for the present. 
πρὸ Εὐκλείδου: ‘before the archonship of Eucleides’. Eucleides held the office of archōn 
in the year 403/2 BC (Isae. 6.47, 8.43; Dem. 43.51). On the proposal of Aristophon, 
Pericles’ citizenship law was re-introduced to address the situation of civic rights being 
exercised by those born of non-citizen women (Aristophon is named with regard to 
another piece of legislation at §32, see τὸν Ἀριστοφῶντος). It seems most likely that 
initially the legislation was retroactive, but an amendment by Nicomenes determined that 
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it should not be applicable to those born before that year and they were exempt from birth 
scrutiny.135 This exemption implies that this was the only action taken by the polis on this 
occasion and that there was no διαψήφισις.136 Thus, Thoucritos was legally entitled to 
Athenian citizenship even if his mother had not been a freeborn woman, since he was 
already an adult when the law was reintroduced (see ὑπὸ τὸν Δεκελεικὸν πόλεμον at §18). 
Nevertheless, Euxitheos strives to remove any doubt of his father’s entitlement by 
showing that he was indeed born to an Athenian mother, and thereby strengthening his 
appeal to be reinstated as a citizen himself. 
περὶ δὲ τῆς μητρὸς (καὶ γὰρ ταύτην διαβεβλήκασί μου) λέξω: ‘And I will speak about 
my mother (for they also slander me with regard to this woman)’. Since Euxitheos was 
born approximately fifteen or sixteen years after the re-enactment of Pericles’ citizenship 
law in 403/2 BC (see ἀποδημοῦντος μετὰ Θρασυβούλου at §42), he needed two Athenian 
parents to be legally entitled to Athenian citizenship. It has been suggested, however, that 
a particular strength in Euxitheos’ appeal lies in the fact that Euboulides excessively 
maligned both Thoucritos and Nicarete on different grounds, when it would have been 
sufficient to target only one parent to disfranchise the speaker.137 While this statement is 
in essence true, it seems more likely that Euboulides made accusations against both 
Euxitheos’ mother and father as a security measure; persuading an assembly of demesmen, 
who would have been familiar with Euxitheos and his relatives, to expel him based on a 
foreign accent or an occupation alone would have been a risky undertaking for an official 
like Euboulides. Therefore, for Euboulides, attacking two parents served as a guarantee; 
for Euxitheos, defending both alike was a necessity.  
                                                     
135 See nn. 77 and 78 in the Introduction. 
136 I follow Lambert in believing that such an exemption meant that there was no need for an extraordinary 
scrutiny to be implemented throughout the Attic demes, and that the phratries and the genē continued to 
take their own measures with respect to their own membership, see The Phratries of Attica, pp. 48-9. 
137 Lape, Race and Citizen Identity in the Classical Athenian Democracy, pp. 204-5. 
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Rather than directly countering Euboulides’ accusations against Nicarete’s status, 
Euxitheos argues that her occupations are evidence not of her birth but of her financial 
circumstances. He thus makes the issue all about his family’s poverty. 
Παρὰ τὸ ψήφισμα: ‘contrary to the decree’. Dilts accepts Blass’ correction, τὸ ψήφισμα, 
in place of τὰ ψηφίσματα (‘decrees’) which is denoted in most of the manuscripts.138 It is 
highly plausible that the single decree mentioned here is the same as at §7, namely that 
of Demophilos (see τὴν διαψήφισιν and παρὰ τὸ ψήφισμα). Nevertheless, Euxitheos does 
not specify which decree he is referring to, nor does he quote from the law. But having 
directly addressed the jury, Euxitheos may have believed that the jurors knew to which 
decree he was referring and that he had no need to denote its terms. It would certainly 
make sense for Euxitheos to argue that Euboulides’ slander of citizens for doing business 
in the marketplace does go against Demophilos’ decree which was only directed at 
ejecting illegal aliens. 
παρὰ τοὺς νόμους: ‘against the laws’. Euxitheos claims that Euboulides’ actions also 
break Athenian laws against slander (κακηγορία). Various laws dealing with defamation 
are attested in the source material: firstly, it was illegal to insult the memory of the dead 
under any circumstances (Dem. 20.104; cf. Plut. Sol. 21); secondly, it was prohibited to 
make a slanderous statement about a living person in certain public places (for example, 
insulting a public official in court: Lys. 9.6). Lysias’ Against Theomnestos, dating to 
384/3 BC, provides further details as to what specifically constituted slander under 
Athenian law: it was illegal to accuse a man of murder, of assaulting his parents, or of 
                                                     
138 Dilts (ed.), Demosthenis Orationes IV (2009), p. 261; cf. Rennie (ed.), Demosthenis Orationes III (1963), 
p. 260. For F. Blass’s edition, see Demosthenis Orationes III, p. 257. However, it must be noted that the 
use of the plural here could have been deliberate exaggeration on the part of the speechwriter, with 
Demosthenes referring to numerous decrees for rhetorical effect. This would mean that the reading of τὰ 
ψηφίσματα in the majority of the manuscripts is genuine. But given both the context and the fact that the 
singular form corresponds with Demosthenes’ earlier reference to the decree (§7), I ultimately accept Blass’ 
emendation. 
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deserting his position in battle (Lys. 10.6-9). Presumably other offences were also 
prohibited which are not related in Lysias’ text, including the one which made it illegal 
to reproach a citizen for his or her employment in the marketplace. Unfortunately, 
Euxitheos also fails to cite the slander laws and does not ask for any of them to be read 
aloud to the jury, as he does with other legislation that he utilises in following lines (see 
both §§31 and 32). The existence of slander laws pertaining to trade would stand as a 
clear indication that citizens involved in such occupations were frequently susceptible to 
abuse. However there is no further reference to corroborate the information provided by 
Euxitheos which specifically relates to the defamation of citizen tradespeople and indeed 
it is not clear whether such laws could be actively enforced. They certainly did not prevent 
Aristophanes from his notorious attacks on Euripides’ mother, Cleito, for selling 
vegetables in the agora (Ach. 478, Thesm. 387, 456, Frogs, 840).139 Since Euxitheos fails 
to offer any information about the stipulations in the laws, it is indeed possible that he 
may be exaggerating their reach. 
ἔνοχον εἶναι τῇ κακηγορίᾳ: ‘is liable for slander’. Athenian slander laws penalised false 
assertions and abusive language at a price of five hundred drachmas (Dem. 21.88; Lys. 
10.12; Isoc. 20.3). Initially, when Solon established laws against slander, he set the 
penalty at three drachmas to be paid to the person slandered and two to the public treasury 
(Dem. 20.104, 40.49; Plut. Sol. 21.1). The amount to be paid had certainly increased 
significantly by the fourth century but it is not known whether the payment continued to 
be divided between the person slandered and the state. Nevertheless, a person was guilty 
of slander only if what he claimed was actually false; if the claim was proven to be true, 
then no offence had been committed (Dem. 23.50; Lys. 10.23, 30).  
                                                     
139 While it is true that things could be said on the comic stage which were not permissible in real Athenian 
society, it is hard to believe that Aristophanic humour would have been so successful if his comedy was 
not in part based on elements of real life; cf. n. 21 in Appendix 3. 
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[31] ἡμεῖς δ᾽ ὁμολογοῦμεν καὶ: ‘And we admit’. The first-person plural pronoun may 
just be rhetorical usage (cf. ἡμων and μετὸν τῆς πόλεως ἡμῖν at §1). However, given that 
the accusations against his mother centre on her employment in the marketplace, the use 
of ‘we’ here more likely indicates Euxitheos’ involvement in the sale of ribbons along 
with Nicarete. 
ταινίας πωλεῖν: ‘to selling ribbons’. The use of the present infinitive suggests that both 
Euxitheos and his mother continued to be actively engaged in the trade at the time of the 
speech. The Greek word ταινία, here translated as ‘ribbon’, is used to describe both 
headbands worn as a sign of victory after a competition (Pl. Symp. 212e; Xen. Symp. 5.9; 
Paus. 6.20.19) and breast-bands worn by young girls (Paus. 9.39.8). Aristophanes 
employs the use of two other terms to denote similar textiles specifically worn by women: 
μίτρα for a headband (Ar. Thesm. 257, 941) and στρόφιον for a woman’s breast-band or 
girdle: (Ar. Lys. 931, Thesm. 139, 251, 255). But since Euxitheos only uses the term ταινία 
(here and again at §35, and ταινιόπωλις at §34), it is not clear what type of ribbons he and 
Nicarete were selling, or whether they sold a variety for different uses. 
ζῆν οὐχ ὅντινα τρόπον βουλόμεθα: ‘to not living in the manner we wish’. Here, 
Euxitheos indicates that he does feel some shame at their way of life. Standing before a 
jury of his peers, he cannot ignore the stigma attached to menial labour in public opinion. 
But, by the time of his appeal, Euxitheos is thought to have been financially comfortable 
(see πολλαὶ δ᾽ ἐκ πενήτων πλούσιαι νῦν at §45), or indeed to have been wealthy enough 
to provide financial aid to his relatives and to have sufficient funds to buy witnesses for 
his present case (see §52). 
ἐγώ σοι τούτου ὅλως τοὐναντίον ἐπιδείξω: ‘I will show you the very opposite of this’. 
Since the most significant aspect of the attack on the speaker’s citizenship concerns the 
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status of his mother, Euxitheos’ defence must deny the connection made by Euboulides 
between her economic activity and her civic status.  
ὅτι οὐκ ἔξεστιν ξένῳ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ ἐργάζεσθαι: ‘that it is not permissible for a foreigner 
to do business in the marketplace’. Euxitheos overturns his opponent’s denunciation of 
Nicarete’s employment in the ἀγορά to use it as veritable proof of her citizenship. Sixth 
century legislation originally prohibited metics from trading in the ἀγορά (see πρῶτον 
τὸν Σόλωνος νόμον below). However, in a subsequent passage, Euxitheos reveals that the 
law was seemingly relaxed with the introduction of a special tax (see εἰ ξενικὰ ἐτέλει at 
§34; a new clause may have been added to the law when it was re-introduced by 
Aristophon, see τὸν Ἀριστοφῶντος at §32). Foreigners could not engage in trade in 
Athens without paying this tax and without being registered with an appropriate deme 
(Poll. Onom. 3.57).140 Both of these requirements would have generated official records, 
and these documents ought to have been used by Euboulides as proofs in his case against 
Euxitheos. Nevertheless, the failure to produce such evidence in court does not 
definitively prove that Nicarete was of Athenian birth, as she could simply have been 
trading without having fulfilled the necessary conditions for a metic. If that was the case, 
one would expect Euboulides to have prosecuted her for illegal trading, though Euxitheos 
would hardly have mentioned any such indictment against Nicarete during his own trial. 
πρῶτον τὸν Σόλωνος νόμον: ‘first the law of Solon’. Euxitheos quotes a past law that he 
accredits to Solon, through which only citizens were permitted to engage in business 
transactions in the ἀγορά. Crucially, Solon’s law had to include both male and female 
citizens for the speaker to avail upon its premise in this case.  
                                                     
140 Whitehead presents a brief discussion of what little evidence survives about the process for deme 
registration for metics and the subsequent need to monitor those who had enrolled with regard to their 
public obligations, in The Ideology of the Athenian Metic, p. 75. 
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However, trade in the marketplace would not enable women of civic birth to make a 
fortune. There existed another Athenian law, preserved in a speech by Isaeus, wherein it 
was decreed that women – or children – could not contract for the disposal of more than 
a bushel of barley (Isae. 10.10). Schaps estimates that this medimnos of barley was the 
equivalent of three drachmas. 141  This law was also parodied in Aristophanes’ 
Ecclesiazusae, in which men were restricted to transactions below the value of a 
medimnos (Ar. Eccl. 1024). The decree certainly had a real impact on the fifth and fourth 
century Athenian community as large-scale trade by women is virtually unknown even in 
the documentary source material. While the measure was established to prevent citizen 
women from participating in large financial transactions, it certainly allowed them to 
engage in petty trade. Knowledge of the law mentioned by Isaeus supports the picture 
drawn by the speaker and his reference to Solon’s law in which Athenian women are 
legally permitted to work in the ἀγορά. 
[32] τὸν Ἀριστοφῶντος: ‘the law of Aristophon’, sc. νόμον. A native of the deme of 
Azenia (Aeschin. 1.64, 158, 3.139), Aristophon proposed many laws during his lengthy 
political career which spanned the years at the end and in the aftermath of the 
Peloponnesian War (by his own admission, Aristophon introduced more decrees than any 
other man: Aeschin. 3.194). In particular, during the archonship of Eucleides (see πρὸ 
Εὐκλείδου at §30), he is noted for reviving Pericles’ citizenship law and seemingly 
introducing a provision which stated that whoever was born of a citizen father but not an 
Athenian woman was a bastard (Ath. 13.577b-c).142 Like so many prominent Athenian 
politicians, being in the public eye made Aristophon vulnerable to attacks. Indeed, he was 
accused seventy-five times of making illegal proposals but was acquitted of all charges 
                                                     
141 D. M. Schaps, The Economic Rights of Women in Ancient Greece, p. 137 n. 32. This amount was by no 
means a trivial sum since that volume of barley was estimated to have fed the average family for six days. 
142 See Introduction, pp. 21-5. 
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in each case (Aeschin. 3.194). His talent for public speaking may have contributed to his 
successful defence of his motions, as even Demosthenes respectfully notes his rhetorical 
ability by classing him amongst ‘very able speakers’ (20.146).143  
In this part of Euxitheos’ speech, the speaker refers to Aristophon’s re-enactment of the 
law of Solon (cited above). But since Euxitheos later refers to a special tax which allowed 
metics to trade in the ἀγορά (see εἰ ξενικὰ ἐτέλει at §34), Aristophon’s re-introduction 
may have included this tax as a new provision. 
οὕτω γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτον ἔδοξεν ἐκεῖνος καλῶς καὶ δημοτικῶς 
νομοθετῆσαι, ὥστ᾽ ἐψηφίσασθε πάλιν τὸν αὐτὸν ἀνανεώσασθαι: ‘for, Athenian men, 
it was thought that this man Solon so wisely and justly made this law that you voted to 
renew it again’. Here, τοῦτον refers to Solon’s law, with ἐκεῖνος referring to he who 
originally enacted it. It is not stated why or when exactly Solon’s law needed to be re-
enacted; presumably, its implementation was no longer being strictly enforced by the end 
of the fifth and the start of the fourth century BC. By specifying that Solon acted ‘wisely 
and justly’ in introducing this measure, and also reminding the jurors that they as 
representatives of the dēmos voted to renew it under Aristophon for that very reason (for 
the speaker’s use of second person, see also εἰ μήτε πείσαντες μήτε δεηθέντες ὑμῶν at 
§3), Euxitheos highlights the fact that Athenian women like his mother had a right to 
work in the ἀγορά and were legally granted preferential treatment over both metics and 
foreigners.  
τοὺς συκοφαντοῦντας πονηρούς: ‘those engaging in sykophancy are wicked people’. In 
a state which had only a minimalist police force for law enforcement, the Athenian legal 
system encouraged volunteers to bring prosecutions before a court and offered financial 
                                                     
143  For further details on Aristophon’s political career, see Dem. 18.162, 19.21, 20.148; see also D. 
Whitehead, ‘The Political Career of Aristophon’, pp. 313-9. 
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reward to the successful prosecutor in some types of cases. By the latter part of the fifth 
century, the practice of sykophancy (‘falsely prosecuting’),144 attributable to personal 
enmities or the will to obtain the payment for a successful case, had become a major 
problem (Dem. 21.103, 39.2, 40.9; Lys. 7.39, 25.3). The financial rewards for the 
prosecutors arising from certain successful public γραφαί tended to be greater than those 
resulting from private δίκαι.145  Thus, in order to discourage false accusations being 
brought before a court, a penalty of a thousand drachmas was introduced for a prosecutor 
in a public case who obtained less than a fifth share of the jury’s votes (see τὸ πέμπτον 
μέρος at §8).146  Moreover, a man accused of sykophancy could be prosecuted in a 
προβολή (a preliminary accusation): this hearing was initially heard by the Ecclēsia 
before the plaintiff brought the accused to stand trial before a jury. This information is 
detailed in the Athēnaiōn Politeia, which also reports that both citizens and metics could 
be charged with sykophancy ([Arist.] 43.5; cf. Aeschin. 2.145).147 
Though the present appeal arose from Euboulides’ accusations in his official capacity as 
βουλευτής (see βουλεύων at §8) and possibly dēmarch of Halimous (see ὅτ᾽ ἀπώλετο 
αὐτοῖς τὸ ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον δημαρχοῦντος Ἀντιφίλου τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ 
Εὐβουλίδου at §26) rather than as a volunteer, Euxitheos mentions the practice of 
sykophancy in order to draw a comparison between their false accusations and those of 
Euboulides against himself. He returns to the topic of sykophancy again at §§34, 49 and 
57.  
                                                     
144 Transliterated as ‘sykophancy’ to avoid confusion with the English noun ‘sycophancy’, which derives 
from a later, post-classical development in the meaning of the word. The origin of συκοφάντης and the 
related verb συκοφαντέω is unknown. When taken literally, συκοφάντης means the ‘one who shows the 
fig’. But when the verb appears first in Aristophanes’ Acharnians in 425 BC, it describes a common 
informer (519, 828). But any explanations regarding the development of the terms are mere guesses. 
145 See n. 40. 
146 See also n. 69 in the Introduction. 
147 MacDowell notes that it was also possible to prosecute a sykophant by an ordinary γραφή, though the 
source material provides little information with regard to such prosecutions (Isoc. 15.313-4), in The Law in 
Classical Athens, p. 65. Elsewhere, R. Osborne presents a detailed analysis of the practice of sykophancy 
and its impact in the broader setting of the Athenian democracy, rather than the state’s legal system alone, 
in Athens and Athenian Democracy, pp. 205-28. 
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ἔστι καὶ ἕτερος περὶ τῆς ἀργίας νόμος: ‘there is also another law regarding idleness’. 
Some authors assign this law on ἀργία to Dracon (Lys. fr. 10 T; cf. Diog. Laert. 1.55; Plut. 
Sol. 17.1, 22.3), whereas others attribute it to Solon (Hdt. 2.177) or even Peisistratos 
(according to Theophrastos, Plut. Sol. 31.2; cf. Poll. Onom. 8.42). According to 
Herodotus and Plutarch, the given penalty was death; Lysias, however, claims that Solon 
established a fine of one hundred drachmas for a first or second conviction, and ἀτιμία 
for a third offence. Harrison postulates that such a law was enacted in order to protect 
familial lines of inheritance from those who would seek to squander the given estate.148 
While Euxitheos confirms that a law governing ἀργία was still in force by the mid-fourth 
century BC, it is not clear whether or not it bore the same stipulations as the one that 
originally came into existence in the fifth century. The speaker’s point is simple: trade in 
the marketplace was not a crime for a citizen, but the ἀργία of which he accuses 
Euboulides certainly was. Indeed, a comment made by Isocrates reveals that there was a 
real Athenian fear that idleness begot poverty, which in turn gave rise to wrongdoing 
(Isoc. 7.44). Euboulides’ idleness has brought about his sykophantic pursuit of Euxitheos 
who, in contrast, is presented as the more honourable citizen. It must be noted, however, 
that Euxitheos offers no evidence to confirm his opponent’s alleged ἀργία. 
[33] ἔξεστιν ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος βλασφημεῖν: ‘that it is permitted for this man to 
slander us on irrelevant matters’. For Euxitheos’ preoccupation with ‘keeping to the 
point’, see also <εἰς> αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα at §59 and ἐρῶ δ᾽ εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα at §60. If the 
rule barring irrelevant matters was enforced during Euxitheos’ appeal, neither speaker 
ought to have referred to details beyond the case (see εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα πάντα λέγειν at 
§7).149 However, this rule may have had a greater impact on Euxitheos’ speech than on 
                                                     
148 Harrison, The Law of Athens Vol. I, pp. 79-81. His comments are certainly persuasive in light of the 
evidence which indicates that dissipating one’s inheritance was an actionable offence: Lys. 19.37; cf. 
Aeschin. 1.30. 
149 See n. 27. 
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Euboulides’. For anything Euboulides had said about Nicarete would arguably have been 
relevant to the question of Euxitheos’ citizen status, whereas any personal attacks made 
against Euboulides would likely have been thought irrelevant. As such, Euxitheos 
attempts to make it abundantly clear to the jury that he is deliberately and honourably 
excluding elements which have no bearing on his entitlement to citizenship (see ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως 
ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος ὑπολήψεσθε ταῦτ᾽ εἶναι at §63, and ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος at §66). 
However, by deliberately reminding the jury that he will not elaborate on certain points, 
Euxitheos is actually drawing their attention to them. Paraleipsis was a rhetorical device 
used to accentuate a detail which was designedly passed over by a speaker (παράλειψις: 
[Arist.] Rh. Al. 1434a19-25, 1438b6; also referred to by the Latin term, praeteritio). In 
the Demosthenic corpus, this pretend omission was often expressed by several specific 
verbs (παραλείψω, Dem. 19.18, 22.52, 24.177; σιωπῶ, Dem. 19.145; ἐάσω, Dem. 21.15). 
By using this device, Euxitheos seeks to colour the jury’s opinion of Euboulides. 
Alternatively, if he was not bound by any such irrelevancy rule, Euxitheos’ attempts to 
limit deliberately the scope of the case may have been part of his rhetorical strategy to 
dismiss Euboulides’ remarks about his family as ‘beyond the matter at hand’.  
ἐὰν λέγω ὃν τρόπον οὗτος ἐργάζεται περιὼν ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ εἰκότως: ‘if I speak of 
the business which this man does as he goes about the city, and rightly so’. Euxitheos 
does not explicitly state what this ‘business’ was. If this information pertained to 
Euboulides’ official public duties, not only would it have been relevant to Euxitheos’ 
claim that his disfranchisement had occurred as a result of his opponent abusing his 
political office but it would have been yet another way for the speaker to successfully 
blacken his opponent’s reputation. Regrettably, though, Euxitheos provides no further 
details, claiming instead that the jurors would criticise him for recounting what was 
already generally known (see below). However, it is highly unlikely that the jury would 
have been familiar with Euboulides as a public figure and so it seems that Euxitheos’ 
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vagueness had another purpose. His ambiguity was likely a rhetorical strategy intended 
to would allow the jurors’ imaginations to run wild (cf. Dem. 21.79, 54.9; Aeschin. 1.55). 
ἃ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ἴστε, τί δεῖ λέγειν: ‘for what need is there to say what you already know?’. 
Euxitheos utilises this appeal to common knowledge several times throughout the speech, 
although such references need not even be true (see ὡς ὑμῶν ἴσασι πολλοί §8, and ταῦτα 
πάντες ἴσασιν οἱ πρεσβύτεροι at §60).  
[34] φανερὰν πᾶσιν: ‘seen by everybody’. Athenian ideology directed women of civic 
birth towards a life of domesticity and away from the public sphere. Xenophon explicitly 
states that it was more honourable for women to remain indoors rather than to be outside, 
whereas he directs men towards external pursuits (Oec. 7.30).150 Athenian women who 
were active outside of the home were undoubtedly susceptible to derogatory comments. 
In the case of the speaker’s mother, her visible employment in the public domain as a 
ribbon-seller has become the main subject of Euboulides’ slander. Moreover, by 
suggesting that Nicarete is ‘seen by everybody’, Euboulides has suggested that she is 
well-known and consequently casts aspersions on her respectability.151 Euboulides plays 
upon the established social ideal in his case against Euxitheos and, since the speaker 
cannot deny his mother’s activities in the ἀγορά, he must use their obvious nature to his 
                                                     
150 It would appear that, overall, public celebrations and religious ceremonies were acceptable instances 
during which female citizens could enter the predominantly male public domain: for wedding ceremonies 
(Isae. 8.18; Ar. Ach. 1056-68), funerary processions and to visit tombs (Dem. 43.63; Lys. 1.8), participation 
in sacrifices (Ar. Ach. 253, Lys. 643), and attendance at festivals (Isae. 3.80, 6.48, 8.19-20; Ar. Thesm. 
passim). Although citizen women could not make a case for themselves in court, they could indeed be 
brought physically into the court by a male relative in order to arouse the sympathy of the jury (Ar. Wealth, 
380; Aeschin. 2.148, 152; Pl. Ap. 34c-35b; Dem. 19.310, 21.99, 186, 25.85, 54.35). Elsewhere, the question 
of whether citizen women attended the theatre is still widely debated by scholars, whereas their presence at 
symposia would make them liable for social disdain (Ath. 588d). However, only well-to-do households 
could afford to send slaves to carry out the necessary chores of washing, fetching water, and shopping 
errands. In particular, shopping was a task that would have been ideally performed by servants (Lys. 1.8-
18) or by citizen husbands (Ar. Eccl. 817-22, Wasps, 493-9; Theophr. Char. 22.7). However, Athenian 
women would undoubtedly have to leave the confines of the oikos to carry out such chores themselves, in 
lower class households without the possession of slaves or indeed in the absence of their husbands due to 
political or military activities. 
151 According to a speech attributed to Pericles by the historian, Thucydides, ‘the greatest glory of a woman 
is to be least talked about by men, whether they are praising you or criticising you’ (Thuc. 2.46). In Athens, 
ἑταῖραι (prostitutes) were the quintessentially visible women; see Lape, Reproducing Athens, p. 76-9. 
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advantage by calling witnesses to them to testify that they know her to be a citizen woman 
nonetheless. Euxitheos also avails himself of Nicarete’s visibility to bolster his argument 
that there would have to be the necessary documentary evidence of her trading in the 
marketplace as a metic woman as a result of being so conspicuous (see below). 
τὰ τέλη ἐξετάσαντας τὰ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ: ‘they ought to have examined the tax register in 
the market’. The Athenian state was not only involved in the administration of the markets 
to benefit both the vendor and the buyer, but it applied a series of indirect taxations on 
wholesale and retail trade to benefit itself. Specifically in terms of retail trade, sales taxes 
and location duties for shops and stalls in the marketplace were among the revenues 
collected. Typically, taxes were ‘farmed’ out to the highest bidders (μισθοῦν: [Arist.] Ath. 
Pol. 47.2-5; Plut. Alc. 5.1) and, having paid a partial payment to the state, the successful 
buyer would strive to collect a greater tax than the amount he had paid.152 The whole 
process was probably overseen by the ἀγορανόμοι (market-controllers, [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 
51.1). The collection of these taxes presupposes the use of official lists or registers, kept 
constantly up to date, to record the payments made and those outstanding. 
εἰ ξενικὰ ἐτέλει: ‘if she paid the foreigner tax’. As detailed above at §31, Solon’s law 
originally forbade foreigners from doing business in the marketplace. But, possibly 
during Aristophon’s re-enactment of this law (τὸν Ἀριστοφῶντος at §32), a provision was 
introduced in order to allow metics who were willing to pay for the privilege of selling 
their wares in the marketplace in the form of a special tax, or ξενικά. While such a law 
did enable metics to trade alongside citizens, it nevertheless favoured Athenian producers 
and the state by limiting the external competition in the market to those able to pay into 
                                                     
152 G. J. Oliver, ‘The Economic Realities’, in A Companion to The Classical Greek World, p. 302. 
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the state treasury. Very little is known about the ξενικά;153 what is clear is that it was paid 
in addition to the required annual sum to legitimately live in the community, the μετοίκιον 
(for an overview of the metic’s tax, see ποῦ μετοίκιον καταθείς at §55). Given that this 
fixed tax would also have been farmed out annually (see above), one can presume that 
official lists were kept to track those who had paid and those who had not. If this was the 
case for the μετοίκιον, it was probably the same for the ξενικά (see καὶ ποδαπὴ ἦν 
ἐπιδεικνύντας below). Since the overt nature of their trade in the marketplace has 
contributed to Euxitheos’ disfranchisement, the lack of any record of them paying this tax 
or their registration would stand in their favour for this case. 
καὶ ποδαπὴ ἦν ἐπιδεικνύντας: ‘and to see if it shows what country she came from’. 
Euxitheos’ statement suggests that any payment records for the ξενικά may have indicated 
the country of origin for the metic listed. Metics were required to register with a deme but 
the actual procedure of enrolment remains obscure; it is not known if an equivalent deme 
register was kept for non-citizens (Themistocles’ decree implies that foreigners were 
registered with the polemarch: ML 23, 29-31).154 But, if indeed one existed, it could have 
been as problematic or even unreliable as the deme register (see τῶν γραμμάτων at §8). 
Thus, the records of the ξενικά could perhaps have served as an alternative for a register 
of resident foreigners (implied by IG II² 141, a decree which records the privilege of 
exemption from the μετοίκιον). Again, the lack of any record pertaining to Nicarete on 
                                                     
153  The ξενικά is not expressly attested elsewhere. In Aristophanes’ Acharnians, the character of 
Dicaeopolis offers to pay the market tax for the Boeotian with whom he is conversing, though it is expressly 
termed as ἀγορᾶς τέλος (896). It is possible that Dicaeopolis is simply referring to the general taxes exacted 
by the state on all traders in the marketplace, ἀγοραῖα τέλη ([Arist.] Oec. 2.1346a2). If that was the case, 
ξενικά may refer to a difference in the rate between the τέλη paid by metics and that paid by citizens. In his 
extensive examination of the place of metics in Athenian society, Whitehead briefly comments on the 
ξενικά as part of his analysis of the financial obligations laid on resident aliens, in The Ideology of the 
Athenian Metic, pp. 77-8.  
154 Based on M. H. Jameson’s notes on the fourth century BC copy of the decree, in ‘A Revised Text of the 
Decree of Themistokles from Troizen’, pp. 310-5. 
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such a list would support the speaker’s claim that Euboulides had brought a case against 
them based on slander. 
τὸν πριάμενον … τὸν ἀποδόμενον: ‘the man who bought her … the man who sold her’, 
referring first to her present owner and then to her previous owner. Euxitheos states that, 
if Nicarete was actually a slave, the men involved in either buying or selling her should 
testify to doing so before the jury. It would be preferable for the man having bought her 
to testify since he was readily purchasing her as a slave but, failing that, the man who had 
sold her would be sufficient to verify her status at the time of the sale. Notably, however, 
Euboulides has not been able to produce either as a witness and Euxitheos emphasises 
this as a deficiency in his case against him. 
This is the only reference in the speech to the status of slave. It is interesting that 
Euxitheos does not allege that he himself had been accused of being a slave (see τόν γε 
ξένον καὶ μέτοικον at §48 and ποῦ μετοίκιον καταθείς at §55).155 It seems most likely that 
Euboulides had never specifically accused either Euxitheos or his mother of being slaves, 
but rather he had sought to prove that they were of foreign descent. Euxitheos may have 
been exaggerating his opponents’ charges for rhetorical effect. 
ἀφείθη ἐλευθέρα: ‘she had been set free’. Rather than being afforded full citizen rights, 
an emancipated slave who chose to remain in Athens could only register as a metic. In 
order to attain this status, the freed slave required the consent of their former owner to be 
their προστάτης (citizen sponsor). One would expect that, if Euboulides had actually 
made a serious allegation that Nicarete was a freedwoman, it would have been easy to 
produce her sponsor as a witness for his case. 
                                                     
155 For the harshness of a penalty of enslavement for a man like Euxitheos, who was not alleged to be a 
slave, see Introduction, pp. 43-9. 
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τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ὁ συκοφάντης: ‘For this is what a sykophant is’. As detailed at §32 (see 
τοὺς συκοφαντοῦντας πονηρούς), sykophancy was the practice of using the state’s legal 
system for illegitimate personal advantage and engaging in prosecutions solely for 
financial gain. Unlike the previous reference, here Euxitheos directly calls Euboulides a 
sykophant. According to the speaker, the definition of a sykophant is one who makes all 
kinds of accusations, without proving them. The labelling of one’s opponent as a 
sykophant was common practice in the lawcourts, a technique designed to create a 
negative portrayal of an opponent which suited the speaker’s case (Lys. 25.3; Aeschin. 
2.145; Lycourg. 1.31). Identifying Euboulides as a sykophant to the court serves to further 
Euxitheos’ argument that the charges against him are false. 
[35] ὅτι ἐτίτθευσεν: ‘that she was a wet-nurse’. Euboulides’ accusations, according to 
Euxitheos, focused on what Nicarete did rather than who she really was. As we have seen 
at §34, her occupation in the ἀγορά has been the main subject of his attack on Euxitheos. 
Here, the speaker specifies that her past employment as a wet-nurse was also used in 
Euboulides’ accusations against her. The trend of employing a nurse to both feed and rear 
children was all the more widespread in the Classical period than in other phases in 
Athenian history. This seems to be reflected in Plato’s description of the ideal state in the 
Republic, wherein citizen wives are wholly relieved of the chore of nursing their own 
children (Pl. Rep. 373c). Notably, in this passage, Plato differentiates between the 
requirement of citizen women for τίτθαι (wet-nurses), and τροφοί (dry-nurses). Neither 
role required any professional training. Indeed, the only prerequisite for τίτθαι was that 
they had to have children of their own. In subsequent years, many of these women 
probably went on to serve as τροφοί. For the most part, it would seem that the role of the 
τίτθη was occupied by foreigners (Amycla, the Spartan wet-nurse of Alcibiades, in Plut. 
Alc. 1.2, Lyc. 16.3) and slaves (the unnamed freed wet-nurse in [Dem.] 47.55-6). 
Although Nicarete stands as the only surviving example of a citizen τίτθη in the source 
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material, it makes the existence of others more likely. Moreover, while Euxitheos must 
later acknowledge the lowly nature of this occupation (see ταπεινὸν at §45),156 he presents 
wet-nursing as an opportunity through which citizen women in situations like Nicarete’s 
could and did earn a legitimate living for their services (see §§42 and 45). 
ὅτε ἡ πόλις ἠτύχει καὶ πάντες κακῶς ἔπραττον: ‘when the city suffered misfortune and 
everyone fared badly’. To account for Nicarete’s employment as a wet-nurse, the speaker 
alludes to Athenian misfortunes at that time. Lacey estimates that this was the period of 
405-3 BC, when siege, starvation, and civil war befell the city.157 But Lacey fails to take 
into account the possibility that these misfortunes could easily refer to the first decades 
of the fourth century, when the aftermath of the war continued to have a negative impact 
on economic and social conditions. The sources confirm the poverty experienced by 
Athens in this later period (Lys. 19.11, 50, 28.3, 11) and that the city was under threat 
from other Greek states (Lys. 30.22; Xen. Hell. 5.1.29). In light of this evidence, and the 
most likely date of 395 BC for Thoucritos’ marriage to Nicarete (see Θούκριτον τὸν 
πατέρα τὸν ἐμόν at §41), it seems most plausible that Euxitheos is referring to Athenian 
misfortunes of the 390s BC. The speaker will reiterate this widespread suffering again in 
a later passage (see ὑπὸ τῶν τῆς πόλεως κατ᾽ ἐκείνους τοὺς χρόνους συμφορῶν at §45). 
Euxitheos deliberately utilises the fact that everybody was suffering during this period in 
order to strengthen his defence of his mother’s past occupation.  
                                                     
156  Jones argues that juries in the fourth century BC were predominantly middle class, in Athenian 
Democracy, pp. 36-8, and 123-4. It certainly seems that the values ascribed to the jurors by the fourth 
century orators were middle class, and distinguishable from those of larger working class and tradesmen 
(Dem. 21.98, 123, 213; Lys. 28.3). K. J. Dover also finds in favour of a similar view and stresses that any 
poorer men of the jury would have been flattered to be classed amongst a more prosperous group of men, 
in Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle, pp. 34-5. S. C. Todd has analysed the 
conclusions of both Jones and Dover and, after examining the ancient sources, he deduces that the bulk of 
the Athenian juries were composed of farmers, including both gentlemen farmers and subsistence farmers, 
in ‘Lady Chatterly’s Lover and the Attic Orators’, pp. 148-70. In light of the evidence concerning the typical 
jury, it is easy to see how Euxitheos must specifically appeal to Athenians belonging to a middle-income 
group and acknowledge their prejudices with regard to his mother’s lowly employment in trade as both a 
wet-nurse and a ribbon-seller, in order to ingratiate himself with the majority of those listening. 
157 Lacey, ‘The Family of Euxitheus (Demosthenes LVII)’, p. 59. See also nn. 74 and 182. 
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ἃς ὑμῖν καὶ κατ᾽ ὄνομα, ἐὰν βούλησθε, ἐροῦμεν: ‘who I will identify by name to you, 
if you wish’. Euxitheos states that he knows of many women of civic birth still publicly 
undertaking the role of wet-nurse. Deliberately, though, orators sought to avoid naming 
respectable Athenian women in court who were still alive at the time of the speech.158 
Still, cases do exist wherein some women were expressly identified if it was absolutely 
necessary for the success of the case and especially if they were connected with the 
speaker’s opponent (Dem. 18.130, 284, 19.281, 39.9, 40.27, 42.27, 43.29; [Dem.] 59.1, 
50, 121; Isae. 3.2, 30, 32, 60, 6.13-14; Andoc. 1.16, 127; cf. ἐμοὶ γάρ ἐστιν μήτηρ 
Νικαρέτη Δαμοστράτου θυγάτηρ Μελιτέως at §68). Here, Euxitheos offers to do just that 
and name examples of other citizen women in the same situation as Nicarete, should the 
jury wish it (for the unfulfilled promise, see §16). Although this was probably only a 
rhetorical offer, his confident manner pertaining to the number of Athenian women 
involved in wet-nursing is highly significant for confirming their employment in this role 
as a whole. 
[36] μηδαμῶς, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, τοὺς πένητας ἀτιμάζετε (ἱκανὸν γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὸ 
πένεσθαι κακόν): ‘Do not, men of the jury, dishonour the poor (for their poverty is a 
sufficient evil)’. Euxitheos appeals to the jurors’ emotions, urging them to have pity on 
impoverished citizens rather than shaming them further for their misfortunes. If he can 
prevail upon their compassion, the speaker can thereby create resentment against his 
opponent for his deliberate degradation of such poor citizens. In Against Conon, Ariston 
makes a similar attempt to arouse the jury’s pity, casting himself as the victim of an 
unprovoked attack and one who stands to be further disgraced should he lose his suit 
(Dem. 54.43). Euxitheos, however, stands to lose his citizen status if, as he claims, 
                                                     
158 See n. 37. 
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Euboulides’ social prejudices are one of the issues which brought about his 
disfranchisement. 
μηδέ γε τοὺς ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ζῆν ἐκ τοῦ δικαίου προαιρουμένους: ‘nor indeed those 
choosing to work and to live honestly’. Anticipating that the jury may have held similar 
social prejudices, the speaker does not deny that such occupations are held in low regard 
(see ζῆν οὐχ ὅντινα τρόπον βουλόμεθα at §31). He nevertheless implores the jury to 
recognise them as much more preferable to those that lack any sort of decency and 
respectability, for example those working as ἑταῖραι. 
ἐὰν ὑμῖν ἐπιδεικνύω τῆς μητρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους οἵους προσήκει εἶναι ἀνθρώποις 
ἐλευθέροις: ‘if I show you that my mother’s relatives are such men as is fitting for free 
citizens to be’. Both here and at §69 (see καὶ ἐμαυτὸν ἐπέδειξα πάντων μετειληφότα ὅσων 
προσήκει τοὺς ἐλευθέρους), the term ἐλεύθεροι must specifically refer to citizen males, 
not merely free men, given that the speaker needs to prove his citizen status in spite of 
his engagement in menial labour alongside his mother.159 
[37] Δαμόστρατος Μελιτεύς: ‘Damostratos of Melite’. Melite was an urban deme of 
the tribe Cecropis, located within the Themistoclean walls to the west of the Acropolis 
(Strabo, 1.4.7).160 It extended from the Athenian ἀγορά towards the Pnyx and, on the other 
side, out the Panathenaic Way.161 Interestingly, Whitehead’s survey from the last quarter 
of the fifth century to the last quarter of the fourth revealed that Melite had the highest 
                                                     
159 W. L. Newman was the first to suggest that ἐλευθερία occasionally has the meaning of ‘citizen birth’, 
rather than just ‘free birth’, in The Politics of Aristotle Vol. I, p. 24 n. 1, Vol. IV, p. 173. Wyse concurs with 
Newman’s explanation, citing a passage from Aeschines (3.169) in addition to the two examples provided 
by Demosthenes’ Against Euboulides, in The Speeches of Isaeus, p. 281; cf. Rhodes, A Commentary on the 
Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia, p. 499, and pp. 501-2. 
160 Cecropis was also the tribe of one of the demes of Halae: Halae Aexonides, see τῇ δ᾽ ἀδελφῇ αὐτοῦ 
συνοικησάσῃ Διοδώρῳ Ἁλαιεῖ at §38. 
161 G. V. Lalonde, ‘IG I³ 1055 B and the Boundary of Melite and Kollytos’, p. 116. 
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concentration of attested metics. 162  Since Damostratos I hailed from this deme, the 
accusation that his daughter Nicarete was of metic status may have been more reasonable 
than his grandson Euxitheos would have the jury believe. For Damostratos I’s dates, 
Davies’ estimation that he must have been born before 460 BC, and that he cannot have 
lived long into the fourth century, seems to be the most plausible.163 
ἐκ μὲν ἧς τὸ πρῶτον ἔσχεν γυναικὸς θυγάτηρ καὶ υἱὸς ᾧ ὄνομ᾽ Ἀμυθέων: ‘from his 
first wife he had a daughter and a son who is named Amytheon’. Damostratos I had two 
children by his first wife, a daughter and a son called Amytheon. Amytheon, at least, was 
born before 433 BC (see τῶν ἐν Σικελίᾳ στρατευσαμένων καὶ τελευτησάντων below). 
Although the son is named, the names of both mother and daughter are typically not 
given.164 However, the husband and son of this daughter are named in the subsequent 
passage (see §38). Damostratos I’s son and daughter were homopatric siblings to Nicarete, 
and uncle and aunt to Euxitheos. 
ἐκ δὲ τῆς ὕστερον, Χαιρεστράτης: ‘and from his second wife, Chaerestrate’. Euxitheos 
freely names Damostratos I’s second wife. Litigants in courts cases were apparently 
willing to name Athenian women after their deaths and, thus, it would explain why 
Euxitheos mentions the name of his grandmother Chaerestrate but not his grandfather’s 
first wife or his aunt from that union (cf. his reference to Lysarete at §§20-1).165 Following 
Davies’ assessment, it seems most likely that the marriage between Damostratos I and 
Chaerestrate took place sometime before 420 BC.166 
                                                     
162 Seventy-five in total, see Whitehead, The Demes of Attica, p. 83. 
163 Davies, Athenian Propertied Families, p. 93. All the names listed in this and subsequent passages are 
arranged in Table 2, pp. 268-9. 
164 See n. 37. 
165 See n. 88. 
166 Davies, Athenian Propertied Families, p. 94. 
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ἡ μήτηρ ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ Τιμοκράτης: ‘my mother and Timocrates’. Because Nicarete’s status 
has been called into question, Euxitheos must prove her legitimate citizen descent to the 
jury by detailing her familial relationships. She is referred to frequently throughout his 
speech but, since it was not socially acceptable to name respectable Athenian women in 
court, the speaker only names her on one occasion and specifically in accordance with 
the δοκιμασία format he has adopted for the conclusion to his speech (see ἐμοὶ γάρ ἐστιν 
μήτηρ Νικαρέτη Δαμοστράτου θυγάτηρ Μελιτέως at §68). Since they share the same 
parents, Damostratos I and Chaerestrate, Timocrates is a full brother to Nicarete and uncle 
to Euxitheos. 
τῷ μὲν Ἀμυθέωνι Δαμόστρατος: ‘Amytheon had Damostratos’. Amytheon was 
Nicarete’s homopatric half-brother, born from her father’s first marriage. Amytheon’s 
son, Damostratos II, was therefore a nephew to Nicarete and a first cousin to Euxitheos 
under Attic kinship ties. 
τοῦ πάππου τοὔνομ᾽ ἔχων: ‘having the same name as his grandfather’. Damostratos II 
was named after his paternal grandfather. In Against Boiotos I, the speaker Mantitheos 
claims that his half-brother has usurped his name because he alleges that he is the elder 
of the two and thus he has the right to the name of their paternal grandfather: ἀξιοῖ δ᾽ 
αὐτὸς ὡς δὴ πρεσβύτερος ὢν τοὔνομ᾽ ἔχειν τὸ τοῦ πρὸς πατρὸς πάππου (Dem. 39.27). It 
would seem that the eldest son was usually named after his paternal grandfather and 
subsequent children after other relatives.167 Thus it is likely that Damostratos II was the 
eldest male child of Amytheon (see below). 
                                                     
167 A second son would often take the name of his maternal grandfather. As such, either Callistratos or 
Dexitheos may have bore the name of their mother’s father. But this naming convention was not a universal 
rule. Cleisthenes was the eldest son born to Megacles and Agariste circa 570 BC, and was named after his 
maternal grandfather (Hdt. 6.131). Similarly, Euxitheos seemingly was the first born son of Thoucritos and 
Nicarete and was given the name of one of his mother’s relatives, probably his great grandfather (see §§39-
40). 
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Καλλίστρατος καὶ Δεξίθεος: ‘Callistratos and Dexitheos’. Euxitheos also refers to two 
other sons of Amytheon, Callistratos and Dexitheos, who were likewise nephews to 
Nicarete and first cousins to the speaker. Both of these men had died by 346/5 BC, as the 
speaker states that Damostratos II is the only surviving son of Amytheon who could be a 
witness on his behalf (§38).168 
τῶν ἐν Σικελίᾳ στρατευσαμένων καὶ τελευτησάντων: ‘among those who served and 
died in Sicily’. The speaker refers to the unsuccessful Sicilian Expedition which the 
Athenians made during the Peloponnesian War. He not only informs the jury that 
Amytheon served as a soldier during this expedition but also that he died there. Euxitheos 
probably included this detail of his uncle losing his life while performing his military duty 
for the state in order to curry favour with the jury. Given that the minimum age for military 
service was eighteen years old and the dates for the Sicilian Expedition are 415-13 BC, 
Amytheon must have been born before 433 BC. Moreover, if one takes Damostratos II to 
be the eldest of Amytheon’s sons and Dexitheos to be the youngest (taking the order in 
which Euxitheos identifies them to be correct with regard to the sequence of their birth), 
the former must have been at least in his early seventies at the time of Euxitheos’ trial (a 
reckoning based on the latest date of the expedition, 413 BC, and of the trial, 345 BC). 
τέθαπται ἐν τοῖς δημοσίοις μνήμασιν: ‘has been buried in the public burial mounds’. 
These public burial mounds were located in Athens. Unlike other Greek states which 
carried out the practice of burying their dead on the battlefield, Thucydides relates that 
the πάτριος νόμος (ancestral custom) of the Athenians was to bring the bones of their 
dead back to the city for burial in a public ceremony at the state’s expense, with the only 
exception being those who died at Marathon in 490 BC and Plataea in 479 BC on account 
                                                     
168 Davies notes that Callistratos had a son, Callimachos, who died at a young age circa 360 BC (IG II² 
6857, 1-3), in Athenian Propertied Families, p. 94. Although Euxitheos refers to this man’s deceased father, 
he must have felt no need to make mention of Callimachos. 
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of their remarkable bravery (for Marathon, see Thuc. 2.34; for Plataea, see Hdt. 9.85 and 
Plut. Arist. 21). Such public recognition for those who died in battle was endorsed under 
the democratic state and, moreover, the ability to tend to one’s dead and to perform the 
customary rites was intrinsically tied to Athenian family life.169 These mounds were 
located in a suburb of Athens, in a part of the Kerameikos which was outside the city’s 
gates. Pausanias, writing in the second century AD, asserts that he saw the public burial 
mounds and specifically the monument for the men who perished in Sicily (Paus. 1.29.4, 
11).  
[38] τῇ δ᾽ ἀδελφῇ αὐτοῦ συνοικησάσῃ Διοδώρῳ Ἁλαιεῖ: ‘And to Amytheon’s sister, 
having married Diodoros of Halae’. Both Amytheon’s mother and sister remain 
unidentified (see ἐκ μὲν ἧς τὸ πρῶτον ἔσχεν γυναικὸς θυγάτηρ καὶ υἱὸς ᾧ ὄνομ᾽ Ἀμυθέων 
at §37). Instead, Euxitheos informs the jury that Amytheon’s sister married Diodoros 
from the deme of Halae. There were two demes of this name: Halae Araphenides lay on 
the east coast of Attica between Brauron and Araphen, and Halae Aexonides was situated 
on the western coast just south of the deme Aexone.170 Halae Araphenides belonged to 
the tribe Aegeis (like the deme of Plotheia, see Ἀπολλόδωρος Πλωθεύς below), and Halae 
Aexonides to the tribe Cecropis (the same tribe as the deme of Melite, see Δαμόστρατος 
Μελιτεύς above, §37).171 Davies estimates that, from the age of their son Ctesibios (see 
below), the marriage must have taken place by 408 BC, but a date circa 420 BC or earlier 
                                                     
169 D. Kurtz and J. Boardman, Greek Burial Customs, p. 143. See also Garland, The Greek Way of Death, 
pp. 89-93. 
170 Traill, The Political Organization of Attica, p. 124. 
171 Unfortunately, there is no evidence to confirm which Halae was Diodoros’ home deme. It is possible 
that he was the ancestor of a well-known cavalry family from Halae Aexonides, which was prominent in 
Athens from the late second century BC until the first century AD (IG II² 1961, 3, 13); it seems unlikely, 
however, given the lack of evidence provided by any of Diodoros’ family during Euxitheos’ appeal and 
indeed such an absence may rather suggest that this family died out circa 370 BC, see n. 173 below. 
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is possible and even likely if she was similar in age to Amytheon (see ἐκ μὲν ἧς τὸ πρῶτον 
ἔσχεν γυναικὸς θυγάτηρ καὶ υἱὸς ᾧ ὄνομ᾽ Ἀμυθέων at §37).172 
υἱὸς γίγνεται Κτησίβιος: ‘a son was born named Ctesibios’. Amytheon’s anonymous 
sister and Diodoros had a son together, named Ctesibios. 173  Since his mother was 
Nicarete’s homopatric sister, Ctesibios was a nephew to Nicarete and a first cousin to 
Euxitheos under Attic kinship ties. 
οὗτος μὲν ἐτελεύτησεν ἐν Ἀβύδῳ μετὰ Θρασυβούλου στρατευόμενος: ‘this man died 
in Abydos serving with Thrasyboulos’. A certain Thrasyboulos of the deme of Collytos 
is reported by Xenophon as joining the Athenian contingent at Abydos, on the shore of 
the Hellespont, where he performed unsuccessfully in 387 BC (Hell. 5.1.25-6). 174 
Another Thrasyboulos from the deme of Steiria is reported as being in the east Aegean 
circa 389/8 BC (Xen. Hell. 4.8.25-31), but Xenophon does not make any direct 
connection between him and Abydos as he does with Thrasyboulos of Collytos (Hell. 
4.8.25-6).175 Taking Euxitheos to be referring to Thrasyboulos of Collytos, this man is 
most noteworthy for his opposition to Alcibiades and for his contribution to restoring the 
Athenian democracy (Plut. Alc. 36.1-2; Aeschin. 3.138; Dem. 24.134). If Ctesibios was 
at least the minimum age for military service when he joined Thrasyboulos’ campaign in 
387 BC, he must have been born no later than 405 BC. 
                                                     
172 Davies, Athenian Propertied Families, p. 155. 
173 Davies notes that there was another son born to Diodoros and Damostratos I’s daughter: a gravestone 
bearing the name of Sosistratos, son of Diodoros of Halae, and his wife Phanocleia dates to the period 390-
365 BC (IG II² 5520), in Athenian Propertied Families, pp. 155-6. Although this Sosistratos may be safely 
regarded as another son, the speaker makes no reference to him or any offspring. This would suggest that 
Diodoros’ line ended with the death of Ctesibios in Abydos (see οὗτος μὲν ἐτελεύτησεν ἐν Ἀβύδῳ μετὰ 
Θρασυβούλου στρατευόμενος at §38). 
174 Collytos was a medium-sized deme, within the city walls just south of the Acropolis and Areopagos, 
and was affiliated with the Attic tribe Aegeis (Strabo, 1.4.7). See Traill, The Political Organization of Attica, 
p. 40. Collytos was the deme of the philosopher, Plato (Diog. Laert. 3.3). 
175 The deme of Steiria was located on the eastern coast of Attica between Prasiae and Brauron (Strabo, 
9.1.22). See Traill, The Political Organization of Attica, p. 43. 
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ὁ Δαμόστρατος: ‘Damostratos’. This is Damostratos II, the only surviving son of 
Amytheon at the time of Euxitheos’ case (see τῷ μὲν Ἀμυθέωνι Δαμόστρατος at §37). 
τῆς δὲ Χαιρεστράτης τῆς ἐμῆς τήθης τὴν ἀδελφὴν: ‘the sister of my grandmother 
Chaerestrate’. Unlike his presumably deceased grandmother (see ἐκ δὲ τῆς ὕστερον, 
Χαιρεστράτης at §37), Euxitheos avoids naming her sister in accordance with court 
etiquette regarding respectable Athenian women who were still alive. This unidentified 
woman was the speaker’s great aunt. 
Ἀπολλόδωρος Πλωθεύς: ‘Apollodoros of Plotheia’. Apollodoros was from the deme of 
Plotheia, a small deme located on the north-eastern slope of Mount Pentelicon and 
affiliated with the Aegeis tribe (like the eastern deme of Halae, see τῇ δ᾽ ἀδελφῇ αὐτοῦ 
συνοικησάσῃ Διοδώρῳ Ἁλαιεῖ above). 176  This Apollodoros I married Nicarete’s 
unnamed maternal aunt (see above), in all likelihood before the end of the fifth century 
BC.177 
τούτων γίγνεται Ὀλύμπιχος: ‘Olympichos was born to them’. Apollodoros I and 
Chaerestrate’s anonymous sister had a son, named Olympichos.178 Olympichos was a first 
cousin to Nicarete and a first cousin once removed to Euxitheos, but he had already died 
by the time of the appeal. 
τοῦ δ᾽ Ὀλυμπίχου Ἀπολλόδωρος: ‘and a son Apollodoros to Olympichos’. Euxitheos 
states that Olympichos had a son named Apollodoros II, after his paternal grandfather as 
was customary (see τοῦ πάππου τοὔνομ᾽ ἔχων at §37). Since Euxitheos further specifies 
                                                     
176 See Traill, The Political Organization of Attica, p. 41. 
177 Davies, Athenian Propertied Families, p. 94. 
178 Besides Olympichos, Davies refers to another son of theirs, in Athenian Propertied Families, p. 94. He 
cites a fragment of a gravestone published by Meritt, which dates to the first half of the fourth century BC, 
and records the death of another son, named either Diodoros or Theodoros; see ‘Greek Inscriptions’ (1961), 
p. 275 n. 121. 
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that Apollodoros II was still living, this man must have been one of the witnesses who 
appeared in court. The speaker and Apollodoros II were second cousins. 
ΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΣ: ‘[WITNESSES]’. In both this and the previous passage, Euxitheos has 
identified a significant number of his mother’s kin, extending through several demes. Yet 
the only witnesses that he calls at this stage are Damostratos II (see §37) and Apollodoros 
II (above). These men are related to Nicarete through her father and her mother 
respectively (in contrast to Euxitheos’ subsequent witnesses, see §39). 
[39] διομνυμένων: ‘swearing under oath’, cf. διομνυμένων at §22. 
τὸν δὲ {καὶ ὁμομήτριον} καὶ κατ᾽ ἀμφότερ᾽ ἡμῖν συγγενῆ καλῶ: ‘and I will also call 
the man who is related to us on both sides’. Dilts follows Blass in considering καὶ 
ὁμομήτριον to be spurious.179 It does appear to be a corruption of the text since Euxitheos 
reveals that he will now call witnesses who are related to him through both of Nicarete’s 
parents. In the previous passage, the speaker summoned witnesses who were related to 
Nicarete through only one of her parents (see ΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΣ at §38). 
τῷ γὰρ Τιμοκράτει: ‘For Timocrates’. Timocrates was Nicarete’s brother by the same 
father and mother, Damostratos I and Chaerestrate. He was thus an uncle to the speaker 
(see ἡ μήτηρ ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ Τιμοκράτης at §37). 
γίγνεται Εὐξίθεος: ‘had a son Euxitheos’. The speaker’s first cousin, the son of his 
mother’s brother Timocrates, was also named Euxitheos. Since Nicarete and Timocrates 
shared the same parents, it would be likely that they would name their children after a 
common relative. Both men could be named after one of their great grandfathers, either 
Damostratos I’s father or Chaerestrate’s father, whose names are not given in the speech 
                                                     
179 Dilts (ed.), Demosthenis Orationes IV, p. 264; cf. Rennie (ed.), Demosthenis Orationes III (1963), p. 
263. For Blass’ edition, Demosthenis Orationes III, p. 259. 
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but one of which could very well have been called Euxitheos (see τοῦ πάππου τοὔνομ᾽ 
ἔχων at §37).  
τοῦ δ᾽ Εὐξιθέου τρεῖς υἱεῖς· οὗτοι πάντες ζῶσιν: ‘and there are three sons to Euxitheos; 
and all these men are living’. These sons, first cousins once removed to the speaker, are 
not named. From this statement, it would appear that the father of these men, Euxitheos, 
was not included with those reported as still living since he is not named as having given 
testimony at the close of the speech (see §68). 
τοὺς ἐπιδημοῦντας αὐτῶν: ‘those who are in town’. This detail may suggest that not all 
of Euxitheos’ sons were present in Athens to bear witness for the speaker, cf. εἶτα τοῦ 
ἑτέρου ἀδελφιδοῦ δύο υἱοί at §68. Though it was possible for an absentee witness to give 
his testimony in the form of ἐκμαρτυρία (see οὐδὲ μαρτυρεῖν ἀκοὴν ἐῶσιν οἱ νόμοι at §4), 
there is no indication by Euxitheos that this is what his missing relative has done. 
[40] τὰς τῶν φρατέρων τῶν συγγενῶν τῶν τῆς μητρὸς καὶ δημοτῶν μαρτυρίας: 
‘depositions from the phratry members of my mother’s relatives and from the demesmen’. 
Since the possession of citizen rights depended on Athenian descent through the female 
line as well as the male,180 the account taken of women by the phratry is significant in a 
case concerning legitimacy. The extent of female involvement in family life is difficult 
to assess since procedures appear to have varied from phratry to phratry. Athenian women 
could be introduced to their father’s phratries as children, 181  but they were more 
commonly received by their husband’s phratries at the γαμηλία (marriage feast; see οἷς 
τὴν γαμηλίαν εἰσήνεγκεν ὑπὲρ τῆς μητρὸς ὁ πατήρ at §43). But what exactly a woman’s 
                                                     
180 See Introduction, pp. 21-5. 
181 Isaeus’ On The Estate of Pyrrhos presents crucial evidence for their introduction: the speaker suggests 
that it could be the law of a particular phratry for a father to introduce his legitimate daughter (3.76), and 
he specifically states that fathers intending their daughters to be ἐπίκληροι (heiresses) were presented to 
their phratry (3.73; for a discussion of the significance of ἐπίκληροι, see ἐπικλήρου δὲ κληρονομήσας 
εὐπόρου at §41). 
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association with either her father’s or her husband’s phratry meant in practice cannot be 
determined;182 it is only clear that they were not regarded as actual members of phratries. 
Even if Nicarete was introduced to her father’s phratry (which one would expect the 
speaker to mention if she had been), she was not a member in her own right and Euxitheos 
provides depositions from the phratry members of his mother’s male relatives in order to 
confirm their legitimate citizen birth and thus, by indirect means, Nicarete’s. 183 The 
demesmen, undoubtedly from her father’s deme of Melite (see Δαμόστρατος Μελιτεύς at 
§37), could also testify to her relatives’ successful enrolment in their group.184 
ὧν τὰ μνήματα ταὐτά: ‘those who share the same burial mounds’. Cf. §§28, 67 and 70. 
ἀστήν: ‘that she is a citizen’, cf. ἀστὴν ταύτην καὶ πολῖτιν εἶναι at §43. 
Πρωτομάχου: ‘Protomachos’. Building as much support as possible, Euxitheos extends 
his evidence to before his mother’s marriage to his father. This is his first mention of 
Nicarete’s first husband, Protomachos. Their daughter (see θυγάτηρ below) was the 
speaker’s half-sister. In a subsequent passage, Euxitheos reveals that Protomachos 
divorced his mother in order to marry an ἐπίκληρος (see ἐπικλήρου δὲ κληρονομήσας 
εὐπόρου at §41) and he then had several children with his second wife (the sons from this 
union stand as witnesses for Euxitheos, see τοὺς τοῦ Πρωτομάχου υἱεῖς at §43). 
αὐτὴν ὁ Τιμοκράτης ὁμομήτριος καὶ ὁμοπάτριος ὢν ἀδελφὸς ἔδωκεν: ‘Timocrates … 
being my mother’s brother from the same father and mother … gave her in marriage’. 
Nicarete’s father was presumably dead by the time of her marriage to Protomachos and 
                                                     
182  Although Lambert estimates that women may have participated in phratry cult activities, in roles 
comparable to those which they had in the religious life of the deme and the polis as a whole, in The 
Phratries of Attica, p. 186. 
183 Isaeus’ On the Estate of Ciron carries a similar implication: the speaker calls witnesses to his mother’s 
wedding and to the fact that her son was accepted into his father’s phratry as proof of her legitimate status 
(8.18-20). 
184 For the association between a deme and the female kin of its members, see Appendix 4, p. 291. 
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therefore Timocrates gave his sister in marriage, acting as her κύριος ([Dem.] 46.18 
specifies that Athenian law required a woman to be betrothed by her father and, if not, by 
a homopatric brother or by her grandfather on her father’s side: ἣν ἂν ἐγγυήσῃ ἐπὶ δικαίοις 
δάμαρτα εἶναι ἢ πατὴρ ἢ ἀδελφὸς ὁμοπάτωρ ἢ πάππος ὁ πρὸς πατρός, ἐκ ταύτης εἶναι 
παῖδας γνησίους; cf. Dem. 44.49).185 As previously attested by the speaker, Nicarete had 
two brothers, Timocrates and Amytheon. Whereas Amytheon was born from Damostratos 
I’s first marriage (see ἐκ μὲν ἧς τὸ πρῶτον ἔσχεν γυναικὸς θυγάτηρ καὶ υἱὸς ᾧ ὄνομ᾽ 
Ἀμυθέων at §37), Timocrates and Nicarete were born from his second marriage to 
Chaerestrate (see ἡ μήτηρ ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ Τιμοκράτης at §37). Since they shared the same 
mother and father, it was more appropriate for Timocrates to be Nicarete’s κύριος rather 
than her older homopatric sibling Amytheon. 
θυγάτηρ: ‘a daughter’. Euxitheos informs the jury that Nicarete had a daughter by her 
first husband, Protomachos (see Πρωτομάχου above). This unnamed daughter was the 
eldest of those born from this union (for other children who must have subsequently died 
see παῖδας ποιησάμενος at §43).186 Euxitheos refers to his homometric sibling as his sister 
(τὴν ἀδελφὴν λαβόντα τὴν ἐμὴν at §43 and οἱ Πρωτομάχου υἱεῖς … τὴν ἀδελφὴν τὴν 
ἐμὴν at §68), and calls both her husband and her son before the jury as his witnesses (§43). 
εἶτα ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ ἐμοῦ ἐγώ: ‘then she had me by my father’. The phrasing here 
suggests that Euxitheos was the first child born of the marriage between Thoucritos and 
Nicarete. The speaker had previously stated that there were four other sons born to his 
mother and father (see ἔτι τοίνυν παίδων αὐτῷ τεττάρων γενομένων ὁμομητρίων at §28). 
                                                     
185 Davies suggests that this marriage took place during the 390s BC, because Thoucritos must have been 
an adult to assume this role, in Athenian Propertied Families, p. 94. 
186 For the Athenian avoidance of naming respectable women’s names in court while they were still living, 
see n. 37. 
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τὸν Κλεινίαν: ‘Cleinias’. Cleinias, son of Cleidicos (see τὸν Κλεινίαν τὸν τοῦ Κλειδίκου 
at §42), was born circa 390 BC.187 Euxitheos informs the jury that his mother served as a 
wet-nurse for this child. As an adult and witness for Euxitheos during his appeal, Cleinias 
presumably confirmed that his family had hired Nicarete as a citizen wet-nurse during his 
testimony at §44. 
τὸ τιτθεῦσαι τὴν μητέρα: ‘my mother being a wet-nurse’. See ὅτι ἐτίτθευσεν at §35. 
ταῦτα πάντα ἐγὼ σαφῶς ὑμῖν διηγήσομαι: ‘all these things I will describe to you 
clearly’. By detailing how Protomachos arranged for Thoucritos to take Nicarete as his 
wife, Euxitheos pre-empts any suspicion that he is digressing from the issue of Nicarete’s 
menial employment as a wet-nurse (first raised at §35). 
[41] ὁ Πρωτόμαχος πένης ἦν: ‘Protomachos was a poor man’. In the previous passage, 
Euxitheos revealed that his mother was married to Protomachos before she married his 
father (see Πρωτομάχου at §40). Euxitheos must explain why his father divorced Nicarete 
in order to avoid raising doubt about her citizen status. He provides the jury with the 
legitimate reason that Protomachos was entitled to marry an ἐπίκληρος (see below).  
ἐπικλήρου δὲ κληρονομήσας εὐπόρου: ‘but because he was acquiring the inheritance of 
a wealthy epiklēros’. Although the term ἐπίκληρος is often translated as ‘heiress’, the 
daughter of an Athenian citizen or even a metic was not entitled to inherit her father’s 
property in her own right if he died without leaving a male heir. She was, however, the 
means through which it was passed to an heir as possession of the estate was obtained 
through her hand in marriage, until sons born from that union came of age to inherit it 
(the term ἐπίκληρος literally refers to the ‘one attached to the estate’; Isae. 3.74). If a man 
                                                     
187 Davies also discusses the ultimately unlikely possibility that Cleinias was related to the family of 
Alcibiades, in Athenian Propertied Families, p. 14. 
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died intestate, leaving only a female child, Athenian law stated that the nearest surviving 
male relative (ἀγχιστεύς) should marry her, keeping the deceased man’s property in the 
family; he would then have a certain control over the property until a son from that union 
came of age ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 56.6-7; cf. Lys. 15.3; Isae. 3.46; Dem. 35.48, 37.33, 43.74). 
Should the nearest male relative decline his claim to the inheritance, the right to her hand 
descended in the order of a defined group of relations or ἀγχιστεία (cf. Isae. 3.74). In a 
case of more than one relative claiming a citizen ἐπίκληρος, the eponymous archōn 
adjudicated between the men in a process known as ἐπιδικασία ([Dem.] 46.22). Such 
marriages were equally as valid as those brought about by dowries and formal betrothals 
(Isae. 6.14; see ἐγγυᾶται below). If the ἐπίκληρος was already married to a man other than 
her father’s adopted heir, it could be insisted on that she divorce her husband (if she had 
no children by him who could claim the property themselves when they reached maturity) 
to ensure that the estate remained within the family (Isae. 3.64).188 The same appears to 
be true for the potential groom, as here Euxitheos relates how Protomachos had to divorce 
Nicarete in order to take possession of the ἐπίκληρος and thus the estate that went with 
her. By stating that Protomachos was a poor man (see ὁ Πρωτόμαχος πένης ἦν above), 
the speaker makes it clear that his reason for divorcing Nicarete was solely financial and 
had nothing to do with doubt regarding her citizen status. 
πείθει: ‘persuaded’. The verb πείθω is often used to denote a financial incentive (Hdt. 8.4, 
134, 9.33; Thuc. 1.37.2, 2.96.2; Xen. An. 1.3.19; Lys. 7.21, 21.10). In this context, it 
might imply the offer of a dowry (προίξ).189 Unfortunately, however, Euxitheos does not 
                                                     
188 Schaps discusses the purpose of the ἐπίκληρος in greater detail, in Economic Rights of Women, pp. 24-
47. For a more general overview of Athenian law with regard to both women and inheritance rights, see R. 
Sealey, The Justice of the Greeks, pp. 68-87, cf. Women and Law in Classical Greece; pp. 29-45; see also 
Cox’s more recent study, in Household Interests, pp. 94-104. 
189 For a detailed discussion of the exchange of a dowry, see Wolff, ‘Marriage Law and Family Organization 
in Ancient Athens’, pp. 53-65. 
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state whether Protomachos had induced Thoucritos to take Nicarete as his wife with the 
offer of a monetary payment. 
Θούκριτον τὸν πατέρα τὸν ἐμόν: ‘my father Thoucritos’. This is the first time that 
Euxitheos’ father is named in the speech. Thoucritos was the son of Thoucritides I (see 
Χαρίσιος ἀδελφὸς ἦν τοῦ πάππου τοῦ ἐμοῦ Θουκριτίδου καὶ Λυσαρέτης τῆς ἐμῆς τήθης 
at §20) and belonged to the deme of Halimous (for details on the deme, see τοῖς 
Ἁλιμουσίοις §15). Since Euxitheos asserts that his father served in the Decelean War of 
413-404 BC (see ὑπὸ τὸν Δεκελεικὸν πόλεμον at §18), Thoucritos must have been born 
before 431 BC to have served at the outbreak of war.190 Davies dates this marriage to 
Nicarete to around 395 BC.191 Euxitheos’ birth year is uncertain but, taking him to be the 
eldest of their children (see εἶτα ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ ἐμοῦ ἐγώ at §40), it would seem that 
he was born in the early 380s BC (see ἀποδημοῦντος μετὰ Θρασυβούλου at §42). Apart 
from the speaker, Thoucritos and Nicarete had four sons, and at least one of these was 
born soon after Euxitheos (see §42). However, all four were dead by the time of the speech 
(see ἔθαψε τούτους εἰς τὰ πατρῷα μνήματα at §28). Protomachos’ obvious concern about 
Nicarete’s future must have stemmed from the fact that she was blameless in the divorce 
and so he sought to arrange her prompt remarriage to his friend (the simultaneous 
arrangement of a divorce and a remarriage also occurs in two other cases in which a 
husband divorces his wife without wishing to impute any fault to her: Isae. 2.8-9; Plut. 
Per. 24.5). The speaker states that his father was an acquaintance of Protomachos and he 
had been persuaded by him to take Nicarete as a wife. 
                                                     
190  See n. 78. 
191 Davies, Athenian Propertied Families, p. 94. Alternatively, Lacey proposes that their marriage took 
place between 410 and 405 BC, on account of the speaker’s reference to Athenian misfortunes (at §§35 and 
45) in the aftermath of the Peloponnesian War, the period which he dates to 405-3 BC, in ‘The Family of 
Euxitheus (Demosthenes LVII)’, p. 59. However, as previously attested, Lacey fails to consider the 
possibility that these misfortunes could refer to the first decades of the fourth century (see also n. 78; see 
especially ὅτε ἡ πόλις ἠτύχει καὶ πάντες κακῶς ἔπραττον at §35). Therefore, Davies’ date of 395 BC is 
entirely plausible. 
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ἐγγυᾶται: ‘was betrothed’. Many marriages were contracted by ἐγγύησις (formal 
betrothal) and by ἔκδοσις (the ceremonial transferal of the bride to the dwelling of her 
new husband). For a lawful ἐγγύησις, the woman’s κύριος arranged her marriage with the 
man intended to be her husband (see αὐτὴν ὁ Τιμοκράτης ὁμομήτριος καὶ ὁμοπάτριος ὢν 
ἀδελφὸς ἔδωκεν at §40). The term refers to the civil contract entered into between the 
κύριος (seller) and the prospective husband (buyer). The right to citizenship was reserved 
for those born from one of the two forms of marriage recognised by Attic law: either by 
ἐγγύησις and ἔκδοσις, or by ἐπιδικασία (see ἐπικλήρου δὲ κληρονομήσας εὐπόρου 
above). 192  Euxitheos emphasises the fact that his father was properly betrothed to 
Nicarete and thus their marriage came about according to official proceedings. In doing 
so, he seeks the jury’s recognition of his right to citizenship as the son of a female citizen 
who had been given in marriage by ἐγγύησις (for his specific reference to it, see ὀμόσας 
τὸν νόμιμον τοῖς φράτερσιν ὅρκον εἰσήγαγέν με, ἀστὸν, ἀστὸν ἐξ ἀστῆς ἐγγυητῆς αὑτῷ 
γεγενημένον εἰδώς at §54). 
τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ αὐτῆς Τιμοκράτους Μελιτέως: ‘her brother Timocrates of Melite’. 
Nicarete’s father must have died before her first marriage as it was Timocrates who gave 
his sister in marriage to Protomachos (αὐτὴν ὁ Τιμοκράτης ὁμομήτριος καὶ ὁμοπάτριος 
ὢν ἀδελφὸς ἔδωκεν at §40). Euxitheos reveals that his uncle then gave her in marriage to 
her second husband, Thoucritos. Cohn-Haft suggests that the mention of Nicarete being 
given to Thoucritos by Timocrates is an indication of her family’s acceptance of the 
                                                     
192 It must be noted that ἐγγύησις, while a necessary condition for marriage, was not itself sufficient proof 
of a marriage; two cases are known from the source material which document that ἐγγύησις had taken place, 
but no marriage had occurred (Isae. 6.22-4; Dem. 27.17). For an overview of the relationship of these 
marriage customs between Athenian law and life, see Wolff, ‘Marriage Law and Family Organization in 
Ancient Athens’, pp. 46-53; W. K. Lacey, The Family in Classical Greece, pp. 105-6. 
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divorce that they might otherwise have opposed.193 Euxitheos’ account does appear to 
denote a positive manner in which the divorce and remarriage were conducted. 
παρόντων τῶν τε θείων ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἄλλων μαρτύρων: ‘while both 
his uncles were present and other witnesses’. There was no local or central marriage 
record kept by officials. But the ἐγγύησις was attended by the relatives of both parties, 
who could then be called as witnesses to the validity of the process and presumably the 
subsequent marriage (cf. Isae. 3.18-20; Dem. 30.21, 39.22). The uncles that the speaker 
refers to were Charisios and Lysanias (see Χαρίσιος ἀδελφὸς ἦν τοῦ πάππου τοῦ ἐμοῦ 
Θουκριτίδου καὶ Λυσαρέτης τῆς ἐμῆς τήθης at §20, and ὁ τούτου πατὴρ Λυσανίας 
ἀδελφὸς ἦν τοῦ Θουκριτίδου καὶ τῆς Λυσαρέτης at §21). Euxitheos states that these men, 
along with other unidentified individuals, were witnesses to the betrothal of his mother 
and father. 
καὶ τούτων ὅσοι ζῶσι, μαρτυρήσουσιν ἡμῖν: ‘and they will give testimony for us, as 
many of these men that are living’. It was important for Euxitheos to provide testimonies 
to the court to account for his mother’s divorce. Thoucritos’ uncles, Charisios and 
Lysanias were presumably dead at the time of his appeal (they do not feature in the 
speaker’s summary of those who gave testimony from his father’s side at §68), and so 
Euxitheos must have relied on the ‘other witnesses’ to confirm that Protomachos was 
required to marry an ἐπίκληρος (see ἐπικλήρου δὲ κληρονομήσας εὐπόρου above) and 
that his father rightfully married Nicarete. 
[42] παιδίων αὐτῇ δυοῖν ἤδη γεγενημένων: ‘when two children had already been 
born to my mother’. Since the speaker has just spoken of Thoucritos’ betrothal to Nicarete 
                                                     
193 If Protomachos and Nicarete’s surviving child had been a son, rather than a daughter, L. Cohn-Haft 
persuasively argues that Nicarete’s family could have legally opposed Protomachos’ dissolution of the 
marriage, in ‘Divorce in Classical Athens’, p. 9. See also Harrison, The Law of Athens Vol. I, pp. 11-2, 309-
11. 
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(see ἐγγυᾶται at §41), it is reasonable to expect that their marriage took place soon after 
and thus these children would be the product of that union. 194  However, Davies 
mistakenly takes these children to be sons of Protomachos,195 which would imply that 
Nicarete continued to live with Protomachos after he came to receive the ἐπίκληρος. He 
does make a more persuasive case for Nicarete’s birth year being no later than 420 BC, 
given that she had three children at this time (albeit one with Protomachos and two with 
Thoucritos), and it can be estimated that Nicarete was in her late twenties or early thirties 
by the time her second husband went on campaign in 387 BC (see below; see also ἔτι 
τοίνυν παίδων αὐτῷ τεττάρων γενομένων ὁμομητρίων at §28). As for Nicarete’s daughter 
with her first husband, it was probably the case that she remained with Protomachos after 
he divorced her mother since children were produced to maintain their father’s oikos.196 
This appears to correspond with details provided in the subsequent passage (see θυγατέρα 
ἐκδούς at §43). With Euxitheos seemingly the eldest child of the union between 
Thoucritos and Nicarete (see εἶτα ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ ἐμοῦ ἐγώ at §40), the two children 
that the speaker refers to here must be himself and a younger brother.  
ἀποδημοῦντος μετὰ Θρασυβούλου: ‘was abroad with Thrasyboulos’. In an earlier 
passage, the speaker mentions that his first cousin Ctesibios died in Abydos while serving 
with Thrasyboulos of Collytos in 387 BC (see οὗτος μὲν ἐτελεύτησεν ἐν Ἀβύδῳ μετὰ 
Θρασυβούλου στρατευόμενος at §38). Although Euxitheos does not specify that 
Thoucritos joined the same campaign, there is no outstanding reason why it cannot be 
                                                     
194  Lacey makes a similar argument, stating that §42 as a whole clearly indicates that Nicarete was 
financially dependent on Thoucritos at this stage in her life, in ‘The Family of Euxitheus (Demosthenes 
LVII)’, pp. 57-8. 
195 He assimilates these children with the two sons of Protomachos who testify for Euxitheos at §43 (τοὺς 
τοῦ Πρωτομάχου υἱεῖς), see Davies, Athenian Propertied Families, p. 94. 
196 For an overview of marriage dissolutions, and the freedom of an Athenian wife to remarry and bear 
children for a subsequent husband, see Harrison, The Law of Athens Vol. I, pp. 39-44. 
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identified with the one embarked upon by Ctesibios.197  Bearing in mind the date of 
Thrasyboulos’ campaign, Euxitheos must have been born before 388 BC since he was the 
eldest of the two children born to Nicarete before Thoucritos went abroad. This would 
make Euxitheos at least forty-two years old at the earliest date of the speech, 346 BC. 
ἐν ἀπορίαις: ‘in dire straits’. After marrying Thoucritos, Nicarete was financially 
dependent on him as her husband. The speaker makes the connection between his father’s 
absence on campaign with Thrasyboulos and his mother’s financial difficulty, having 
been left with two young children. Euxitheos previously stated that Thoucritos was poor 
(see πένης ὢν §25) and, taking his claim to be true, Nicarete would thus have had little or 
no means to live off in his absence. However, it is difficult to explain why his family did 
not support her. Thoucritos’ uncles had kept the family property in his absence during the 
Decelean War and his subsequent enslavement in Leucas (see ὑπὸ τὸν Δεκελεικὸν 
πόλεμον and πραθεὶς εἰς Λευκάδα at §18), and only divided it to give him his share upon 
his return to Athens (see ἔπειθ᾽ ὅτι ἀφικόμενος τῆς οὐσίας παρὰ τῶν θείων τὸ μέρος 
μετέλαβεν at §19). Lacey deduces that Thoucritos’ family property was farm-land from 
which they had been unable to obtain an income after the Spartan occupation of Decelea 
and subsequent devastation of Attica (cf. Lys. 7.6; for this property, see ἔπειθ᾽ ὅτι 
ἀφικόμενος τῆς οὐσίας παρὰ τῶν θείων τὸ μέρος μετέλαβεν at §19).198 As such, the 
family would only have been in a position to support Nicarete when peace and economic 
stability was restored to Athens. As previously noted, Lacey’s dates for this period are a 
                                                     
197  Lacey, however, suggests that the campaign with Thrasyboulos was probably the one in which 
Thoucritos was captured and enslaved (Euxitheos claims that this occurred during the Decelean War of 
413-404 BC, see ὑπὸ τὸν Δεκελεικὸν πόλεμον at §18). He accounts for the speaker’s lack of explicit 
connection between the two events as ‘a Greek orator’s typical presentation of facts’ and argues that the 
Thrasyboulos in question was Thrasyboulos of Steiria, in ‘The Family of Euxitheus (Demosthenes LVII)’, 
pp. 58-9. But since Lacey’s premise primarily depends on an earlier estimation for the dates of the 
misfortunes of the city (§§35 and 45), his timeline does not align with other dating evidence (see nn. 79 
and 191). 
198 Lacey, ‘The Family of Euxitheus (Demosthenes LVII)’, p. 59. 
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little early in light of other evidence,199 but his allusion to instability in Athens would 
have continued to be applicable to the first decades of the fourth century BC and the 
economic hardships experienced in the aftermath of losing the Peloponnesian War. 
Members of Thoucritos’ family, in particular his ageing uncles (presumably dead at the 
time of the speech, see καὶ τούτων ὅσοι ζῶσι, μαρτυρήσουσιν ἡμῖν at §41) may have had 
financial difficulties of their own and may have been unable to provide for Nicarete and 
her children. Of course, an alternative explanation for their lack of support is that 
Nicarete’s children by Thoucritos were illegitimate and, as his mistress, she would have 
no formal claim on his family and her children by him would have been regarded as 
bastards. Without the public recognition of his father on the tenth day after a child’s birth, 
in a ceremony known as the δέκατος, illegitimate children were not accepted by their 
fathers’ relatives and members of their wider kinship groups (Dem. 39.20, 22, 24); these 
children could not subsequently inherit (Ar. Birds, 1649-70), nor could they receive any 
state support if their fathers died in battle (Lys. fr. 10a).200 
τὸν Κλεινίαν τὸν τοῦ Κλειδίκου: ‘Cleinias the son of Cleidicos’. Cleidicos’ son Cleinias 
was born circa 390 BC (see τὸν Κλεινίαν at §40). Very little is known about their 
family,201 but the fact that Cleidicos could afford to employ a wet-nurse to attend to his 
son does suggest that he was a man of some means. 
τῇ μέντοι ὑπαρχούσῃ πενίᾳ ἴσως καὶ ἀναγκαῖα καὶ ἁρμόττοντα ποιοῦσα: ‘but she was 
doing what was perhaps both necessary and fitting in her existing poverty’. When faced 
with such dire circumstances, the speaker presents Nicarete’s action in becoming a τίτθη 
as extemporised and opportunistic in the need for economic survival. This does not prove, 
                                                     
199 See nn. 79 and 191. 
200 Against Theozotides, in S. C. Todd, Lysias, p. 385. For a concise evaluation of the separation of 
illegitimate children from their fathers’ families, see D. Ogden, ‘Bastardy and fatherlessness in Ancient 
Greece’, pp. 107-14. 
201 This Cleidicos may have been related to Alcibiades, but the connection is tentative; see Davies, Athenian 
Propertied Families, pp. 13-5. 
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as Euboulides would have the jury believe, that she was not a citizen. However, his 
slander against Nicarete may have some merit with regard to Euxitheos’ status. Since the 
speaker acknowledges that this slander stemmed from Nicarete’s activities as a wet-nurse, 
one cannot exclude the possibility that she served as a wet-nurse to another child other 
than Cleinias. She may have been induced by the promise of financial aid or even the loss 
of her own child to raise that infant as her own citizen son (Euxitheos previously stated 
that four of Nicarete’s other sons by Thoucritos had died, see ἔθαψε τούτους εἰς τὰ 
πατρῷα μνήματα at §28). If Euxitheos was indeed this non-Athenian child and he had 
entered into Thoucritos’ family in his infancy as a supposititious child, it is likely that 
none of the relatives who stand as witnesses on his behalf knew of his true origin and so 
their testimonies would be true based on the extent of their knowledge. 202  Indeed, 
Euboulides may have had suspicions but he would have had no evidence of Euxitheos’ 
concealment within Thoucritos’ household, if only Nicarete and the birth mother knew of 
it. Still, MacDowell rightly notes that it is a weakness in his defence that Euxitheos cannot 
prove that he had been born while Thoucritos was at home or indeed within nine months 
of his departure.203 With such potential for doubt arising from the issue of Nicarete’s wet-
nursing, it is understandable that Euxitheos does not dwell on the matter.  
[43] παῖδας ποιησάμενος: ‘he produced children’. Here, Euxitheos is speaking of 
Nicarete’s first marriage to Protomachos and thus the children born from that union (in 
contrast to τοὺς τοῦ Πρωτομάχου υἱεῖς below); they are not, as Lacey assumes, the 
children from Protomachos’ subsequent marriage to the ἐπίκληρος (for the heiress, see 
ἐπικλήρου δὲ κληρονομήσας εὐπόρου at §41).204 The verb ποιεῖσθαι literally means ‘to 
make for oneself’, but it commonly signifies ‘to adopt’ or ‘to acknowledge’ (in particular, 
                                                     
202 See n. 131. 
203 MacDowell, Demosthenes the Orator, p. 290. 
204 Lacey, ‘The Family of Euxitheus (Demosthenes LVII)’, p. 58. 
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see Dem. 39.4, passim). Given the context, it cannot denote adoption here. Rudhardt 
makes a more cogent argument that ποιεῖσθαι bears a distinctly social meaning, 
specifically the civil act of recognising a child that was only permitted for those born to 
an Athenian mother.205 Accordingly, Euxitheos’ purpose in using this verb must be to 
expressly emphasise the citizen status of Nicarete and, as a result, the legitimacy of her 
children. 
The speaker’s use of the plural, παῖδες, must refer to children born to Protomachos and 
Nicarete who subsequently died, for he has previously only made reference to one 
daughter (see θυγάτηρ at §40). If other children from his mother’s first marriage had 
survived, Euxitheos would surely have been able to call upon more witnesses for his case: 
either homometric half-brothers to provide testimony to the court themselves, or the men 
who had married any other surviving half-sisters, or even any additional nephews from 
such siblings (cf. εἶθ᾽ υἱὸς τῆς ἀδελφῆς at §68). 
θυγατέρα ἐκδούς: ‘gave his daughter in marriage’. As we have seen, the re-enactment of 
Pericles’ citizenship law meant that civic rights were restricted to persons born of a citizen 
father and a citizen mother.206 There existed another Athenian law which stated that it 
was illegal for a citizen male to give a non-citizen woman in marriage to another citizen 
male, representing her as his own daughter (ὡς ἑαυτῷ προσήκουσαν, [Dem.] 59.52). 
According to the details provided by the orator in this speech, the punishment for breaking 
this law was ἀτιμία and the confiscation of the accused’s property. The punishment for 
the false kinswoman, however, is not recorded. It is likely that this law was primarily 
intended to penalise a citizen attempting to give in marriage his illegitimate daughter, but 
it covered circumstances of misrepresenting any female metic or slave as a relative. Since 
the law stipulated that anyone qualified to do so (typically an Athenian male citizen who 
                                                     
205 J. Rudhardt, ‘La reconnaissance de la paternité dans la société athénienne’, pp. 55-6. 
206 See Introduction, pp. 21-5. 
 208 
was not himself subject to ἀτιμία) could indict a man who he suspected of giving an non-
citizen women in marriage, Euxitheos therefore reports that Protomachos’ actions with 
regard to his daughter are not indicative of a man who doubted her mother’s citizen status 
and who held any fear that he could be charged. After Protomachos divorced Nicarete, he 
most likely kept their daughter with him (see παιδίων αὐτῇ δυοῖν ἤδη γεγενημένων at §42) 
and Euxitheos makes the point that Nicarete’s former husband gave their daughter in 
marriage to an Athenian man (see εἶτα Εὔνικον Χολαργέα below). Protomachos’ actions 
were his open acknowledgement of both mother and daughter being citizen women. 
Furthermore, one would expect that if there were significant doubts about the status of 
his daughter and a summons had been made, Euboulides would have referred to it in his 
case against Euxitheos, yet the latter makes no reference to any such accusation against 
that side of his family. 
ἀστὴν ταύτην καὶ πολῖτιν εἶναι: ‘her being both a native and citizen’. Like their 
corresponding male forms, ἀστή and πόλιτις express a civil connection to the 
community.207 Wolff suggests that the male term πολίτης referred to a citizen with full 
rights, while ἀστός and ἀστή referred to natives of Athens who were not full citizens 
(without the right to vote, i.e. Athenian boys or Athenian women); 208  however, his 
differentiation does not work in this context. Patterson makes a more convincing 
distinction between the two terms by making reference to the fact that ἀστή was implicitly 
and often explicitly used in contrast to a ξένη to indicate a native member of the 
community, whereas πόλιτις was coined in the later fifth century to refer to a female 
member of the πόλις and which could be used to indicate internal participation.209 Since 
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208 Wolff, ‘Marriage Law and Family Organization in Ancient Athens’, p. 83. 
209 C. Patterson, ‘Athenian Citizenship Law’, p. 269. In a similar manner, J. Blok notes that the term 
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both terms nonetheless indicate citizen status for a woman, and I have translated ἀστός 
and ἀστή as ‘citizen’ elsewhere in this text (see also πότερόν ποτ᾽ ἀστὸς ἢ ξένος ἦν ᾧ 
ταῦθ᾽ ὑπῆρχεν at §24), here I distinguish between the two terms as ‘native’ and ‘citizen’ 
respectively.  
τοὺς τοῦ Πρωτομάχου υἱεῖς: ‘Protomachos’ sons’. These are the sons of Protomachos’ 
second marriage to the ἐπίκληρος (as opposed to παῖδας ποιησάμενος above). Euxitheos 
does not refer to them as his brothers, only as the sons of his mother’s former husband, 
but he does identify the daughter of Protomachos and Nicarete at his sister (see below; 
the distinction is made again at §68: οἱ Πρωτομάχου υἱεῖς … τὴν ἀδελφὴν τὴν ἐμὴν). 
Protomachos’ sons from his subsequent marriage are called to confirm that their father, 
deceased at the time of the trial, married Nicarete while being certain of her citizen status 
and that he also accepted the daughter from that union to be his legitimate offspring. 
οἷς τὴν γαμηλίαν εἰσήνεγκεν ὑπὲρ τῆς μητρὸς ὁ πατήρ: ‘who my father brought in for 
the marriage-feast on behalf of my mother’. Having just referred to Nicarete’s first 
marriage to Protomachos, Euxitheos calls witnesses to the fact that his own father had 
married her according to custom and had offered a γαμηλία for the phratry members on 
her behalf. It was an event held after the wedding had taken place, involving both a feast 
(Hsch. s.v. γαμηλία) and a sacrifice (Poll. Onom. 8.107), but further details have not been 
preserved. Euxitheos seems to imply that Nicarete’s γαμηλία was celebrated before a 
select group of phratry members rather than the whole phratry. The size of a gathering 
may have varied according to the specific requirements of each phratry, or it may simply 
have depended on the means of the individual (Euxitheos claims that Protomachos was a 
poor man in an earlier passage, §41). Though the γαμηλία may have been normal practice, 
it does not appear to have been an explicit legal requirement nor does it seem to have 
required the same tight control as male introductions to the phratry (i.e. during a 
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candidate’s infancy at a ceremony known as the μεῖον, and during his adolescence at the 
κουρεῖον)210 and there probably was no official scrutiny or opportunity for the phratry 
members to object to a wife’s presentation. These wives do not seem to be regarded as 
actual members of their husband’s phratry and there is no surviving information as to 
what, if indeed anything legally, the γαμηλία meant in practice. Apart from Euxitheos’ 
reference, the γαμηλία is mentioned in two of Isaeus’ speeches regarding legitimacy: the 
speaker of On the Estate of Ciron calls witnesses to his mother’s wedding and her son 
being accepted into his father’s phratry (8.18, 20), and the point at issue in On the Estate 
of Pyrrhos is the status of an alleged daughter of the speaker’s uncle (3.76, 79). In fact, 
the phrasing appears to be standard construction as it features in all three (§43; Isae. 8.18, 
3.79).  
Yet unlike Isaeus’ speeches which refer to legitimacy with regard to inheritance rights, 
Demosthenes’ alone uses the γαμηλία as evidence for citizenship legitimacy. The γαμηλία 
itself did not bestow legitimacy by descent – that derived from the citizenship status of 
the parents – but it was a guarantee of a woman’s legitimate status. Ultimately it was this 
part of the marriage process which officially authenticated a woman’s role as an Athenian 
wife, capable of bearing children whom the members could subsequently receive into the 
community as citizens. As witnesses, the phratry members who attended Thoucritos’ 
γαμηλία for Nicarete were thus witnesses to her citizen status and crucial to Euxitheos’ 
case in proving his own qualification for citizenship. There is a similar scenario in On 
Behalf of Euphiletos wherein the speaker, whose brother was also ejected by his deme 
during the extraordinary διαψήφισις of 346/5 BC, emphasises the evidence provided by 
members of his phratry (Isae. 12.8).211 
                                                     
210 See Appendix 5, pp. 293-7. 
211 For the significance of phratry members providing evidence in cases involving citizenship, see Appendix 
5, pp. 295-6. 
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εἶτα Εὔνικον Χολαργέα: ‘next Eunicos of Cholargos’. Eunicos married Euxitheos’ half-
sister, the unnamed daughter of Protomachos and Nicarete (see also §68). Cholargos was 
a deme of the tribe Acamantis and was located just north of Athens.212  Eunicos is 
therefore the speaker’s brother-in-law. 
τὴν ἀδελφὴν λαβόντα τὴν ἐμὴν: ‘who has received my sister in marriage’, cf. οἱ 
Πρωτομάχου υἱεῖς … τὴν ἀδελφὴν τὴν ἐμὴν at §68. 
εἶτα τὸν υἱὸν τῆς ἀδελφῆς: ‘next my sister’s son’. Euxitheos’ homometric half-sister and 
Eunicos had a son who, though unfortunately not named in the speech, was evidently an 
adult by 346 BC since he stands as a witness for his uncle. 
[44] εἰ τῶν συγγενῶν ὄντων τοσούτων τουτωνὶ καὶ μαρτυρούντων καὶ 
διομνυμένων ἐμοὶ προσήκειν: ‘if in spite of so many of these relatives giving testimony 
and swearing under oath to be related to me’. Euxitheos deliberately turns the jury’s 
attention to his family connections and their undisputed citizenship status, focusing his 
argument on genealogical descent. He emphasises the number of relatives he can produce 
and their sworn testimonies which confirm that they are his kin. The strength of Euxitheos’ 
argument relies on the weight of this number. At first glance, such a solid body of kinsmen 
appears to be a significant strength in his case. Yet, an undeniable weakness lies in the 
fact that Euxitheos fails to address sufficiently the possibility of fraud with regard to his 
witnesses. On the one hand, Euboulides has accused Euxitheos of bribing witnesses to 
testify that they are relatives (see §§52-3); on the other hand, and perhaps a more likely 
scenario, the witnesses themselves could have all been deceived with regard to Euxitheos’ 
                                                     
212 Traill, The Political Organization of Attica, p. 47. Most notably, Cholargos was the deme in which 
Pericles was born (Plut. Per. 3). 
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status if he had been smuggled into Thoucritos and Nicarete’s family as a baby (for this 
hypothesis, see ἔτι τοίνυν παίδων αὐτῷ τεττάρων γενομένων ὁμομητρίων ἐμοὶ at §28). 
τοῦ Κλεινίου: ‘of Cleinias’, see τὸν Κλεινίαν τὸν τοῦ Κλειδίκου at §42. 
[45] ταπεινὸν: ‘a lowly thing’ (this term appears throughout the Demosthenic corpus, 
denoting humble or even humiliating rankings, see Dem. 1.9, 4.23, 8.67, 9.21, 10.69, 
13.25, 16.24, 18.108, 178, 19.325, 21.186, 45.4). In general, manual labour was ascribed 
negative overtones in ancient Greece and was considered to be an improper practice for 
citizen males (working for another and losing one’s independence was considered 
particularly unbecoming: Pl. Laws, 846d-e, Rep. 371e; Xen. Mem. 2.8; Arist. Pol. 
1254b20-36, 1278a6-20, 1329a1-40, 1337b10-15; yet Xenophon presents a more realistic 
view of such labour, specifying that husbandry was the most appropriate manual 
occupation, Oec. 5.4-17).213 If manual labour carried negative connotations for men, then 
for women of civic status to be engaged in such activities, the implications were even 
worse. By describing the occupation of wet-nurse as ταπεινός, Euxitheos once again 
acknowledges the particular stigma attached to the former profession of his mother (cf. 
§§35 and 42). 
πολλὰ δουλικὰ καὶ ταπεινὰ πράγματα τοὺς ἐλευθέρους ἡ πενία βιάζεται ποιεῖν: 
‘Poverty compels free men to do many servile and lowly tasks’. The notion that poverty 
wielded a corrupting force was commonplace in different genres (Hom. Od. 14.157; Thuc. 
3.45.4; Eur. El. 376; Arist. Pol. 1295b5-10). 
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ἔριθοι: ‘wool-workers’ (cf. ταλασιουργοί is the commonly used term to denote 
freedwomen occupied as wool-workers).214 Spinning and weaving was characteristically 
a female skill which traversed marital status, age, and social classification (Pl. Alc. 126e, 
Rep. 5.455c; Xen. Oec. 7.6, Lac. 1.3-4). Since all Athenian women, even those of the 
upper-classes, learned to spin and weave, they could logically take their skills to the 
marketplace in times of economic need and thus make a decent income. Xenophon 
provides specific details about Aristarchos’ female relatives who have descended upon 
him, having been left behind in the city after the revolution caused an exodus to the 
Piraeus at the close of the Peloponnesian War (Xen. Mem. 2.7.2-12; for the date, cf. Hell. 
2.3.4). Aristarchos is advised by the character of Socrates to put the women to wool-
working in order to lessen their financial burdens as a family unit; his initial attitude to 
manual labour concurs with the typical Athenian mentality to paid employment, but 
Socrates reminds him that weaving was a suitable occupation for respectable women. In 
the paradigm provided by Xenophon, wool-working is presented as lowly but honourable 
work for Athenian women to undertake. It would seem that this occupation was generally 
held in higher esteem than earning a livelihood through wet-nursing. 
τρυγήτριαι: ‘grape-pickers’. Euxitheos’ statement that many Athenian women had 
undertaken such work appears to be corroborated by the discovery of many pots, namely 
black and red figure lekythoi and skyphoi, which depict scenes of groups of women in 
what appear to be orchards: in some scenes the women pick fruit and collect the crop in 
baskets, while in others they are portrayed as sitting around a tree.215 However, it is not 
                                                     
214 In one inscription, five of the thirteen female names and occupations inscribed are wool-workers: Lyde, 
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215 In particular, see fig. 2.29, Attic black figure lekythos, Braunshweig, Herzog Anton Ulrichs-Museum 
AT 700; fig. 1.12, in S. Lewis, The Athenian Woman, p. 84. 
 214 
clear whether the women depicted on these pots are indeed hired help or citizen wives 
and daughters working for their own households (the greater part of Attica was probably 
occupied by peasant farmers who were too poor to afford slaves; Aristotle describes the 
lowest classes of society having to use their wives and children, Pol. 1323a5). 
Nevertheless, a comment made by Hesiod does indicate that situations could arise in 
which free women needed to undertake paid agricultural work beyond their own 
farmsteads, specifically when economic hardship befell the family. Hesiod urges his 
brother to work lest he, his wife and children be compelled to resort to hiring themselves 
out as agricultural workers to their neighbours (Hes. Works and Days, 399-400). When 
viewed in conjunction with one another, these sources do suggest definitive female 
involvement in agricultural work and, thus, they corroborate Euxitheos’ example of 
numerous Athenian grape-pickers. 
ὑπὸ τῶν τῆς πόλεως κατ᾽ ἐκείνους τοὺς χρόνους συμφορῶν: ‘by the misfortunes of the 
city at that time’. Euxitheos again states that Athens as a whole was experiencing 
particular hardship at the time when his mother and other citizen women undertook paid 
employment outside of the oikos (see also ὅτε ἡ πόλις ἠτύχει καὶ πάντες κακῶς ἔπραττον 
at §35). As previously highlighted, the period of the Decelean War was particularly severe 
on the city of Athens and its population (ὑπὸ τὸν Δεκελεικὸν πόλεμον at §18). A 
substantial part of the male population had already been killed during the Peloponnesian 
War and many slaves had fled from the city after 413 BC, when the Spartans fortified a 
base at Decelea (Thuc. 7.25.5). The effects of the war and the Athenian defeat would 
certainly have had a lingering impact on Athens in the decades which followed.  
πολλαὶ δ᾽ ἐκ πενήτων πλούσιαι νῦν: ‘and many who were poor then are now rich’. Here, 
πολλαί is the third use of the adjective πολύς in this passage. Such a repetition by the 
speaker stresses how widespread the undertaking of paid manual labour had become. 
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Euxitheos appears to be among those who were once poor but now live comfortable lives. 
The speaker refers to both the poverty of his father (see πένης ὢν at §25) and of his mother 
while her husband was abroad on military campaign (see ἐν ἀπορίαις at §42) but, at the 
time of the speech, Euxitheos himself is wealthy enough for his opponents to accuse him 
of buying witnesses (see τῶν μαρτύρων ἐνίους ὠφελουμένους μοι μαρτυρεῖν συγγενεῖς 
εἶναι at §52). Though Euxitheos might have financially prospered from business in the 
marketplace (for his involvement in the trade along with his mother see ταινίας πωλεῖν at 
§31), such work was not the means through which a citizen woman could make a fortune 
in her own right. Athenian law forbade women from making a contract valued at more 
than a bushel of barley (Isae. 10.10); essentially, they were not permitted to engage in 
sales for more than three drachmas.216 Preventing women from performing large financial 
transactions limited them to making a living from petty trade. Thus, it must be Euxitheos’ 
own participation in the trade which has enabled his family to achieve their present 
financial security. 
ἀλλ᾽ αὐτίχ᾽ ὑπὲρ τούτων: ‘But more regarding these matters presently’. For the 
unfulfilled promise see §16. 
 
§§46-51: Euxitheos’ evidence about himself 
Since Euxitheos’ status depends on that of his parents, he has already dedicated a 
considerable amount of his speech to detailing their citizen lineages. But yet, it remains 
for the speaker to prove that he is indeed their son, born from their legally sanctioned 
union and that he was subsequently recognised by their family and social groups. One 
would expect him to list his own credentials separately, providing witnesses to each stage, 
and particularly detailing his service in various deme offices (in a similar manner to his 
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report about his father at §§23-5). But at §46, despite a declaration that he will bring 
witnesses, he does not do this and instead presents the factual information altogether, 
thereby devoting more time to argumentation. It is possible that Demosthenes deliberately 
sought a direct and decisive climax to the factual demonstration. But, if Euxitheos was 
attempting to deceive the jury with regard to his origin and parentage, a short overview 
of the evidence pertaining to his own citizen status could indicate that he wished to avoid 
dwelling on what was actually a crucial flaw in his case. In fact, the speaker brings no 
evidence after §46, and such a complete lack of evidence to support claims which could 
easily have been proven before the court is certainly suspicious. Moreover, it seems 
strange that Euxitheos was apparently not introduced into Thoucritos’ genos (§46). The 
brevity on his own credentials stands as a definite weakness in Euxitheos’ defence overall. 
Further difficulties follow at §51. Euxitheos’ assumption that he is indeed the son of 
Thoucritos and Nicarete leads him to argue that he must be a citizen since he openly 
declares them to be his parents, whereas a non-citizen would claim to be the son of parents 
other than his own. Rather than providing some evidence that Thoucritos and Nicarete 
are his parents, the speaker surprisingly relies on a rather flimsy contention. 
[46] κεκληρονομηκότα καὶ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ γένους: ‘having inherited both the 
property and the lineage’. Since Euxitheos first speaks of having acquired property from 
his parents (more specifically from his father, see ἔπειθ᾽ ὅτι ἀφικόμενος τῆς οὐσίας παρὰ 
τῶν θείων τὸ μέρος μετέλαβεν at §19), τοῦ γένους must then refer to the citizen ‘lineage’ 
that he also attained from them rather than the social group, the genos. Although genos 
membership was hereditary and Euxitheos’ father Thoucritos was certainly a member (as 
confirmed by τοὺς γεννήτας at §23; see also §§24 and 67), Euxitheos’ membership of this 
group is never explicitly attested anywhere in the speech. Given that the speaker merely 
implies that he also belongs to the genos (see γεννήταις at §24 and εἰς Ἀπόλλωνος 
πατρῴου {ἦγον} at §54), it is more fitting to translate τοῦ γένους as ‘the lineage’ here. 
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It seems strange that Euxitheos would not have been admitted to Thoucritos’ genos when 
he was a child.217 However, doubts regarding Euxitheos’ legitimacy and therefore his 
citizen status may explain why he was not introduced (or indeed, if the genos rejected his 
membership). The genē were more exclusive than phratries and so it would have been 
harder to enrol a suspicious candidate.218 
οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ: ‘But nevertheless’. For the use of this phrase, see οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καίπερ 
τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων at §3. 
ὡς εἰσήχθην εἰς τοὺς φράτερας: ‘that I was introduced to the phratry members’. A 
candidate was introduced to his father’s phratry either in infancy or during childhood.219 
ὡς ἐνεγράφην εἰς τοὺς δημότας: ‘that I was entered into the register of the demesmen’. 
Deme enrolment usually took place at the age of eighteen.220 
ὡς ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν τούτων προεκρίθην ἐν τοῖς εὐγενεστάτοις κληροῦσθαι τῆς ἱερωσύνης 
τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ: ‘that I was chosen by these same men to draw lots with men of the best 
lineage for the priesthood of Heracles’. Local deme cults were separate from the state 
cults that were situated in some of the demes and managed by central authorities. It is 
possible that the majority, if not all, of the Athenian demes possessed their own local cults 
and maintained control over them. For example, the cult of Artemis Colaenis was 
important in the deme of Myrrhinous (IG II² 1182, 18-21; Paus. 1.31.4); the deme of 
Acharnae had temples dedicated to Ares and Athena (SEG 21.519, 6-9); the deme of 
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Aexone particularly worshipped Hebe (IG II² 1199).221 However, the nature of the deme 
cults is hard to assess. Cleisthenes’ formal creation of the deme system in 508/7 BC may 
have occasioned a deme to engage in the cult-worship of its founder or the relevant 
eponymous hero of the ten Attic tribes ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 21.5-6). Yet many cults must 
have come down from archaic times and predated Cleisthenes’ reorganisation, since his 
reforms left Athenian citizens free to engage in traditional religious practices (τὰ δὲ γένη 
καὶ τὰς φρατρίας καὶ τὰς ἱερωσύνας εἴασεν ἔχειν ἑκάστους κατὰ τὰ πάτρια, [Arist.] Ath. 
Pol. 21.6; cf. Thucydides’ description of the rural Athenians’ resentment at having to 
abandon their homes and ancient shrines at the start of the Peloponnesian War, 2.16.2). 
Thus, the very nature of a deme cult is a problematic one, as indeed is noted by 
Whitehead.222 
Euxitheos here provides information about one such cult in the deme of Halimous, that 
of Heracles and the selection process for its priesthood. He notes that the demesmen, 
presumably during the deme assembly, oversaw the appointment of the priest by sortition 
from a preselected list of candidates. This preliminary list comprised of ‘men of the best 
lineage’; since the speaker was not from an aristocratic family, this clearly did not refer 
to noble-born men but rather the requirement that the candidates have a long established 
ancestry on both sides.223 This specification suggests that choosing the priest of Heracles 
from among the sons of the best families in Halimous was a longstanding tradition, 
possibly preceding Cleisthenes’ deme system. Unfortunately, however, Euxitheos does 
not detail how long this appointment was held, whether this was a one-year term of office 
or whether it was for life. His only other allusion to the priesthood notes that one of the 
duties of the priest of Heracles was to offer a sacrifice on behalf of the demesmen (see 
                                                     
221 For a comprehensive study of deme religion and cults, see Osborne, Demos, pp. 178-82, and R. Parker, 
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222 Whitehead, The Demes of Attica, pp. 176-8. 
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δεῖν ἄν με καὶ αὐτὸν θύειν ὑπὲρ τούτων καὶ τοῦτον μετ᾽ ἐμοῦ συνθύειν at §47). 
Interestingly, Euxitheos does not stipulate that he actually held the priesthood of Heracles, 
only that he was among those preselected to draw lots for the position. This detail, 
however, would not have had any bearing on Euxitheos’ case; the speaker uses his 
inclusion in this preselection process to not only confirm his citizen status but to further 
claim to be among those of the best lineage. 
ὡς ἦρχον ἀρχὰς δοκιμασθείς: ‘and that having been approved by scrutiny I held offices’. 
Euxitheos refers to holding deme offices as further proof of his previously established 
citizen status, in much the same manner as he claims for his father in a previous passage 
(see ἀρχὰς ἔλαχεν καὶ ἦρξεν δοκιμασθείς at §25; for the δοκιμασία process, see §§25-6). 
He claims that he too had been scrutinised during δοκιμασία proceedings and had been 
deemed fit to hold office. 
Although Euxitheos subsequently claims to have held the office of dēmarch (§§63-4), he 
does not clarify here which other offices he personally held or when he served. Nor does 
he call for any deposition to be read before the court, as he did when referring to his 
father’s time spent in deme offices. Since providing details about these roles could only 
help his case, it appears strange that he does not make more of the part he played in the 
deme’s civic life. It is not impossible that such an omission was due to Euxitheos’ 
exaggeration of his role in deme politics; if he was embellishing the truth with regard to 
holding several deme offices, it would be less surprising that his expulsion from the deme 
was so easily attained than for one who had played such an active role in Halimous. 
[47] δεῖν ἄν με καὶ αὐτὸν θύειν ὑπὲρ τούτων καὶ τοῦτον μετ᾽ ἐμοῦ συνθύειν: ‘I 
personally would have been required to sacrifice on behalf of these demesmen and 
Euboulides would have been required to join in the sacrifice with me’. If Euxitheos had 
won the lottery between the preselected candidates, he would have been appointed as the 
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priest of Heracles for the deme of Halimous and would have undertaken all the duties that 
went with it (for deme cults in general, see ὡς ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν τούτων προεκρίθην ἐν τοῖς 
εὐγενεστάτοις κληροῦσθαι τῆς ἱερωσύνης τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ at §46). One such duty was to 
offer sacrifices on behalf of the demesmen and to sacrifice alongside them. Euxitheos 
makes the point that if there were any real suspicion with regard to his birth, someone 
would surely have opposed his initial nomination in order to prevent a foreigner from 
sacrificing on behalf of Athenian citizens. He thus asks the jury to consider how the very 
same men were once prepared to have him make sacrifices on their behalf but are now no 
longer willing to sacrifice together with him. 
τὸν μὲν ἄλλον χρόνον ἅπαντα παρὰ πᾶσιν τοῖς νῦν κατηγοροῦσι πολίτης 
ὡμολογημένος: ‘that all throughout the past I have been acknowledged as a citizen by all 
those who now bring accusations’. Euxitheos uses the priesthood (ὡς ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν τούτων 
προεκρίθην ἐν τοῖς εὐγενεστάτοις κληροῦσθαι τῆς ἱερωσύνης τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ at §46) as 
evidence not only of his citizen status but also that his fellow demesmen, including 
Euboulides, have always accepted it.  
[48] οὐ γὰρ ἂν δήπου … εἴασεν: ‘For surely he would not allow … ’. The use of 
δήπου with the negative is heavily ironic in an oral context. The term is often used to 
denote mock surprise or incredulity (Ar. Birds, 269, Eccl. 327, Wealth, 140; Pl. Symp. 
194b; Xen. Mem. 4.2.11).224 
τόν γε ξένον καὶ μέτοικον: ‘a foreigner and a metic’. This is Euxitheos’ first and only 
specific mention of the status of metic in the text.225 It has already been noted that metics 
were required to register with an Attic deme, pay the annual μετοίκιον and obtain 
                                                     
224 See Denniston and Dover, The Greek Particles, pp. 267-8. 
225 While I take ξένος to simply mean ‘foreigner’, μέτοικος is a particular type of foreigner, one who wished 
to take up residence in Athens for more than a short period. For an in-depth discussion of the Greek terms 
used to describe foreigners, see Whitehead, The Ideology of the Athenian Metic, pp. 6-13. 
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sponsorship from an Athenian citizen (see §34). But what of their place in Athenian 
society? Though they lived amongst the native community, Aristotle clearly distinguishes 
metics as non-citizens in view of the fact that they were excluded from public honours 
(Pol. 1278a35-8). Xenophon specifies that they had no right to own land or a house on it 
(Ways and Means, 2.6). Furthermore, Euxitheos reveals that metics could not hold either 
political or religious offices, nor could they become members of the tribes, phratries and 
genē (see below and also τῶν ὑμετέρων ἱερῶν καὶ κοινῶν at §3). Thus, their participation 
in their demes and in the polis as a whole was extremely limited. 
In the current context, the terms metic and foreigner are synonymous. When they were 
specifically directed at a citizen, they were intended primarily as an insult. But 
accusations of this kind had lasting ramifications for a man’s status since they destabilised 
his claim to citizenship. Euboulides’ accusations against Thoucritos and Nicarete 
stemmed from events in their lives which occurred either before Euxitheos was born or 
shortly after; if there had been any prior doubts regarding Euxitheos’ legitimacy, rumours 
about his status ought to have been long established. Euxitheos uses this knowledge to 
his advantage by ironically asking the jury to consider whether Euboulides would have 
allowed either a metic or a foreigner to assume the citizen rights which they were not 
legally entitled to (cf. on §25). It is important to note that Euxitheos at no stage in his 
speech answers an accusation of him being a slave, but only of being of foreign descent 
(see also ποῦ μετοίκιον καταθείς at §55). 
οὔτ᾽ ἀρχὰς ἄρχειν οὔθ᾽ ἱερωσύνην κληροῦσθαι μεθ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ προκριθέντα: ‘either to 
hold offices or to draw lots with himself after being initially selected for the priesthood’. 
Metics were excluded from crucial aspects of citizen life (see above). Here, Euxitheos 
specifies that they could not hold office, a measure that isolated them from the political 
life of the Athenian state. Their exclusion is completed by their prohibition from the 
priesthoods. Though metics lived in the deme alongside citizens and paid the appropriate 
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charges for the privilege of doing so, they had no lasting tie to it.226 In practice, however, 
it would have been difficult to distinguish physically a metic from a citizen. In Lysias’ 
Against Pancleon, the speaker initially sued his opponent as a metic (23.2, cf. 15) and 
then as a citizen (23.2), before he finally concluded that Pancleon was slave (23.3). For 
both the speaker of Against Pancleon and Euboulides, it was easy to bring a charge 
against their opponent’s status; with such uncertainty regarding status, it would have been 
much more difficult for these men actually to prove their allegations. 
οὐδέ γ᾽ ἄν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, παλαιὸς ὢν ἐχθρὸς ἐμοὶ τοῦτον τὸν καιρὸν περιέμενεν: 
‘Since he is an old enemy of mine, Athenian men, he indeed would not have waited for 
this particular time’. Euxitheos has previously claimed that it was his opposing testimony 
in a prior case of Euboulides’ that was the cause of the animosity between the two of them 
(see §8, particularly διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἔχθραν ἐπιτίθεταί μοι). But Euxitheos does not offer 
any proof of this long-standing enmity, either then or at this point in his speech, though 
he continues to use it as the motivation behind his disfranchisement (he also speaks of a 
feud involving their fathers at §61; for general cases arising from rivalries see §§6, 49, 57 
and 63). 
εἴπερ τι συνῄδει τοιοῦτον: ‘if he really knew something such as this about me not being 
a citizen’. Euxitheos questions why Euboulides has waited for so long before bringing to 
light information about the former’s foreign or illegitimate birth. His opponent could not 
have foreseen the Ecclēsia’s decision to order an extraordinary scrutiny in every deme, 
nor did he need it to make an accusation against him before this. Euboulides could have 
brought a γραφὴ ξενίας at any time,227 and the speaker uses the fact that he did not initiate 
such a suit to entice the jury to question the validity of his claim now. 
                                                     
226 If a metic moved deme, his designation changed. If a citizen moved deme, his did not. 
227 For details on this public suit, see n. 69 in the Introduction. 
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[49] τὸν μὲν ἄλλον ἅπαντα χρόνον δημοτευόμενος μετ᾽ ἐμοῦ καὶ κληρούμενος: ‘for 
all the rest of the time, while belonging to the same deme as me and drawing lots’. The 
sense conveyed here is that deme membership came to mean more than just living in a 
deme, it also meant active participation (see also ἐν οἷς ὁ πάππος ὁ τοῦ πατρός, ὁ ἐμός, 
<ὁ> πατήρ, ἐνταῦθα καὶ αὐτὸς φαίνομαι δημοτευόμενος at §55; for similar uses of the 
verb δημοτεύομαι, see Dem. 44.39 and Lys. 23.2-3). This notion is further compounded 
by Thucydides, who has Pericles claim that there was no reason for a man who was 
uninterested in politics to live in Athens (Thuc. 2.40.2). 
ἐπειδὴ δ᾽ ἡ πόλις πᾶσα τοῖς ἀσελγῶς εἰσπεπηδηκόσιν εἰς τοὺς δήμους ὀργιζομένη 
παρώξυντο: ‘when the entire city had been provoked to anger by those who had 
outrageously infiltrated the demes’. The result of so much public resentment was the 
formulation and enactment of the widespread review of the deme registers in 346/5 BC.228 
Euxitheos’ own words to the jury indicate that there was significant support in favour of 
expelling those who had wrongly assumed citizenship (see also σιωπῇ at §1 and διὰ τὴν 
τοῦ πράγματος ὀργήν at §3). Demosthenes applies the verb εἰσπηδάω to express a sudden 
or violent irruption elsewhere, at Dem. 21.22, 78, 54.5, 20. 
ἦν δ᾽ ἐκεῖνος μὲν ὁ καιρὸς τοῦ συνειδότος αὑτῷ τἀληθῆ λέγειν: ‘the right time to speak 
for someone who was sure of the truth’. The time that Euxitheos refers to here was after 
the preliminary selections for the priesthood of Heracles and before the sortition took 
place (see ὡς ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν τούτων προεκρίθην ἐν τοῖς εὐγενεστάτοις κληροῦσθαι τῆς 
ἱερωσύνης τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ at §46). 
ὁ δὲ νυνὶ παρὼν ἐχθροῦ: ‘but right now, the present time, is for an enemy’. Again, 
Euxitheos reminds the jury that there are men who would bring false charges against 
                                                     
228 The previous extraordinary διαψήφισις in 445/4 BC took place after the city had received a gift of 
Egyptian grain, necessitating a full review of the deme registers, see Introduction, pp. 31-2. 
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others in order to win a victory over their enemy (see also §§6, 57 and 63). His intention 
is obviously to draw a parallel with the state of affairs between himself and Euboulides, 
and the alleged personal enmity between them (for their personal feud, see §§8, 48 and 
61). 
συκοφαντεῖν βουλομένου: ‘someone wishing to engage in sykophancy’. For details 
regarding the sykophant, see τοὺς συκοφαντοῦντας πονηρούς at §32 and τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν 
ὁ συκοφάντης at §34. 
[50] (καί μοι πρὸς Διὸς καὶ θεῶν μηδεὶς θορυβήσῃ, μηδ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ᾧ μέλλω λέγειν 
ἀχθεσθῇ): ‘(and by Zeus and the gods let nobody make a commotion, or be annoyed at 
what I am about to say)’. Euxitheos asks the jurors to remain calm as he is about to say 
something that might cause them offence (he does so again at §59, καί μοι πρὸς Διὸς καὶ 
θεῶν μηδεὶς ὑπολάβῃ δυσκόλως … ). The phrase πρὸς Διὸς καὶ θεῶν appears in several 
other lawcourt speeches, indicating that it was most likely a formulaic entreaty (Dem. 
18.199, 55.9, 35; Aeschin. 1.87).229 On this occasion, the speaker describes himself as a 
fellow Athenian even though the jury have yet to decide his case. Indeed, it is a common 
technique to anticipate an audience’s negative reaction to a point made by the speaker 
(Plat. Apol. 20e, 21a, 30c; Dem. 3.10, 8.32, 23.144).230 The speaker had to be careful not 
to incite the jurors’ resentment and, to continue with a point irrespective of its potential 
to provoke, he must deem it to be essential to his case. 
                                                     
229 For a discussion on entreaties to the gods, see M. Edwards, ‘Les dieux chez les orateurs attiques’, pp. 
417-25. 
230 For vocal expressions made by one or more jurymen to a litigant, see n. 68. 
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καὶ οὐχ ἑτέρας μὲν ὢν ταύτης δὲ προσποιούμενος: ‘and I am not pretending to be her 
son while being the son of another’. Euxitheos denies outright that he was a supposititious 
child.231  
[51] ὧν δ᾽ οὐκ εἰσὶν προσποιουμένοις: ‘and to be pretending to be who they are not’. 
When used in conjunction with a negative, the verb προσποιέω means ‘to pretend the 
contrary’. 
δίκαιον ὑπάρχειν παρ᾽ ὑμῖν τοῦτο σημεῖον ὡς εἰσὶ ξένοι, ἐμοὶ δήπου τοὐναντίον ὡς 
εἰμὶ πολίτης: ‘it is right of you to hold this as a sign that they are foreigners … surely the 
opposite should hold for me as proof that I am a citizen’. If the general consensus is to 
believe that a person is a foreigner for claiming to be the child of other parents, Euxitheos 
then contends that he must be a citizen for acknowledging his true parents. But this is 
ultimately a poor argument. A man who was unsure of his parents’ status would be more 
likely to lie about it rather than to find ‘new’ parents. 
ξένην καὶ ξένον τοὺς ἐμαυτοῦ γονέας ἐπιγραψάμενος: ‘For having registered a foreign 
woman and man as my parents’. Since deme lists probably only recorded the father’s 
name (in accordance with normal identification practices, see Dem. 39.10), the inclusion 
of two parents was probably meant to emphasise the absurdity of such a notion. 
ἀλλ᾽ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον συνῄδειν, ἐζήτησ᾽ ἂν ὧν φήσω γονέων εἶναι: ‘but if I had known 
any such thing, I would have sought people who I could say are my parents’. Euxitheos 
uses irony in an attempt to undermine Euboulides’ attack on the citizenship of his parents, 
stating he would have sought actual citizens to register as his parents had he known that 
they were foreigners (cf. καίτοι οὐ δήπου παῖς ὢν ἐγὼ ταῦτ᾽ ἔπειθον αὐτοὺς ἀργύριον 
διδούς at §54). Of course, what he neglects to say is that lying about their foreign status 
                                                     
231 For supposititious children, see n. 131. 
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would also be an option. Though his argument is superficial, his ironical approach enabled 
him to pass over the point that he really ought to prove, that he was the legitimate 
offspring of Thoucritos and Nicarete. 
 
§§52-6: Euboulides’ accusations against Euxitheos 
Euxitheos deals with Euboulides’ allegations at §§52-3, specifically that he bribed 
Thoucritos’ family to say that they were his relatives. This suggests that his opponent’s 
attack placed more emphasis on Nicarete, claiming that Thoucritos’ family were lying by 
accepting the illegitimate Euxitheos as one of their own. 
[52] Ἔτι τοίνυν ὀρφανὸς κατελείφθην: ‘And furthermore I was left fatherless’ (cf. 
§§27 and 54). The Greek word ὀρφανός can be translated as ‘orphan’, but it does not 
necessarily imply that the son or daughter had lost their mother too (Hes. Works and Days, 
330; Eur. El. 914, 1010; Lys. 2.60, 3.7).232 Since Euxitheos’ mother was still alive at the 
time of the speech’s delivery, ὀρφανός is translated here as ‘fatherless’. The loss of one’s 
father was considered to be such a social problem that the Athenian state made provisions 
to maintain the orphans of fallen soldiers at public expense until they turned eighteen 
years of age. But, as demonstrated by Euxitheos’ use of ὀρφανός here, the term did not 
only refer to a child. He employs this term again when making his final entreaty to the 
jury to vote in his favour for the sake of his mother (see ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦ μὲν πατρὸς ὀρφανὸς 
κατελείφθην at §70), perhaps in a further attempt to rouse the jury’s pity. 
τῶν μαρτύρων ἐνίους ὠφελουμένους μοι μαρτυρεῖν συγγενεῖς εἶναι: ‘some of the 
witnesses are being paid by me to testify that they are my relatives’. At the time of the 
speech, Euxitheos’ opponents believe him to have sufficient funds to buy witnesses for 
                                                     
232 Liddell and Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, s.v. ὀρφανός. 
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the present case. If these reports were true, the speaker must have acquired his wealth 
through business rather than inheriting it from the father he himself claimed was poor 
(see πένης ὢν at §25). Despite the fact that Euxitheos previously declared that he and his 
mother do not live in a manner they could wish (see ζῆν οὐχ ὅντινα τρόπον βουλόμεθα at 
§31), other elements in the speech appear to confirm that he thrived from this business 
(see πολλαὶ δ᾽ ἐκ πενήτων πλούσιαι νῦν at §45) or even amassed considerable wealth (ἃ 
ἐγὼ ἀνέθηκα τῇ Ἀθηνᾷ at §64, and τούτων τινὲς ἐπὶ τὸ οἰκίδιον ἐλθόντες <τὸ> ἐν ἀγρῷ 
νύκτωρ ἐπεχείρησαν διαφορῆσαι τὰ ἔνδοθεν at §65). If Euxitheos was indeed a man of 
means, it would certainly explain how he was able to afford to pay Demosthenes’ fee for 
writing his speech.233 
One speculative aspect worth consideration is if Euboulides’ accusation of bribery was 
true. This would not only explain why Euxitheos was unsupported during the vote of the 
demesmen at the διαψήφισις (see §14) but also how he was able to produce some of 
Thoucritos’ relatives during his appeal (see §20-1). Before his case came to court, 
Euxitheos could have bought their apparent change of heart (cf. the alternate theory that 
his elderly relatives had departed the deme ἀγορά early along with other senior demesmen, 
see οἱ μὲν πρεσβύτεροι τῶν δημοτῶν at §10). 
καὶ ἅμα μὲν κατ᾽ ἐμοῦ λέγουσιν τὰς ἐκ τῆς πενίας ἀδοξίας καὶ περὶ τὸ γένος 
διαβάλλουσιν: ‘One minute they speak against me for the dishonour of my poverty and 
they slander my lineage’. Euxitheos’ use of the plural, τὰς ἀδοξίας, may be rhetorical 
exaggeration, though he may well have had Nicarete’s work as both a wet-nurse and as a 
ribbon-seller in mind. Here, he emphasises his opponents’ apparent inconsistency in order 
to draw the jury’s attention away from the charge that he bought witnesses. 
                                                     
233 See pp. 13-14 in the Introduction. 
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[53] ἐξῆν δὲ δήπου τούτοις, εἰ νόθος ἢ ξένος ἦν ἐγώ, κληρονόμοις εἶναι τῶν ἐμῶν 
πάντων: ‘And surely it was possible for these relatives, if I indeed was a bastard or a 
foreigner, to be heirs to all my property’. The re-enactment of Pericles’ citizenship law in 
403/2 BC once again restricted citizenship to the offspring of two Athenian citizen 
parents. This renewal included a clause, attributed to Aristophon (see §§30-2), which 
stated that whoever was not born of a citizen woman was a νόθος (Ath. 13.577b-c: 
Ἀριστοφῶν δ᾽ ὁ ῥήτωρ, ὁ τὸν νόμον εἰσενεγκὼν ἐπ᾽ Εὐκλείδου ἄρχοντος ὃς ἂν μὴ ἐξ 
ἀστῆς γένηται νόθον εἶναι; similar comments regarding the possession of only one 
Athenian parent are found in Dem. 23.213 and Plut. Them. 1).234 Since they lacked one 
of the two Athenian parents necessary for citizenship (εἰ μήτε πείσαντες μήτε δεηθέντες 
ὑμῶν at §3), νόθοι were not legally entitled to inherit money or property; both Dem. 43.51 
and Isae. 6.47 attribute this provision to the same proposal of Aristophon. The right to 
inherit was thus a privilege of citizens and the fact that it was denied to both νόθοι and 
ξένοι alike is used by the speaker to support the reliability of his witnesses and thus his 
citizen status. The ‘people’ that Euxitheos refers to here are the family members that he 
brings as witnesses, specifically those who could have prevented the speaker from 
inheriting from his father and who could stand to inherit his possessions should he lose 
his appeal to be reinstated in the deme (according to Dionysios at Isae. 16, the property 
of a failed appellant was confiscated by the state, but debts and even exemptions could 
be claimed from that property by a third party: cf. [Dem.] 49.45 and [Dem.] 53; Lys, 
17).235 While this is a strong argument with regard to Thoucritos’ relatives standing as 
witnesses to his case, it is interesting that the speaker does not deny outright that he is a 
                                                     
234 For a brief discussion of the status of bastards with regard to Pericles’ citizenship law of 451/0 BC and 
its subsequent re-enactment, see Introduction, pp. 23-4 and also n. 12 in Appendix 3. A comprehensive 
study of bastardy in Greek society was undertaken by Ogden, in Greek Bastardy in the Classical and 
Hellenistic Periods (1996). 
235 This is only true if Euxitheos’ property was that which he inherited from Thoucritos. If, however, 
Euxitheos’ assets were from his own earnings, his paternal relatives could have no claim on it. 
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νόθος. Either Euxitheos believed that he had devoted enough time to detailing how his 
father had legally married an Athenian woman (§§40-3) and felt it was reliable enough 
not to warrant dwelling further on the issue, or he was attempting to gloss over any 
suggestion that he was a νόθος in order to cover a particular weakness in his case. 
κινδυνεύειν ἐν ψευδομαρτυρίοις: ‘run the risk of a suit for giving false testimony’. In 
Attic oratory, there are numerous references to giving false testimony before a court. 
While many describe the trials and the convictions (Dem. 24.131, 39.18, 45.50; [Dem.] 
46.10, 47.1, 9, 76, 49.56; Aeschin. 1.85), others refer to the danger of providing a false 
deposition like Euxitheos does here (for the use of κινδυνεύειν and ψευδομαρτυρεῖν 
together, see Dem. 29.16, 34.19, 41.16 and [Dem.] 47.5). While Euxitheos makes only a 
brief argument that those providing testimony as his relatives would not have chosen to 
undergo the risk of perjuring themselves, the speaker in On Behalf of Euphiletos dedicates 
more time to arguing from probability that his alleged family members would not risk 
giving false testimony (Isae. 12.4-8). 
μηδεμιᾶς ἐξωλείας ὑπόχους ἑαυτοὺς ποιεῖν: ‘without anybody making themselves 
liable to utter destruction?’. In taking the oath, a litigant called ‘utter destruction’ down 
on himself if he violated it in any way (see κατ᾽ ἐξωλείας at §22). 
[54] με εὐθέως ἦγον εἰς τοὺς φράτερας: ‘they immediately brought me to the phratry 
members’. The speaker’s relatives brought him to the phratry members, presumably in 
the absence of his father (either Euxitheos’ father was still abroad with Thrasyboulos, see 
ἀποδημοῦντος μετὰ Θρασυβούλου at §42, or his father had already died, see §§27 and 
52).236 Although phratry membership does not appear to have directly affected a man’s 
legal status, it could be used as evidence of his legitimacy if his citizenship was 
                                                     
236 See n. 11 in Appendix 5. 
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questioned (their refusal could also be exploited in court to challenge somebody’s status, 
as demonstrated by [Dem.] 59.59).237 Hence, Euxitheos endeavours to show the jury that 
he was accepted by his father’s phratry, notably from a customarily young age. 
There is, however, a noticeable lack of witnesses to confirm Euxitheos’ story. Though a 
number of his paternal relatives were present to give testimonies during the trial (§§20-
2), none confirm that he was introduced to the phratry as a young child. Likewise, the 
phratry members who appear in court to attest to his father’s membership do not 
subsequently testify that they bore witness to Euxitheos’ presentation at either the μεῖον 
or the κουρεῖον. Such an absence is certainly striking, and it gives weight to the theory 
that Euxitheos was illegally being passed off as the legitimate son of Nicarete and 
Thoucritos.238 The phratry members may have had sufficient doubts regarding his birth 
that they were reluctant to give testimony on his behalf. 
εἰς Ἀπόλλωνος πατρῴου {ἦγον}: ‘to the sacred place of Ancestral Apollo’. Dilts 
maintains Schaefer’s deletion of the word ἦγον.239 Since it is repeating a verb that had 
already been included in the previous clause, I concur that its recurrence here is 
unnecessary. In addition to the state cults, deities such as Ancestral Apollo and also Zeus 
of the Household (Ζεὺς Ἑρκεῖος; literally, ‘Zeus of the Courtyard’) were common to the 
phratries (IG II² 4973; Dein. Against Moschion)240  and to the genē (see Ἀπόλλωνος 
πατρῴου καὶ Διὸς ἑρκείου γεννῆται at §67; IG II² 2602, 3629, 3630). Indeed, Demetrios 
of Phaleron defined an Athenian citizen as one who worshipped Zeus of the Hearth and 
                                                     
237 See Appendix 5, pp. 295-6. 
238 See nn. 130 and 131. 
239 Dilts (ed.), Demosthenis Orationes IV, p. 268; cf. Rennie (ed.), Demosthenis Orationes III, p. 267. For 
Schaefer’s edition, see Apparatus criticus et exegeticus ad Demosthenem (1824-7). 
240 For the Deinarchos fragment, see Harp. s.v. Ἑρκεῖος Ζεύς; fr. B. 11, see Minor Attic Orators, pp. 316-
7. The more literal translation of ‘Zeus of the Courtyard’ refers to the small courtyard altars which may 
have featured in many Greek households (Hom. Od. 22.334-5; Soph. Ant. 487). Domestic cults were 
symbolically dependent on and sanctioned by the cults of the social bodies; for the multi-layered nature of 
the cult of Zeus of the Household, see Lambert, The Phratries of Attica, pp. 215-6. 
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Ancestral Apollo (FGrH 228 F6 apud Harp. s.v. Ἑρκεῖος Ζεύς; cf. Pl. Euthyd. 302b; 
[Arist.] Ath. Pol. fr.1 in Harp. s.v. Ἀπόλλων πατρῷος). For Euxitheos’ implication that 
he too was a genos member, see γεννήταις at §24. 
εἰς τἄλλα ἱερά: ‘and to the other sacred places’. This must refer to places of worship for 
other cults belonging to the deme, phratry and genos.241 Probably included amongst such 
‘sacred places’ were the deme cult of Ζεὺς Ἑρκεῖος (SEG 33.147, 22), the phratry cult of 
Ζεὺς φράτριος (IG II² 1237, 1) and the genos cult of Ζεὺς Ἑρκεῖος, which is specifically 
mentioned by the speaker towards the end of his speech (see Ἀπόλλωνος πατρῴου καὶ 
Διὸς ἑρκείου γεννῆται at §67).  
καίτοι οὐ δήπου παῖς ὢν ἐγὼ ταῦτ᾽ ἔπειθον αὐτοὺς ἀργύριον διδούς: ‘And yet surely 
being a child I did not persuade them to do these things by giving them money’, for the 
use of πείθω to denote bribery, see πείθει at §41. In much the same manner as §51 (see 
ἀλλ᾽ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον συνῄδειν, ἐζήτησ᾽ ἂν ὧν φήσω γονέων εἶναι), Euxitheos employs the 
use of irony to belittle the accusation against him that he paid his present witnesses to 
admit him into the phratry.242 Undoubtedly, Demosthenes was ridiculing such claims 
against his client for rhetorical effect. This allowed the speaker to gloss over the issue 
rather than to offer an unequivocal response. 
ὀμόσας τὸν νόμιμον τοῖς φράτερσιν ὅρκον εἰσήγαγέν με, ἀστὸν ἐξ ἀστῆς ἐγγυητῆς 
αὑτῷ γεγενημένον εἰδώς: ‘having sworn the customary oath to the phratry members, he 
introduced me, knowing me to be his citizen son from a citizen wife who was lawfully 
married to him’. Here, τὸν νόμιμον refers to the customary oath sworn by a father when 
                                                     
241 For an overview of worship in the phratry cults, see Lambert, The Phratries of Attica, pp. 206-25. For 
the deme cults, see Osborne, Demos, pp. 178-82, and Parker, Polytheism and Society at Athens, pp. 50-78. 
242 Since admission usually took place when the candidate was young, see Appendix 5, pp. 293-5. 
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introducing his son to the phratry.243  A similar formula is presented in a speech by 
Isaeus.244 Euxitheos is careful to mention that his father swore such an oath, specifying 
that his son had been born of a citizen woman pledged by ἐγγύησις. Since citizenship was 
reserved for those born of two legally married citizens, the speaker reminds the jury that 
his parents have abided by proper procedures in their union (for legally-recognised 
betrothals and thus both legitimate marriages and children, see ἐγγυᾶται at §41). 
[55] ποῦ μετοίκιον καταθείς: ‘Where did I pay the metic’s tax?’. Like his previous 
statement at §48 (τόν γε ξένον καὶ μέτοικον), Euxitheos claims that he is being accused 
of being of metic status. He does not, however, address any charge of being a slave and 
it thus seems likely that Euboulides only alleged that Euxitheos was a foreigner. The 
μετοίκιον was an obligatory tax, paid annually by metics in order to legitimately live in 
the community (Xen. Ways and Means, 2.1). This poll tax was levied on the person rather 
than his or her property or activities, at a rate of one drachma per month for a male metic 
and half a drachma per month for a female (Harp. s.v. μετοίκιον).245 A similar phrase to 
the one used by Euxitheos here can be found at both Dem. 29.3 and Lys. 31.9, and 
collectively they give the impression that metics deposited this payment in person. If this 
is taken to be true, tax-collectors merely had to record the transaction (as noted at §34, 
see εἰ ξενικὰ ἐτέλει) and pursue those who did not pay. Since paying this tax classified 
                                                     
243 It should be noted, however, that Lambert believes it to be more likely that τὸν νόμιμον is a reference to 
Pericles’ citizenship law, which provided that citizen descent was necessary in the female line, see The 
Phratries of Attica, pp. 170-1 n. 159. While he poses an interesting theory, there is simply nothing to support 
it in this speech or elsewhere. 
244 Isae. 8.19: ὀμόσας κατὰ τοὺς νόμους τοὺς κειμένους ἦ μὴν ἐξ ἀστῆς καὶ ἐγγυητῆς γυναικὸς εἰσάγειν. 
But the wording of the oath seems to have varied between phratries, as other introducers only swore that 
the candidate was born in wedlock (Isae. 7.16; Andoc. 1.127; [Dem.] 59.60; IG II² 1237, 109-111). 
Although it cannot be known for sure whether or not every phratry required that their members were born 
from lawfully betrothed or married Athenian women, Odgen suggests that bastard children of two Athenian 
parents were excluded from phratry, deme and citizenship alike, Greek Bastardy in the Classical and 
Hellenistic Periods, pp. 152-3; for the issue of bastardy with regard to Pericles’ renewed citizenship law, 
see Introduction, pp. 23-4, and Appendix 3, pp. 284-6 (cf. nn. 17 and 20 in Appendix 5). 
245 This was not an overly harsh fee; see Whitehead, The Ideology of the Athenian Metic, pp. 75-7; see also 
MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens, pp. 76-7, and N. R. E. Fisher, ‘Citizens, Foreigners, and Slaves 
in Greek Society’, in A Companion to The Classical Greek World, p. 339. 
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him as a metic and separated him from the class of citizen, the penalty of slavery was 
enacted for those convicted of evasion (Dem. 25.57). Defaulters were committing fraud; 
their lack of payment blurred the deliberate divide between citizen status and that of metic. 
By asking ‘have I paid the metic’s tax?’, Euxitheos again emphasises that Euboulides has 
brought no evidence of his family’s name appearing in the tax records in order to support 
his claims. However, if the speaker or even his mother were illegally passing for citizens, 
they certainly would not have registered to pay this tax. 
ἐν οἷς ὁ πάππος ὁ τοῦ πατρός, ὁ ἐμός, <ὁ> πατήρ, ἐνταῦθα καὶ αὐτὸς φαίνομαι 
δημοτευόμενος: ‘I also clearly belong to that same deme in which my father’s 
grandfather, my own grandfather, my father belong’. Dilts maintains Reiske’s insertion 
of the article after the noun, in order to include rightly the speaker’s grandfather.246 For 
the speaker’s use of δημοτευόμενος, see τὸν μὲν ἄλλον ἅπαντα χρόνον δημοτευόμενος 
μετ᾽ ἐμοῦ καὶ κληρούμενος at §49. 
[56] ὁρῶ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐ μόνον τῶν ἀποψηφισαμένων Ἁλιμουσίων 
ἐμοῦ κυριώτερ᾽ ὄντα τὰ δικαστήρια, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς βουλῆς καὶ τοῦ δήμου, δικαίως: 
‘For I see, Athenian men, that the lawcourts are more powerful not only than those 
Halimousians who disfranchised me, but also than the Boulē and the Ecclēsia, and rightly 
so’. For a brief account of the jury, see ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί at §1. When citizens were 
selected to serve as jurors, they swore to abide by laws and decrees of the Ecclēsia and 
the decrees of the Boulē (Dem. 24.27; a subsequent passage purports to be the text of that 
oath, beginning ‘ψηφιοῦμαι κατὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ψηφίσματα τοῦ δήμου τοῦ 
Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῆς βουλῆς τῶν πεντακοσίων … ’, Dem. 24.149).247 But jurors, like those 
                                                     
246 Dilts (ed.), Demosthenis Orationes IV, p. 269; cf. Rennie (ed.), Demosthenis Orationes III, p. 267. For 
J. J. Reiske’s edition, see Oratorum Graecorum quorum princeps est Demosthenes, quae supersunt. 
247 The document quoted at Dem. 24.149-51 can hardly be genuine; it omits clauses which are known to be 
part of the oath and includes others which make little contextual sense; see M. Canevaro’s recent work on 
this topic, in The Documents in the Attic Orators, pp. 173-80. For Scafuro’s reliable reconstruction of the 
oath, see n. 72. 
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voting in the Ecclēsia, were not held accountable for their decisions and could not be 
penalised for their vote (unless it could be effectively shown that they had accepted bribes; 
a difficult feat, given the size and random selection of juries). Moreover, the lawcourts 
had the power of judicial review.248 It is thus understandable why these courts could be 
viewed as the true governing power in Athens; one source observes that some blamed 
Solon for making the courts too powerful (Arist. Pol. 1274a4-5) and others made claims 
that the courts were viewed as above the law (Dem. 2.78; Isoc. 20.22). As a result, 
Euxitheos’ appreciation of the lawcourts’ power seems to be more than just a blatant 
attempt at flattering the jury. Yet, in practice, the Athenian court system belies such a 
picture of lawcourts truly being more powerful than the Boulē and the Ecclēsia. The 
courts lacked written records and, as such, cases were tried on an individual basis rather 
than according to precedent. The juries’ decisions were made without any formal 
deliberation and were delivered without any authoritive interpretation of the law. More 
importantly, they did not possess the power to introduce legislation. Nevertheless, 
Euxitheos’ view that the jury before him was more powerful than the Halimousians who 
disfranchised him holds true; should they find in his favour, the court possessed the 
necessary authority to overturn the deme’s decision and reinstate him as a citizen. 
κατὰ γὰρ πάντα αἱ παρ᾽ ὑμῖν εἰσι κρίσεις δικαιόταται: ‘for in all respects your 
judgements are most just’. Euxitheos purposefully compliments the jury’s decision-
making (cf. τοὺς ἠδικημένους ἅπαντας σεσῴκατε at §6 and οὐδέν᾽ ἀπεστερεῖτε at §57). 
                                                     
248 In addition to hearing appeals from candidates for office who were rejected at the δοκιμασία (see ἀρχὰς 
ἔλαχεν καὶ ἦρξεν δοκιμασθείς at §25) and complaints made against officials ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 45.2-3, 48.4-
5, 54.2), the fourth century BC Athenian juries tried cases in which the proposers of new decrees and laws 
were challenged by a γραφὴ παρανόμων (indictment for illegal legislation; Andoc. 1.17, 22) and a γραφὴ 
νόμον μὴ ἐπιτήδειον θεῖναι (public procedure for introducing an unsuitable law; [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 59.2) 
respectively, either before or after they were enacted (Xen. Hell. 1.7.12-14; Dem. 22.5, 9-10). For a 
comprehensive study of Athenian institutional history, see M. H. Hansen, The Sovereignty of the People’s 
Court in Athens in the Fourth Century B. C. and the Public Action Against Unconstitutional Proposals 
(1974); for a more recent discussion, see A. Lanni, ‘Judicial Review and the Athenian ‘Constitution’’, pp. 
1-22. 
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This is a variation of a rhetorical topos expressing confidence in the jury, and intended to 
flatter them (Antiph. 2.1, 5.4, 8, 6.10, 51; Andoc. 1.2, 9; Lys. 3.2; Isoc. 15.169-70; 
Aeschin. 2.24). Having just referred to the Halimousians who disfranchised him, 
Euxitheos makes a direct comparison between what he believes to be an unjust expulsion 
on their part and his confidence in the present jury’s just judgement to reinstate him. 
 
§§57-65: corruption in Halimous 
 Euxitheos refers to abuses in the deme’s administration as further proof that Euboulides’ 
charges against him are unjust. However, he provides no evidence to support his claims 
of incompetency and dishonest practices in Halimous, and so it is difficult to give any 
credence to his claims of misconduct or deliberate malice on Euboulides’ part. 
[57] οὐδέν᾽ ἀπεστερεῖτε: ‘you have deprived no one’. Euxitheos flatters the jury again 
(cf. τοὺς ἠδικημένους ἅπαντας σεσῴκατε at §6 and κατὰ γὰρ πάντα αἱ παρ᾽ ὑμῖν εἰσι 
κρίσεις δικαιόταται at §56), but here he specifically directs his comments to those who 
belong to large demes. Larger demes would probably have been subject to more attention 
from outside officials than the smaller demes, and were thus more likely bound by fair 
administration procedures; smaller demes were most likely thought to be able to control 
better their own admissions, given their size and supposed thorough knowledge of their 
compact community, and thus corruption might have gone unchecked. Essentially, the 
speaker is asking the jury not to take it for granted that the Halimousians voted fairly 
because of their relatively small size and localised knowledge. But, since the Attic demes 
differed in practices regardless of size (see παραγένοιντό μοι πάντες οἱ δημόται at §16), 
Euxitheos’ accusation cannot be proven and his flattery of these jurors cannot be taken as 
more than a further attempt to suggest that his disfranchisement was a direct result of 
corruption in his own deme. 
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τῶν ἀναβαλέσθαι δεομένων: ‘those asking to adjourn’. According to the speaker, 
Euboulides was unwilling to postpone the vote on Euxitheos’ citizenship until the next 
day (see ἀναβαλέσθαι εἰς τὴν ὑστεραίαν at §12). 
δι᾽ ἔχθραν ἐπιβουλεύοντας: ‘those plotting on account of personal enmity’. The speaker 
has reminded the jury on several occasions that cases arising from personal rivalries have 
often come before the court (see §§6, 49 and 63). His purpose in doing so is to draw a 
comparison with the case before them now, which he claims is a direct result of the 
animosity between himself and Euboulides (see §§8, 48 and 61). 
[58] τοὺς δὲ καλῷ καὶ δικαίῳ πράγματι μὴ καλῶς χρησαμένους: ‘those who have 
wrongly dealt with this honourable and fair matter’, i.e. the extraordinary scrutiny held 
by each deme, in accordance with the Ecclēsia’s decree (for the decree, see τὴν 
διαψήφισιν at §7).249 
παρ᾽ ἡμῖν: ‘in ours’, referring to the deme of Halimous. Having informed the jury that 
the deme register had previously been lost during Antiphilos’ dēmarchy (ὅτ᾽ ἀπώλετο 
αὐτοῖς τὸ ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον δημαρχοῦντος Ἀντιφίλου τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ 
Εὐβουλίδου at §26 and also δημαρχῶν ὁ Εὐβουλίδου πατήρ … Ἀντίφιλος at §60), the 
speaker declares that Halimous’ actions with regard to its membership are the worst of 
all the demes (see below). Once again, Euxitheos relies on exaggeration for rhetorical 
effect. But, while it is difficult to believe that political malpractices were not similarly 
known in other demes, there may be an element of truth in his assertion that Halimous 
was experiencing particular difficulties around the time of his trial. Aside from the details 
provided in Euxitheos’ account, sources recount an episode in which an ex-slave was 
indicted for bribing his way into an illegal enrolment in Halimous (Dein. Against 
                                                     
249 See also the Introduction, pp. 25-43. 
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Agasicles; cf. Hyp. 4.3). 250  But this incident occurs later than Euxitheos’ appeal, 
somewhere between 336 and 324 BC, and so it cannot be known whether wrongful 
expulsions and admissions in the deme were the result of corruption alone (and if so, to 
what extent this pervaded the deme) or whether administrative ineptitude played a part. 
Either way, this sort of conduct in a deme explains why it was necessary for the state to 
hold the extraordinary διαψήφισις of 346/5 BC. 
οὗτοι γὰρ ἀδελφῶν ὁμομητρίων καὶ ὁμοπατρίων τῶν μέν εἰσιν ἀπεψηφισμένοι, τῶν 
δ᾽ οὔ, καὶ πρεσβυτέρων ἀνθρώπων ἀπόρων, ὧν τοὺς υἱεῖς ἐγκαταλελοίπασιν: ‘For, 
those who are brothers born of the same mother and the same father, these men have 
disfranchised some but not others, and have disfranchised older men without means, but 
have left behind their sons as citizens’. Those born of the same mother and same father 
had exactly the same qualifications for citizenship. Consequently, by informing the jury 
that the Halimousians had disfranchised some such men, Euxitheos wants to demonstrate 
their irrational conduct with regard to deme membership. He makes a similar point about 
disfranchising a father but retaining his son, since citizenship derived from Athenian 
parentage. Moreover, the speaker stipulates that these older men were without means and 
his intention may have been to suggest that they were too poor to pay the necessary bribes 
to remain as members of the deme (see §§59 and 60). Euxitheos sought to display events 
occurring in his deme in the worst possible light in order to persuade the jury that his 
disfranchisement was among such illogical and corrupt acts. 
[59] ὃ δὲ πάντων δεινότατον οἱ συνεστηκότες πεποιήκασιν: ‘But the worst of all the 
things which the conspirators have done’, once again referring to Euboulides’ alleged 
                                                     
250 For the Deinarchos fragment, see Harp. s.v. ᾽Αγασικλῆς (cf. Suda, s.v. ᾽Αγασικλῆς Adler Α169); fr. A. 
7, see Minor Attic Orators, pp. 314-5. 
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fellow conspirators (cf. οἱ μετὰ τούτου συνεστηκότες at §16; for the use of the verb 
συνίστημι, see also §§13, 60, 61 and 63). 
(καί μοι πρὸς Διὸς καὶ θεῶν μηδεὶς ὑπολάβῃ δυσκόλως … ): ‘(and by Zeus and the 
gods, let no one take offence … )’. For a similar formulaic entreaty cf. καί μοι πρὸς Διὸς 
καὶ θεῶν μηδεὶς θορυβήσῃ, μηδ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ᾧ μέλλω λέγειν ἀχθεσθῇ at §50. 
<εἰς> αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα: ‘on the same subject’. Dilts retains Blass’ amendment of <εἰς>.251 
It appears to be a sensible addition since it correlates to the phrase εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα, 
used by the speaker at §§7 and 60. Euxitheos is prevented from making further 
accusations against Euboulides by the rule which states that litigants in private suits must 
keep to the issues directly concerning the case (for this rule, see εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα πάντα 
λέγειν at §7). But given that he has just asked the jurors not to take offence, it appears 
that he was aware that they may consider him to be going further than he ought to.  
Ἀναξιμένην καὶ Νικόστρατον: ‘Anaximenes and Nicostratos’. Nothing is known about 
these foreigners beyond Euxitheos’ assertion that Euboulides and his associates illegally 
enrolled them in the deme in return for money. Elsewhere, a certain Nicostratos is 
likewise accused of bribery around this time but it cannot be determined if he was the 
same man as mentioned here (Aeschin. 1.86; for another named individual in an unlawful 
enrolment, see παρ᾽ ἡμῖν at §58). This was a serious charge of corrupting an official (cf. 
Dem. 44.37; Aeschin. 1.86).252 Whether or not the speaker is telling the truth cannot be 
                                                     
251 Dilts (ed.), Demosthenis Orationes IV, p. 270; cf. Rennie (ed.), Demosthenis Orationes III, p. 268. For 
Blass’ edition, see Demosthenis Orationes III, p. 265. 
252 Elsewhere, Dem. 21.113 quotes a law, possibly dating from the sixth century BC, which details that if 
any Athenian accepts a bribe to the detriment of any individual citizen or the state as a whole, then both he 
and his children were punished with ἀτιμία and their familial property was confiscated. More specifically, 
the Athēnaiōn Politeia states that a magistrate who was convicted of bribery was fined ten times the amount 
he received ([Arist.] 54.2). The same text also indicates that the γραφὴ δωροξενίας was aimed at exposing 
people who became citizens by bribing an official ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 59.3). 
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known, but naming these individuals makes his claims against his opponents seem more 
believable. 
κοινῇ διανειμάμενοι πέντε δραχμὰς ἕκαστος προσεδέξαντο: ‘having divided the 
money for this they each received a share of five drachmas’. Again, by including the exact 
amount, Euxitheos makes his claim appear plausible. Yet if Euxitheos is telling the truth, 
there are two possible scenarios with regard to this figure: either the total sum had to be 
divided amongst so many men that it only amounted to five drachmas each (unfortunately, 
at no stage in the text does the speaker reveal how many conspirators there were), or the 
original amount was a relatively small sum used to purchase Athenian citizenship (at 
Aeschin. 1.114-5, the politician Timarchos accepted two thousand drachmas from a 
relative of the man he had sought to disfranchise).253 If this is a fictitious account, the sum 
of five drachmas was meant to convince the jury that Euboulides thought so little of 
Athenian citizenship. 
καὶ ταῦτ᾽ οὐκ ἂν ἐξομόσαιτο Εὐβουλίδης οὐδ᾽ οἱ μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ μὴ οὐκ εἰδέναι: ‘And 
neither Euboulides nor those with him would deny these things on oath stating that they 
did not know about them’. Athenian law decreed that neither party in a suit could be asked 
to give evidence (see αὐτοῖς δὲ τοῖς ἠδικηκόσιν με at §14). As such, Euboulides himself 
could not testify but the speaker does call on those who conspired with his opponent to 
either confirm or deny on oath the contents of his deposition (for the witness’ ἐξωμοσία, 
cf. οὐ δυνήσονται ἔξαρνοι γενέσθαι at §14). However, Euxitheos does not call any 
witnesses to confirm that his opponent denied the oath.  
                                                     
253 Five drachmas is a surprisingly small sum for purchasing Athenian citizenship. Indeed, Whitehead has 
also questioned whether or not this sum of five drachmas is a corruption in the text and, if not, he rightly 
surmises that Euxitheos wished to imply that their ‘threshold of corruptibility was so low’, in The Demes 
of Attica, p. 296 n. 16. For the rates of pay in the fourth century BC, see n. 41. 
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καὶ νῦν τούτων οὐκ ἀπεψηφίσαντο: ‘And yet they did not disfranchise these men now 
in the latest review’, sc. διαψήφισις, at the time that Euxitheos was expelled. 
[60] ἕνεκ᾽ ἀργυρίου: ‘on account of money’. Euxitheos accuses Euboulides and his 
co-conspirators of accepting payments from those wishing to have their enemies expelled 
from the deme, of extorting money from those threatened with an attack on their 
citizenship, and of taking bribes from impostors wishing to remain in the deme. Whether 
or not this was true, it does suggest that the abuse of citizenship regulations was perhaps 
not uncommon.254 
εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα: ‘the same matter at hand’. Euxitheos again anticipates the jury’s 
intolerance for him straying from the main issues pertaining to the case, see εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ 
πρᾶγμα πάντα λέγειν at §7, and <εἰς> αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα at §59.  
δημαρχῶν ὁ Εὐβουλίδου πατήρ … Ἀντίφιλος: ‘while Euboulides’ father Antiphilos 
was serving as dēmarch’, see ὅτ᾽ ἀπώλετο αὐτοῖς τὸ ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον 
δημαρχοῦντος Ἀντιφίλου τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ Εὐβουλίδου at §26. 
τεχνάζει βουλόμενος παρά τινων λαβεῖν ἀργύριον, καὶ ἔφη τὸ κοινὸν γραμματεῖον 
ἀπολωλέναι: ‘he used trickery wishing to take money from some people, and he said that 
the deme register had been lost’. At §26, Euxitheos informed the jury that the deme 
register had been lost, yet he made no mention of any suspicions surrounding its 
disappearance at that stage of his speech. Here, he reveals his doubts about the register’s 
supposed disappearance. He believes that Antiphilos was bribed to say that he had lost 
the register in order to have a compulsory vote on all of the demesmen. This accusation 
serves not only to blacken Antiphilos’ character but also his son’s, furthering his previous 
                                                     
254 For utilising charges of false citizenship as a weapon in the fifth century BC, see schol. Ar. Frogs, 416, 
418, Birds, 765, 1669; see also Walters ‘Perikles’ Citizenship Law’, p. 327 n. 39. 
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claim that Euboulides too accepted bribes (see §59). The speaker presents the episode as 
a deliberate political move by some demesmen to attack other members. The compulsory 
voting that followed this loss of the register did not bring to light any accusations against 
Euxitheos’ family (καὶ ὢν ἐχθρὸς τῷ ἐμῷ πατρὶ τότε οὐ μόνον οὐ κατηγόρησεν, ἀλλ᾽ 
οὐδὲ τὴν ψῆφον ἤνεγκεν ὡς οὐκ ἦν Ἀθηναῖος at §61), and the speaker can thus use this 
as evidence that Euboulides’ present claims are unfounded. 
καὶ κατηγορῶν δέκα τῶν δημοτῶν ἐξέβαλεν, οὓς ἅπαντας πλὴν ἑνὸς κατεδέξατο τὸ 
δικαστήριον: ‘and accusing ten of the demesmen he expelled them, all of whom bar one 
were readmitted by the lawcourt’. According to the speaker, nine of the ten men who had 
been expelled under Antiphilos’ compulsory voting were subsequently reinstated (for the 
vote, see ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ διαψηφίσεις ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐγένοντο τοῖς δημόταις and καί τινας 
ἀπήλασαν αὑτῶν at §26). Since these men were ejected as a result of a compulsory deme 
vote rather than a deme-wide review of the registers, they may have each brought a δίκη 
βλάβης (a private suit for compensation) which would compel the deme to readmit them 
if the δικαστήριον found in their favour. In Against Neaera, Phrastor sought to bring a 
private suit against his phratry and his genos after they refused to admit his child ([Dem.] 
59.59-60). In On Behalf of Euphiletos, the appellant had initially brought a private suit 
against his deme after he had been rejected during their annual διαψήφισις proceedings 
when he was eighteen years old; as a result, he was subsequently admitted but the deme 
seized this opportunity presented by the extraordinary deme-wide διαψήφισις of 346/5 
BC to have him removed from their register (Isae. 12.11-12). 255  But, without any 
confirmation from Euxitheos that the nine disfranchised Halimousians brought 
                                                     
255 See Appendix 1, pp. 278-9. 
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definitively private cases, we cannot be sure that they did not bring (or at least have the 
option to bring) public appeals like his own case.256 
Euxitheos’ statement that nine were successful was obviously meant to show the scandal 
around the whole affair and was thereby intended to blacken his opponent’s name via his 
father’s corrupt expulsion of several demesmen. He does not comment on why Antiphilos 
had these men ejected, whether he had a personal grievance against them or whether he 
was acting on behalf of others, but his specification of the number of members involved 
does make his account sound credible. Ultimately, we cannot know if Euxitheos’ report 
is genuine, though he would have been taking a significant risk if he was fabricating such 
a story. 
ταῦτα πάντες ἴσασιν οἱ πρεσβύτεροι: ‘the elders know of all these things’ (cf. Antiph. 
5.71; Isoc. 16.4; Lycourg. 1.93). For other variations of this rhetorical device, see ὡς ὑμῶν 
ἴσασι πολλοί at §8, and also ἃ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ἴστε, τί δεῖ λέγειν at §33. But since the speaker 
does not bring one such man forward, nor indeed anyone who could verify this claim, it 
cannot be assumed that such a claim is indeed true.  
[61] ὅπου καὶ τοὺς ὄντας πολίτας συνιστάμενοι ἐξέβαλον: ‘when they were 
conspiring to expel even those being citizens’, see §60. 
καὶ ὢν ἐχθρὸς τῷ ἐμῷ πατρὶ τότε οὐ μόνον οὐ κατηγόρησεν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τὴν ψῆφον 
ἤνεγκεν ὡς οὐκ ἦν Ἀθηναῖος: ‘And being an enemy of my father at that time, not only 
did he not accuse him but neither did he cast his vote that he was not Athenian’. 
Thoucritos was not among those expelled as a result of the compulsory votes when the 
deme register was being reconstituted having been lost (see τεχνάζει βουλόμενος παρά 
τινων λαβεῖν ἀργύριον, καὶ ἔφη τὸ κοινὸν γραμματεῖον ἀπολωλέναι at §60). Here, 
                                                     
256 For a discussion of the appeal process in relation to Demophilos’ decree, see Introduction, pp. 25-43 and 
also Appendix 7, pp. 302-13. 
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Euxitheos specifies that Antiphilos neither accused Thoucritos nor cast an opposing vote 
against him despite being an enemy of his. Although he does not explain the cause of 
their enmity, Euxitheos obviously wants the audience to see that Antiphilos’ loss of the 
register was an ideal opportunity for him to triumph over Thoucritos, either by publicising 
any knowledge of his illegitimacy or by using corrupt means to expel him illegally. Since 
Euxitheos has made two prior claims that Euboulides was a personal enemy of his (see 
διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἔχθραν ἐπιτίθεταί μοι at §8 and οὐδέ γ᾽ ἄν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, παλαιὸς 
ὢν ἐχθρὸς ἐμοὶ τοῦτον τὸν καιρὸν περιέμενεν at §48), it is not surprising that he suggests 
that their enmity derived from the hostility between their fathers. The topos of a personal 
enmity being passed down to a younger generation, specifically from father to to son, also 
appears in Isaeus’ On the Estate of Astyphilos (9.17-20). Though Euxitheos does not 
corroborate this claim, the parental connection serves as an attempt to persuade the jury 
that Euboulides was as dishonest as his father (see §60, especially καὶ κατηγορῶν δέκα 
τῶν δημοτῶν ἐξέβαλεν, οὓς ἅπαντας πλὴν ἑνὸς κατεδέξατο τὸ δικαστήριον). 
ὅτι ἁπάσαις ἔδοξεν δημότης εἶναι: ‘Because he was considered to be a deme member 
by all’. However, Euxitheos does not provide witnesses or written testimony to prove this. 
ἀλλ᾽ Εὐβουλίδης αὐτὸς οὑτοσί: ‘Euboulides himself’. For the prolific use of οὑτοσί 
throughout Demosthenes’ genuine speeches, see οὑτοσί at §8. 
οὔτε κατηγόρησεν οὔτ᾽ ἐναντίαν τὴν ψῆφον ἤνεγκεν· καὶ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα πάλιν ἐμὲ 
πάντες ἐψηφίσαντο δημότην: ‘neither accused me nor cast an opposing vote; for even 
on this occasion they again all voted me a deme member’. Euxitheos successfully passed 
the demesmen’s vote to be entered into the register after his father had previously 
undergone the compulsory vote, when the deme register was lost. A compelling statement 
but, again, no evidence is offered by the speaker to confirm this. 
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ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐμοῦ ὕδατος: ‘in the time allotted to me’. For the water-clock, see σὺ δ᾽ ἐπίλαβε 
τὸ ὕδωρ at §21.257 It appears that a litigant could interrupt his own speech in order to 
make an offer to relinquish some of his own time to his opponent: Dem. 18.139, 19.57; 
[Dem.] 50.2 (cf. ἐν τῷ ἐμῷ λόγῳ at Andoc. 1.26, 35, 55; Aeschin. 2.59). The frequent 
recurrence of such proposals suggests that it was an effective way for a speaker to present 
himself in a confident manner, with some even requesting that the attendant pour out the 
remaining water because he had no need for the rest of his time allowance (ἐξέρα τὸ ὕδωρ 
at Dem. 36.62, 38.28). Whether or not this offer was genuine on the speaker’s part, and 
he actually paused to await a response, cannot be known but it is unlikely that an opponent 
would accept such a challenge and risk the jury’s disfavour for taking someone else’s 
time-allowance. 
[62]  ἐγὼ τετράκις ἐπιδεικνύω πρότερον: ‘I can show that four times previously’. 
Euxitheos summarises the four occasions at which the demesmen have previously voted 
on his legitimacy: his father having passed the scrutiny, when he himself passed the 
scrutiny, after the register was lost and a compulsory vote was held, and finally when he 
himself was among those preselected for a priesthood.  
ὅτε ὁσίως ἄνευ συστάσεως ἐψηφίσαντο: ‘when they voted piously without any 
conspiracy’, i.e. they voted in accordance with the oath (see κατ᾽ ἐξωλείας at §22). 
καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ τὸν πατέρα δημότας αὑτῶν εἶναι ψηφισαμένους, πρῶτον μέν γε τοῦ 
πατρὸς δοκιμασθέντος, εἶτ᾽ ἐμοῦ: ‘they voted both me and my father to be members of 
their deme, indeed first when my father was approved by scrutiny, then me’, see ἀρχὰς 
ἔλαχεν καὶ ἦρξεν δοκιμασθείς at §25. 
                                                     
257 See also Appendix 7, pp. 309-11. 
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ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ διαψηφίσει: ‘then in the earlier voting by ballot’. Dilts accepts Wolf’s 
introduction of the word διαψηφίσει in place of the manuscript’s διαδικασίᾳ.258 While 
this amendment is contextually appropriate, it must be noted that the use of the verb 
διαδικάζειν (with the meaning ‘to decide individually’) as equivalent to διαψηφίζεσθαι is 
not unknown (IG II² 1237).  
Here, the wording employed by Euxitheos seems to imply that both he and his father 
underwent the compulsory vote. However, since it is not known when the deme register 
was lost (see ὅτ᾽ ἀπώλετο αὐτοῖς τὸ ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον δημαρχοῦντος Ἀντιφίλου 
τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ Εὐβουλίδου at §26), it cannot be determined if the speaker himself was 
actually included. Moreover, his previous statements at §§26 and 61 suggest that it was 
just his father who was confirmed by the vote of the demesmen. 
καὶ ταῦτα πάντα μεμαρτύρηται: ‘And all of these things have been testified to’. 
Witnesses are crucial to speak on behalf of someone when the only archival record of 
attendance, the deme register, had been lost (see καλῶ καὶ τούτων μάρτυρας at §27). 
[63] Εἰ δὲ δεῖ τὴν δημαρχίαν λέγειν: ‘And if it is necessary to speak of my service as 
dēmarch’. In addition to Antiphilos, Euxitheos expressly states that he too held the office 
of dēmarch (for this office and the speaker’s ambiguity with regard to Euboulides serving 
as dēmarch, see §26). Yet such a casual reference, to his dēmarchy, and a late one at that, 
appears strange; surely a detailed account of his time in this office could have been used 
as evidence for his legitimacy (the office would have been as important as the missed 
priesthood which he emphasises at §§46-8 and 62). This would have been particularly 
useful for the jury, since Euxitheos’ dēmarchy in Halimous may not have been a matter 
of widespread public knowledge. Alternatively, Euxitheos’ brevity regarding his term in 
                                                     
258 Dilts (ed.), Demosthenis Orationes IV, p. 271; cf. Rennie (ed.), Demosthenis Orationes III, p. 269. For 
Wolf’s edition, see Demosthenis et Aeschinis opera (1604). 
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this office may be explained by his unpopularity in this role; he makes the point that he 
was dēmarch and therefore an Athenian citizen, but he refrains from presenting a detailed 
account because of he was so disliked by his fellow demesmen 
The speaker proceeds by informing the jury that he became unpopular for honouring his 
debt-collecting duties. However, tensions could have arisen with the demesmen if 
suspicions about Euxitheos’ legitimacy had begun to circulate. If Euxitheos is to be 
believed about his unpopularity as dēmarch, his election to the post was probably quite 
recent and may have facilitated his ejection from the deme, though he makes no more of 
use of this claim during his defence. 
ἐν ᾗ διάφορος ἐγενόμην εἰσπράττων ὀφείλοντας πολλοὺς αὐτῶν μισθώσεις τεμενῶν: 
‘and during which I became unpopular by exacting owed rents for sacred precincts from 
many of them’. Euxitheos’ τεμένη were lands dedicated to a god and leased out by the 
deme. It was the duty of the dēmarch to collect rents due on such land (and also to enforce 
payments to private creditors, as implied by Ar. Clouds, 37; see ὅτ᾽ ἀπώλετο αὐτοῖς τὸ 
ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον δημαρχοῦντος Ἀντιφίλου τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ Εὐβουλίδου at §26). 
But defaulting appears to have been a particular issue in Halimous, as Euxitheos believes 
his role as a debt collector instigated his unpopularity amongst the demesmen. Unlike 
Euboulides (see κοινῇ διανειμάμενοι πέντε δραχμὰς ἕκαστος προσεδέξαντο at §59), 
though, Euxitheos presents himself as incorruptible. 
ἕτερ᾽ ἃ τῶν κοινῶν διηρπάκεσαν: ‘other debts which they pilfered from public property’. 
These debts were owed to the deme, and may refer to money owed for the use of public 
lands (IG II² 2492, 2493, 2498) or for building contracts (IG II² 1176 and 1215) by men 
serving as deme officials. 
ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος ὑπολήψεσθε ταῦτ᾽ εἶναι: ‘but perhaps you will take these 
things to be outside the matter at hand’. Euxitheos appears to foresee the jury’s reaction 
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to an account of his activities as dēmarch and is afraid that they would consider them to 
be irrelevant to the present case (for the paraleipsis, see ἔξεστιν ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος 
βλασφημεῖν at §33 and ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος at §66; cf. εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα πάντα λέγειν 
at §7). 
ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἔχω δεικνύναι τεκμήριον ὡς συνέστησαν: ‘And I also have this to show 
as proof that they have conspired’. Euxitheos makes yet another reference to the alleged 
conspiracy against him (see also §§13, 16, 59, 60 and 61). 
ἔκ τε γὰρ τοῦ ὅρκου ἐξήλειψαν τὸ ψηφιεῖσθαι γνώμῃ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ καὶ οὔτε χάριτος 
ἕνεκ᾽ οὔτ᾽ ἔχθρας: ‘for they removed from the oath the clause to vote according to their 
most just judgement and not on account of favour or hatred’. During the διαψήφισις, the 
demesmen were asked to vote according to their most just understanding of the situation, 
and were bound by the oath to vote on the matter at hand and not another issue. 
Presumably, Euxitheos alleges that this clause was removed so as to allow Euboulides 
and his co-conspirators to corrupt the demesmen’s vote on him (for the personal enmity 
between Euxitheos and Euboulides, see §§8 and 48; for Euxitheos’ lack of popularity 
with the demesmen, see ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἔχω δεικνύναι τεκμήριον ὡς συνέστησαν above). 
The wording of this oath bears a striking resemblance to that of the jurors.259 This was 
the oath that was noted at §8 as being administered by Euboulides (see κύριος ὢν τοῦ θ᾽ 
ὅρκου). Yet Euxitheos did not mention the removal of this clause in his earlier reference. 
Here, he fails to bring any witnesses to substantiate his claims before the jury.  
[64] ἱεροσυλήσαντες τὰ ὅπλα: ‘stole the sacred arms’. Euxitheos unceremoniously 
throws in this accusation against the demesmen from whom he collected outstanding 
debts (see ἐν ᾗ διάφορος ἐγενόμην εἰσπράττων ὀφείλοντας πολλοὺς αὐτῶν μισθώσεις 
                                                     
259 The passage at Dem. 24.149-51 purports to be the text of that oath, though it does not appear to be 
wholly genuine, see n. 234. For Scafuro’s reconstruction of the dikastic oath, see n. 72. 
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τεμενῶν at §63; for similar unrestrained claims, see Dem. 36.45, 45.79, 54.37; Andoc. 
1.124-5). On the one hand, it serves to portray these demesmen as deliberately seeking 
revenge, and on the other, to present Euxitheos as dedicated to his deme and a pious 
citizen. 
ἃ ἐγὼ ἀνέθηκα τῇ Ἀθηνᾷ: ‘which I dedicated to Athena’. Arms belonging to an enemy 
and captured in war were commonly dedicated in temples and shrines after battle (Hdt. 
5.95; Thuc. 3.114.1; Aeschin. 3.116). Given that Euxitheos makes no mention of a battle 
or even a war, he may have purchased the arms as an offering to be placed in a sacred 
space in his deme.260 If that was the case, such an ostentatious purchase must undermine 
his earlier argument of ‘not living in a manner’ he would wish (ζῆν οὐχ ὅντινα τρόπον 
βουλόμεθα at §31). 
καὶ τὸ ψήφισμα ἐκκολάψαντες ὃ ἐμοὶ ἐψηφίσαντο οἱ δημόται: ‘and defaced the stone 
decree which the demesmen voted in my honour’. Stone decrees could be erected as an 
expression of gratitude, and this decree most likely thanked Euxitheos for his dedication 
of arms (see above; for such deme decrees, see for example IG II² 1178, 1179, 1186 and 
1198). Alternatively, the decree may refer to a statute proposed by the speaker and passed 
by the deme at an assembly, and thereby may confirm his past service as a dēmarch. But 
the speaker would presumably have specified that it was such a decree, given the honour 
that would accompany it, and he would easily have been able to provide witnesses to its 
existence. Ultimately, he does not provide any witnesses to verify his account and he does 
not make any more of the decree as part of his case. 
                                                     
260 A. Westermann, Ausgewählte reden des Demosthenes, p. 180. There is nothing in the source material 
which reveals the cost of such a dedication. But H. Van Wees estimates that a basic shield and spear had a 
price of approximately twenty-five to thirty drachmas, or the value of a month’s wages, in ‘Tyrants, 
Oligarchs and Citizen Militias’, p. 63. He also calculates that a full set of bronze armour and a sword would 
have cost between seventy-five and one hundred drachmas, or the equivalent of three month’s wages. 
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[65] ὥσπερ φυγάδος ἤδη μου ὄντος καὶ ἀπολωλότος: ‘just as if I was already an 
exile and a ruined man’. Euxitheos’ use of the term φυγάς suggests that exile was one of 
the potential outcomes of him losing the case; either he could be punished with exile by 
the court, or he could go into voluntary exile in order to avoid the shame of losing his 
citizen status or even to avoid being enslaved. At no stage in the text does the speaker 
explicitly state what the penalty would be if he lost his appeal; in the very first passage, 
he only acknowledges the magnitude of his trial and shame that could befall him 
(λογισαμένους τό τε μέγεθος τοῦ παρόντος ἀγῶνος καὶ τὴν αἰσχύνην at §1), and later 
reiterates that it involved ruin (ὅλως ἀπολέσητε at §70).261 
τούτων τινὲς ἐπὶ τὸ οἰκίδιον ἐλθόντες <τὸ> ἐν ἀγρῷ νύκτωρ ἐπεχείρησαν 
διαφορῆσαι τὰ ἔνδοθεν: ‘some of these men came to my cottage in the country at night 
and attempted to plunder the things within’. Dilts maintains Blass’ acceptable addition of 
<τὸ>.262 Those who faced trial and the possibility of their possessions being confiscated 
by the state may also have had to contend with potential attacks from looters (cf. Lys. 
19.31). If caught in the act, τοιχώρυχοι (robbers) were liable to ἀπαγωγή (summary arrest) 
by the Eleven: if they immediately confessed, they would have been executed, if not they 
faced trial and would have faced the death penalty if convicted (for the jurisdiction and 
functions of the Eleven, see [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 52.1).  
Euxitheos, however, makes no mention of any convictions for this alleged crime. Nor 
does he specify what, if anything, was actually taken from amongst his possessions; but, 
if his allusion to living a lowly life is true (see ζῆν οὐχ ὅντινα τρόπον βουλόμεθα at §31), 
they could hardly have taken many valuable possessions. Moreover, he fails to name the 
men supposedly responsible for this raid; it can only be assumed that they were at least 
                                                     
261 For a thorough discussion of the possible penalty, see Introduction, pp. 43-9. 
262 Dilts (ed.), Demosthenis Orationes IV, p. 272; cf. Rennie (ed.), Demosthenis Orationes III, p. 270. For 
Blass’ edition, see Demosthenis Orationes III, p. 267. 
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some of the men from whom he exacted the money owed to the deme (ἐν ᾗ διάφορος 
ἐγενόμην εἰσπράττων ὀφείλοντας πολλοὺς αὐτῶν μισθώσεις τεμενῶν at §63). Given that 
Euxitheos refrains from identifying the culprits, it is thus unlikely that Euboulides himself 
had been amongst them. 
καὶ ταῦτα τοὺς εἰδότας, ἐὰν βούλησθε, καλοῦμεν: ‘And, if you wish, I will call those 
who know these things’. For such promises, see ὅθεν δ᾽ οὗτοι συνέστησαν at §16. It is 
unfortunate that Euxitheos does not fulfil such a promise, since witnesses to these things 
could only make his argument more readily believable. 
 
§§66-70: ἐπίλογος 
At §§66-9, Euxitheos sums up his case; §70 closes the speech with his final and emotional 
appeal to the jury. Interestingly, Euxitheos summarises his case by structuring it as a 
series of questions and answers in the same manner as that of the δοκιμασία. 
[66] ἃ τούτοις ἐστὶν διαπεπραγμένα: ‘crimes which have been committed by these 
men’. The men to which Euxitheos refers are the same men mentioned in the previous 
passage, those who broke into his cottage (τούτων τινὲς ἐπὶ τὸ οἰκίδιον ἐλθόντες <τὸ> ἐν 
ἀγρῷ νύκτωρ ἐπεχείρησαν διαφορῆσαι τὰ ἔνδοθεν at §65). Thus I translate 
διαπεπραγμένα here as ‘the crimes which have been committed’, rather than the more 
literal translation of ‘the deeds which have been done’. 
ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος: ‘beyond the matter’, see εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα πάντα λέγειν at §7. 
Euxitheos seeks to win the jury’s favour by specifying that he will not introduce details 
which they consider to be beyond the matter at hand (cf. ἔξεστιν ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος 
βλασφημεῖν at §33 and ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος ὑπολήψεσθε ταῦτ᾽ εἶναι at §63). 
Although by first making reference to his knowledge of their many other crimes and lies, 
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he succeeds in bringing such charges to their attention without invoking the jury’s 
displeasure.  
τοὺς θεσμοθέτας ἀνακρίνετε: ‘you questioned the Thesmothetae’. The Thesmothetae 
were six of the nine archōns (other than the eponymous archōn – civic magistrate, the 
basileus – chief religious officer, and the polemarch – war official) appointed annually. 
These six magistrates were the state’s lawgivers with the power to deal with a number of 
cases which were typically concerned with the interests of the whole community; in 
addition to presiding over the ἐφέσεις of men rejected by their demes, the Thesmothetae 
had jurisdiction over εἰσαγγελίαι (for treason), προβολαί (preliminary accusations 
presented to the Ecclēsia), δοκιμασίαι (for magistracies), and numerous γραφαί, including 
the γραφαὶ ξενίας and γραφαὶ παρανόμων (indictment for illegal legislation; for an 
overview of their responsibilities, see [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 59.1-7).263 
The ‘questioning’ that Euxitheos is referring to is the δοκιμασία which the Thesmothetae 
would have been subjected to after being selected by lot and before they were allowed to 
enter office (for the questions associated with this process, see below). Other public 
officials underwent the same scrutiny; Euxitheos has previously mentioned the δοκιμασία 
as the process which both he and his father underwent in order to hold office in Halimous 
(see ἀρχὰς ἔλαχεν καὶ ἦρξεν δοκιμασθείς at §25; see also §§46, 62 and 67). Here, he 
refers to the questioning of the Thesmothetae to emphasise just how important such a 
process was to establish a man’s credentials. 
ἐγὼ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐμαυτὸν ὑμῖν ἀνακρινῶ: ‘I will question myself in the same 
manner before you’. Euxitheos informs the jury that he will utilise the format of the 
                                                     
263  For further details regarding the Thesmothetae, see Rhodes, A Commentary on the Aristotelian 
Athenaion Politeia, pp. 657-68. For their specific involvement with the ἐφέσεις, see Introduction, pp. 27-
8, and 32-3; with the γραφαὶ ξενίας, see n. 69 in the Introduction. 
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δοκιμασία and show in the subsequent passages that he has answered the same questions 
that were asked of the Thesmothetae.264 He covers all the questions, directly or indirectly 
(§§66-9), except two: whether he pays his taxes and whether he has performed military 
service (cf. Dein. 2.17-8).265 Crucially, these are two aspects of Athenian life which 
would have been easy to prove for a citizen. 
The speaker intends to demonstrate that the strict procedure that the Thesmothetae were 
subject to has also been applied to him and, moreover, that he ought to pass this scrutiny 
based on the content of his speech. Since Euxitheos’ case seemingly arose from the 
widespread διαψήφισις directed by Demophilos in 346/5 BC (see τὴν διαψήφισιν at 
§7),266 he draws the jurors’ attention to the authority of the δοκιμασία as another occasion 
in which citizen status could be called into question. Scafuro notes that he thereby creates 
the ultimate scrutiny, ‘a scrutiny, then, within a scrutiny’.267 By successfully answering 
such questions, the jury was expected to acknowledge the inextricable relationship 
between holding office and being an Athenian citizen. 
‘ὦ ἄνθρωπε, τίς ἦν σοι πατήρ;’: ‘Sir, who was your father?’. First of all, the candidate 
in a δοκιμασία was asked to name his father and the deme to which he belonged (τίς σοι 
πατὴρ καὶ πόθεν τῶν δήμων, [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 55.3). Given that his father died before he 
                                                     
264 The questions put to the candidates for the archonship are recorded in the Athēnaiōn Politeia: ‘τίς σοι 
πατὴρ καὶ πόθεν τῶν δήμων, καὶ τίς πατρὸς πατήρ, καὶ τίς μήτηρ, καὶ τίς μητρὸς πατὴρ καὶ πόθεν τῶν 
δήμων;’ μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα εἰ ἔστιν αὐτῷ Ἀπόλλων Πατρῷος καὶ Ζεὺς Ἑρκεῖος, καὶ ποῦ ταῦτα τὰ ἱερά 
ἐστιν· εἶτα ἠρία εἰ ἔστιν καὶ ποῦ ταῦτα· ἔπειτα γονέας εἰ εὖ ποιεῖ, κεἰ τὰ τέλη εἰ τελεῖ, καὶ τὰς στρατείας εἰ 
ἐστράτευται. ταῦτα δ᾽ ἀνερωτήσας, ‘κάλει’ φησὶν ‘τούτων τοὺς μάρτυρας.’ ἐπειδὰν δὲ παράσχηται τοὺς 
μάρτυρας, ἐπερωτᾷ ‘τούτου βούλεταί τις κατηγορεῖν;’ ([Arist.] 55.3-4; cf. Aechin. 1.28; Dein. 2.17). 
265 In the fourth century BC, the only mandatory tax on citizens was the εἰσφορά (a property tax levied for 
the purposes of war), which was paid on an occasional basis by all but the poorest classes of Athenians; see 
M. R. Christ, ‘The Evolution of the Eisphora in Classical Athens’, pp. 53-69. If Euxitheos was truly poor 
(see ζῆν οὐχ ὅντινα τρόπον βουλόμεθα at §31), he would not have paid this tax nor would he have 
performed any liturgies. 
266 See also Introduction, pp. 25-43. 
267 A. C. Scafuro, ‘Witnessing and False Witnessing’, p. 165. 
 
 253 
came of age (see §§27, 52 and 54), Euxitheos adjusts the question appropriately to ‘who 
was your father?’. 
ἐμοί Θούκριτος: ‘Thoucritos was my father’. Dilts follow Blass’ addition of a question 
mark after ἐμοί.268 But, since Euxitheos has already stated that he will question himself 
in the same manner as the δοκιμασία, a question mark after ἐμοί seems to be an 
unnecessary insertion to the text and so it has not been included here. Maintaining the 
question mark in the translation (‘Mine? Thoucritos’) would impede the flow of the text. 
[67] ‘οἰκεῖοί τινες εἶναι μαρτυροῦσιν αὐτῷ;’: ‘Are there any relatives that give 
testimony for him?’. Euxitheos continues with his summary in the format of a δοκιμασία 
but the phrasing of this question is not found in the Athēnaiōn Politeia. Instead, it appears 
there that a candidate is given the chance to call witnesses to his statement at the 
conclusion of the questioning (ταῦτα δ᾽ ἀνερωτήσας, ‘κάλει’ φησὶν ‘τούτων τοὺς 
μάρτυρας’, [Arist.] 55.3; also see καλῶ δ᾽ ὑμῖν τοὺς οἰκείους, εἰ βούλεσθε below). 
πρῶτον μέν γε τέτταρες ἀνεψιοί: ‘indeed first there are his four first cousins’. However, 
only three first cousins of his father were named in earlier passages: Thoucritides II and 
Charisiades at §20, and Niciades at §21. Rather than being regarded as a corruption to the 
text, scholars have attempted to identify this fourth cousin. Davies contends that this 
anonymous cousin is the son of another sibling from the second marriage of the speaker’s 
great grandfather, therefore making him a half-brother to Thoucritides I but a full brother 
to Lysarete.269 On the other hand, Thompson and Bicknell assert that he is the son of a 
                                                     
268 Dilts (ed.), Demosthenis Orationes IV, p. 272; cf. Rennie (ed.), Demosthenis Orationes III, p. 271. For 
Blass’ edition, see Demosthenis Orationes III, p. 268. 
269 Davies refers to Thoucritos, son of Kephisodoros of Halimous, who served as βουλευτής in the first half 
of the fourth century (IG II² 1742, 15-6), in Athenian Propertied Families, p. 95. 
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previous marriage on the part of a maternal great grandmother.270 If Lysarete’s mother 
had indeed married twice, the children of that marriage would be her half-brothers and 
half-sisters and their children would be Thoucritos’ first cousins on only his mother’s side 
under Attic kinship ties.271 This would appear to correspond more readily with other 
details in the text; at §22, Euxitheos differentiates between those related to his father 
through the male line (τῶν μὲν τοίνυν πρὸς ἀνδρῶν τῷ πατρὶ συγγενῶν ἀκηκόατε) and 
those related to him through the female line on Thoucritos’ mother’s side (τὰς τῶν πρὸς 
γυναικῶν τῷ πατρὶ συγγενῶν μαρτυρίας). By calling a fourth first cousin of Thoucritos, 
related to him through his mother’s half-siblings from another marriage, Euxitheos 
strengthens his case by establishing his own father’s claim to citizenship through his 
extended family (see also οἱ τὰς ἀνεψιὰς λαβόντες αὐτῷ below).  
εἶτ᾽ ἀνεψιαδοῦς: ‘then the son of a first cousin’. Referring to Nicostratos, the son of 
Niciades, who was the son of Thoucritos’ uncle Lysanias (see §21). Lysanias and 
Thoucritides I were half-brothers, sharing the same father. Nicostratos is a first cousin 
once removed to Thoucritos and a second cousin to Euxitheos. 
οἱ τὰς ἀνεψιὰς λαβόντες αὐτῷ: ‘those having received his female first cousins in 
marriage’. This is the first mention of these female first cousins of Thoucritos. Since they 
are not listed with his relatives through his father’s line, it is probable that they are 
relatives on his mother’s side, perhaps even sisters of the fourth male first cousin 
mentioned above (see πρῶτον μέν γε τέτταρες ἀνεψιοί above). It would make sense for 
the speaker to distinguish between the paternal and maternal relatives of Thoucritos in 
this manner, referring to those most closely related to his father first and then his other 
                                                     
270 Thompson, ‘The Prosopography of Demosthenes, LVII’, p. 90; and Bicknell, ‘Thoukritides’ mother’, p. 
115. Thompson has also suggested that this cousin was probably the βουλευτής Thoucritos or his father 
Kephisodoros (see n. 255 above). 
271 For the genealogical tree, see Table 2, pp. 268-9. 
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relations in descending order (Euxitheos does the same with his mother’s kin at §68). But 
these female cousins do not testify before the court in their own right, they do so through 
their husbands, who legally became their κύριοι upon marriage. A woman’s κύριος could 
testify on her behalf and seemingly with her consent (Isae. 12.5; female plaintiffs could 
also claim inheritances in court through their κύριοι: Isae. 3.2-3, 7.2; Dem. 43.9). 
However, she could not be held legally responsible for his perjury or false testimony (Isae. 
3.3-4; see also κατ᾽ ἐξωλείας and τὰς τῶν πρὸς γυναικῶν τῷ πατρὶ συγγενῶν μαρτυρίας 
at §22).272 It would be in the interest of their husbands to testify to Thoucritos’ citizenship 
as the doubt cast on his citizenship could potentially extend to their wives through his 
mother’s line if his status is not adequately verified. Of course, these women are not 
identified before the court as it was not socially acceptable to do so.273  
εἶτα φράτερες: ‘then members of his phratry’. Euxitheos called the members of his 
phratry as witnesses along with the members of his genos at §23. 
Ἀπόλλωνος πατρῴου καὶ Διὸς ἑρκείου γεννῆται: ‘the members of his genos who share 
Ancestral Apollo and Zeus of the Household’. During a δοκιμασία, the candidate was 
asked if he worships the household gods (εἰ ἔστιν αὐτῷ Ἀπόλλων Πατρῷος καὶ Ζεὺς 
Ἑρκεῖος, καὶ ποῦ ταῦτα τὰ ἱερά ἐστιν, [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 55.3). At §54, Euxitheos states 
that he was taken to the temple of Ancestral Apollo and to other sacred shrines of his 
phratry and genos (see εἰς Ἀπόλλωνος πατρῴου {ἦγον} and εἰς τἄλλα ἱερά; cf. Euxitheos’ 
selection to draw lots for the priesthood of Heracles at §46). 
εἶθ᾽ οἷς ἠρία ταὐτά: ‘those who share the same burial mounds’, cf. ἔθαψε τούτους εἰς τὰ 
πατρῷα μνήματα at §28 and ἀπόδοτέ μοι θάψαι εἰς τὰ πατρῷα μνήματα at §70. Euxitheos 
had reserved the final testimony on his father’s behalf for those who share common burial 
                                                     
272 For a concise overview, see R. Just, Women in Athenian Law and Life, pp. 23-7. 
273 See n. 37. 
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ground. Previously, the speaker ascribed the use of these common graves to the members 
of his genos (see ὧν ὅσοιπέρ εἰσι τοῦ γένους κοινωνοῦσι at §28) but, at this point in the 
speech, he does not make a connection to a specific social body. Moreover, he deviates 
from the order of the testimony given in the body of the speech by mentioning them here 
before the demesmen (see §§23 and 25). It is likely that he does this to continue with his 
allusion to procedure in the δοκιμασία, in which the candidate is then asked whether he 
has family tombs and where they are (εἶτα ἠρία εἰ ἔστιν καὶ ποῦ ταῦτα, [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 
55.3). 
οἱ δημόται πολλάκις αὐτὸν δεδοκιμάσθαι καὶ ἀρχὰς ἄρξαι: ‘the demesmen give 
testimony that he has often been approved by scrutiny and held office’, sc. μαρτυροῦσιν. 
From Euxitheos’ summary, it can be inferred that some members of his deme gave 
depositions which attested to the fact that his father had passed the scrutiny for public 
office (ἀρχὰς ἔλαχεν καὶ ἦρξεν δοκιμασθείς at §25; whereas he had previously called on 
members of his deme as witnesses to his election as phratriarch at §23). Their testimony 
was not only relevant for confirming the fact that Thoucritos had been approved but also 
their very membership in the deme is significant since it was the deme’s decision to 
disfranchise Euxitheos at their assembly. 
καλῶ δ᾽ ὑμῖν τοὺς οἰκείους, εἰ βούλεσθε: ‘But I will call my relatives before you, if you 
wish’. After questioning, a candidate in the δοκιμασία is given the chance to call 
witnesses to his statements (ταῦτα δ᾽ ἀνερωτήσας, ‘κάλει’ φησὶν ‘τούτων τοὺς μάρτυρας’, 
[Arist.] Ath. Pol. 55.3). Though Euxitheos has already called his relatives through his 
father’s line as witnesses during the trial, he persists with the premise of a δοκιμασία 
because it was an occasion besides a διαψήφισις procedure in which citizen status could 
be called into question. He seeks to impress upon the jury that, since both he and his father 
have passed the scrutiny to hold office, then thus they must pass the test for citizenship. 
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[68] ἐμοὶ γάρ ἐστιν μήτηρ Νικαρέτη Δαμοστράτου θυγάτηρ Μελιτέως: ‘For my 
mother is Nicarete, daughter of Damostratos of Melite’. This is the first time that 
Euxitheos’ mother is named in the speech (cf. §37, wherein Euxitheos lists Damostratos 
I’s children but he does not name his two daughters). During a δοκιμασία for holding 
public office, the candidate was asked about his mother’s lineage (τίς μήτηρ, καὶ τίς 
μητρὸς πατὴρ καὶ πόθεν τῶν δήμων, [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 55.3). Rather than breaking the 
social norm of not naming respectable Athenian women who were still living, Euxitheos 
utilises the format of the δοκιμασία to name his mother and to demonstrate to the jury 
that she has a right to citizen status.274 
πρῶτον μὲν ἀδελφιδοῦς: ‘First her nephew’. Dilts retains Westermann’s emendation of 
ἀδελφιδοῦς, in place of the ἀδελφοὶ δύο of most of the manuscripts.275 This correction is 
in keeping with the details provided in the body of the speech (see §38). Thus, this nephew 
is Damostratos II, the son of Nicarete’s half-brother Amytheon, and thus a first cousin of 
the speaker.  
εἶτα τοῦ ἑτέρου ἀδελφιδοῦ δύο υἱοί: ‘then the two sons of another nephew’. The other 
nephew indicated here is the one also named Euxitheos, and first cousin to the speaker 
(see §39). His sons were therefore cousins to the speaker once removed. However, in the 
earlier passage, the speaker refers to Euxitheos as having three sons (see τοῦ δ᾽ Εὐξιθέου 
τρεῖς υἱεῖς· οὗτοι πάντες ζῶσιν at §39). It must have been the case that only two of his 
sons were present in court to testify on Nicarete’s behalf. Unfortunately, no reason is 
given as to why the third was absent; it could simply be the case that he was not present 
in Athens at the time of the trial, he may even have been abroad on military duty (see 
                                                     
274 See n. 37; cf. n. 88. 
275 Dilts (ed.), Demosthenis Orationes IV, p. 272; cf. Rennie (ed.), Demosthenis Orationes III, p. 271. For 
Westermann’s edition, see Ausgewählte reden des Demosthenes, p. 182. 
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τοὺς ἐπιδημοῦντας αὐτῶν at §39), but perhaps the speaker’s lack of explanation betrays 
some familial tension between these two men. 
εἶτ᾽ ἀνεψιαδοῦς: ‘next a son of her first cousin’. Dilts again follows Westermann’s 
introduction of ἀνεψιαδοῦς to the text, whereas the manuscripts provide ἀνεψιοὶ αὐτῆς.276 
Referring to Apollodoros, the son of Olympichos, who was son of her mother’s sister and 
thus her first cousin (see §38). Apollodoros is a cousin once removed to Nicarete and a 
second cousin to Euxitheos. By referring to Apollodoros after Euxitheos’ sons, the 
speaker slightly deviates from the order in which the witnesses were presented in the body 
of the speech. 
οἱ Πρωτομάχου υἱεῖς … τὴν ἀδελφὴν τὴν ἐμὴν: ‘the sons of Protomachos … my sister’. 
For the distinction between the two see τοὺς τοῦ Πρωτομάχου υἱεῖς and τὴν ἀδελφὴν 
λαβόντα τὴν ἐμὴν at §43. 
Εὔνικος Χολαργεύς: ‘Eunicos of Cholargos’. See note for εἶτα Εὔνικον Χολαργέα at §43. 
εἶθ᾽ υἱὸς τῆς ἀδελφῆς: ‘Then my sister’s son’. Euxitheos calls his nephew, Nicarete’s 
grandson, as witness at §43. Euxitheos follows the same pattern in reporting witnesses to 
his mother’s status as he did with his father’s relatives in the previous passage (see §67). 
He began with those most closely related to his mother from the family she was born into 
and then moved on to those from her marital families. 
[69] φράτερες τῶν οἰκείων αὐτῆς καὶ δημόται ταῦτα μεμαρτυρήκασι: ‘the 
members of her relatives’ phratry and the demesmen have given testimony to these things’. 
The phratry members and the demesmen cannot give testimony about Nicarete’s citizen 
status, since she is neither a member of the phratry (see ἐν τοῖς φράτερσιν at §19) or the 
                                                     
276 Dilts (ed.), Demosthenis Orationes IV, p. 272; cf. Rennie (ed.), Demosthenis Orationes III, p. 271. For 
Westermann’s edition, see Ausgewählte reden des Demosthenes, p. 182. 
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deme. There is nothing in the text to suggest that Nicarete had been introduced to 
Damostratos I’s phratry and, if she had been, one would expect Euxitheos to make explicit 
reference to it. The phratry members who gave testimony are therefore described as 
‘members of her relatives’ phratry’ (cf. τὰς τῶν φρατέρων τῶν συγγενῶν τῶν τῆς μητρὸς 
καὶ δημοτῶν μαρτυρίας at §40). Yet, these phratry members and the demesmen can testify 
that Nicarete’s kin are indeed members and are thus recognised citizens. 
ὅτι κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ὁ πατὴρ ἔγημεν: ‘that my father married according to the laws’. 
A candidate for the archonship had to have been legally married to a citizen wife ([Dem.] 
59.104-6). Thus, Euxitheos’ father had to have been married in accordance with Athenian 
law in order to hold office (for Thoucritos’ term in a public role, see ἀρχὰς ἔλαχεν καὶ 
ἦρξεν δοκιμασθείς at §25). 
γαμηλίαν τοῖς φράτερσιν εἰσήνεγκεν: ‘he held a marriage-feast for the members of his 
phratry’. See οἷς τὴν γαμηλίαν εἰσήνεγκεν ὑπὲρ τῆς μητρὸς ὁ πατήρ at §43. 
καὶ ἐμαυτὸν ἐπέδειξα πάντων μετειληφότα ὅσων προσήκει τοὺς ἐλευθέρους: ‘I also 
proved that I myself have been sharing in everything which is fitting for free citizen 
males’. Only a small section of Euxitheos’ summary directly concerns himself, as he 
affirms that he has had a share in everything that befits free citizen males. While his lack 
of evidence after §46 certainly arouses suspicion, Euxitheos’ concision with regard to his 
own credentials may not be so surprising given that the majority of the main body of the 
text focused on proving the citizen status of both of his parents, which would then ensure 
his own right to citizenship. For the term ἐλεύθεροι, cf. §36. 
εὐορκοίητε: ‘you would be faithful to your oath’, cf. πράττειν ὁποῖον ἄν τι ὑμῖν εὐσεβὲς 
εἶναι δοκῇ at §17. 
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[70] εἰ γονέας εὖ ποιοῦσιν: ‘whether they treat their parents well’. Having been 
questioned as to whether or not he has family tombs (see εἶθ᾽ οἷς ἠρία ταὐτά at §67), a 
candidate in a δοκιμασία is then asked whether he treats his parents well (γονέας εἰ εὖ 
ποιεῖ, [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 55.3). Though his conduct towards his parents could have no direct 
impact on his social status, Euxitheos includes this clause in order to appeal to the jury’s 
conscience (for a similar appeal to the jury’s pity, see μηδαμῶς, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, τοὺς 
πένητας ἀτιμάζετε (ἱκανὸν γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὸ πένεσθαι κακόν) at §36). Subsequently, he 
directly pleads to the jury on behalf of his mother, so that he might bury her in the 
ancestral mounds. Only a favourable vote can enable the speaker to abide by a citizen’s 
duty to honour their parents. 
ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦ μὲν πατρὸς ὀρφανὸς κατελείφθην: ‘I was left orphaned by my father’. For 
Euxitheos’ use of the term ‘orphan’, see ἔτι τοίνυν ὀρφανὸς κατελείφθην at §52. His 
mother was still alive at the time of his appeal. 
ἀπόδοτέ μοι θάψαι εἰς τὰ πατρῷα μνήματα: ‘to give me back the right to bury her in 
the ancestral mounds’. For the obligations of relatives after death, see ἔθαψε τούτους εἰς 
τὰ πατρῷα μνήματα at §28 (cf. εἶθ᾽ οἷς ἠρία ταὐτά at §67). Having been disfranchised by 
the deme, Euxitheos has lost his access to the family burial mounds. Rather than his own 
right to be buried there, the speaker pleads on behalf of his mother who, as the speaker 
has claimed she was the legitimate wife of Thoucritos (see ἐγγυᾶται at §41), was entitled 
to be buried there alongside her husband and deceased children. If, however, the penalty 
for losing his appeal was indeed slavery,277 Euxitheos would thus be incapable of burying 
his mother. 
                                                     
277 See Introduction, pp. 43-9. 
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ὅλως ἀπολέσητε: ‘bring me to complete ruin’. For the speaker’s possible penalty, see 
also λογισαμένους τό τε μέγεθος τοῦ παρόντος ἀγῶνος καὶ τὴν αἰσχύνην at §1 and ὥσπερ 
φυγάδος ἤδη μου ὄντος καὶ ἀπολωλότος at §65. 
πρότερον γὰρ ἢ προλιπεῖν τούτους, εἰ μὴ δυνατὸν ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν εἴη σωθῆναι, 
ἀποκτείναιμ᾽ ἂν ἐμαυτόν, ὥστ᾽ ἐν τῇ πατρίδι γ᾽ ὑπὸ τούτων ταφῆναι: ‘For rather than 
abandoning them, if it is not possible to be saved by them, I would kill myself, so that I 
could be buried in my homeland’. If exile was not an alternative penalty to be suffered in 
the place of being enslaved, the language which Euxitheos uses during this final address 
may signal that he believed that he would be sold abroad. But both voluntary exile and 
slavery abroad would deny Euxitheos an Athenian burial.278 Such a dramatic close to his 
speech was certainly intended to play on the jurors’ emotions. 
                                                     
278 For epitaphs emphasising the Greek attitude towards being interred in one’s native land, see R. Lattimore, 
Themes in Greek and Latin Epitaphs, pp. 199-202. 
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Table 1: divisions and dates of speeches1 
Deliberative oratory 
Name of the speech    Date2 
- On the Symmories (Dem. 14)   354/3 BC 
- For the Megalopolitans (Dem. 16)  353/2 BC 
- On the Freedom of the Rhodians (Dem. 15) 353-0 BC 
- First Philippic (Dem. 4)    circa 352/1 BC  
- On Organisation (Dem. 13)   circa 350 BC 
- First Olynthiac (Dem. 1) 
- Second Olynthiac (Dem. 2)   349/8 BC 
- Third Olynthiac (Dem. 3)  
                                                          
1 KEY:  
( ) Round brackets are used for the speeches which I accept as having been written by Demosthenes. 
[] Square brackets are used for the speeches which were clearly not written by Demosthenes. 
2 The orations are arranged chronologically rather than numerically. 
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- On the Peace (Dem. 5)    346 BC 
- Second Philippic (Dem. 6)   344/3 BC 
- On Halonnesos ([Dem.] 7)   342 BC 
- On the Situation in the Chersonese (Dem. 8) 341 BC 
- Third Philippic (Dem. 9)    341 BC 
- Fourth Philippic (Dem. 10)   341 BC 
- Response to Philip’s Letter (Dem. 11)  340 BC 
- Philip’s Letter ([Dem.] 12) 
- On the Treaty With Alexander ([Dem.] 17) circa 331 BC 
 
Epideictic oratory 
Name of the work    Date 
- Erotic Essay ([Dem.] 61)    350-35 BC 
- Funeral Oration (Dem. 60)   338 BC 
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Forensic oratory 
Public Speeches: 
Name of the speech     Date    Legal action    Name of speaker 
- Against Nicostratos ([Dem.] 53)    circa 366/5 BC  ἀπογραφή    Apollodoros 
- On The Trierarchic Crown (Dem. 51)   360/59 BC   διαδικασία before the Council Demosthenes (?) 
- Against Leptines (Dem. 20)    355/4 BC   γραφὴ νόμον μὴ ἐπιτήδειον θεῖναι Demosthenes 
- Against Androtion (Dem. 22)    355/4 BC   γραφὴ παρανόμων   Diodoros 
- Against Timocrates (Dem. 24)    353/2 BC   γραφὴ νόμον μὴ ἐπιτήδειον θεῖναι Diodoros 
- Against Aristocrates (Dem. 23)    352/1 BC   γραφὴ παρανόμων   Euthycles 
- Against Medias (Dem. 21)    347/6 BC   γραφὴ ὕβρεως    Demosthenes 
- Against Euboulides (Dem. 57)    346/5 BC    ἔφεσις     Euxitheos 
- On the False Embassy (Dem. 19)   343 BC   εὔθυναι    Demosthenes 
- Against Neaera ([Dem.] 59)    circa 342 BC   γραφὴ ξενίας    Theomnestos & 
Apollodoros 
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- Against Theocrines ([Dem.] 58)    circa 340 BC   ἔνδειξις    Epichares 
- On the Crown (Dem. 18)     330 BC   γραφὴ παρανόμων   Demosthenes 
- Against Aristogeiton I (Dem. 25)   circa 325/4 BC  ἔνδειξις    Demosthenes 
- Against Aristogeiton II ([Dem.] 26)            (unknown) 
Private Speeches:     
- Against Callippos ([Dem.] 52)    369/8 BC   δίκη ἀργυρίου    Apollodoros 
- Against Aphobos I (Dem. 27)    364/3 BC   δίκη ἐπιτροπῆς   Demosthenes 
- Against Aphobos II (Dem. 28)        
- Against Timotheos ([Dem.] 49)    circa 362 BC   δίκη βλάβης/χρέως   Apollodoros 
- Against Aphobos For Phanos (Dem. 29)  362/1 BC   δίκη ψευδομαρτυριῶν   Demosthenes 
- Against Onetor I (Dem. 30)    362/1 or early 361/0 BC δίκη ἐξούλης    Demosthenes 
- Against Onetor II (Dem. 31)  
- Against Callicles (Dem. 55)    unknown   δίκη βλάβης    Teisias’ son 
- Against Leochares (Dem. 44)    361-56 BC   δίκη ψευδομαρτυριῶν   Aristodemos’ son 
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- Against Spoudias (Dem. 41)    circa 360 (?)   δίκη ἀργυρίου/βλάβης/ἐνοικίου Polyeuctos 
- Against Polycles ([Dem.] 50)    360-58 BC   δίκη τριηραρχικοῦ/βλάβης  Apollodoros 
- Against Conon (Dem. 54)    357 or 343 BC  δίκη αἰκίας    Ariston 
- Against Euergos & Mnesiboulos ([Dem.] 47)  356-3 BC   δίκη ψευδομαρτυριῶν   Apollodoros (?) 
- Against Zenothemis (Dem. 32)    between 354/3-340 BC      Demon 
- Against Lacritos (Dem. 35)    circa 351/0 BC  παραγραφαί    Androcles 
- For Phormion (Dem. 36)     350/49 BC        Demosthenes (?) 
- Against Stephanos I (Dem. 45)    350/49 BC   δίκη ψευδομαρτυριῶν   Apollodoros 
- Against Stephanos II ([Dem.] 46)    
- Against Boiotos I (Dem. 39)    349/8 BC              δίκη βλάβης    Mantitheos 
- Against Boiotos II (Dem. 40)    circa 347 BC   δίκη προικός 
- Against Pantaenetus (Dem. 37)    347/6 BC   παραγραφαί    Nicoboulos 
- Against Nausimachos & Xenopeithes (Dem. 38) 346 BC        Aristaechmos’ son 
- Against Olympiodoros (Dem. 48)   circa 342 BC   δίκη βλάβης    Callistratos 
- Against Apatourios (Dem. 33)    circa 341 BC   παραγραφή    (unknown) 
267 
 
- Against Macartatos (Dem. 43)    late 340s BC   διαδικασία    Sositheos 
- Against Phaenippos (Dem. 42)    335/4, 330/29 or 328/7 BC ἀντίδοσις & διαδικασία  (unknown) 
- Against Phormion (Dem. 34)    327/6 BC                     παραγραφή    Chrysippos                                 
- Against Dionysodoros (Dem. 56)   323/2 BC   δίκη βλάβης    Dareios  
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Table 2: Euxitheos’ family tree 
Euxitheos’ paternal lineage1 
 
 (first wife, non-Athenian?)        =    (Athenian man)             =        (second wife, Athenian?) 
 GRANDFATHER’S MOTHER     GREAT GRANDFATHER          GRANDMOTHER’S MOTHER 
 
 
 
 Thoucritides I           ~~~~~ = Lysarete      Charisios                    Lysanias~~~~~~~~~~(other offspring) 
GRANDFATHER   GRANDMOTHER     GREAT UNCLE   GREAT UNCLE          GREAT UNCLE/AUNTS 
 
                Thoucritos   =   Nicarete           Thoucritides II            Charisiades      Niciades                  (man & several women)2 
                FATHER             MOTHER 1st COUSIN                  1st COUSIN     1st COUSIN           1st COUSINS  
                                 ONCE REMOVED       ONCE REMOVED      ONCE REMOVED      ONCE REMOVED 
              
 
 
              Euxitheos                        (four sons)                    Nicostratos 
                               BROTHERS                       2nd COUSIN  
                                                          
1 KEY:  
CAPS   Indicates relationship to the speaker  ~~~~~  Indicates half-sibling relationship  =    Indicates marriage 
             Indicates witnesses cited by Euxitheos. Womenfolk on his father’s side also give testimonies but are not named. 
2 These homometric siblings (to Lysarete) produced one male and several female offspring who were reckoned as cousins to the speaker’s father under Attic kinship ties (see πρῶτον μέν γε 
τέτταρες ἀνεψιοί at §67). 
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Euxitheos’ maternal lineage 
            (man)     = (woman) 
            GREAT GRANDFATHER   GREAT GRANDMOTHER 
 
 (first wife)          =        Damostratos I          =       Chaerestrate                  (woman)3 
            GRANDFATHER      GRANDMOTHER                  GREAT AUNT 
 
          (woman)4                      Amytheon~~~~~Timocrates                          Nicarete                           =     Protomachos    Olympichos 
             AUNT                        UNCLE   UNCLE                                   MOTHER                                            1st COUSIN  
           ONCE REMOVED 
 
                                                 =    Thoucritos 
                                         FATHER 
 
   Ctesibios     Damostratos II       Callistratos      Dexitheos  Euxitheos       (woman)5 = Eunicos     Euxitheos       (four sons)              Apollodoros II 
   1st COUSIN      1st COUSIN        1st COUSIN       1st COUSIN 1st COUSIN         SISTER    BROTHER-IN-LAW            BROTHERS            2nd COUSIN 
                          
 
              (three sons)               (man) 
           1st COUSIN ONCE REMOVED              NEPHEW 
                                                          
3 Married Apollodoros I of Plotheia (see Ἀπολλόδωρος Πλωθεύς at §38). 
4 Married Diodoros of Halae (see τῇ δ᾽ ἀδελφῇ αὐτοῦ συνοικησάσῃ Διοδώρῳ Ἁλαιεῖ at §38). 
5 Nicarete’s first marriage to Protomachos bore several children, but it would appear that only a daughter survived (see θυγάτηρ at §40 and παῖδας ποιησάμενος at §43). This daughter was a 
sibling to Euxitheos under Attic kinship ties. Protomachos had more children with his second wife, specifically sons, whom Euxitheos also calls upon as witnesses (τοὺς τοῦ Πρωτομάχου 
υἱεῖς at §43). 
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Appendix 1: Isaeus’ On Behalf of Euphiletos (Isae. 12) 
While material contained within the Demosthenic canon is useful for the analysis 
of Against Euboulides, a speech composed by his oratorical predecessor depicts the only 
extant suit which bears a strikingly close relation to Euxitheos’ case. Written by Isaeus, 
this speech is unique within his corpus as his only work which does not pertain to an 
inheritance dispute.1 The case involves a man named Euphiletos who has been 
disfranchised by the deme of Erchia.2 The text is Euphiletos’ defence of his right to 
citizenship before an Athenian jury. Unfortunately, however, Euphiletos’ speech does not 
survive in its entirety; only a fragment is preserved in a lengthy quotation by Dionysios 
of Halicarnassos (Isae. 17). While the appellant in this case was Euphiletos, the fragment 
which we possess was spoken by the appellant’s unnamed brother. Dionysios states that 
this section was delivered after the facts of the case had been presented and confirmed by 
witnesses (Isae. 16).3 He also comments on the speech’s strong argumentation and 
consolidation of the witness testimonies, noting that the quoted passage particularly 
demonstrates Isaeus’ thoroughness and great attention to detail. It is unfortunate, 
however, that Dionysios’ observations cannot be considered with regard to the whole 
speech. Being bereft of the text in its entirety has certainly deprived its readers of some 
significant background details and has left it open to much speculation. 
The extant fragment does reveal several facts pertaining to the case. It is known 
that Euphiletos, son of Hegesippos, had been accepted as a legitimate citizen into the 
deme of Erchia (12.12). It can be presumed that this took place after the regular deme-
                                                          
1 For a general overview of Isaeus’ career and an introduction to each of his speeches, see M. Edwards, 
Isaeus (2007). 
2 The deme of Erchia belonged to the tribe Aegeis. It was located approximately twenty kilometres east of 
Athens. Notable members of this deme include the logographer Isocrates and the historian Xenophon. For 
its geographical placement, see E. Vanderpool, ‘The Location of the Attic Deme Erchia’, pp. 21-6. 
3 In an earlier passage, Dionysios states that Isaeus departed from the conventional form of narrative in 
some of his speeches and, in this speech, he notes that the logographer divided Euphiletos’ narrative into 
sections and added a proof to each part (Isae. 14).  
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enrolment procedure, when the candidate had attained the age of eighteen.4 However, 
when the deme held an extraordinary vote on all of its members at a later date, the vote 
of the διαψήφισις went against Euphiletos (12.12). But his family strongly opposed the 
deme’s decision and legal proceedings were initiated between Euphiletos and the deme. 
Euphiletos’ unnamed half-brother is the speaker of the preserved fragment from this 
subsequent case, acting as a supporting speaker (συνήγορος).5 He was Hegesippos’ son 
from a previous marriage (12.2, 5-6). His help is particularly valuable since he would not 
have to share his inheritance if Euphiletos were to be disfranchised (12.4). Euphiletos also 
had the support of both of his parents, his half-sisters and their husbands, Hegesippos’ 
former brother-in-law, and several phratry members (12.1, 5-6, 8-9). The testimonies of 
his male relatives and fellow phratry members were a crucial element in countering the 
deme’s argument that he was not the biological son of Hegesippos. Evidently, the deme 
of Erchia maintained that Euphiletos had been illicitly adopted (12.2).6 The demesmen 
did not, however, appear to question the citizen status of either Hegesippos or his second 
wife (12.2-3, 9). Exactly how the deme sought to prove Euphiletos’ illegitimacy or indeed 
what evidence the demesmen brought is regrettably not discussed by the speaker. 
Ultimately, the deme did not have to ascertain who Euphiletos’ father actually was, it 
only had to justify why they voted to strike his name from the register.  
Since the jury would presumably have already heard the main arguments of 
Euphiletos’ case from the appellant himself, his brother’s speech mainly refers to points 
which have already been made. The speaker begins with possible motives why his father 
might have adopted Euphiletos, either because he had no legitimate children of his own 
                                                          
4 This ordinary διαψήφισις is described in most detail by the Athēnaiōn Politeia ([Arist.] 42.1). For a 
discussion of this process, see Introduction, pp. 25-43. 
5 It was not unusual for litigants to invite a family member or friend to stand up before the court and speak 
on their behalf. In theory, the συνήγορος offered their support freely and was not paid to be an advocate. 
For a comprehensive discussion on συνηγορία in Athenian courts, see Rubinstein, Litigation and 
Cooperation (2000). 
6 For supposititious children, see n. 131 in the Commentary. 
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or because he was compelled by poverty to adopt a non-citizen child illegally in return 
for a fee (12.2). He argues that both scenarios were improbable since Hegesippos already 
had the speaker as a legitimate heir, and that bringing up another son caused him 
considerable expense (12.2-3). Hegesippos has already testified that Euphiletos is his son, 
seemingly swearing before the court that no adoption took place (12.1, 8-9). The speaker 
then argues that it was implausible that he, being older by thirteen years (12.10), would 
testify falsely on behalf of Euphiletos when he would then have to share his inheritance 
with an unlawful heir (12.4). Indeed, the speaker maintains that Euphiletos’ present 
witnesses would have had more reason to testify against him than in his favour if they 
doubted his paternity: if his half-sisters had any reason to believe that Euphiletos was 
only the son of their stepmother, their husbands would not have vouched for him, nor 
would the brother of Hegesippos’ first wife whose doing so would harm the interests of 
his nieces and nephew (12.5-6). He even refers to the threat of perjury to bolster his 
argument from improbability (12.4, 6). Consequently, the speaker notes that their 
opponents could not have produced better witnesses if they found themselves in 
Euphiletos’ position (12.7-8). In addition to the testimonies provided by these relatives 
and some phratry members, the speaker informs the court of his own willingness, together 
with that of his stepmother and his father, to swear an oath that Euphiletos is who they 
claim (12.9-10).7 Furthermore, he makes a point of contrasting the number of people 
willing to testify on his brother’s behalf with the opposition’s lack of witnesses, a detail 
which he claims strongly influenced the arbitrators (12.11). The fragment ends with the 
speaker’s request that the jury take the compelling verdict from the arbitration process 
into account, giving it as much consideration as his opponents would have asked for if 
                                                          
7 Informing the jury that Euphiletos’ mother was willing to confirm her son’s paternity with a sworn oath 
may have been a particularly effective tool in persuading a jury of his legitimacy. Giving an example of 
rhetorical induction, Aristotle notes the probability that women always discern the truth in matters of 
parentage (Rh. 2.23.11). He refers to the success of the oath when Plangon utilised it to compel Mantias to 
acknowledge her two sons as his (Dem. 39.4, 25-6, 40.11); see S. Usher, Greek Oratory, pp. 168-9. 
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the judgement had gone against Euphiletos rather than in his favour (12.12). While it is 
impossible to fully reconstruct Euphiletos’ case from such a small quotation, it is clear 
that his defence of his right to citizenship rested heavily on his multiple witness 
testimonies from both relatives and phratry members and the prior decision of the 
arbitrators. 
Dionysios’ introductory comments are fairly helpful in contextualising Isaeus’ 
speech. First he states that Euphiletos summoned the demesmen of Erchia to court, 
claiming that they had unjustly deprived him of his citizenship rights (Isae. 16).8 He then 
connects the speech to a law (νόμος) passed by the Athenians, which enabled a review 
(ἐξέτασις) of the demesmen and allowed for those who had been rejected to appeal the 
decision before a court. He also states that appellants risked losing their property and their 
freedom if the jury voted against them. However, Dionysios does not state the exact legal 
procedure involved between Euphiletos and the deme. Nor does he indicate which board 
heard the appeal, whether it was the Thesmothetae who heard cases concerning ξένια and 
the appeals from the annual deme enrolments or the Forty who automatically sent cases 
to arbitration. Indeed, he fails to provide any further details about the case or its 
background and, as such, his brief remarks have instigated much debate. 
The main point of contention for scholars is whether or not to connect Euphiletos’ 
speech to the extraordinary διαψήφισις occasioned by Demophilos’ decree in 346/5 BC. 
Several scholars find that assigning the case to Demophilos’ motion is problematic with 
regard to the speech’s authenticity. These scholars have taken the speaker’s reference to 
a two-year arbitration process (12.11) to mean that his current suit was thereby delayed 
before coming to court and, as such, a date of 344/3 BC appears to be too late for Isaeus 
                                                          
8 For the unusual interpretation that the demesmen of Erchia had lodged the appeal before the court, see M. 
Just, ‘Le rôle des διαιτηταί dans Isée 12, 11’, pp. 111-6. While his argument is certainly interesting, he fails 
to make a wholly convincing case that Dionysios was mistaken and therefore misleading to current scholars 
in his given title for Isaeus 12 (ἡ ὑπὲρ Εὐφιλήτου πρὸς τὸν Ἐρχιέων δῆμον ἔφεσις, Isae. 14.3). 
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to be the genuine author of the speech.9 Still, there is no evidence to prove conclusively 
that Isaeus’ speech-writing career had ended by this date. Both Wyse and Gomme must 
concede that it was not impossible for him to still be writing in the late 340s BC. Since 
Isaeus’ earliest surviving speech is dated circa 389 BC (On the Estate of Dicaeogenes, 
Isae. 5), it is certainly plausible that he continued to write into his mid-seventies and that 
his speech for Euphiletos’ case was probably one of the last that he wrote before his death 
circa 340 BC.10  
Dionysios’ lack of details with regard to the law or indeed to its proposer has also 
prompted scholars to question whether the speech can be specifically tied to the 
διαψήφισις of 346/5 BC. Diller believes that Dionysios has simply confused the type of 
scrutiny that was held before Demophilos’ decree with that which was held after, and that 
the fragment of Euphiletos’ speech belongs to a δίκη held before Demophilos’ decree was 
passed.11 Gomme refers to the fact that Dionysios indicates elsewhere that two of 
Deinarchos’ speeches concerning disfranchisements were delivered during the 
archonship of Archias (in 346/5 BC; Against the Kerykes and Against Moschion in Din. 
11), the very year in which Demophilos proposed his decree.12 He maintains that, had 
Dionysios thought the Euphiletos case was also one of these, he might easily have labelled 
it accordingly and used the fact to give a more precise date to Isaeus’ speech. Gomme 
subsequently agrees with Diller’s conclusion that On Behalf of Euphiletos derived from 
a lone scrutiny in the deme of Erchia rather than at a trial arising from a deme-wide 
                                                          
9 Wyse, The Speeches of Isaeus, pp. 715-6; Diller, ‘The Decree of Demophilus’, pp. 201-2; Gomme, ‘Two 
Problems of Athenian Citizenship Law’, p. 125. Wyse suggests an alternative possibility that Euphiletos’ 
case may belong to an unattested earlier scrutiny. Though the source material is sparse for this period, it 
seems unlikely to me that such an event occurred without any record or even passing allusion to it in any 
of the surviving sources. 
10 Very little is known about Isaeus’ life. It is generally accepted that he was born around 415 BC. Dionysios 
claims that Isaeus was in his prime after the Peloponnesian War and that he lived on into the years of Philip 
II of Macedon’s rule (Isae. 1; cf. [Plut.] X orat. 839e-f). If these estimations are correct, Isaeus’ career as a 
logographer lasted for approximately forty-nine years. 
11 Diller, ‘The Decree of Demophilus, 346-345 B.C.’, pp. 201-2. For a discussion of Diller’s theory that 
Demophilos’ decree established the public appeal process, see Appendix 7, pp. 307-8. 
12 Gomme, ‘Two Problems of Athenian Citizenship Law’, p. 125. Cf. n. 99 in the Introduction. 
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extraordinary διαψήφισις.13 Ultimately, I cannot agree with Gomme and Diller, since their 
analyses are entirely dependent on the belief that Isaeus’ On Behalf of Euphiletos is earlier 
in date than Demosthenes’ Against Euboulides, a premise which is far from certain.14  
Establishing the nature of the legal procedure described by Dionysios is certainly 
a challenge. Scholars are divided in their classification of the speech, with some arguing 
that it was a γραφή and others maintaining that it was a δίκη (specifically a δίκη 
βλάβης).15 Several elements have complicated the issue, one of which is recognising who 
lodged the case. While it is clear from Euxitheos’ case that Euboulides was acting on 
behalf of the prosecution when he addressed the court first (see §§1 and 5), Diller and 
Carey have taken the speaker’s comments in On Behalf of Euphiletos to signify that 
Euphiletos was the prosecutor in his case.16 Specifically, they cite the speaker’s use of the 
future tense of ἀξιόω in relation to his opponents.17 However, his use of this tense does 
not decisively prove that his opponents have yet to speak. Wyse raises an interesting point 
by referring to a parallel in another oration attributed to Isaeus, wherein the future tense 
of ἀξιόω is used in a similar manner and where there are certain indications that the 
                                                          
13 Diller perceives a possible connection between Euphiletos’ speech and earlier legal actions mentioned 
by Euxitheos during the course of his own defence, cases which the speaker claims arose from extraordinary 
circumstances in the deme of Halimous (see §§26 and 60), in ‘The Decree of Demophilus, 346-345 B.C.’, 
pp. 201-2; Gomme suggests that Euphiletos’ appeal may have originated from an ordinary annual scrutiny 
of new members admitted at the age of eighteen, in ‘Two Problems of Athenian Citizenship Law’, p. 127 
n. 10. 
14 Even Gomme must acknowledge a certain fluidity with regard to the date; he suggests that the arbitration 
process need not have lasted for two full years; see ‘Two Problems of Athenian Citizenship Law’, p. 125 
n. 2. If one assumes that the arbitration pertains to Euphiletos’ current suit, it is possible that the case was 
carried over from one year to the next, from one arbitrator to another, and so Euphiletos may have brought 
his appeal to court in either 346/5 BC or 345/4 BC. 
15 Those who regard it as public: Wyse, The Speeches of Isaeus, pp. 716-7; R. J. Bonner, ‘The Jurisdiction 
of Athenian Arbitrators’, pp. 415-6; and Hansen, Apagoge, Endeixis and Ephegesis against Kakourgoi, 
Atimoi and Pheugontes, p. 64 n. 26 (albeit cautiously). Those who regard it as private: Diller, ‘The Decree 
of Demophilus, 346-345 B.C.’, p. 201; Rubinstein, Litigation and Cooperation, pp. 61-2 n. 99; and C. 
Carey, ‘An Overlooked Papyrus of Isaios’, p. 24 n. 17. 
16 Diller, ‘The Decree of Demophilus, 346-345 B.C.’, p. 201; Carey, ‘An Overlooked Papyrus of Isaios’, p. 
24 n. 17. 
17 Isae. 12.8: νυνὶ δὲ ἡμῶν πάντα ταῦτα παρεχομένων ἀξιώσουσιν ὑμᾶς τοῖς αὑτῶν πείθεσθαι λόγοις μᾶλλον 
ἢ τῷ πατρὶ τῷ Εὐφιλήτου καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τῷ ἀδελφῷ καὶ τοῖς φράτορσι καὶ πάσῃ τῇ ἡμετέρα συγγενείᾳ. 
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speaker delivered his speech second.18 Ultimately, the matter of which side spoke first 
during Euphiletos’ case hinges on the interpretation of a single word.  
While it is difficult to understand the technicalities involved in the case from the 
speech’s fragmentary state, the parallels to which both Wyse and Gomme refer certainly 
make a more credible case for Euphiletos delivering his speech after his prosecutors had 
presented theirs. Indeed, the speaker subsequently describes Euphiletos’ opponents as 
being ‘without risk’,19 a label which closely parallels Euxitheos’ categorisation of 
Euboulides as ‘without liability’ (see §5). With neither opponent facing personal risk for 
their role in the legal proceedings, it seems to indicate that both parties were acting as 
representatives of their demes rather than on their own behalf.  
Another factor which has complicated the identification of the legal procedure is 
the speaker’s allusion to arbitration (12.11).20 While most private cases were submitted 
to arbitration, typically there was no recourse to it in the case of public actions.21 
According to the Athēnaiōn Politeia, δίκαι were allocated by lot to a public arbitrator for 
an attempt at preliminary resolution ([Arist.] 53.1-5).22 While the process of arbitration 
was compulsory in such cases, the arbitrators’ verdicts were not binding and the author 
                                                          
18 Isae. 8.11: οὗτος δ᾽ ὁ νῦν ὑμᾶς ἀξιώσων τοῖς αὑτοῦ μάρτυσι πιστεύειν ἔφυγε τὴν βάσανον (cf. 8.6). See 
Wyse, The Speeches of Isaeus, pp. 596-7, and 719. Wyse also highlights the future tense of ἀξιόω in Isae. 
7.2, and directly compares these uses to the opening statement made by Euxitheos in his appeal. Gomme 
arrives at a similar conclusion, also citing the passage at Isae. 8.11 to explain the use of the future tense at 
Isae. 12.8, in ‘Two Problems of Athenian Citizenship Law’, p. 128. 
19 Isae. 12.8: μὴν οὗτοι μὲν οὐδ᾽ ἐν ἑνὶ κινδυνεύοντες ἰδίας ἔχθρας ἕνεκα ποιοῦσιν. 
20 For an overview of the legal problems raised by the involvement of arbitrators, see Wyse, The Speeches 
of Isaeus, pp. 716-7. 
21 For a discussion of the extent of the arbitrators, see Bonner, ‘The Jurisdiction of Athenian Arbitrators’, 
pp. 407-18, and Rhodes, A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia, pp. 587-95. For a more 
recent, albeit broad, overview of the matter, see D. Roebuck, Ancient Greek Arbitration, pp. 173-6. 
22 The author also states that public arbitrators were men aged fifty-nine years old and over who heard 
private suits exceeding ten drachmas. Normally, cases that were brought before an arbitrator had to be 
completed before he finished his term in office. However, Euphiletos’ case appears to have been with an 
arbitrator for two years, and not necessarily the same one (the Greek is not clear: ἡμεῖς μὲν τοὺς συγγενεῖς 
μάρτυρας καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν διαιτητῶν καὶ ἐφ᾽ ὑμῶν παρεχόμεθα … δύο ἔτη τοῦ διαιτητοῦ τὴν δίαιταν ἔχοντος, 
Isae. 12.11). This delay may have been due to the death of the dēmarch, as noted by the speaker in the same 
passage. Moreover, while accepting the arbitrator’s decision meant that the matter would be kept out of 
court and that neither party risked the penalties of losing at a trial, it is important to note that the decision 
of an arbitrator was not binding. 
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stresses that an appeal to the jury-court was an option for either party who was dissatisfied 
with the verdict. Numerous scholars have assumed that the two attempts at arbitration to 
which Euphiletos’ brother refers were made in relation to the current case; with the first 
terminated by the death of the dēmarch, a second action was lodged by Euphiletos as the 
prosecutor. Several of these scholars have therefore concluded that Euphiletos’ case was 
a δίκη and technically dissimilar to Euxitheos’, who makes no mention of having to 
submit to arbitration during his account.23 Carey states that none of the existing evidence 
pertaining to the public arbitration system suggests that it would have been used for cases 
of such magnitude which arose from the implementation of Demophilos’ decree.24 He too 
finds that Euphiletos’ appeal most resembles a private suit and he thus makes the same 
suggestion as Diller and Gomme that the speech may derive from an extraordinary 
scrutiny within a single deme. 
While Carey’s evidence is worthy of note, there are several arguments which 
persuasively account for Euphiletos’ reference to arbitration in a public suit. Wyse 
surmises that the public arbitrator may have aided in the preparation of appeals arising 
from the extraordinary scrutiny by conducting the examination (ἀνάκρισις) and the 
preliminaries before a trial, thereby relieving some of the demand on the Thesmothetae 
as the presiding body.25 He also claims that no weight need be attached to the fact that 
                                                          
23 Diller, ‘The Decree of Demophilus, 346-345 B.C.’, p. 201. In addition to classifying Against Euboulides 
as a private suit due to the speaker’s reference to the water-clock, Rubinstein also maintains that the 
reference to arbitration in On Behalf of Euphiletos strongly suggests that this was a private action, in 
Litigation and Cooperation, pp. 61-2 n. 99; see Appendix 7, pp. 309-10. 
24 ‘An Overlooked Papyrus of Isaios’, p. 24 n. 17. Carey concludes that it would be unlikely for the 
Athenians to allow an alternative route of appeal through the medium of a private suit if a special appeals 
mechanism had been set up in connection with Demophilos’ decree. However, this conclusion rests on his 
reading of a statement made by Euxitheos in which the speaker seems to refer to the appeals process as a 
new measure (see §6). While his interpretation is certainly valid, it is by no means the only way to 
understand the given passage (cf. Diller’s theory, Appendix 7, pp. 307-8). 
25 The Speeches of Isaeus, pp. 716-7; cf. n. 81 in the Introduction. Bonner finds Wyse’s explanation to be 
satisfactory, in ‘The Jurisdiction of Athenian Arbitrators’, p. 416. However, he notes that the apparent 
introduction of new evidence by Euxitheos would be incompatible with the regular arbitration (see §14) 
and, had both parties submitted to a process of arbitration (which is indeed not mentioned by the speaker), 
it must have been as extraordinary as the scrutiny which occasioned the case itself. Ultimately, both Wyse 
and Bonner maintain that Against Euboulides and On Behalf of Euphiletos are public suits. As does Hansen, 
who also surmises that the special circumstances resulting from the extraordinary διαψήφισις of 346/5 BC 
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Euxitheos does not mention whether his case was heard by an arbitrator, since his silence 
may indicate that the arbitrator’s verdict had gone against him.26 If Euphiletos’ deme, 
Erchia, and indeed Euxitheos had refused to abide by the decision of each of their 
arbitrators, Wyse’s theory would explain why both cases still came before the jury.27 
However, there is no actual evidence to support Wyse’s suggestion of collaboration 
between the arbitrators and the Thesmothetae. 
Euphiletos’ reference to arbitration has been explained more satisfactorily 
elsewhere. Kapparis persuasively argues that Euphiletos’ brother refers to an earlier case 
between the appellant and his deme, a private suit which went to public arbitration and 
was drawn out for two years.28 Certainly, the terms used by the author of the speech would 
support this.29 Although very few details are given regarding this case, Kapparis’ reading 
is very convincing: Euphiletos alone was rejected by his deme, presumably during his 
deme’s annual διαψήφισις proceedings when he was eighteen years old, but he initiated 
a δίκη against them and a prolonged period of arbitration resulted in his case being 
successful and the deme subsequently admitting him (12.12). But when Demophilos 
proposed a review of the deme registers in 346/5 BC, those in the deme of Erchia who 
                                                          
may have involved the arbitrators, in Apagoge, Endeixis and Ephegesis against Kakourgoi, Atimoi and 
Pheugontes, p. 64 n. 26. 
26 Gomme disagrees with Wyse by claiming that, had Euxitheos’ case been referred to an arbitrator and the 
decision had gone against him, it would be more natural for Euxitheos to have referred to it as ‘another 
instance of his enemy’s chicanery and cunning’, in ‘Two Problems of Athenian Citizenship Law’, p. 127. 
However, his argument is far from compelling if one considers that Euxitheos already faced possible bias 
from the jury, who may have felt more inclined to uphold a deme’s official decision against one of its own 
members. Admitting to a second ruling against him from the office of an arbitrator could further any 
prejudice on the jury’s part. Moreover, Euxitheos already had quite a challenge to convince the jury of 
Euboulides’ corruption of the deme vote against him without also trying to prove that the arbitrator’s 
decision had also been distorted. On the contrary, the speaker of On Behalf of Euphiletos makes great use 
of the fact that the arbitrator had voted in Euphiletos’ favour and against his fellow demesmen (12.11-2). 
In light of this, Wyse’s suggestion remains a plausible notion. 
27 A similar argument is made by Hansen, in Apagoge, Endeixis and Ephegesis against Kakourgoi, Atimoi 
and Pheugontes, p. 64 n. 26. 
28 Kapparis, ‘Immigration and Citizenship Procedures in Athenian Law’, pp. 86-91; cf. ‘Isaeus 12: On 
Behalf of Euphiletus’, pp. 73-8. 
29 Isae. 12.11: ἐπειδὴ ἔλαχεν ὁ Εὐφίλητος τὴν δίκην τὴν προτέραν τῷ κοινῷ τῶν δημοτῶν καὶ τῷ τότε 
δημαρχοῦντι, ὃς νῦν τετελεύτηκε, δύο ἔτη τοῦ διαιτητοῦ τὴν δίαιταν ἔχοντος οὐκ ἐδυνήθησαν οὐδεμίαν 
μαρτυρίαν εὑρεῖν ὡς οὑτοσὶ ἄλλου τινὸς πατρός ἐστιν ἢ τοῦ ἡμετέρου. 
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had initially opposed Euphiletos’ membership seized this opportunity to have him 
removed.  
In conclusion, the classification of Euphiletos’ action is a complex issue. Though 
Dionysios fails to mention Demophilos by name when describing the law which 
authorised the review, sufficient reasons emerge to find that Euphiletos’ case arose as a 
result of this scrutiny; undeniable similarities appear through a direct comparison with 
Euxitheos’ case and a thorough discussion of the extraordinary διαψήφισις of 346/5 BC. 
While he is indeed vague with regard to the details, Dionysios’ description does indeed 
correspond to Demophilos’ motion which instigated the διαψήφισις of that year. 
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Appendix 2: Libanios’ life and career 
Fortunately, many details are known about Libanios’ life and career; most of these 
are provided by his Autobiography and more than one thousand and six hundred letters 
which he wrote.1 Born in Antioch in AD 314, Libanios moved to Athens in AD 336 in 
order to complete his education, studying there for several years. In AD 340, he took up 
position as a private teacher in Constantinople. By AD 344/5, he was installed as 
professor in Nicomedia, a post which he held for five years and which brought him into 
contact with the future saint Basil and the next ruler Julian. Libanios was summoned by 
emperor Constantius to return to Constantinople in AD 349 to serve as the city’s official 
sophist, which he reluctantly accepted. He remained in the capital until AD 354 and then 
finally returned home to Antioch, where he accepted the chair of rhetoric and taught there 
for the rest of his life. After a succession of domestic troubles and personal bereavements 
in the early AD 360s, Libanios was cheered by the accession of Julian to the throne. But 
his devotion to paganism and resolute rejection of Christianity made him an unpopular 
figure, and his connection to Julian and his regime brought further dislike even after the 
emperor’s death in AD 363, which carried on into Valens’ reign. On the other hand, the 
subsequent ruler Theodosios bore no ill-will against the rhetorician and he even showed 
his imperial favour by offering him an honorary title of Praetorian Prefect which Libanios 
turned down. Soon after the death of his only son in AD 391, Libanios himself died, 
probably in AD 393, having become quite ill in his later years. 
Libanios’ writings are substantial. In addition to the series of Hypotheses, his 
surviving works include sixty-four orations ranging from sophistic essays to official 
panegyrics, fifty-one declamations on a variety of historical and mythological topics,2 
                                                 
1 The fullest recent biography of Libanios can be found in L. Van Hoof, Libanius, pp. 7-38. 
2 Of the fifty-one declamations, forty-four are generally believed to be genuine. The spurious declamations 
are 17, 34, 40, 43, 45, 49, and 51; see A. F. Norman’s translation of Libanios, Selected Works, p. xlviii. For 
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approximately one thousand and six hundred letters to friends and acquaintances both 
famous and unknown,3 a large collection of rhetorical exercises (προγυμνάσματα), and 
an autobiography which he composed in AD 374. 
                                                 
a more recent and comprehensive study of Libanios and his texts, see Van Hoof, Libanius: a critical 
introduction (2014). 
3 Some one thousand five hundred and forty or more of these letters are considered to be genuine; see 
Norman’s translation of Libanios, Selected Works, p. xlix. 
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Appendix 3: Pericles’ citizenship law of 451/0 BC 
The Athēnaiōn Politeia presents the most detail with regard to Pericles’ 
citizenship law, including the date and contents from the decree itself.1 It states that, 
during the archonship of Antidotos (451/0 BC), Pericles passed a law limiting citizenship 
to those who had Athenian parentage on both sides ([Arist.] 26.4). Rather than defining 
Athenian citizenship, Pericles’ law outlined the necessary requirement in order to attain 
it. For the first time in a known written law, Pericles restricted Athenian citizenship to 
those who fulfilled this condition. Previously, any son from an Athenian father and his 
legally wedded wife was considered to be a legitimate child and would attain full citizen 
rights when he came of age, whether his mother was Athenian or foreign.2 The new law 
was most likely not retroactive, but was to be enforced for all those who had yet to be 
registered as citizens by 451/0 BC.3 While there is no epigraphic evidence to reveal the 
original wording of Pericles’ law, the terminology used by the author of the Athēnaiōn 
Politeia may reflect the language of the decree.4 Citizenship was to be reserved for the 
children of two ἀστοί, a term which was explicitly used against that of ξένοι (see πότερόν 
ποτ᾽ ἀστὸς ἢ ξένος ἦν ᾧ ταῦθ᾽ ὑπῆρχεν at §24) and, as such, marked a new period in 
Athenian citizenship. 
In a different context from that of the Athēnaiōn Politeia, Plutarch also discusses 
Pericles’ citizenship law. In his biography of the prominent politician, Plutarch reveals 
that Pericles had requested a suspension of his own law in order to enrol his illegitimate 
                                                 
1 Cf. Ael. VH. 6.10, 13.24; Suda s.v. δημοποίητος Adler Δ451. For a comprehensive study of Pericles’ law, 
see Patterson, Pericles’ Citizenship Law of 451-450 B.C. (1981). 
2 Enrolment in both the Athenian social groups was agnatic. Thus it may be assumed that children born of 
an Athenian woman and a foreign man would not be acknowledged as citizens when they came of age, 
even if their parents were married, as they had no entry route to the necessary deme. 
3 See nn. 77 and 78 in the Introduction. 
4 [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 26.4: … ὃς ἂν μὴ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἀστοῖν ᾖ γεγονώς. See Blok’s in-depth discussion, ‘Perikles’ 
Citizenship Law’, pp. 141-6. 
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son as a citizen and, as such, he briefly summarises the decree.5 The author goes on to 
connect Pericles’ law to the early extraordinary διαψήφισις which took place after the 
Egyptian king had given a large gift of grain to Athens. While Plutarch fails to state when 
exactly this διαψήφισις took place in regard to the law being enacted, Philochoros dates 
the gift to 445/4 BC (FGrH 328 F119 apud schol. Ar. Wasps, 718a-b).6 None of the 
sources suggest that Pericles’ law was specifically enacted in anticipation of such an 
event. Consequently, it seems more plausible to view the law as propounding Athenian 
concerns over their citizenship and the διαψήφισις of 445/4 BC as a continuation of those 
concerns, which were brought to the forefront once again with the Egyptian gift of grain.7 
Pericles’ legislation became the standard norm for evaluating citizenship, and the action 
taken in 445/4 BC stands as an example of the Athenians enforcing it. 
The Athēnaiōn Politeia is the only surviving source which offers an explanation 
for the introduction of Pericles’ law at that particular time. The author identifies the large 
number of citizens at that time as the motivation behind the decree.8 On the surface, at 
least, this reasoning seems appropriate given that the law was enacted as the Athenian 
offensive was subsiding at the end of the Greco-Persian Wars (492-449 BC), at a time 
when Athens had acquired a large intake of foreigners as a result of its naval exploits.9 
                                                 
5 Plut. Per. 37.3: ὁ Περικλῆς … νόμον ἔγραψε μόνους Ἀθηναίους εἶναι τοὺς ἐκ δυεῖν Ἀθηναίων γεγονότας. 
Gomme believes that Plutarch was using a subsequent statement from the Athēnaiōn Politeia when he wrote 
this passage, namely the author’s discussion of the form of the constitution at that time (μετέχουσιν μὲν τῆς 
πολιτείας οἱ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων γεγονότες ἀστῶν, [Arist.] 42.1), in ‘Two Problems of Athenian Citizenship 
Law’, p. 135 n. 23. Walters doubts that Plutarch had this passage in mind, preferring the possibility that he 
had access to another unnamed text, in ‘Perikles’ Citizenship Law’, p. 334. But, ultimately, it cannot be 
known where Plutarch obtained the information regarding Pericles’ citizenship law. 
6 For a brief discussion of this event, see Introduction, pp. 31-2. A. Coşkun has recently argued that 445/4 
BC is a more plausible date for the enactment of Pericles’ citizenship law than the date transmitted in the 
Athēnaiōn Politeia, in ‘Perikles und die Definition des Bürgerrechts im klassischen Athen’, pp. 1-35. 
Unfortunately, however, the evidence is ambiguous regarding the revision of the deme lists in 445/4 BC 
and the subsequent action taken against those who were disfranchised. There is nothing substantial in the 
source material to warrant accepting Coşkun’s theory over the particular details provided by the Athēnaiōn 
Politeia. 
7 For a similar theory, see Davies, ‘Athenian Citizenship’, pp. 110-2. 
8 [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 26.4: … διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν. 
9 Rhodes, however, raises the objection that the increase in the citizen body conflicts with the author’s 
earlier point that Athens had endured severe losses at the start of the so-called First Peloponnesian War, 
fought during the period after Ephialtes’ reforms of 462/1 BC, and thus he argues that Pericles was more 
concerned with the quality of the citizen body than its size, in A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion 
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But since the law was not retroactive, it would not have reduced the citizen body to 
immediately solve any issue regarding its size. Instead, it is likely that the law sought to 
deal with the increase in citizen numbers from mixed marriages between Athenian men 
and foreign women.10 With the expansion of Athenian imperial power, the opportunity 
for intermarriage was considerably greater than before and thus the children of these 
unions made their way onto the deme registers. While there is no specific mention of 
marriage in the sources for Pericles’ decree, the ratification of the law undoubtedly made 
marriages between citizens and foreigners an unappealing prospect, as any children from 
such unions would be henceforth excluded from the privileges of citizenship, including 
the right to inherit property in Attica (Isae. 6.25, 8.43). Indeed, some scholars have 
interpreted Pericles’ legislation as banning marriages between foreigners and citizens.11 
However, one would expect the law to address directly the legality of marriage if such a 
prohibition was to be enforced as a result of its ratification. The silence of the existing 
evidence with regard to marriage ultimately makes any connection to Pericles’ legislation 
unverifiable. 
                                                 
Politeia, pp. 333-4. Diller had earlier propounded a somewhat similar theory to explain why Pericles had 
established this law and concluded that it was due to Athenian jealousy of their citizen rights being bestowed 
on those beyond the ties of kinship, in Race Mixture Among the Greeks Before Alexander, p. 92. It is 
certainly plausible that the growth of Athenian imperialism had attracted people to the city who were then 
claiming the citizen status that they were not entitled to. Yet Patterson more persuasively argues that the 
law need not be seen solely as a selfish move to protect access to Athenian privileges; instead, she 
emphasises that it was a part of the larger development of polis organisation and institutions, in line with 
public burial of the war dead, the paid service in popular courts and expanded public festival boards, in 
‘Athenian Citizenship Law’, p. 280. Blok follows a comparable line of thinking, by concluding that Pericles 
was upgrading the demes to the same importance as the genē and following the process of democratisation 
of the preceding decades, in ‘Perikles’ Citizenship Law’, p. 165. 
10 Both Patterson and Walters have defended the notion that there was an increase to the Athenian citizen 
body as result of unions between citizen men and metic or slave women respectively: Patterson, Pericles’ 
Citizenship Law of 451-450 B.C., pp. 99-100; Walters, ‘Perikles’ Citizenship Law’, pp. 331-6. For a similar 
view, see also Osborne, ‘Law, the Democratic Citizen and the Representation of Women in Classical 
Athens’, pp, 6-11, and Carawan, ‘Pericles the Younger and the Citizenship Law’, pp. 389-91. 
11 Wolff, ‘Marriage Law and Family Organization in Ancient Athens’, p. 67; Harrison, The Law of Athens 
Vol. I, p. 62; D. M. MacDowell, ‘Bastards as Athenian Citizens’, p. 88; and S. C. Humphreys, ‘Public and 
Private Interests in Classical Athens’, p. 99. The law mentioned in the case against Neaera, allowing for the 
prosecution of a man for cohabiting with a woman in a mixed relationship ([Dem.] 59.16) is not expressly 
connected to Pericles’ law, nor is there any suggestion that it was introduced in the fifth century. 
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As it stands, the law recorded in the Athēnaiōn Politeia only refers to parentage 
and, as such, the lack of detail has caused further problems in determining the status of a 
νόθος, both before and after the enactment of Pericles’ law. It is not definitively known 
if νόθοι born of unwed Athenian fathers and free foreign mothers were denied certain or 
indeed all rights of citizenship before the introduction of the law in 451/0 BC, and whether 
νόθοι born of two unmarried Athenian parents were similarly refused access to some, if 
not all, citizenship privileges especially in its aftermath. Since the sources neither wholly 
confirm nor deny the admission of νόθοι from two Athenian parents into the citizen body, 
the material remains open to interpretation and is a greatly contested issue.12 For a son 
born of two unmarried Athenian parents, and thereby lacking the proof of legitimacy 
through marriage, it was necessary for his father to openly acknowledge paternity before 
his deme in order to avoid suspicion regarding his status (Dem. 39.2-4; 40.8-11). 
Euxitheos therefore, who claims that his parents were married, devotes considerable 
attention to providing proof of this to the court (see §§40-3, 53 and 69). He specifically 
refers to his parents’ union as having been contracted by one of the two forms of citizen 
marriages recognised by Attic law (see ἐγγυᾶται at §41). Though no extant source reports 
that Pericles’ law specifically required the marriage of two Athenian citizens, it certainly 
bestows a guarantee of legitimacy which was most needed when claiming one’s right to 
citizenship.  
While the author of the Athēnaiōn Politeia may provide the wording of the law’s 
main regulation, no further details are given with regard to how the law was put into 
                                                 
12 It is argued that they were admitted to citizenship by Harrison, The Law of Athens Vol. I, pp. 63-5; 
MacDowell, ‘Bastards as Athenian Citizens’, pp. 88-91; Walters, ‘Perikles’ Citizenship Law’, pp. 317-20; 
and Kamen, Status in Classical Athens, pp. 63-70. However, numerous scholars maintain that both Solonian 
law on legitimacy and Pericles’ citizenship law decreed that they were not; for details, see Gomme, ‘Two 
Problems of Athenian Citizenship Law’, p. 131 n. 17; Wolff, ‘Marriage Law and Family Organization in 
Ancient Athens’, pp. 75-85; Lacey, The Family in Classical Greece, p. 282 n. 15; Humphreys, ‘The Nothoi 
of Kynosarges’, pp. 88-95; S. B. Pomeroy, Goddesses, Whores, Wives and Slaves, pp. 66-7, 91; P. J. 
Rhodes, ‘Bastards as Athenian Citizens’, pp. 89-92; Davies, ‘Athenian Citizenship’, p. 105; Patterson, 
‘Those Athenian Bastards’, pp. 40-73; Ogden, Greek Bastardy in the Classical and Hellenistic Periods, pp. 
151-65; and Blok, ‘Perikles’ Citizenship Law’, p. 145 n. 12. 
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effect.13 After the law was passed, only the sons of two Athenian parents were entitled to 
be registered in their father’s deme. Should a deme make any fraudulent admissions, 
individual citizens could bring a γραφὴ ξενίας against those they suspected of illegally 
assuming Athenian citizenship.14 Although it is unclear whether this was a result of 
Pericles’ law, indictments could also be brought against a suspected foreign male or 
female living with an Athenian citizen as a valid husband and wife union, and against a 
citizen man for knowingly giving a foreign woman in marriage to a fellow Athenian, the 
penalties for which included enslavement, fines, confiscations, and loss of citizen rights 
([Dem.] 59.16, 52).15 Since the law does not seem to have been retroactive, it must have 
been the case that any sons who had been enrolled contrary to Pericles’ law between 451/0 
BC and the extraordinary διαψήφισις of 445/4 BC were ejected from the demes. The 
lawsuits which ensued were a series of γραφαὶ ξενίας.16 This scrutiny has been utilised as 
evidence of the Athenians applying Pericles’ law as rigorously as possible.17 
The official status of Pericles’ legislation during the Peloponnesian War is 
uncertain. The increase to the citizen body which the Athēnaiōn Politeia reports as 
instigating the law was certainly diminished by the prolonged conflict, though no formal 
change to the requirement for citizenship appears to have been made.18 However, it does 
                                                 
13 See n. 68 in the Introduction. 
14 See n. 69 in the Introduction. 
15 In addition to prohibiting cohabitation in a mixed status relationship (see n. 11 above), [Dem.] 59 also 
refers to a law which forbade a citizen man from giving a non-citizen woman in marriage to another citizen, 
representing her as his own daughter (ὡς ἑαυτῷ προσήκουσαν, [Dem.] 59.52). Though there is no evidence 
to suggest that the possible indictments mentioned in [Dem.] 59.16 and 52 were an actual part of Pericles’ 
citizenship law, Ogden suggests that these actions were indeed a further rationalisation of what was 
effectively the legislation since 451/0 BC, in Greek Bastardy in the Classical and Hellenistic Periods, p. 
80. Elsewhere, while maintaining that the two documents cited in [Dem.] 59.16 and 52 were parts of the 
same law, Kapparis contends that this law was not introduced until sometime in the 380s BC, in Apollodoros 
‘Against Neaira’ [D.59], p. 202. Primarily, he argues that such a date coincides with the time when the first 
children of mixed unions born after 403 BC, the earliest date for the re-confirmation of Pericles’ citizenship 
law, were no longer entitled to citizenship. Alternatively, the actions referred to by [Dem.] 59 may have 
arisen from the subsequent re-enactment of Pericles’ law in 403/2 BC and, moreover, may bear a connection 
to the period in which the Athenian state attempted to eliminate inconsistent, outdated, or redundant laws 
(see n. 66 in the Introduction). For further discussion on such indictments and their penalties, see Harrison, 
The Law of Athens Vol. I, pp. 26-8; and MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens, p. 87. 
16 See Introduction, pp. 31-2. 
17 Hansen, The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Democracy, p. 53. 
18 See n. 70 in the Introduction. 
287 
 
seem likely that social divisions between citizens and aliens had been relaxed during the 
conflict. Indeed, Pericles was allowed to enrol his illegitimate son in his phratry (Plut. 
Per. 37.5). Moreover, there are claims in the source material that the state had been 
generally less scrupulous about the requisite for citizenship during this period (Isoc. 8.21, 
43, 88-9).19 Ultimately concessions were made, such as a grant for nearly all citizenship 
rights to be bestowed upon the Plataeans after the siege of 429-7 BC ([Dem.] 59.104-6) 
and for the right of intermarriage to be given to the Euboeans at some stage before 405 
BC (Lys. 34.3). Besides these formal additions to the citizen body, it is likely that ξένοι 
and νόθοι were admitted into the Athenian ranks intentionally or not and thereby made 
their way onto the deme registers.20 The impact of such additions and the Athenian 
preoccupation with citizen identity were brought to the stage by the contemporary 
playwrights.21 Produced sometime between 414 and 410 BC, Euripides’ Ion has its main 
character’s status and legitimacy questioned throughout the play (see especially 722, 
1048-1105). Aristophanes made frequent comments regarding citizenship: in 414 BC, he 
has his Chorus Leader refer to lenient practices during this period (Birds, 764-5), his 
titular heroine in Lysistrata propose the inclusion of metics and well-disposed foreigners 
to the citizenry early in 411 BC (574-86) and, in 405 BC, and he has another Chorus 
discuss citizenship under the guise of true and counterfeit coins (Frogs, 718-37). 
Ultimately, however, the Athenians were defeated in the Peloponnesian War and they 
                                                 
19 Carawan has argued that Pericles’ law was temporarily relaxed in two stages: the first in 430/29 BC, 
allowing νόθοι to be recognised if the family had no legitimate children left, and the second in 411-403, 
permitting νόθοι to be recognised alongside legitimate children, in ‘Pericles the Younger and the 
Citizenship Law’, pp. 383-406. 
20 Isocrates states that the public cemetery and the deme and phratry lists had been filled with those who 
had no claim on the city (8.88). See also Humphreys, ‘The Nothoi of Kynosarges’, p. 94. 
21 Social historians increasingly use drama as a source for Athenian history since issues of citizen life and 
laws are represented in both the tragic and comic plays. Still, one must always be cautious not to take 
citations out of their dramatic context. For modern discussions of the social, political and ideological 
context of Athenian drama, see J. J. Winkler and F. I. Zeitlin, F. I., Nothing to Do with Dionysos? (1990); 
D. Rosenbloom, ‘From Ponêros to Pharmakos’, pp. 283-346; P. J. Rhodes, ‘Nothing to Do with 
Democracy’, pp. 104-19. 
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found themselves in a position whereby they were compelled to evaluate the nature of 
citizenship and its privileges, and even seek to limit it once more. 
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Appendix 4: the workings of the deme 
The one hundred and thirty-nine demes varied in size and encompassed both the 
city and Attic countryside; the purpose of these social groups was the establishment of 
local communities.1 The best and fullest ancient source for the demes is the Athēnaiōn 
Politeia which, after attributing the framework of the deme system to Cleisthenes, 
specifies that those living in each deme were to be fellow demesmen and officially known 
by their deme’s name ([Arist.] 21.4).2 By attaching the name of one’s deme to one’s own 
appellation, communal membership becomes synonymous with a person’s identity.3 By 
successfully registering with a deme, an Athenian officially became a citizen. The newly 
registered man became a member of that social group and membership of that same deme 
passed through the male line from father to son, irrespective of any change in residence.4 
With Athenian parentage as the principal requirement for membership, the deme was 
inherently tied to Athenian citizenship since there was no centralised record of citizens 
belonging to the state.5 
The second requirement for deme membership was age. Unlike the variable age 
of entry into the phratry during the child’s youth,6 the normal age for deme admission 
was fixed at eighteen years old.7 Although admission into a deme was not explicitly 
                                                 
1 Regarding the number and size of the demes, see Whitehead for a concise overview in The Demes of 
Attica, pp. 17-24. 
2 Cleisthenes reorganised the Athenian citizen body in 508/7 BC: he left the four existing φυλαί intact but 
removed their political significance, instead transferring it to his newly created deme system and grouping 
the demes to form thirty newly established τριττύες (thirds) and ten φυλαί ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 20-22; Hdt. 
5.66, 69-73). For Cleisthenes reforms, see A. Andrewes, ‘Kleisthenes' Reform Bill’, pp. 241-8; Whitehead, 
The Demes of Attica, pp. 3-38; R. Develin and M. Kilmer, ‘What Kleisthenes Did’, pp. 3-18. 
3 Dem 39.9: καὶ τίς ἤκουσε πώποτε, ἢ κατὰ ποῖον νόμον προσπαραγράφοιτ᾽ ἂν τοῦτο τὸ παράγραμμα ἢ 
ἄλλο τι πλὴν ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ὁ δῆμος.  
4 Cf. ἐν οἷς ὁ πάππος ὁ τοῦ πατρός, ὁ ἐμός, <ὁ> πατήρ, ἐνταῦθα καὶ αὐτὸς φαίνομαι δημοτευόμενος at §55; 
[Arist.] Ath. Pol. 42.1-2. A change in deme membership could only occur when a man relinquished his 
attachment to one deme and was adopted by another (Dem. 44.26). 
5 The renewal of Pericles’ citizenship law at the end of the fifth century BC required that candidates for 
citizenship had two Athenian parents, see Introduction, pp. 21-5; for the implementation of the original law, 
see Appendix 3, pp. 282-88. 
6 See Appendix 5, pp. 293-5. 
7 [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 42.1: μετέχουσιν μὲν τῆς πολιτείας οἱ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων γεγονότες ἀστῶν, ἐγγράφονται δ᾽ 
εἰς τοὺς δημότας ὀκτωκαίδεκα ἔτη γεγονότες. For the debate regarding the age at which a citizen was 
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dependent on prior phratry membership, whether or not a candidate had phratry approval 
may have been considered in evaluating entry to a deme even if members of the same 
phratry were not necessarily members of the same deme.8 Ultimately, each deme was 
responsible for scrutinising new members during an annual assembly, presided over by 
its current dēmarch.9 New admissions were subject only to supervision by the Boulē, 
undertaken in the format of a δοκιμασία and during which the main concern was verifying 
the age of the candidates.10 Those gathered at the assembly might also have to review 
older candidates for admission, specifically adopted sons (Isae. 7.16; Dem. 44.44) and 
enfranchised immigrants. But, since adopted adult sons would have already undergone 
the δοκιμασία by the Boulē and enfranchised immigrants would have had prior 
affirmation by the Ecclēsia, the deme’s role in their admittance was more a matter of a 
formal confirmation than a comprehensive scrutiny.11 
Deme entry enabled the exercise of economic, political, and military privileges 
and responsibilities: the ownership of landed property, liability for taxation and the 
performance of liturgies, assignment for military duties, access to religious rites and 
ceremonies, admission to the courts and jury duty, voting in elections, holding office and 
participation in the Ecclēsia. Thus, since admission into the deme functioned as the 
control over access to citizenship, it was appropriate that the deme itself or even the state 
                                                 
enrolled in his deme, whether in his eighteenth year or after his eighteenth birthday had passed, see n. 80 
in the Introduction. 
8 It also worked in reverse: if a candidate had been rejected by either the deme or the phratry, he could use 
his membership of the other as evidence in his appeal given the overlap between the two with regard to 
Athenian citizenship (Isae. 7.13; Dem. 44.41). For Euxitheos’ references to phratry membership in order to 
bolster his claim for reinstatement in the deme, see ἐν τοῖς φράτερσιν at §19. 
9 For a full analysis of this entire process, from scrutiny to possible appeal, see Introduction, pp. 26-8. For 
the role of the dēmarch during these proceedings, see τῶν γραμμάτων at §8; for the dēmarchy as a public 
office, see ὅτ᾽ ἀπώλετο αὐτοῖς τὸ ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον δημαρχοῦντος Ἀντιφίλου τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ 
Εὐβουλίδου at §26. 
10 For the Boulē’s δοκιμασία of newly enrolled citizens after the annual διαψήφισις in a deme, see 
Introduction, pp. 27-8. For the timing of this δοκιμασία and annual registration process, see also p. 26. 
11 See Whitehead, The Demes of Attica, p. 103. 
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could make revisions to its membership by implementing an extraordinary scrutiny;12 
though provision was made for rejected candidates to lodge an appeal before a 
δικαστήριον (cf. οὐκ ἂν ἐδώκατε τὴν εἰς ὑμᾶς ἔφεσιν at §6). Such measures sought to 
ensure that those lacking the necessary credentials were not included, and that those who 
did have a legitimate right were. 
There is no evidence to suggest that the demes drew up any account of women of 
citizen birth. A comment in the Athēnaiōn Politeia indicates that such women were not 
regarded as members of a deme in their own right; during a δοκιμασία for holding public 
office, a candidate was asked about his mother’s lineage, specifically regarding her father 
and his deme.13 It would appear that an Athenian woman was associated with a deme only 
through her κύριος: first through their father and then through their husband (cf. Isae. 8.19 
refers to ‘the wives of the demesmen’). Although female membership may have been 
formally ignored by the demes, they did participate in some deme activities, specifically 
religious ceremonies and customary rituals.14  
Each deme managed its own property and communal land, such as theatres, 
shrines, and sanctuaries etc. It organised festivals and cult activities (like Halimous’ cult 
of Heracles at §46) and controlled its own levying and expenditures (as at §63). The 
demes also kept official records of the metics who came to reside within their districts 
and exacted taxes from their immigrant residents (see ποῦ μετοίκιον καταθείς at §55).15 
With the individual demes governing their own affairs, undoubtedly there was much local 
                                                 
12 For specific reference to an extraordinary scrutiny held in a single deme, see §§26 and 60-2. Both 
Euxitheos and Euphiletos were expelled from their respective demes during the deme-wide scrutiny of 
346/5 BC; for Euphiletos’ case, see Appendix 1, pp. 270-9. 
13 [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 55.3: καὶ τίς μήτηρ, καὶ τίς μητρὸς πατὴρ καὶ πόθεν τῶν δήμων. Cf. τὰς τῶν φρατέρων 
τῶν συγγενῶν τῶν τῆς μητρὸς καὶ δημοτῶν μαρτυρίας at §40. See also J. P. A. Gould, ‘Law, Custom and 
Myth’, pp. 40-6; Sealey, The Athenian Republic, pp. 18-9.  
14 Cf. n. 150 in the Commentary. See also Whitehead, The Demes of Attica, pp. 77-81. 
15 For the important measure of deme registration, see Whitehead, The Ideology of the Athenian Metic, p. 
72-5. For a more general discussion of the metic position within the demes, see Whitehead, The Demes of 
Attica, pp. 81-5. 
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variation with regard to actual practices. However, some uniformity may be found in the 
general manner through which the demes managed communal life and administration, 
essentially how the deme assemblies imitated the procedure of the Ecclēsia. For normal 
purposes, these assemblies were probably held within the deme itself but, as Euxitheos 
specifies that his deme convened in the city on the occasion of his disfranchisement (see 
τοῦ ἄστεως at §10), there may have been certain circumstances which necessitated the 
demesmen to gather in Athens. The routine business of a deme assembly appears to have 
entailed speeches and the enactment of administrative or honorific decrees (see 
κατέτριψεν τὴν ἡμέραν δημηγορῶν καὶ ψηφίσματα γράφων at §9).16 In addition to the 
position of dēmarch, the deme assemblies could appoint whatever officials they 
required.17 Moreover, Euxitheos expressly refers to local offices which both he and his 
father had held after undergoing a formal δοκιμασία before taking up their duties (see 
§§25, 46 and 67). It must be assumed that the other Attic demes also employed this 
δοκιμασία procedure during their assemblies as the means through which to verify a 
man’s credentials again before he entered a political office. Since membership in a deme 
was a prerequisite for entry into the Boulē, and each deme was at some stage represented 
in the Boulē, the more ambitious Athenians could use local office as the means through 
which to enter the larger political stage. 
                                                 
16 However, it is not known whether the presiding dēmarch adhered to a predetermined agenda or if the 
assembly permitted motions from the members gathered, as Whitehead rightly notes in The Demes of Attica, 
pp. 95-6. 
17 For officials chosen by lot, see ἀρχὰς ἔλαχεν καὶ ἦρξεν δοκιμασθείς at §25. For officials chosen by lot 
from a preliminary list, see §§46-8. For elected officials, see Isae. 7.28; Dem. 44.39. Since the speaker does 
not make reference to any other specific deme offices, it is not necessary to discuss additional officials here. 
Whitehead provides a full discussion of other administrative positions within the demes in The Demes of 
Attica, pp. 139-48. 
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Appendix 5: the workings of the phratry 
Before the reforms of Cleisthenes in 508/7 BC, every Athenian man belonged to 
a phratry; a subdivision of the four old tribes which was established for the descendants 
of a common ancestor and, as such, it was primarily concerned with matters of family and 
descent.1 Although the phratries had lost any political significance through Cleisthenes’ 
reorganisation, they continued to play a role in Athenian life for religious purposes and 
still maintained some control in matters relating to legitimacy of descent, including access 
to citizenship and inheritance of property. They came to serve as social communities in 
which citizens were connected to one other by kinship or proximity of abode.2 Belonging 
to a phratry seemed to be normal practice for an Athenian citizen (Ar. Birds, 1669-70; Pl. 
Euthyd. 302c-d). Like the demes, the phratries held meetings, leased land and lent money, 
and organised cultic activities for its members.3 
Both natural and adopted sons of Athenian men joined their father’s phratry.4 
Although the phratries were legally required to admit those who had been recognised by 
a group such as the genos,5 they were otherwise in control of their own admissions. Some 
of the surviving evidence connects the admission processes with the main event in the 
phratry’s calendar, the three day festival of the Apatouria.6 The phratries held this 
                                                          
1 The names of most phratries signify that their members were descended from a common and often 
mythical or divine ancestor. The earliest references to the phratry as a group are found in Homer’s Iliad 
(2.362-3, 9.63-4).  
2 Claiming a common ancestor, all phratry members were theoretically distant relatives; in practice, though, 
new citizens could enrol in a phratry of their choice (IG II² 558, 20-1). 
3 Lambert’s study remains the most comprehensive analysis of the phratries’ role in Athenian society, see 
The Phratries of Attica (1993). 
4 However, one group of citizens was excluded from the phratries; Lambert notes that certain naturalised 
citizens were omitted from phratry membership, most commonly those who were enfranchised as part of a 
group, The Phratries of Attica, pp. 49-55. 
5 For details on this social group, see Appendix 6, pp. 298-301. 
6 Adopted sons were also normally introduced to their adoptive father’s phratry at this event (Dem. 39.4; 
Pl. Ti. 21b). Most adoptions involved relatives and thus there was no need to join more than one phratry; 
see Osborne, Demos, pp. 127-8. Elsewhere, the speaker of On the Estate of Apollodoros details the 
procedure of the enrolment of an adoptive child (Isae. 7.15-7); however, he states that this took place at the 
festival known as Thargelia (in the month of Thargelion, approximately May/June). Wyse notes the 
irregularity of introducing an heir at this time and suggests that it was due to an apprehension that the 
adoptive father would not survive until the Apatouria, in The Speeches of Isaeus, p. 558. 
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publicly-funded festival in the autumn month of Pyanepsion (sometime around late 
September to early November).7 Admissions took place on the third day (called 
κουρεῶτις; schol. Ar. Ach. 146).8 Unlike deme membership which was obtained at the 
age of eighteen,9 a candidate could be introduced to his father’s phratry when he was 
young, either in his infancy at a ceremony known as the μεῖον or during his adolescence 
at the κουρεῖον.10 The μεῖον seems to have taken place soon after a child was born (IG II² 
1237, 5 and 60; Harp. s.v. μεῖον) and details provided by the orators confirm that several 
candidates were introduced to the phratries when they were young children (Dem. 43.11; 
Isae. 8.19, 126; Andoc. 1.126). The introducer was usually the candidate’s father, but a 
close relative could also present a candidate in his absence.11 This man came before his 
fellow phratry members to make a sacrifice and to swear an oath before the phratriarch 
that he was proposing the admission a child born of a lawfully married Athenian woman 
(see §54).12 There would have been an opportunity for any of the present phratry members 
to object to his introduction by preventing the ceremonial sacrifice.13 Similarly, the 
members of a phratry could also oppose a candidate’s introduction at the κουρεῖον by 
                                                          
7 The month is confirmed by Theophrastos (Char. 3.5; cf. Harp. s.v. Ἀπατούρια). 
8 The first day of the Apatouria (δορπία) involved a communal feast for the phratry members, while the 
second day (ἀνάρρυσις) entailed sacrifices to the patron deities Zeus Phratrios and Athena Phratria (Pl. 
Euthyd. 302d; schol. Ar. Ach. 146; cf. Suda s.v. Ἀπατούρια Adler Α2940 and φράτορες Adler Φ694). 
Aristophanes and Plato allude to competitions which take place during the three days of the Apatouria, 
including boxing, wrestling, horseracing and recitation contests (Ar. Peace, 887-99; Pl. Ti. 21a-b). 
9 Either in his eighteenth year or after his eighteenth birthday had passed, see n. 75 in the Introduction. 
10 An inscription from Decelea in 396/5 BC gives the fullest account of the procedure for entry into a phratry 
and specifically makes reference to both the μεῖον and the κουρεῖον (IG II² 1237; see P. J. Rhodes and R. 
Osborne, Greek Historical Inscriptions, pp. 26-38). But for the problematic nature of the two introductions, 
see the literature cited by Lambert, The Phratries of Attica, p. 161 n. 106; Scafuro, ‘Witnessing and False 
Witnessing’, p. 185 nn. 31-2. 
11 Presumably, it would be acceptable for family members to introduce the candidate if his father had died. 
Euxitheos was introduced by relatives (see με εὐθέως ἦγον εἰς τοὺς φράτερας at §54). Elsewhere, in 
Demosthenes’ Against Macartatos, the speaker introduced his own young son to his father-in-law’s phratry 
in a situation of posthumous adoption (43.11-5, cf. 81-3). In Andocides’ On the Mysteries, the relatives of 
the candidate’s mother approached the altar to introduce him to his father’s phratry but, his father being 
present, he denied paternity on oath (1.125-6). 
12 For the office of phratriarch, see φρατρίαρχον at §23. Euxitheos states that his father specifically swore 
an oath that he had been born of a woman pledged by ἐγγύησις to her husband: ὀμόσας τὸν νόμιμον τοῖς 
φράτερσιν ὅρκον εἰσήγαγέν με, ἀστὸν ἐξ ἀστῆς ἐγγυητῆς αὑτῷ γεγενημένον εἰδώς (see §54; but the 
wording of this oath may have varied between the Attic phratries).  
13 In Against Macartatos, the speaker specifies that the defendant had the opportunity to object to his son’s 
enrolment in his father-in-law’s phratry (Dem. 43.82; cf. Isae. 8.19). 
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removing the introducer’s sacrifice from the altar,14 an event which may have coincided 
with the candidate’s formal enrolment and entry into the phratry as he came of age (IG 
II² 1237, 6 and 26; Poll. Onom. 8.107).  
Though practices probably varied from phratry to phratry, it appears that some 
form of scrutiny was implemented, either as a part of the ceremony itself or as a separate 
procedure; in such a scrutiny, the introducer would attest the candidate’s qualification by 
descent and the phratry would vote on his eligibility.15 When this scrutiny took place thus 
had a bearing on when the candidate was officially inscribed on the phratry register: after 
the μεῖον in his infancy (at Dem. 39.20),16 or after the phratry’s vote (Isae. 7.16; IG II² 
1237, lines 97-8). But what would rejection by a phratry mean for the candidate? Though 
there is no surviving evidence which explicitly states that phratry membership was 
specifically required by law,17 it did play a crucial role with regard to rights of inheritance 
and legitimising lines of descent.18 The importance of phratry membership is attested by 
the existence of a provision for appeal for those whose application for membership was 
                                                          
14 In a speech by Isaeus, the elder brother of a candidate objected to his sibling’s introduction but, after a 
discussion with his father regarding inheritance, the two came to an agreement and the younger brother was 
subsequently admitted (6.22). 
15 Details provided in On the Estate of Apollodoros reveal that such a vote took place in addition to the 
introducer’s oath (7.16). According to the inscription from Decelea, this would have taken place a year after 
the κουρεῖον (IG II² 1237, 26-9). For a brief discussion, see Lambert, The Phratries of Attica, pp. 172-3. 
16 While the speaker of Against Boiotos implies that he was registered in his infancy, he maintains that his 
adopted brothers were registered at a later age (Dem. 39.4). 
17 The brief comment of the Athēnaiōn Politeia on citizenship only refers to deme membership ([Arist.] 
42.1). However, Lambert argues that its omission of phratry membership does not demonstrate that it was 
not another necessary condition, in The Phratries of Attica, p. 33 n. 36. His theory is certainly persuasive 
in light of the situation presented in Demosthenes’ Against Boiotos: though the speaker maintains that his 
father was deceived into adopting Plangon’s two sons, he asserts that he was nevertheless compelled to 
introduce them to his phratry: ὡς δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἐποίησεν, εἰσάγειν εἰς τοὺς φράτερας ἦν ἀνάγκη τούτους (39.4). 
For Boiotos’ adopted brothers at least, phratry membership seems to have been a necessary element in 
obtaining full citizenship. 
18 This is particularly apparent in cases of adoption: the speaker of Isaeus’ On the Estate of Philoctemon 
recounts how Philoctemon blocked the introduction of his father’s son by another woman because a 
successful admission would thus result in his having to share his inheritance with him (6.10, 21-3); the 
litigant in Against Macartatos presents his son’s introduction into his father-in-law’s phratry as decisive 
proof of his right to inherit (Dem. 43.11, 13-5, 81); in Against Boiotos, the speaker does not challenge his 
adoptive brothers’ share of his father’s estate, but rather he seeks to compel the elder of the two to abide by 
the name with which he was registered at his introduction to the phratry (Dem. 39.30-1). 
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rejected by their phratry.19 It is also significant that the law decreed that those who 
wrongly assumed phratry membership could be prosecuted in a central court.20 In 
practice, without phratry membership, one’s citizenship could be liable to challenge. 
Without it, one could hardly be considered a full citizen as communal participation was 
integral to the affirmation of Athenian descent. 
The association between Athenian women and the phratries is also important. 
Each phratry regulated its own procedures and it appears that some phratries may have 
accepted the introduction of their members’ daughters.21 The extent of this practice, 
however, cannot be determined since it is not attested elsewhere in the surviving sources. 
Nevertheless, there is evidence that a citizen woman could be presented to her husband’s 
phratry at a ceremony named as γαμηλία (see οἷς τὴν γαμηλίαν εἰσήνεγκεν ὑπὲρ τῆς 
μητρὸς ὁ πατήρ at §43). But, unlike their male counterparts, these ceremonies were not 
undertaken to bestow membership on women.22 It is not known what, if anything, a 
woman’s association with the phratry of either her father or her husband would have 
meant in practice.23 Rather, the presentation of Athenian women to the phratries was the 
means through which to acknowledge their legitimacy openly.24 Since the revival of 
Pericles’ citizenship law meant that a candidate for citizenship must have both an 
Athenian mother and father,25 the phratry was essential as the only institution which could 
                                                          
19 For appeal to the phratry: Dem. 43.82 and IG II² 1237, 29-31; appeal to the court: Phrastor brought a suit 
against his genos after they rejected his son and therefore automatically prevented his admission to his 
phratry ([Dem.] 59.59-60). 
20 In Isaeus’ On the Estate of Pyrrhos, the speaker directly associates the usurpation of citizen rights with 
phratry membership (3.37). Cf. Lambert’s theory that Pericles’ citizenship law regulated phratry 
admissions, see nn. 68 and 79 in the Introduction.  
21 In On the Estate of Pyrrhos, the speaker reveals that Pyrrhos had the opportunity to introduce his daughter 
Phile to his phratry if she was legitimately his child (Isae. 3.73). 
22 Euxitheos encapsulates the association between the phratry and his mother by describing them as phratry 
members of her male relatives (see φράτερες τῶν οἰκείων αὐτῆς καὶ δημόται ταῦτα μεμαρτυρήκασι at §69). 
23 Lambert argues that women may have played a role in the cult activities of the phratry, in much the same 
manner as they did in the demes and the polis as a whole, in The Phratries of Attica, p. 186 and ch. 6, 
‘Religion and Officers’, pp. 205-35. 
24 A fact that was all the more important in a case concerning the rights of the alleged epiklēros, Phile, for 
whom neither was performed (Isae. 3.76). 
25 See Introduction, pp. 21-5; cf. Appendix 3, pp. 282-8. 
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acknowledge the legitimate status of the daughters and wives of its members. Whereas 
the demes controlled the acquisition of most of the criteria of citizenship, the phratry’s 
role in the polis was essentially the control of qualification by descent and thus access to 
the citizen body and its privileges. Unofficially, the link between phratry membership and 
citizenship was no less strong than that between deme membership and citizenship. 
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Appendix 6: the workings of the genos 
Although the name of a genos could be the same as the phratry name, the two 
groups were not identical.1 The origin of the genos is not clearly outlined in the extant 
source material and references to this social group are sparse in general. The Athēnaiōn 
Politeia implies that all citizens were members of a genos in the early stages of Athenian 
society, stating that the four old Ionian tribes were divided into three τριττύες or phratries, 
and each of these groups was subdivided into thirty genē and each genos comprised of 
thirty men.2 However, it has been noted that this synopsis more likely reflects fourth-
century theorising rather than historical reality.3 Elsewhere, the original use of the term 
seems to denote noble lineages (Thgn. 894; Pind. Ol. 6 and 8; Hdt. 5.55, 5.62.2; cf. [Arist.] 
Ath. Pol. 20.1, 28.2). The apparent privileges of certain genē and the likelihood that not 
all citizens belonged to one in the Classical period does give plausibility to the argument 
that these groups were originally aristocratic in nature.4 If this was the case, the genē must 
have dominated the political process before Cleisthenes’ reforms of 508/7 BC. By the 
fourth century BC, all Athenians who belonged to a genos would have been able to claim 
a long established and distinguished bloodline but they were not necessarily wealthy 
families.5 
                                                 
1 The names of the genē typically derived from a common (if mythical) male ancestor, recording the descent 
of their members, but they could also be geographical (e.g. the Salaminioi) or occupational (e.g. the 
Bouzygae). For a comprehensive study of most of the known names, see J. Toepffer, Attische Genealogie, 
(1889); see also Bourriot, Recherches sur la nature du genos, pp. 1347-66. It was possible for some of the 
genē and the phratries to share the same name as both were hereditary social groups whose membership 
followed family lines, though they differed in their role and function in Athenian society.  
2 [Arist.] Ath. Pol. fr. 3: καλεῖσθαι δὲ αὐτὰ τριττῦς καὶ φρατρίας· εἰς δὲ τὴν φρατρίαν τριάκοντα γένη 
διακεκοσμῆσθαι, καθάπερ αἱ ἡμέραι εἰς τὸν μῆνα, τὸ δὲ γένος εἶναι τριάκοντα ἀνδρῶν. 
3 For a comprehensive analysis of this fragment from the lost beginning of the Athēnaiōn Politeia, and its 
implausible statement that the τριττύες and the phratries were identical, see Rhodes, A Commentary on the 
Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia, pp. 68-71. In his comprehensive two-volume work, Bourriot advocates that 
the genos, like the deme, was part of the political fabric of the mature polis and that its creation can be 
traced back to the time of Solon, in Recherches sur la nature du genos, pp. 325-6 and 338-9. For Bourriot’s 
discussion of the fourth century BC sources relating to genē, see pp. 390-711. 
4 See Andrewes, ‘Philochoros on Phratries’, pp. 1-10. 
5 Euxitheos claims genos membership for his father (see §23), yet he speaks of his mother’s financial 
hardship during her husband’s absence for military duty (see §42), and he subsequently refers to his and 
his mother’s lowly way of life after his father’s death (see §31). 
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Membership of a genos was restricted to legitimate offspring of male citizens. 
Admissions were made seemingly during infancy ([Dem.] 59.59) and after the candidates 
had undergone a scrutiny process similar to that for phratry membership.6 Indeed, in the 
fourth century, certain genē bore clear ties to a phratry (Aeschin. 2.147; Isae. 7.15-17; 
[Dem.] 59.59-61; IG II² 1237).7 A fragment from the fourth book of Philochoros’ Atthis, 
covering legislation from the mid-fifth century BC, establishes a further connection 
between the two social groups as it states that genos members had automatic entry into 
the phratries.8 Both Lambert and Andrewes have proposed that it ought to be inferred 
from this fragment that, while some Athenians were members of a genos and had 
guaranteed access to the phratry, those who were not were thus subject to the routine 
procedure for entry.9 Their positon is certainly persuasive in light of the evidence 
provided by the orators; several speeches refer to phratry admission without any allusion 
to a genos (Isae. 2.14, 3.73-6, 6.22, 10.8, 12.3; Dem. 39.4, 20). Moreover, comments 
made by Euxitheos suggest that no close association existed between his phratry and his 
father’s genos: the speaker could have claimed genos membership through Thoucritos, 
although he never calls upon the members to attest to his own citizenship as he does for 
                                                 
6 Including a comparable oath, Andoc. 1.127; [Dem.] 59.60 (for the phratry scrutiny, see Appendix 5, pp. 
290-3). Unfortunately, Euxitheos provides no details in his speech about the process of Thoucritos’ 
introduction to the genos (see §23).  
7 For the inscription, and the close relationship between the genos of the Demotionidae and the phratry of 
Decelea, see Andrewes, ‘Philochoros on Phratries’, pp. 3-5. Lambert has argued that the genē were 
normally ‘subgroups’ of the phratries, in The Phratries of Attica, p. 74. His theory is certainly plausible 
but, unfortunately, it is far from absolutely proven given the few references which exist in the surviving 
source material. 
8 Philoch. FGrH 328 F35a: τοὺς δὲ φράτορας ἐπάναγκες δέχεσθαι καὶ τοὺς ὀργεῶνας καὶ τοὺς 
ὁμογάλακτας, οὓς γεννήτας καλοῦμεν; cf. Harp. s.v. γεννῆται; Suda, s.v. γεννῆται Adler Γ147. Lambert 
has proposed an interesting theory that this fragment is an extract from Pericles’ citizenship law of 451/0 
BC, which restricted genos membership to those born of two citizen parents along with that of the deme 
and the phratry, in The Phratries of Attica, pp. 47-8, 60. However, the overall lack of source material for 
Pericles’ original citizenship law makes it impossible to confirm, see Appendix 3, pp. 282-8. 
9 Lambert, The Phratries of Attica, p. 61 n. 12; Andrewes argues that genos members were admitted to the 
phratry without scrutiny because they had already passed a more rigorous scrutiny to secure membership 
in the smaller group, ‘Philochoros on Phratries’, pp. 1 and 6. 
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his father.10 It is difficult to see how Euxitheos could enter his father’s phratry but not his 
genos if they were in any way closely connected.  
However, Euxitheos does use Thoucritos’ membership of the genos as proof of 
his father’s citizen status (see τοὺς γεννήτας at §23) and he claims to be among those of 
the best lineage (see ὡς ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν τούτων προεκρίθην ἐν τοῖς εὐγενεστάτοις κληροῦσθαι 
τῆς ἱερωσύνης τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ at §46). Genos membership is similarly used as evidence in 
other suits concerning legitimacy and citizenship: in Against Neaera, Apollodoros relates 
how Phrastor’s genos refused to accept his son by Neaera’s daughter ([Dem.] 59.55, 59-
61); in Isaeus’ On the Estate of Apollodoros, Thrasyllos utilises details about his 
introduction to his uncle’s genos as proof of the legality of his adoption (7.13-17, 26, 43). 
Although genos membership did not itself affect a man’s legal status, it was valuable as 
supporting evidence for a person whose legitimacy was in question. Since the principle 
of descent functioned similarly as the major qualification for membership, belonging to 
a genos was thus used like phratry membership as proof of possession of that 
qualification. 
Athenian religion appears to have formed the core of the genos social group. 
Genos members were bound together by rights and duties relating to religion: they shared 
the same cults and ceremonies (see §§54 and 67; Aeschin. 2.147; IG II² 1237, 52-64), a 
common burial place (see §28), and they could even be preselected to contend for priestly 
office (see ὡς ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν τούτων προεκρίθην ἐν τοῖς εὐγενεστάτοις κληροῦσθαι τῆς 
ἱερωσύνης τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ at §46). Larger genē, with a more widely scattered membership 
pool, may have had a broader focus beyond the religious sphere and had important 
administrative functions with regard to common land and property (SEG 21.527). 
                                                 
10 See κεκληρονομηκότα καὶ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ γένους at §46. However, Euxitheos does claim that he had 
been introduced to the cult worship of Apollo at §54, which he specifies is sacred to the genos of his father 
at §67, and he vaguely implies that he had been scrutinised by the genos along with his father at §24. 
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However, unlike the phratries’ role in openly acknowledging the legitimate status of the 
daughters and wives of its members, the genē appear to have had no such public 
orientation. 
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Appendix 7: Against Euboulides as a public or private action 
Initially, it would appear to be a matter of common sense that a case concerning 
citizenship and one carrying such a harsh penalty for a failed appellant ought to be 
categorised as a public lawsuit. Yet certain features of Euxitheos’ case conflict with what 
one would expect from a normal public action. As such, the classification of Euxitheos’ 
appeal as either a public action or a private suit has caused considerable scholarly debate. 
In the many previous attempts to categorise this speech, scholars have also discussed the 
fragmentary speech On Behalf of Euphiletos given that both Euphiletos and Euxitheos are 
appealing their respective disfranchisements from their demes.1 Since the precise legal 
procedure involved in each case was not explicitly stated by either speaker, there has been 
much disagreement regarding the classification of these texts and the seemingly stable 
categories of public and private suits. Nonetheless, my contention is that Against 
Euboulides was delivered as a public action and, in order to justify this view, this section 
will review relevant details from both speeches. 
Early scholars on this topic regarded both appeals as private, as Schömann (1831) 
argued in the case of Euphiletos and Blass (1893) in that of Euxitheos.2 This classification 
appears to have been generally accepted for many years. Wyse (1904) was one of the first 
to openly contest this view, and he was closely followed by Bonner (1907) in regarding 
both speeches as public suits.3 Murray (1964) places Against Euboulides in one of the 
later volumes of the Loeb Classical Library series under the label of Demosthenes’ 
‘private speeches’ (Vols. IV-VI).4 MacDowell (2009) follows suit by counting Euxitheos’ 
speech among Demosthenes’ private cases, as does Rubinstein (2000) who lists it 
                                                          
1 For an overview of this case, see Appendix 1, pp. 270-9. 
2 F. G. Schömann, Isaei Orationes XI, pp. 478-81; F. Blass, Die Attische Beredsamkeit, pp. 51 and 487. 
3 Wyse, The Speeches of Isaeus, pp. 716-7; Bonner, ‘The Jurisdiction of Athenian Arbitrators’, pp. 415-6. 
4 Orations Vol. VI, trans. A. T. Murray. The Loeb Classical Library edition of Isaeus’ orations does not 
differentiate between public and private actions: of the surviving twelve speeches, the only division made 
between the first eleven orations and Euphiletos’ appeal is that the former all centre on inheritance disputes 
whereas the latter pertains to the loss of civic rights, in Isaeus, trans. E. S. Forster, pp. ix and 429. 
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alongside Isaeus’ On Behalf of Euphiletos in her categorisation of the forensic speeches.5 
And while Hansen (1976) is a little more cautious with Euphiletos’ case, he contends that 
Euxitheos’ suit must be classified as a public action.6 Such confidence with regard to 
Against Euboulides is echoed by Harris (2013) in his more recent placement of this speech 
under the heading of ‘public speeches’ in the Demosthenic corpus.7  
First and foremost, one must properly define the official categories of public and 
private actions which are used in relation to both Against Euboulides and On Behalf Of 
Euphiletos. An ἔφεσις was a legal action taken when a judgement of an official or a court 
was contested and the dispute was then brought before a higher authority to be resolved.8 
The appeal process, however, was not a uniform system: there were variations in when 
an appeal could be brought and how it was referred to the court.9 The author of the 
Athēnaiōn Politeia describes this court as judge in all matters both private and public.10  
The Athenians classified legal cases in various ways. In very general terms, a 
private suit (more commonly termed as a δίκη) was defined as one which could be legally 
brought by the aggrieved party or his immediate personal representative, while a public 
suit (the most usual type was the γραφή) was deemed to affect the whole community and 
could be brought by any citizen who had not incurred a legal disqualification.11 Both of 
these were legal avenues which could be pursued in cases relating to someone’s civic 
                                                          
5 MacDowell, Demosthenes the Orator, p. 2; Rubinstein, Litigation and Cooperation, pp. 61-2 n. 99. 
6 Hansen, Apagoge, Endeixis and Ephegesis against Kakourgoi, Atimoi and Pheugontes, p. 64 n. 26. 
7 Harris, The Rule of Law in Action in Democratic Athens, pp. 383-4. 
8 According to the Athēnaiōn Politeia, Solon introduced the appeal to the lawcourt in what was deemed to 
be a move to strengthen the power of the people ([Arist.] 9.1). 
9 It is most likely that the appeal process varied according to the nature of the case from which it originated; 
in addition to the appeals following both the ordinary and extraordinary διαψηφίσεις, the sources confirm 
that there was an appeal to the court for those arrested in an ἀπαγωγή (summary arrest) if they maintained 
their innocence ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 52.1), an appeal process for decisions made at the δοκιμασία for holding 
office ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 45.3, 55.2), another against the verdicts made by the arbitrators ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 
53.2; Dem. 40.31, cf. Dem. 21.86 and Dem. 29.59), and for the arbitrators themselves if they were convicted 
of making an unjust ruling ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 53.5). However, in a brief overview of the range of the appeals, 
MacDowell concludes that there were some kinds of case in which a magistrate’s decision was final and 
there was no provision for an appeal, in The Law in Classical Athens, pp. 30-2. 
10 [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 9.2: καὶ πάντα βραβεύειν καὶ τὰ κοινὰ καὶ τὰ ἴδια τὸ δικαστήριον; cf. Plut. Sol. 18.3. 
11 See MacDowell for a broad discussion of the types of cases, in The Law in Classical Athens, pp. 57-9. 
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status, though they differed with regard to initiation, intention and even potential 
outcome. On the one hand, a δίκη (most likely a δίκη βλάβης) was initiated by the person 
who had been denied admission to a deme, phratry or genos, and most likely against those 
whom the candidate felt to be most responsible for his rejection rather than that entire 
social body.12 This was a voluntary process undertaken by a rejected candidate, or his 
relative, as the means through which to secure membership in one of the social groups. 
Athenian law made provision for the dispute to be submitted to public or private 
arbitration but, since the instigator was not obliged to proceed with a δίκη, the rejected 
candidate could opt to abide by the group’s original decision and continue residing in 
Athens as a metic (cf. Lib. Hyp. 27). A γραφὴ ξενίας, on the other hand, was an action 
taken against an individual alleged to be a foreigner usurping citizen rights. While it was 
also initiated on a voluntary basis, albeit with considerable risk for the prosecutor if he 
failed to obtain one fifth of the votes in his favour, it was compulsory for the accused to 
be brought before the court and to submit to a hearing which was presided over by the 
Thesmothetae.13 Ultimately, while the public and private legal proceedings differed in 
nature, elements of both appear to feature in the known appeals of Against Euboulides 
and On Behalf of Euphiletos, which were initiated against the appellants’ respective 
demes after the extraordinary διαψήφισις of 346/5 BC. 
The διαψήφισις process itself is a fundamental factor to consider in the 
classification of the two appeals as this vote, undertaken by the two separate demes, was 
the cause of both. In ordinary and extraordinary circumstances, the διαψήφισις was a 
compulsory procedure for those wishing to obtain and even maintain citizen status.14 It 
seems that any member of the deme was free to bring an accusation against a candidate 
                                                          
12 While Phrastor brought a private case against his genos for rejecting his son by Neaera’s daughter, six 
individuals are specifically singled out as refusing to allow the boy’s introduction to the group in the 
subsequent case Against Neaera ([Dem.] 59.58-61). 
13 For details on the γραφὴ ξενίας, see nn. 69 and 96 in the Introduction. 
14 For a detailed discussion of the process involved, see Introduction, pp. 25-43. 
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during the meeting, before an actual vote was held. Since accusations were made in the 
presence of the assembled demesmen, one would expect that any man who was willing 
to oppose another man’s membership would believe that his claim was substantial enough 
to persuade a majority amongst his fellow members. Indeed, Euxitheos suggests that both 
those subjected to the vote and those wishing to make accusations against them could 
make prior arrangements for witnesses to be present to support their claims (§§11 and 
12). At the end of a διαψήφισις procedure, any candidate who was subsequently rejected 
by the deme could either abide by that decision and live as a metic or he could appeal to 
the lawcourt. These appeals were presided over by the Thesmothetae ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 
59.3), and so are comparable to the public γραφαί. If the candidate chose to pursue the 
matter, his case was brought before a jury and he faced a prosecution that was acting on 
behalf of the deme. Euboulides served as one of the five prosecutors on behalf of his deme 
(see §1; cf. [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 42.1, Aeschin. 1.114). Yet he is described by Euxitheos as 
‘without accountability’ (ἀνυπεύθυνος at §5), a direct contrast to the γραφαί. It thus 
appears that, unlike the prosecutors in ordinary γραφαί who faced penalties for failing to 
obtain one-fifth of the vote, Euboulides bore no personal liability.15 While an appeal 
initiated after an extraordinary διαψήφισις bears some resemblance to a γραφή, it does 
not fully adhere to the criteria that one would expect from a public suit. It becomes clear, 
then, that it is difficult to categorise Against Euboulides and even On Behalf of Euphiletos 
as either public or private based on the διαψήφισις procedure alone. 
In an attempt to overcome the problems of classification, scholars have focused 
their attention on one or two of the features of the appeals and have used other evidence 
to support their analyses. Diller argues that the involvement of the Thesmothetae and the 
possible penalty of slavery in an appeal against expulsion are technically similar to a 
                                                          
15 See n. 124 in the Introduction. 
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γραφὴ ξενίας.16 He finds further parallels between the two from known characteristics of 
the γραφή and comments made by Euxitheos in Against Euboulides: firstly, the 
representatives of the deme spoke first as the accusers and the defendant spoke last (§§1 
and 5) and secondly, new or unseen evidence could be introduced before the jury (see 
ταῦτα γέγραφα αὐτοῖς at §14). Diller thus suggests that one may tentatively assume that, 
in ordinary circumstances, the appeal against expulsion from a deme and the γραφὴ ξενίας 
were handled ‘by the same process’.17 He subsequently uses the account provided in the 
Athēnaiōn Politeia to confirm his view that both the γραφή and the appeal were public in 
nature; he maintains that the author of the Athēnaiōn Politeia specifically associates the 
appeals against expulsion with public cases such as γραφαί, δοκιμασίαι (scrutinies of 
newly enrolled citizens and those chosen for public office, held by either the Boulē or the 
court), and καταγνώσεις (guilty verdicts passed on from the Boulē), and directly opposes 
them to the δίκαι ἴδιαι he refers to thereafter ([Arist.] 59.3-5).  
While Gomme acknowledges the resemblance between a γραφὴ ξενίας and an 
appeal against expulsion in so far as they both came before the Thesmothetae, he 
disagrees with Diller’s conclusions and argues that the author of the Athēnaiōn Politeia 
distinguishes between an appeal and a δίκη no less than he does between an appeal and a 
γραφή.18 He emphasises that the essential difference between an appeal and a γραφή was 
the fact that the latter was undertaken on a voluntary initiative whereas the scrutiny was 
obligatory on the part of the deme, with the deme not bearing any liability in any 
subsequent appeals which arose from it.19 Gomme also stresses that the nature of an 
appeal and that of a γραφή were different; in the appeal, the jury had only to decide 
whether the appellant was of legitimate birth, with no need to determine if either party 
                                                          
16 Diller, ‘The Decree of Demophilus, 346-345 B.C.’, p. 196. The severe penalty of slavery would likely 
indicate that such appeals were public cases; for a discussion of the penalty for a failed appellant in a 
διαψήφισις, see Introduction, pp. 43-9. 
17 Diller, ‘The Decree of Demophilus, 346-345 B.C.’, p. 197. 
18 Gomme, ‘Two Problems of Athenian Citizenship Law’, p. 129. 
19 Gomme, ‘Two Problems of Athenian Citizenship Law’, pp. 129-30. 
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was guilty of deception or dishonesty, but the γραφὴ ξενίας was a specific charge for the 
fraudulent usurpation of citizen rights.20 
Euxitheos’ speech did not arise from an unknown διαψήφισις. It is the only extant 
lawcourt speech which scholars agree originates from the extraordinary διαψήφισις that 
was occasioned throughout all the demes by the decree of Demophilos in 346/5 BC.21 
Libanios not only connected the speech to the law passed in that year and gave the terms 
of the decree under which it was initiated (Hyp. 27), but his placement of the speech 
alongside other public speeches is significant.22 However, Dionysios’ categorisation of 
Euxitheos’ appeal is problematic: he groups the action taken against Euboulides among 
private suits (Dem. 13), though he inconsistently classifies two similar disfranchisement 
cases as public actions (Against the Kerykes and Against Moschion in Din. 11).23 For the 
comparable case of Euphiletos’ speech, however, Dionysios does not specify whether he 
believes it to be a private action similar to Euxitheos’ or whether he would place it with 
the two spurious public speeches of Deinarchos (Isae. 16). Indeed, it would seem that the 
classification of Against Euboulides and also On Behalf of Euphiletos was challenging 
even for ancient authors. 
While it has already been noted that Diller identifies several elements in Against 
Euboulides which resemble a public action, his main contention is that the decree of 
Demophilos was the mechanism which instituted the appeal from the deme to the court 
as a public indictment. In his article, Diller’s main argument is that previous suits arising 
from διαψηφίσεις had been private and he specifically cites a statement made by 
Euxitheos, which he claims is indicative of the appeal being a newly established course 
                                                          
20 Gomme, ‘Two Problems of Athenian Citizenship Law’, pp. 130, 132-6, and 138-9. 
21 For Demophilos’ decree, see Introduction, pp. 25-43. 
22 Libanios probably had access to more evidence for Demosthenes’ speeches than we do today; see 
Introduction, pp. 16-7, especially n. 57. 
23 See n. 99 in the Introduction. 
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of action and therefore a public one (οὐκ ἂν ἐδώκατε τὴν εἰς ὑμᾶς ἔφεσιν, §6).24 Diller 
asserts that this provision was established for both the deme-wide scrutiny of 346/5 BC 
and for all future candidates for deme enrolment, as detailed in the account provided by 
the Athēnaiōn Politeia ([Arist.] 42.1). Yet Gomme subsequently counters that there had 
been similar, if not identical, appeal processes to that portrayed in Against Euboulides 
before Demophilos’ decree; he refers in particular to Euxitheos’ comment regarding those 
restored to his deme after the loss of the register (§60).25 With no further evidence to 
prove either the theory propounded by Diller or that of Gomme,26 it cannot be definitively 
known if an appeal against deme expulsion was always a public matter or if it became so 
with the implementation of Demophilos’ decree. 
One cannot doubt the elements of Euxitheos’ appeal which convinced Diller that 
this case was nevertheless a public suit. Hansen supports Diller’s conclusions by stating 
that the case presented in Against Euboulides must be classified as a public action taken 
by the deme against Euxitheos, and specifically not a private suit brought by Euxitheos 
against the deme, for several reasons.27 Firstly, he refers to Dionysios’ classification of 
Against Moschion as a public action (Din. 11); the similar nature of this case, together 
with Libanios’ categorisation of Euxitheos’ trial as a public suit, have convinced Hansen 
that Dionysios was mistaken in classing the action of Euxitheos as a private action. 
Moreover, Hansen also stresses the fact that the representatives chosen by the deme are 
prosecutors and not defendants (§1; cf. Aeschin. 1.77-8), and that this suit was one of 
several public actions which the Thesmothetae presided over (ἡγεμονία δικαστηρίου; 
[Arist.] Ath. Pol. 59.3-4). For Hansen, such features remove any doubt with regard to the 
                                                          
24 Diller, ‘The Decree of Demophilus, 346-345 B.C.’. For his reference to §6, see p. 205 n. 14. 
25 Gomme, ‘Two Problems of Athenian Citizenship Law’, pp. 128-9, 136. 
26 See Introduction, pp. 42-3. 
27 Hansen, Apagoge, Endeixis and Ephegesis against Kakourgoi, Atimoi and Pheugontes, p. 64 n. 26.  
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public nature of Euxitheos’ appeal. Indeed, when viewed together in this manner, the 
evidence is most persuasive. 
Rubinstein, however, finds the classification of Against Euboulides as a public 
action highly problematic because of the appearance of the water-clock (§21).28 She states 
that Hansen has overlooked the speaker’s request for the water-clock to be stopped, the 
use of which strongly suggests to her that the suit was a private action. This exact 
expression appears in several other orations; two of these speeches are attributed to 
Demosthenes and two to Isaeus, but all of them are definitively private cases: a suit for 
battery (αἰκίας δίκη, Dem. 54.36) and three suits for bearing false witness (δίκαι 
ψευδομαρτυριῶν, Dem. 45.8, Isae. 2.34 and 3.12, 76). The Athēnaiōn Politeia records 
that each speaker in a δίκη was allowed a certain number of χόες, or measures of water 
contained in a pitcher, which was determined by the type of suit and the value of the claim 
being sought ([Arist.] 67.2). A speaker’s call for the water-clock to be stopped thus 
appears to be a feature of private legal actions. This seems to correspond with another 
statement contained within the Athēnaiōn Politeia, in which the author describes how 
public cases are timed by the διαμεμετρημένη ἡμέρα (‘measured day’, ([Arist.] 67.1-3). 
While both parties received an equal amount of water during this process, he specifically 
states that the κλεψύδρα was not stopped in actions conducted in a διαμεμετρημένη ἡμέρα 
(cf. Harp. s.v. διαμεμετρημένη ἡμέρα). It is important to note, however, that the text 
becomes highly fragmentary after the author has stated that the standard of measurement 
used was the length of the days in the month of Poseidon.29 Further details pertaining to 
the measured day are scarce. Xenophon briefly notes that the measured day was divided 
into three parts: one for the prosecution, another for the defence and the final part for the 
judgement (Xen. Hell. 1.7.23). For the possible duration of each of these parts, one must 
                                                          
28 Rubinstein, Litigation and Cooperation, pp. 61-2 n. 99. 
29 The shortest days of the year, falling in the midwinter ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 67.4-5). 
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turn to Aeschines’ description of how eleven amphoras of water were apportioned to the 
defence on one such measured day (Aeschin. 2.126). When read in unison, these three 
sources emphasise the importance of time being allocated on an equal basis. At a later 
stage in his speech, Euxitheos even offers to give some of his allotted time to his 
opponents so that they might attempt to prove that he is lying to the court (see ἐπὶ τοῦ 
ἐμοῦ ὕδατος at §61). Offering part of one’s own measurement of water and to thus change 
the time balance was obviously a ploy to win favour with the jury. While this statement 
of Euxitheos’ is certainly compatible with the account of the proceedings provided by the 
Athēnaiōn Politeia with regard to public suits, his earlier request to halt the flow of the 
water from the κλεψύδρα definitely is not. 
If Euxitheos’ case was heard in accordance with the measured day, then the water-
clock should not have been stopped for witness testimonies. But, there is nothing 
definitive in the Athēnaiōn Politeia passage to state that all public suits were measured 
without stopping the κλεψύδρα and Rubinstein must thus concede that the passage from 
Against Euboulides (§21) could be the only surviving piece of evidence to suggest that 
the water-clock could indeed be stopped during a public suit.30  
Boegehold theorises that there may have been other periods of time for which the 
κλεψύδρα was not running during a measured day, as he explains the discrepancy in his 
analysis of a χοῦς estimated to measure four minutes and a χοῦς which actually emptied 
in three minutes.31 Since very little information has survived in regard to the measured 
day, there may well have been occasions during this process which required that the flow 
of water be halted: Euxitheos may have been referring to one such occurrence after his 
witnesses had given their testimonies. Further questions have been raised in relation to 
the use of the water-clock in private suits from the evidence provided in a speech 
                                                          
30 See also Rhodes, A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia, pp. 722, 726-7. 
31 Boegehold, The Lawcourts at Athens, pp. 77-8. 
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attributed to Lysias. A similar phrase to that used by Euxitheos occurs frequently in that 
speech, when the speaker introduces his witnesses to the court in a παραγραφή or counter-
indictment (καί μοι ἐπίλαβε τὸ ὕδωρ, Lys. 23.4, 8, 11, 14 and 15). But since such a 
formula is unique within the corpus of Lysias, scholars have found its repetition odd and 
have debated the reason behind it. Usher describes the request to stop the water as an ‘un-
Lysianic mannerism’ which raises doubts as to the authorship of the speech; he also states 
that the instances of its occurrence in Demosthenes and Isaeus do not seem to be 
explicable on the grounds of time shortage, and serve only to confirm the impression that 
its inclusion was fairly haphazard.32 Usher raises an interesting point, when he suggests 
the thought that the phrase might have been added to Euxitheos’ speech after it was 
delivered in court. Orations were certainly edited and sometimes amended before they 
were published.33 The appearance of the water-clock formula at §21 may subsequently 
have been added to the text to create an impression that the speaker had no time to waste. 
Ultimately, one cannot view the reference to the water-clock as definitive proof that 
Euxitheos’ appeal was a private case. 
The fragmentary nature of Isaeus’ speech for Euphiletos poses further questions 
rather than shedding much light on the issue of whether or not the appeals arising from a 
διαψήφισις were public or private cases. That there are no references to time 
measurements in this speech is hardly surprising since only a quotation of it is preserved 
by Dionysios’ text (Isae. 17) so that the precise circumstances pertaining to the case are 
not known.34 Diller perceives a possible connection between Euphiletos’ speech and 
earlier legal actions mentioned by Euxitheos during the course of his own defence, cases 
which the speaker claims arose from extraordinary circumstances in the deme of 
Halimous. According to the speaker, the loss of the lexiarchic register in Halimous 
                                                          
32 S. Usher, ‘The Speech Against Pancleon’, pp. 10-11 n. 15. 
33 For the practice of revising speeches before publication, see n. 36 in the Introduction. 
34 See Appendix 1, pp. 270-9. 
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occasioned a single extraordinary διαψήφισις and most of those ejected after it were 
subsequently re-instated by the lawcourt (§§26 and 60; cf. IG II² 1237 for a single scrutiny 
in a phratry). Diller assumes that these were private suits rather than appeals; he contends 
that appeals were made from previous official acts, while the genē and the phratries could 
not introduce such acts since they were not official bodies.35 He cites the example of 
Phrastor’s private suit against his genos for not enrolling his son ([Dem.] 59.59-61). 
However, Diller’s own differentiation between the genē and the official body of the 
demes casts doubt over whether there were indeed any legal similarities between cases 
arising from the former social group and the cases in Halimous and Euphiletos’ suit; since 
deme membership was the means through which to access citizen rights and privileges, it 
seems more plausible that those who were expelled during a διαψήφισις would follow the 
procedure initiated by rejected candidates at deme enrolment and pursue an appeal 
([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 42.1; Euxitheos’ appeal clearly resembled the process for the deme’s 
annual scrutinies as described here). Nevertheless, the lack of any significant 
corroborative evidence makes it difficult to ascertain whether or not they were public or 
private cases. Euxitheos does not explicitly state what type of suit the ejected men brought 
after the previous διαψήφισις in Halimous. While his report confirms the involvement of 
the court during extraordinary circumstances, such as the loss or destruction of a deme’s 
register, it reveals nothing about the particular type of process undertaken for these cases. 
As such, I cannot find any merit to Diller’s argument. 
In sum, the classification of Demosthenes’ Against Euboulides is undoubtedly a 
complex issue. Even with the little evidence provided by Isaeus’ On Behalf of Euphiletos, 
neither Euphiletos’ brother nor Euxitheos explicitly describe the legal procedure involved 
in each of their cases and, as such, it has become necessary to focus on specific details 
contained within their speeches in an attempt to determine whether their appeals were 
                                                          
35 Diller, ‘Scrutiny and Appeal in Athenian Citizenship’, p. 307. 
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public or private suits. Having reviewed these features, it seems most plausible that both 
orations derive from public actions. While the fact still remains that elements of these 
appeals differ from what is typically expected in γραφαί, the irregular circumstances 
which necessitated the extraordinary διαψήφισις in Halimous and in Erchia may have also 
required their own form of public suit. However, as Euxitheos’ case is the only extant 
speech depicting an appeal against disfranchisement, it cannot be definitively known 
whether all such appeals adhered to a similar process. 
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